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Volume XVI Winter 1973 Number 4

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VOLUME XVI WINTER 1973 NUMBER 4

Reflections on the Quarter 841

West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr ..... *Walter F. Hahn* 859

Strategies for an Environmental Decade ..... *Robert Leider* 881

The Philippine Maoists ..... *Justus M. van der Kroef* 892

Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military ..... *Charles D. Corbett* 927

Pakistan's Security Problem: A Bill of Constraints ..... *Anwar H. Syed* 952

Bab el Mandeb, Strategic Troublespot ..... *J. Bowyer Bell* 975

The U.S. Military: Patterns of Adaptation for the 1970's ..... *Terry J. Busch and Ronald J. Stupak* 990

Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age ..... *Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Cornelius J. Gearin* 1008

Prolegomena on the Post-Behavioral Revolution in International Studies ..... *Ronald J. Yalem* 1032

Is There a Paradigm in the House? ..... *John J. Weltman* 1043

Reviews:

Arms and the World: The View from Sweden ..... *James E. Dougherty* 1057

The Communist Powers and Africa ..... *W. Scott Thompson* 1066

Modern German History: Two Interpretations ..... *John Stanley Wozniak* 1070

The Limits to Prediction ..... *Barry M. Mitnick* 1073

Books Received 1080

Contributors to this Issue 1094

Index to Volume XVI 1101

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Reflections on the Quarter

U.S.-European Relations in an Era of Negotiations

WHILE attention has been focused on the Viet Nam cease-fire, significant developments have occurred in Europe. Preparatory discussions have begun both for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). The CSCE and MBFR concepts have different origins. The former is essentially a Soviet initiative, while the latter stems from a Western—specifically an American—desire to maintain military security in Europe at lower cost and manpower levels.

Soviet interest in a CSCE dates from the mid-1950's when Moscow proposed such a conference as a means of forestalling West German membership in NATO. Subsequently, in early 1965, the Warsaw Pact called for a security conference in an apparent effort to prevent the formation within NATO of a multilateral nuclear force. Similarly in 1966, Moscow expressed support for an all-European conference as a means of reducing the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, the Soviets have sought to limit the influence of the European Economic Community by substituting a more nebulous form of pan-European cooperation.

Desire for international acceptance of the status quo in East-Central Europe has been another Soviet consideration. Although Moscow's diplomacy has already enjoyed considerable success along this line, especially in achieving an enhanced status for the German Democratic Republic, the CSCE could put the finishing touches on a well-orchestrated diplomatic offensive designed to gain Western acceptance of continued Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Through the CSCE the Soviet Union could also seek, by promoting an atmosphere of détente in Europe, to engender a greater willingness on the part of the West to increase trade, especially in products of advanced technology.

Finally, there is some apprehension for the Soviets in the prospect that West European states might move toward greater collaboration in defense if it appeared that the U.S. security guarantee was being withdrawn. Moscow may see the CSCE as an opportunity to propose agreements that would deepen the atmosphere of détente and diminish public support in Europe for any major increase in defense spending. In all likelihood, current Soviet interest in a CSCE is a result of a complex intertwining of these various motivations.

The Western powers have exhibited an ambivalent attitude toward the idea of a conference. On the one hand, the reduction of tensions between East and West in Europe appears to be a desirable

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prospect. On balance the *Ostpolitik* treaties, the Berlin Agreement and the SALT I accords have met with approval and support both in Western Europe and the United States. The CSCE represents a step toward further negotiations. Yet the possibility remains that the Soviet Union will seek to use the CSCE to deepen divisions within the Western alliance, since the problems of reaching agreement among the Western powers in advance of, or even during the course of, negotiations with the Soviets will be formidable. Thus, while the Western allies have acquiesced in Soviet desires for a CSCE, they have done so with no great enthusiasm and with little expectation that the conference will produce major changes in East-West relations.

Several procedural and substantive issues have marked the preparatory talks. Determining when the conference should be held and how long it should last is the first step. Originally, many in the West believed that the Soviet Union, for propaganda purposes, would seek a prolonged conference. However, it has now become apparent that Moscow favors a short conference, beginning early in the summer of 1973 and lasting not more than three months. One explanation advanced for this is that Moscow has already achieved its basic objective, West German acceptance of the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe, and sees no purpose in prolonging a CSCE beyond the point of obtaining from the other Western states a similar acknowledgment of the status quo. From the USSR's standpoint, an extended CSCE might serve to destabilize its control in Eastern Europe more than to preserve it.

The second procedural issue concerns the choice of format. The Soviets would like the conference to be initiated by a meeting of foreign ministers, after which substantive discussions would take place in various working groups, and, finally, the acceptable results of these groups would be ratified at a high-level meeting of either the foreign ministers or the heads of government of the states involved. This three-stage approach is essentially a "high exposure" one and would accord with a Soviet strategy designed to maximize the propaganda value of a CSCE. The West, on the other hand, has insisted that a "low profile" be maintained throughout the conference in order to keep it from becoming a propaganda forum.

Substantively, there are four main themes presently under discussion. First, the Soviet Union desires a "statement of principles governing relations between participating states." Such a "statement" would probably be little more than a restatement of the basic principles found in the UN Charter.

The second theme deals with the problem of security. Evidently none of the major powers involved in the preparatory talks contemplates that the conference itself will settle any important security issues. Rather, security discussions are likely to be limited to attempts to find areas of agreement on such "confidence building" activities as

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exchanges of observers at military exercises and/or prior notification of such exercises. The Soviet press has already denounced such proposals as an effort to obstruct the work of the conference.

Insuring a broader exchange of peoples and ideas between Eastern and Western Europe forms the third area of concern. This has caused great consternation among the East European and Soviet governments, since they fear the implications of the freer exchange of ideas, people and information for communist control. The West, on the other hand, has insisted that the détente, to be valid, must include the lowering, if not the removal, of barriers to free movement.

Finally, the Soviet Union has called for the setting up of some form of "permanent machinery" to coordinate greater interaction between East and West. In the West the fear has been voiced that such machinery would be used by Moscow as an ongoing propaganda forum to create an appearance of détente without any real substance.

Most likely East-West disagreement over the first two themes will be minimal. The "bargaining" will probably develop over the third and fourth themes, with the West pushing the "free exchange" idea while the Soviet Union and its allies seek an agreement to set up "permanent machinery."

The major principle in the Western approach to the conference and to other East-West negotiations is that any agreement must be accompanied by substantive actions designed to increase military stability in Europe. One of the key initiatives of the United States has therefore been to link developments in the CSCE to progress in the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

The MBFR concept has been viewed in the United States as a means of lowering the U.S. commitment of conventional forces and preserving a deterrent relationship in European security. Conceivably, MBFR negotiations and any eventual agreements may reduce Congressional pressures for unilateral U.S. troop reductions in Europe and provide time for the United States and its European allies to modify existing strategic doctrine and achieve agreement on the respective levels of U.S. and European efforts.

Not unexpectedly, there is little enthusiasm in Western Europe for MBFR. The French have declared their strong opposition to such negotiations and have refused to be a party to them. Great Britain has participated in preparatory discussions on a "damage limitation" basis, seeking to minimize the potentially destabilizing effects of MBFR on existing NATO security arrangements. The German Federal Republic, while perhaps the most receptive of the major West European states because of hoped-for savings if indigenous as well as stationed troops are included in any MBFR agreement, appears also to have had second thoughts. Bonn has sought to preserve, in as strong a form as possible, the U.S. security guarantee, and many German observers believe any draw-down of Ameri-

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can forces in Germany, even if matched by a similar draw-down in Warsaw Pact forces, will mark a significant reduction in the credibility of the guarantee.

Nor has the Soviet Union evidenced great enthusiasm for MBFR. Soviet agreement to participate in the talks was extracted by the United States as the necessary *quid pro quo* for U.S. acceptance of the CSCE. If the preparatory talks are indicative, it appears that Moscow intends to slow their pace as much as possible. Already the Soviets have sought to complicate the complex situation by insisting that Bulgaria and Rumania, states not originally invited to participate, be included in the discussions.

Still, working out differences with regard to who is to participate and to what extent, is likely to be easier than planning the substantive aspects of MBFR. The problem of equivalency of East-West forces—in terms of manpower as well as military fighting power—has perplexed military planners both in Europe and the United States for several years. Many who have studied the problem intensely have come to the conclusion that it is almost impossible to arrive at an acceptable technical formula of equivalency between NATO and WTO forces. Asymmetries between East and West in geography, force configuration, military strategies and mobilization capabilities are only a few of the many considerations that would have to be taken into account.

Given the difficulties likely to be encountered in MBFR negotiations, the stated intention of the United States to maintain a linkage between MBFR developments and those of the CSCE may be impossible to realize. Such a linkage might be preserved by insisting that the operation of substantive CSCE agreements be made conditional upon reaching substantive agreements regarding MBFR. At present, however, there is not much to support the linkage approach, since the CSCE will probably be a short conference whereas the complexity of the force reduction issue promises to prolong the MBFR discussions.

The United States must preserve its security guarantee to Europe, while assisting Western Europe, over time, to assume a greater proportion of the burden of its own defense. It is by no means certain that this goal can be reconciled with the conduct of negotiations designed to lower the U.S. and West European contributions to NATO. In short, the problem confronting the United States, implicit in the Nixon Doctrine itself, is the reconciliation of the principle of partnership, as it relates to Western Europe, with the conduct of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Soviet-American Trade

A MAJOR feature of recent American diplomacy has been the effort to identify and extend areas of common interest between the United States and the Soviet Union, ranging from arms control to trade. The increasing number of agreements negotiated with Moscow since 1969 indicates the Nixon

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Administration's commitment to this effort. In 1969 two accords were worked out; in 1971, four; and in 1972, ten. In the last three years, the United States has arranged for joint ventures with the Soviet Union in space, public health, pollution control and other scientific and health research. The trade agreement of 1972 figures in this effort to increase Soviet interest in a more cooperative relationship by holding out the possibility of providing the Soviet economy with many of its conspicuous needs, such as feed grain, computer hardware and long-term credits. But the question that arises is whether Soviet-American trade has implications transcending its strictly commercial aspects.

According to proponents of the trade treaty, the principal U.S. economic and political objectives that might be served include: (1) access to the Soviet market for U.S. exports, and to Soviet raw materials, particularly energy reserves, since we must find additional sources of petroleum and gas; (2) the development within the USSR of "vested interests" that would find both increased trade and improved Soviet-American relations to their benefit; (3) the establishment of negotiating "linkages" between Soviet-American trade and agreements in other fields, such as security; and (4) the strengthening of Soviet internal forces toward "liberalization" and a broadened base of decision-making.

The Soviet Union represents an untapped market in which American and West European businessmen have long been interested. While trade has grown somewhat in the past decade, it amounted to a meager $200 million in 1971. Anticipations regarding the trade agreement are that U.S. exports to the Soviet Union may triple in the next three years, and could exceed $1 billion annually within the next decade. This is a tempting prospect for American exporters faced by increased competition from Japan and Western Europe.

One of the principal Soviet reasons for signing the trade accord, with its stipulations concerning the settlement of the World War II debt, appears to have been Moscow's eagerness to acquire information on American machinery and technology, particularly in the computer field. Labor productivity has been a persistent problem in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet leadership has evidently come to recognize that the key to higher production lies in increased automation. The Program adopted at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 declared that science no longer was part of the social superstructure, but was a direct "productive" force. In 1966 Kosygin went even further, stating that "the course economic competition between the two world systems will take depends in large measure on the level of scientific development and the scale of application of research."

It is doubtful that the trade agreement will enable the United States to acquire extensive scientific knowledge or obtain new insights into Soviet politics and society. While the proposed office-

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hotel-trading complex for visiting American executives in Moscow may be welcome in terms of comfort, it would seem but another instance of the customary isolation of foreigners from the mainstream of Soviet life. Although a government-sponsored trading agency is to be established to build business relationships with companies outside the USSR, the purpose of state-controlled organizations is generally more to restrict than to expand unofficial contacts between Soviet enterprises and groups in other countries.

Trade with the United States holds out additional prospects for the Soviet Union in heavy industry. These include development of fuel resources to spur the lagging fuel industry, strengthening the heavy road transport industry, and obtaining long-term credits for the purchase of Western technologies. The first area, that of fuel, is of vital importance to the development of the Soviet economy as a whole, and in all likelihood heavy industry will receive the lion's share of the technology imported.

A key issue in the expansion of Soviet trade has been the formidable nature of the country's needs and the shortage of currency with which to supply them. This led the government to try to obtain special concessions from the United States in the trade agreement on the issue of credits, and having to settle for credit terms that are described as "usual and customary in the financing of exports" was a setback for the leadership. Moscow will no doubt continue to bargain for more favorable terms in any subsequent negotiations for the expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade.

The most immediate gains from Soviet-American trade are likely to accrue in the agricultural and consumer goods sectors of the Soviet economy. The much sought after "most favored nation" clause, if granted, would lower U.S. tariffs on such Soviet exports as vodka, furs and caviar. These consumer goods are already marketed in the United States and require no further negotiations to improve their sales position. Moreover, it is to be expected that American technology will have an impact on the consumer industry, resulting in reduced costs and higher productivity.

The agricultural sector is in dire need of revitalization. The disastrous crop failure of 1972 forced the government to allocate billions of additional rubles for agricultural investment in 1973 over and above the target set in the Five-Year Plan. But efforts to achieve the long-run goal of agricultural self-sufficiency through capital investment and the import of farm machinery will not solve the pressing food needs of the present. The separate Soviet-American wheat agreement reached in 1972 indicates the scope of the immediate problem. The Soviet Union may have to rely on major imports of farm products for the next decade, making the agricultural sector at least partially dependent on U.S. grain imports for some time to come.

Nevertheless, the possibilities of developing permanent "vested interests" in the expansion of trade

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on the basis of the present negotiations are severely limited. At best, the contemplated expansion of trade will create a temporary dependence by the USSR on specific U.S. exports. The longer-term Soviet interest will lie in strengthening the Soviet capacity for self-sufficiency as a result of the infusion of Western science and technology. Thus, in the agricultural sector, Soviet purchases of U.S. grain will be paralleled by a vigorous effort to acquire American farm machinery. But no Soviet leadership will be prepared to permit Soviet-American contacts resulting from trade to advance to such a point that they could threaten the party's undisputed role as the guardian of ideological purity at home.

Whether there exist potential negotiating "linkages" between trade and security questions remains to be seen. Apparently, the U.S. Administration wanted to make the trade pact contingent on Soviet assistance in achieving a cease-fire in Viet Nam. One of the major reasons for President Nixon's visit to Moscow was to discuss the Viet Nam issue. It may not have been accidental that the North Vietnamese gave out information about a possible cease-fire shortly after the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement was initialed.

Trade, however, is only one factor in the evolving U.S.-Soviet relationship, which must be viewed in the context of Soviet concern over a growing dialogue between Washington and Peking. The main source of Soviet uneasiness appears to be the prospect of a China ten to twenty years hence, industrialized with the assistance of American capital and technology. Perhaps Moscow's wisest policy in this regard is to compete with China in securing Western credits and technology.

Although the trade agreement may have contributed to Soviet willingness to aid the United States in de-escalating the Viet Nam conflict, it seems to have had little or no influence in securing accord in other areas, certainly not with respect to Soviet domestic policy. In recent years, the Soviet Union has adopted an increasingly repressive posture against dissidents. The domestic crackdown culminated in June 1972 with the arrest of the leader of the Moscow Democratic Movement, Pyotr I. Yakir, and persecution of the Soviet Jews desiring to emigrate to Israel. The Jackson Amendment to the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, in fact, made the granting of "most favored nation" treatment to the Soviet Union contingent on Moscow lifting the "diploma" tax on Jews seeking to emigrate. At first, it seemed as though the regime would comply. But in the wake of the U.S. elections, the Soviets published a secret decree issued somewhat earlier, in August 1972, regulating emigration and imposing an "education" tax of up to $20,000 on prospective emigrants. Moreover, the government took action against the Ukrainian dissidents in June 1972, just after President Nixon's visit to the USSR. These events suggest that Soviet leaders may have concluded that a relaxed international climate demands in-

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tensified ideological vigilance at home.

In sum, the U.S.-Soviet trade accords must be seen in connection with other developments in the relations between the superpowers. The longer-term importance of trade will be highly dependent upon whether either country will seek to expand the present limited rapprochement. The bearing of increased trade on other issues of superpower interest is by no means self-evident. Although it may be possible to achieve specific "linkages" between trade and other issues—in the field of security, for example—such potential gains must be carefully formulated and negotiated. Given the formidable obstacles to the utilization of trade as a means of effecting change in the Soviet Union and achieving long-range U.S. goals, the United States should seek immediate political and economic gains from whatever leverage the Soviet need for Western technology confers upon American policy.

The Viet Nam Cease-Fire

IN describing the process by which the final Viet Nam cease-fire agreement was reached, Presidential Adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger noted that "we have gone through peaks and valleys in these negotiations, of extraordinary intensity." With the signing of the accord and related protocols in Paris on January 27, a clearer picture of the path to that point is now discernible.

Early in 1972, Hanoi realized that continued success in the pacification and Vietnamization programs would gain increased legitimacy for the Thieu Government and result in communist troops being confined to the mountains and jungles of South Viet Nam, away from the population. The decision to launch the Easter invasion of the South followed. Many thoughtful observers believe North Viet Nam's principal goal was to launch a final thrust in order to secure maximum military and psychopolitical advantages before engaging in conclusive negotiations with the United States.

But Hanoi failed either to establish major new communist strongholds in the South or to shatter Saigon's morale and Washington's determination. South Viet Nam's forces resisted far more effectively than was expected, and the massive American response in the form of air strikes and the blockade of North Vietnamese ports proved a disastrous surprise to those in Hanoi who had counted on internal opposition to the war in the United States restraining President Nixon's moves in the months before the U.S. election. Because of the failure of the invasion, the losses suffered, and diplomatic pressure from Moscow and Peking, Hanoi entered the negotiation phase of its strategy in a far weaker position than it had foreseen.

As a result, during October 1972 the North Vietnamese pressed for an accord—in Kissinger's words, "almost as maniacally as they fought the war"—in order to wrest maximum concessions from President Nixon in the sensitive pre-election period and before sufficient prep-

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arations for an end to the fighting could be accomplished in South Viet Nam. Significant progress was made and crucial compromises negotiated. Most important, Hanoi dropped the demand that the United States predetermine the political fate of South Viet Nam in the communists' favor.

Although Kissinger made clear that the draft would have to be accepted by all parties, his own faith in it and Hanoi's belief that Kissinger spoke for Presidents Nixon and Thieu apparently convinced the North Vietnamese leadership that final agreement had been reached. Both Nixon and Thieu, however, pointed out that several key provisions of the draft needed to be tightened and clarified, thus delaying Hanoi's timetable and leading to its unilateral October 25 disclosure of the terms of the draft in an effort to engineer Washington into an immediate signing. An unexpected effect of this was to tie Hanoi inextricably into serious negotiations on reasonable terms for the first time. The North Vietnamese agreed to a "final round" of talks, which commenced amid mutual suspicion and pressures for changes on November 20 and lasted until November 26. Three areas of clarification were sought by Washington, concerning linguistic differences as they affected interpretation of the agreement, the international control machinery, and the legal status of the demilitarized zone.

The North Vietnamese regime, anticipating that the talks would collapse because of its differences with Washington and the U.S. disagreement with Saigon over truce terms, began an evacuation of Hanoi on December 3. Convinced of the opposition's obstinacy, angry at the reopening of issues it had thought closed, and seeking more advantageous terms, it proceeded, between December 4 and 13, to retract previous concessions and set forth new demands of its own. For example, the International Control Commission would be composed of only 250 men, entirely dependent on their hosts for logistics, as compared with the independent force of 5,000 men the United States thought necessary to supervise a cease-fire. The release of American prisoners was made contingent on the release of political prisoners held by the South Vietnamese. Also, Hanoi continued to treat the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord as an implied coalition government in the Vietnamese text, while agreeing in the English text that it was not.

President Nixon concluded that Hanoi's changes were designed to exacerbate cleavages between Washington and Saigon, force further concessions, and delay the signing in order to prepare new communist military efforts. On December 14 he called upon the North Vietnamese to resume serious negotiations within seventy-two hours. On December 17 Dr. Kissinger explained the breakdown in the negotiations and declared, "We will not be blackmailed into an agreement. We will not be stampeded into an agreement. And . . . we will not be charmed into an agreement until its conditions

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are right." In the absence of a satisfactory North Vietnamese reply to his initiative of December 14, President Nixon ordered the resumption of full-scale bombing of the North on December 18.

For twelve days American airpower pounded the North. Vast stocks of war supplies that had flowed south from China during the October 23-December 18 bombing halt were destroyed. Flying against what Defense Department officials called the "most heavily defended piece of area in the history of warfare," in raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, B-52's incurred losses at an expected 2 to 3 per cent. The bombing was intended to serve three purposes: to forestall future military preparations by the North Vietnamese, to reassure President Thieu of the American commitment, and to pressure Hanoi into serious negotiations. Judging by subsequent events, these purposes apparently were achieved.

Late in December, North Viet Nam signaled that it was prepared to resume negotiations if the bombing was halted. On December 30, Nixon stopped all air strikes north of the 20th Parallel, and the talks in Paris were resumed on January 8. At first the atmosphere was not conducive to further compromise by either side, but by tackling the less contentious questions first, it became possible to establish a framework for the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations. By January 15, Nixon felt that sufficient progress had been made to cease all bombing, mining and shelling of the North. Saigon still objected to many facets of the accord, but other objections had been overcome or reduced, and Administration spokesmen clearly conveyed that further changes to satisfy South Viet Nam were impossible. Traditional supporters of the American role in Viet Nam, including Senators Stennis and Goldwater, voiced agreement with the Administration. Meetings between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were held on January 23, and the final arrangements for the cease-fire were completed.

The agreement and its four accompanying protocols contain the same general provisions as those reached three months earlier, although many of the crucial details differ significantly. The in-place cease-fire began on January 27, despite last-minute fighting for position, gratuitous shellings, and continued exchanges between the opposing sides after the cease-fire had taken effect. All American and allied military personnel and equipment will be withdrawn within sixty days. Only periodic replacement of armaments previously in place is to be allowed, and no new infusions of troops are permitted. All captured military personnel held in North and South Viet Nam are to be returned.

For the first sixty days, Four-Party Joint Military Commissions are to oversee the cease-fire, to be replaced by Two-Party Joint Military Commissions consisting of representatives of Saigon and the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government; disputes are to be referred to the International Commission of Control and Super-

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vision. The 1,160-man International Commission, made up of equal forces from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland, and independent as to logistics and initiative, is to oversee the cease-fire and related provisions, operating in unanimity although private nonofficial reporting is allowed. A tripartite National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, requiring unanimous decision among its Saigon, PRG and neutralist elements, was to be established immediately to "do their utmost" to sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet Nam within ninety days, to "decide the procedures and modalities" of general elections, and to negotiate reductions and demobilization in armed forces.

An international conference on Viet Nam was to be convened within thirty days of the cease-fire, with attendance by the United Nations Secretary-General and representatives of the Soviet Union, China, France, Britain, the four member-states of the Control Commission, the United States, North and South Viet Nam, and the PRG. All foreign military forces are to be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia and their territory is not to be used for military activities or to "encroach on the sovereignty or security of one another or of other countries." The United States pledges to contribute to the reconstruction of Indochina.

Since October, many problems that existed in the draft agreement have been resolved. The provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accord applicable to the cease-fire have been specified. The release of "political prisoners" held in South Viet Nam is to be negotiated between the South Vietnamese government and the PRG. The Control Commission was to begin its duties immediately after the cease-fire. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord's tasks were stipulated and no allusions to a disguised coalition government were included in the language of the agreement. Despite communist insistence, the PRG is not treated as a government co-equal to Saigon. The 17th Parallel remains the provisional demarcation line between North and South, as specified in the 1954 Geneva Accord. Many other specifics relating to controls, procedures, movements and civil operations are detailed.

Unsolved problems linger in that there are no control provisions for Laos or Cambodia. Although Dr. Kissinger said he expected a cease-fire agreement in Laos and a *de facto* cease-fire in Cambodia soon, many problems remain. Dr. Kissinger reasons that the prohibitions on foreign troops in Laos and Cambodia will be sufficient to promote cease-fires and to reduce the number of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet Nam by attrition since they are not to be reinforced. In the absence of control machinery, and considering past communist behavior, such reasoning is tenuous at best. Additionally, even though it may be justified, the continuation of American bombing in Laos or Cambodia may now contravert the signed accord.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision is much

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smaller in size than the minimum previously thought necessary by the United States. Furthermore, it lacks enforcement powers and several of its members have pointedly eschewed playing a policeman's role. To date, its efforts to supervise the cease-fire have been futile. Aside from the difficulty of arriving at unanimity in its reports, past practices suggest that the reports will be of dubious weight and likely to pay greater attention to the alleged violations of South Viet Nam and the United States, since their activities may be more visible to the Commission than those of the North and the PRG.

The political provisions of the cease-fire accord remain ambiguous, as intended, and they are separate from the military provisions. Conflicts of interpretation seem certain, and chances for agreement are slim against a background of years of internecine battle, mutual jockeying for position, and continued distrust—besides which, neither side seems disposed yet to arrive peacefully at a political solution. In the meantime, the communists gain access to more of the South Vietnamese population, of whom they can now boast the allegiance of only 5 to 10 per cent; they can also increase their legitimacy as a participant in South Viet Nam's political life and exploit opportunities to exacerbate internal dissension. Moreover, a major problem for Saigon will be the natural desire of millions of "urban refugees" to return to their rural lands, large parts of which are contested or under communist control. Such a mass repatriation may well serve to increase the communist population base, while control of some rural areas may also be used as leverage against the cities' need for food supplies. At present, the communists control perhaps 20 per cent of the nation's hamlets and most of the hinterland of mountains and jungles. Their strength is particularly evident in portions of the northernmost eight provinces, and in scattered portions of the Delta surrounding and south of Saigon.

Finally, the international conference held in late February only legitimized the accords on Viet Nam. No further activity is expected. The United States failed to involve China and the Soviet Union in major responsibility for maintaining the peace, losing an opportunity to enlarge or solidify the fragile base of peace in Indochina.

In sum, the agreement is far more specific and contains more safeguards than the October draft, and is certainly preferable to any agreement possible at any time in the past decade. Yet it remains vague in many crucial respects. No one expects the path ahead to be smooth, but how rocky it becomes is highly dependent on the good will of all parties, a spirit of compromise, and energetic scrutiny of the terms' implementation. Under present circumstances, hopes are not high.

President Thieu does not expect the agreement to hold for long. In anticipation of intense political struggle in the months ahead, he has organized his Democracy Party, set limits upon the factionalism

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normally rife in South Vietnamese politics, and braced local structures with political cadres. If there are continuous violations of the accords, marked by escalation of small-unit clashes and the assertion of communist aims for dominance, the result could be a major North-South confrontation.

Likewise, Hanoi does not expect the current agreements to last long or to be binding. A December article in *Hoc Tap,* North Viet Nam's Communist Party theoretical journal, stated: "There is a time for us to advance but there also is a time for us to step backward temporarily in order to advance more steadily later. We cannot exterminate imperialism at one time and in a single battle. We drive it back step by step and destroy it part by part." In the period ahead, Hanoi and the Viet Cong will endeavor to consolidate their control in areas they now hold and secretly rebuild their clandestine political strength. NVA units are "South Vietnamizing" by breaking up into small units and adopting a guerrilla warfare strategy. In these circumstances, Thieu is clearly justified in maintaining vigilance. As he said in a recent interview: ". . . for me, for us, it isn't a question of choosing between Moscow and Peking. It's a question of choosing between life and death."

At present, no judgment can be made as to who, if anyone, won the war. The war is not yet over; American ground forces are permanently removed as a factor, but the Vietnamese now enter a deadly political struggle. Analogies to earlier settlements and situations can be discarded. South Viet Nam today is far more capable of fending for itself and the North Vietnamese capability is far more strained.

A judgment can be made, however, as to who won the present peace. President Nixon, by judicious and bold use of carrot and stick and the skilled interplay of local and international forces, has accomplished a settlement on terms most people thought impossible. The withdrawal of 500,000 American troops dampened domestic dissent in the United States, while Vietnamization improved the combat role of the South Vietnamese. Allied incursions into Cambodia and Laos, and the massive U.S. response to North Viet Nam's Easter invasion and settlement-delay, checked Hanoi, disrupted its logistics, and established the no-nonsense unpredictability of the American President. The desire for an accommodation with the United States placed Moscow and Peking in the position of pressuring Hanoi to make peace so that great-power relations would not be unsettled. The promise of up to $7.5 billion in reconstruction aid for Indochina is a humanitarian gesture with firm precedent and an incentive for cooperation. Substantial American airpower remains in Thailand and in the Pacific area against severe violations.

Economics will be crucial to the outcome of events. During the past few years of subdued conflict, prosperity reached many parts of the South Vietnamese countryside, increasing stability and the legitimacy of the central government.

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At present, owing to American withdrawals and the North's invasion, South Viet Nam is in a recession, but inflation is under control and exports are rising. Saigon has totally reformed and streamlined the foreign investment laws, and many projects are planned. Japan especially, already South Viet Nam's predominant trading partner, stands by with hundreds of millions of dollars in aid. Offshore oil exploitation eventually promises over $500 million a year in revenues. An extensive economic infrastructure has been created by the war and large pools of trained labor are available. Economic growth and stabilization would contribute significantly to the maintenance of peace. However, most investment awaits surer prospects of stable conditions.

Two distinct lessons emerge from the American experience in Viet Nam. First, domestic support is crucial to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, particularly when a long and sustained effort is required. In shaping domestic opinion on foreign policy, the communications media, and especially television, play a crucial role. In this respect, the "open societies" of the West differ fundamentally from their adversaries. Clearly North Viet Nam, in launching its massive invasion of the South in 1972, believed that internal U.S. divisions would act as a major restraint upon American ability to respond forcefully.

Second, the President of the United States represents not only his immediate electoral constituency, but those of the past and future, as well as the fate of many other peoples around the globe. Accordingly, his deliberations must look beyond immediate effects and reactions to decisions and take account of the future role of the United States as a prime actor in the international system. Such factors were clearly central to President Nixon's bold decision to take the initiative away from Hanoi in 1972, to respond massively to North Viet Nam's Easter invasion, and to conclude a "peace with honor."

America and Algeria: A New Pragmatism

ALGERIA is often labeled a radical state, a state that exports revolution and provides a haven for insurgents; a socialist state that nationalizes foreign industry and welcomes aid from the Soviet Union. Such labels appear seriously dated. Under President Houari Boumedienne, Algeria has emerged as a pragmatic state, seeking trade relations with countries of diverse political ideology while preserving its own autonomy.

The United States has responded favorably to this change in approach, despite persistent differences over Viet Nam and Israel. The U.S. government recognizes that Algeria prizes its political freedom and that the Soviet Union has not gained special military rights in Algeria despite its aid. Above all, the United States and Algeria have a growing common interest in the sale and distribution of oil and natural gas, Algeria's principal resources. Recent long-term agreements between the Al-

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gerian state petroleum company, Sonatrach, and American companies indicate the seriousness and extent of the rapprochement.

Algeria won independence in 1962 after a bitter and protracted struggle against France that appeared to pit the insurgents not only against their colonial overlords but against France's allies in NATO and Israel. Diplomatic and material support offered to the insurgents by the Soviet Union, as well as by Arab and Asian states, confirmed Algerian sympathies with anti-Western states, although the Algerians continued their close ties with France.

Despite this hostility to France's allies, Algerian leaders had warm feelings toward President Kennedy, who spoke up in support of Algerian independence in 1957. As President, he sent a sympathetic official—William Porter—to be Consul General in Algiers, and later Ambassador. But the anti-Western rhetoric of the new Algerian President, Ahmad Ben Bella, rapidly strained relations with the United States. Ben Bella's visit to Cuba shortly before the missile crisis, his contention that Washington was assisting Morocco in the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute of 1963, and his willingness to purchase arms from Moscow antagonized American officials, who perceived Algeria's actions in terms of the Cold War rather than as a new nation's attempt to assert its independence and authority.

Relations became particularly tangled over American aid programs. Over a six-year period, the United States provided wheat valued at over $175 million to Algeria. But each year's appropriations had to be confirmed by Congress and risked being jeopardized by domestic political considerations. Moreover, the 1962 Hickenlooper Amendment required that aid be suspended to any country that did not compensate American citizens for expropriated or nationalized property. Algeria had nationalized some American holdings in 1962 and the negotiations over compensation became protracted and increasingly antagonistic.

Although the coup d'état by Colonel Boumedienne in June 1965 resulted in a turn toward internal economic development and a cooling in relations with the Soviet Union, the aid conflict persisted, reaching its climax on the eve of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Anti-American feeling, fed by the U.S. role in Viet Nam, had also increased since 1965. Algerians' suspicions of American economic and military pressure rendered credible to them Egyptian claims that U.S. planes aided the Israelis when they launched their attack against Egypt on June 5, 1967. The government joined other Arab states in severing diplomatic relations with the United States while maintaining consular relations.

The late 1960's witnessed the nadir in America's political relations with Algeria. The Algerian government bitterly opposed U.S. policy in Viet Nam and the Middle East. It offered material aid to the Palestinian resistance movement and provided a haven in 1968 to Eldridge Cleaver, a leader of the Black Panthers. It criticized the

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presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and called for the denuclearization of the Mediterranean and the exclusion from it of any but Mediterranean fleets.

Paradoxically, the 1967 war also forced the Algerian leaders to undertake a reassessment of the country's foreign policy that opened the way for the re-establishment of relations with the United States on a new, apolitical basis.

Algeria became disillusioned with Egypt and Syria for failing to continue the 1967 war as a guerrilla war of liberation, despite the formidable risks and suffering such an effort would involve. But within the government there arose a bitter debate as to the best strategy the country might follow in its relations with the Middle East. The debate was won by technocrats who advocated that primary concern should be placed on domestic economic problems and that political differences should not dominate economic requirements in Algeria's foreign policymaking.

The technocrats' control was strengthened when Boumedienne survived an attempted coup d'état in December 1967 by the Army Chief of Staff. Algeria then embarked on a vigorous development program that stressed the strengthening of oil and natural gas production and related industries, and the diversification of foreign markets. Negotiations with the Common Market over special trade and tariff arrangements, which had run into difficulties earlier, were stepped up and trade with both the United States and the Soviet Union increased markedly. In an interview in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, the Algerian Ambassador to Beirut, Muhammad Yazid, categorized the Algerian attitude: "What we must exclude is economic control . . . of our daily lives and values by foreign countries. We approve of any Arab country which controls its economy, which deals with other countries, whoever they may be, on the basis of commercial and technical exchanges and which ensures that others respect our sovereignty and culture and do not attempt to depersonalize or de-Arabize us. . . . I think we can have a relationship of sound economic and technical co-operation with no strings attached, on the basis of mutual respect and independence."

In line with this nationalist approach, Algeria nationalized nine American oil and natural gas companies in 1967. However, the pragmatic nature of the nationalizations was emphasized by both the government and the companies during the negotiations on compensation. The two sides actively explored the possibility of continuing commercial relations on the basis of Algerian ownership of the petroleum resources. The breakthrough came in October 1968 when Getty Petroleum Company signed an agreement with Sonatrach granting the latter 51 per cent ownership in the operation. Getty would provide capital necessary for further exploration and production and would receive a specified percentage of realized profits. A second agreement, with El Paso Natural Gas Company in 1969, provided for fifteen billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas to enter the

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United States each year over a twenty-five-year period. El Paso would build a fleet of tankers and would transport the gas to the east coast of the United States. Sonatrach would handle all the operations within Algeria, including construction of a new liquefaction plant.

Although American companies took the lead in these efforts, the U.S. government responded readily to their initiatives and quietly assisted the arrangements. It granted export licenses which enabled U.S. trade with Algeria to increase rapidly; as a trading partner of Algeria, the United States is now exceeded only by France and West Germany. Secretary of State William Rogers met with the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, at the United Nations in the fall of 1969 and the United States strengthened its diplomatic representation (through the Swiss embassy) in Algiers. Moreover, the head of the Washington-based Export-Import Bank visited Algeria in February 1971 and later offered to finance Algeria's costs in the El Paso project, provided that its credit be used to buy American equipment. The remaining nationalization cases were also resolved that spring.

Official U.S. interest in economic relations with Algeria stems directly from the importance of Algeria's natural gas reserves, which are third only to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, and from America's approaching energy crisis. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 19, 1972, Ambassador David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, estimated that by 1975 15 per cent of the natural gas used east of the Mississippi will come from Algeria and that, a decade later, the United States might purchase half of Algeria's natural gas. With such important ramifications to be considered, Washington is anxious that American companies and technological equipment be involved in its production and transport, rather than European, Japanese or Soviet firms. Thus American experts now work on contract to Sonatrach on feasibility studies for gas pipelines and exploration for oil in the desert. The trade agreements also provide the opportunity to improve diplomatic relations indirectly, by avoiding divisive political issues and concentrating on mutually beneficial economic areas.

Delays in the Federal Power Commission's approval of the El Paso-Sonatrach agreement reduced the diplomatic value of the deal, although approval was finally granted in October 1972. As Ambassador Newsom testified: "At one point . . . we had understood that had this moved rapidly to a conclusion . . . it might have provided the basis for resumption of relations. The time that it has taken, I think, has changed the picture. The Algerians have not been precise with us in what might, in their minds, justify a resumption of relations. Certainly if this goes through it will be helpful in this effort but I don't know that it will automatically bring it about."

Basic political conflicts would

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appear to stand in the way of an explicit resumption of diplomatic relations, but the lack of such relations has clearly not hampered economic rapprochement. Algeria continues to support the Palestinian resistance movement, but the tone of its support has altered as the movement has fallen into disarray. Thus Ambassador Yazid emphasizes that "It is the historical responsibility of the Palestinian people to liberate their country. If they don't do it no one will do it for them." In an interview with C. L. Sulzberger of the *New York Times* in July 1972, Boumedienne indicated that if the United States treats the Soviet departure from Egypt as an opportunity to renew its diplomatic efforts and if it urges Israel to return to its June 1967 frontiers, a fundamental change will have occurred in the area.

On certain politically volatile issues, the United States and Algeria have taken directly opposing stands. Algeria has granted Black Panthers the right of asylum, despite U.S. objections. However, it was visibly embarrassed by the July 1972 hijackings to Algiers and returned the million dollar ransom to the United States, thus incurring sharp criticism from the Panthers themselves.

More importantly, Algeria has opposed the American attitude toward international terrorism in general. In the wake of Munich, Algeria sponsored the resolution which passed the UN General Assembly's Legal Committee in November 1972. The resolution emphasized that the underlying causes of terrorism should be studied, in contrast to the American effort to get the UN to pass strict measures aimed at the terrorist act itself.

In the past such contradictory stands could have disrupted American-Algerian efforts to mend relations, but in 1972 the parties did not allow this to happen. Both the United States and Algeria have reduced their political expectations of each other. The United States has become more responsive to the sensitivity of Algerians concerning their autonomy and the Algerians have accepted a businesslike relationship with the United States. The economic contacts can be expected to expand in the future. No dramatic political results should be expected, but the developing relationship provides an encouraging example of the rapprochement that is possible between two estranged countries when they concentrate on common economic interests and are not involved in frequent political crises.

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WEST GERMANY'S OSTPOLITIK: THE GRAND DESIGN OF EGON BAHR

by Walter F. Hahn

EGON Bahr is Special Minister (*Sonderminister*) in the second government of Chancellor Willy Brandt in the Federal Republic of Germany. The post continues a close association between Bahr and Brandt that dates back to at least 1960. Bahr served Brandt as head of press relations when the latter was Governing Mayor of Berlin, as chief of the planning staff of the West German Foreign Ministry (with the personal rank of Ambassador) under Foreign Minister Brandt in the Grand Coalition government of Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (1966-1969), and as State Secretary in the Chancellor's Office in the first Brandt Government.

Bahr is widely acclaimed (or attacked) as the "chief architect" of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. "One can without exaggeration characterize him as the real strategist of *Ostpolitik*," wrote Dettmar Cramer in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as early as August 1970, "no matter how readily Bahr has always stepped into the background and no matter how much he avoids any personal exaltation."[1] The conservative newspaper *Die Welt* has described him, with clear innuendo, as "the left hand of Brandt" in foreign policy.[2]

On the sinuous road of negotiations stretching from the treaty that established West German diplomatic relations with Rumania in 1967 to the signing of the Basic Treaty (*Grundvertrag*) between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in December 1972, Bahr has been seemingly ubiquitous. He could claim little credit for the treaty with Rumania (which had been in large measure negotiated by Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder in the Erhard Government), but he accompanied Foreign Minister Brandt on his triumphal journey to Bucharest in 1967. He headed the team of West German negotiators who strove for a similar agreement with Czechoslovakia before the events of August 1968 intervened. In January 1970 he traveled to Moscow to enter into the series of

[1] "Egon und die Ostpolitik," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 25, 1970.
[2] "Einflussreich und pressescheu," *Die Welt* (Hamburg), December 19, 1972.

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negotiations that produced the Bonn-Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970. He accompanied Brandt during a surprise visit with Brezhnev in the Crimea in September 1971. He hammered out with his East German counterpart, State Secretary Michael Kohl, the Berlin Transit Agreement with the German Democratic Republic which became part of the Four-Power Berlin Accord of 1972, as well as the subsequent Traffic Agreement between the FRG and GDR in May 1972. And in December 1972 Bahr and Kohl climaxed intensive negotiations with the signing of the *Grundvertrag*, which established the ground-rules of relations between the FRG and the GDR on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty and common membership in the United Nations.

Bahr's title, "architect of *Ostpolitik*," bespeaks more than the roles of negotiator and executor of policies mandated by the Chancellor. His subservience to Brandt notwithstanding, he is clearly the "man of ideas" who has shaped West German foreign policy as much as he has carried it out. The influence is implied by the nature of his close relationship with Brandt: "Like no one else Bahr has found an almost intuitive contact with Brandt through the precision of his thinking. . . ."[3] It is reflected even more clearly by his rising stature and power within the West German policy apparatus since 1969.

The precise extent of that power and influence, and particularly the relationship and division of prerogatives between Bahr and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, are not measurable by any yardstick. The description of Bahr as Brandt's "mini-Kissinger"[4] (and by implication of Scheel as a "mini-Rogers") may be exaggerated, as might be past rumors of serious friction between Bahr and Scheel.[5] Walter Scheel is, after all, more than simply Foreign Minister in the Brandt Government: he is also the head of the Free Democratic Party, continued coalition with which remains essential to the survival of the Brandt Government, at least until the next national elections in 1976. Yet, as far as relative influence upon Brandt in broad foreign policy *conception* is concerned, the Brandt-Bahr relationship seems to leave little doubt as to the dominant figure.

[3]Ulrich Blank, "Die graue Maus und der Dressman," *Die Weltwoche* (Zurich), November 15, 1972.

[4]*Die Welt*, December 19, 1972, *op. cit.*

[5]For example, it was reported that Chancellor Brandt's trip to the Soviet Union in September 1971 for consultations with Chairman Brezhnev was arranged by Bahr and that Scheel was furious at not even having been informed of the arrangements. See "Auswärtiges Amt über Egon Bahr verärgert," *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), September 19, 1971.

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There is stronger evidence of the power of Bahr's influence. Ever since his controversial speech in Tutzing in July 1963, in which he first outlined a strategy of "change through rapprochement" with the German Democratic Republic, Bahr has evolved a consistent and integrated rationale for *Ostpolitik* — assumptions, objectives, strategy and tactics. It will be brought out below that *Ostpolitik* thus far has been startlingly consistent not only with the rationale but also with the strategy projected by him as early as 1969.

Background of Egon Bahr

Who is this small-statured, reserved man who seems to fit the stereotype of the *eminence grise*? It is a favorite generalization in West Germany that practically every German has "a past" — in the mysterious connotations of that term. In Bahr's case, the past is both interesting and revealing.

Egon Bahr was born in 1922 in Treffurt in the *Land* of Thuringia, the son of a schoolteacher. The town of his birth lies today not far beyond the GDR border. Thuringia (incidentally also the native region of Michael Kohl, Bahr's negotiations partner in the GDR) tends to be associated romantically in Germany as the "heartland" of German protestantism and nationalism.[6] Bahr attended high school (*Gymnasium*) in Berlin, but after graduation in 1940 was unable to enroll in a university because National Socialist officials discovered that his maternal grandmother was Jewish.[7] In 1941, he was drafted into the Luftwaffe. When the mass bombing raids over Germany began, he volunteered for fighter-pilot training and was sent to the air academy in Kissingen. Just before graduation, his lineage "defect" was once again "discovered" and Bahr was given a dishonorable discharge for "endeavoring to insinuate himself into the officers' corps."[8] He returned to Berlin, this time as a conscripted munitions worker in an industrial plant that was producing Tiger tanks.

After the collapse in 1945, Bahr turned to journalism. He worked briefly as local reporter for the Soviet-licensed *Berliner Zeitung*, and subsequently for the American-sponsored organs *Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Tagesspiegel*. In 1950 he joined the American radio station in Berlin, RIAS, as its Bonn cor-

[6]See, for example, "Egon Bahr: Mission in Prag," *Rheinischer Merkur* (Koblenz), August 4, 1967.
[7]"Der Mann neben Willy Brandt," *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt), August 27, 1971.
[8]"Er denkt zuviel — die Leute sind gefährlich," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), December 25, 1972.

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respondent. In Bonn he came to know Willy Brandt, then a rising man in the Berlin SPD and a Berlin delegate to the Bundestag.

Apparently, Bahr became a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1957, the year Brandt rose to Mayor of Berlin. In 1959 Bahr left RIAS to become West German press attaché in Ghana. He cut his tour of duty short when, in 1960, Mayor Brandt offered him the post of Press Speaker of the Berlin Senate and Director of the Press and Information Office of the Land Berlin. In this office "Bahr quickly grew into the role of political advisor, preoccupied with the task of making policy and not merely writing about it."[9] In this role, also, he quickly earned from his former colleagues the sobriquet "Tricky Egon" for his alleged obfuscating and veiling tactics.[10]

On August 13, 1961, Bahr witnessed the event that, by his own admission, impacted devastatingly upon his view of the course of German policy: the erection of the Communist Wall in Berlin. As he explained some nine years later:

> The reality then [in August 1961] was that the Governing Mayor of Berlin had to wait for a relatively long time before Allied patrols came. It also took a long time before merely a protest was sent to Moscow. That was the reality. In Berlin it became clear, in the most brutal way, where the border lies between east and west, and that no one could reach beyond the wall. And the question was: if you cannot do away with the wall . . . then one must make an attempt despite the wall so that the people on the one side could visit again their relatives on the other side. In a nutshell, the attempt was to come to terms with the realities despite the realities.[11]

The "attempt" was articulated by Bahr in his controversial speech on July 15, 1963, at the Protestant Academy in Tutzing, Bavaria. Ostensibly taking his cue from President John F. Kennedy's book, *The Strategy of Peace,* Bahr argued that the principles of this strategy could be applied to Germany through a policy of "change through rapprochement." He called for an end to the West German policy of "all or nothing" with respect to the German question. Reunification of the nation must be regarded as "a process with many steps and many stations." The old formulas could not be successful because the Soviet Union will not permit the "zone" to be torn down from its sphere of influence. A policy

[9] *Frankfurter Rundschau, op. cit.*

[10] Volker Borho, "Allen unbequemen Fragen weicht er geschickt aus," *Münchner Merkur* (Munich), November 2, 1972.

[11] Statement in a TV interview on August 3, 1970, reported in *Kommentarübersicht* (Bundespresseamt, Bonn), August 4, 1970.

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aimed at toppling the East German regime was unrealistic. It followed from this that change in East Germany could be wrought only via the regime in East Berlin. The Berlin wall was not only a sign of weakness of the Ulbricht regime, but also a sign of its fears and drive for self-preservation. "The question is if there are possibilities to reduce the completely justified fears of the regime gradually to the point where the loosening of the border and of the wall will become practicable, because the risk will become tolerable [for the regime]. This is a policy which we can formulate as change through rapprochement."[12]

Bahr's Contacts with the East

The Tutzing speech clearly was designed as a trial balloon. It not only detonated controversy in West Germany, but also brought Bahr a series of contacts with Soviet officials and, Bahr's critics charged later, conversations with members of the East German regime.

The nature, number and circumstances of these contacts — and at whose initiative they were undertaken — are not clear. According to some sources, the first contact came between Bahr and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Belitski, and it was followed between 1963 and 1966 by a number of secret conversations between Brandt and Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin Pyotr Abrassimov, at which Bahr allegedly was present.[13]

Bahr's purported links with the East Germans during that period were initially hinted at by Walter Ulbricht himself, when he made the reported comment in Warsaw on November 12, 1968, that the SPD "leadership" had promised him to bring about the recognition of the GDR "through the road of understanding over partial questions [*Teilfragen*]."[14] The hint was sharpened by the SED newspaper *Neues Deutschland,* which countered denials in Bonn of Ulbricht's comment with the suggestion that those who questioned its veracity should "address their inquiries to Herr Brandt."[15] Subsequently came direct charges, published by the West German newspapers *Bayern-Kurier* and *Welt am Sonntag,* that Bahr had carried on secret talks with GDR officials, including members of the SED Politburo in East Berlin, and that tapes of

[12]"Die umstrittene Rede Bahrs in Tutzing," *Telegraph* (Berlin), July 20, 1963.
[13]See, for example, Herbert Mittelstaedt, "Spürhunde hinter Bahr," *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Mainz), December 5, 1968.
[14]See "Ulbricht schlug Bonn auch die Hintertür zu," *Rheinische Post* (Düsseldorf), November 26, 1968.
[15]As reported by Reinhard Appel, "Keine Hintergründe des Falles Bahr," *Stuttgarter Zeitung,* January 11, 1969.

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these conversations were in the possession of a Western intelligence service (presumably relayed by the East German secret police). The charges included the implication that Bahr had discussed his Tutzing speech beforehand with East German officials.[16] They were countered but never categorically denied in their totality by Foreign Minister Brandt, who declared that he assumed "full responsibility" for anything that might have transpired.[17]

By the time these charges were being debated in Bonn in late 1968, however, a perhaps more significant round of secret conversations had taken place between prominent members of the SPD and leaders of the Italian Communist Party. The story of these meetings — to the extent that it has come to light — is a fascinating one in view of later developments, but much too complex and too full of nuances and implications to be treated here at length. A fairly comprehensive account, culled from a variety of sources, including Italian ones, was published by the West German academician Heinz Timmermann in the June 1971 issue of the periodical *Osteuropa*.[18] Essentially the story seems to have been the following.

In April 1967, the leaders of twenty-four communist parties in Europe met in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. A basic purpose of the meeting was to reach a consensus on how to react to the new *Ostpolitik* of the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition in Bonn. The Karlovy Vary declaration featured a summons to European Socialist and Social Democratic parties to join in creating a "collective security system" in Europe and issued a catalogue of principles and preconditions toward that goal. The demands, however, clearly were focused upon the Federal Republic. They included: the recognition of existing borders (especially the Oder-Neisse border of Poland), the recognition of the GDR on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty, the conclusion of renunciation of force agreements among "all states in Europe," the pledge of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, the "defense and development of democracy in the Federal Republic," the legitimization of the German Communist Party, and the conclusion of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty.[19]

[16]Mittelstaedt, *op. cit.*

[17]Gerhard Reddeman, "Fragen ohne Antwort," *Rheinischer Merkur* (Koblenz), January 17, 1969.

[18]Heinz Timmermann, "Im Vorfeld der Neuen Ostpolitik," *Osteuropa,* June 1971, pp. 388-399.

[19]Statement, "For Peace and Security in Europe," adopted by the Conference of European Communist and Worker Parties on Problems of European Security,

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Subsequent to the Karlovy Vary meeting, the Communist Party of Italy apparently took it upon itself to test the willingness of the SPD to accommodate to these conditions, and to act as intermediary between the SPD and the Eastern parties, particularly Ulbricht's SED. The first contact came in Bonn in September 1967 between A. Jacobelli, foreign editor of *L'Unita*, the CPI organ, and West German journalists close to the SPD. It was followed, according to Timmermann, by a variety of secret meetings in Italy and in West Germany, involving on the SPD side such men as the late Leo Bauer (editor of *Die Neue Gesellschaft* and later adviser to Chancellor Brandt), Egon Franke (then a member of the SPD Presidium and now Minister of Inner German Relations), and Fried Wesemann (then director of the SPD Information Service), and on the Italian side a number of people in the top CPI leadership including Enrico Belinguer, who is today CPI chairman. Egon Bahr joined the last of these secret meetings, which took place in Munich in March 1968.

The precise content of the meetings is, of course, unknown. It is clear, however, that they were addressed to the possibility of an accommodation with respect to the demands issued in Karlovy Vary, and particularly to an accommodation between the FRG and GDR. Two facts are of particular significance in underlining the seriousness of the talks. First, apparently a concrete result of the negotiations was the sanctioning of the previously banned but now "newly founded" and renamed German Communist Party in the Federal Republic in 1968 — a development eased by the

held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, April 24-26, 1967. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1968* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), pp. 1042-1046.

Marshall D. Shulman provides the following account of the Karlovy Vary conference: "The main thrust of Brezhnev's analysis [in his major address at the conference] was that 'American and West German imperialism is the major threat to European peace.' The 'close partnership' between Bonn and Washington and the continued existence of NATO were designated as the targets for political action.

"Brezhnev made it clear that the function of the Karlovy Vary Conference was not to lay down a concrete basis for negotiation of a European settlement, but to mobilize mass political support in Europe for several sharply-defined objectives: the containment of American and West German influence in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of NATO, and the reduction of American influence in Western Europe. . . .

"This implied taking tactical steps to appeal to the social democrats of Europe and Brezhnev signalled that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was 'prepared to develop contacts with social democratic parties that want to proceed together. . .' He also issued an invitation to trade-unionists and peasant parties, as well as middle-class nationalists and neutralists to join a campaign reminiscent of the Peace Movement of the 1950's. . . ." Shulman, "Soviet Proposals for a European Security Conference, 1966-69," in *Studies for a New Central Europe*, Series 2, Nos. 3/4, 1968-1969.

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circumstance that the Ministry of Justice in the Kiesinger Government was in the hands of Social Democrat (later Federal President) Gustav Heinemann. Second, according to Timmermann, it was decided at the Munich meeting to suspend the conversations pending the federal elections in the FRG in the autumn of 1969. The meaning was clear: the next "stage" had to wait until the SPD was in a better position to shape West German policy.[20]

It bears noting that the fact of these contacts was subsequently confirmed by the Brandt Government in November 1971 in response to a parliamentary query. However, the speaker for the government, Minister Horst Ehmke, claimed that "negotiations had not taken place," and that "only" security and cooperation in Europe had been "discussed."[21]

Interview with Bahr in January 1969

All of the above was relatively unknown background in January 1969, when this writer interviewed Egon Bahr in Bonn. Before describing this interview, some explanations are in order. I was in Europe at the time in connection with several research assignments, including a private project dealing with concepts of German reunification. By the time I spoke with Bahr, I had already interviewed a number of prominent West German members of government and parliament. Early in the trail of these interviews, I discovered that it seemed to be difficult to induce West Germans to look beyond the immediate problems facing the Federal Republic and toward the longer-range alternatives of West German policy. I experimented therefore with a "scenario technique." I began each interview by posing a hypothetical situation in the near-range future — a situation that in general featured little change in the overall political dimensions of Europe, but in which the interview respondent (or his party) was thrust into the responsibilities of decision-making.

The interview with Egon Bahr took place in the late afternoon of January 9, 1969, in Bahr's office in the Foreign Ministry. My report of it below is from notes taken during the interview and dictated into a tape recorder in my hotel room immediately following the interview. The tape was transcribed, along with other interview reports, on February 5, 1969, after my return to the United States. The following report thus does not represent a

[20]Timmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 396.
[21]"Ehmke bestätigt frühere Kontakte zwischen SPD und der KP Italiens," *Die Welt*, November 5, 1971.

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verbatim transcript of Bahr's statements, but rather a detailed and accurate description of what he said.

The interview report is given here *in toto*, as it was then transcribed from the tapes. No changes of any kind have been made in the original manuscript with but one exception: the deletion of a reference by Bahr to a West German official document that conceivably could have been under some sensitivity constraints. The reference was a marginal one to support a statement made, and the deletion in no way affects the substance of what Bahr said.

Notes of Interview with Ambassador Egon Bahr, Foreign Ministry, January 9, 1969

Bahr is an intimate of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, the relationship dating back to the days when Brandt was Mayor of Berlin and Bahr was his chief of press relations. Today Bahr is Ambassador-at-Large under Brandt and head of the German equivalent of the Policy Planning Council in the Foreign Ministry. He is credited (or discredited) with being one of the main architects of the *Ostpolitik* under the Kiesinger government, headed the West German delegation in Czechoslovakia prior to the Soviet intervention, and was in fact the leading candidate for Ambassador to Czechoslovakia following the expected assumption of diplomatic relations. Bahr has been somewhat controversial of late, having been targeted by the right wing in the CDU and the CSU with the charge of having held discussions with members of the SED Central Committee in East Berlin.

I posed to Bahr the following scenario: Let us assume that it is early summer 1970. The world situation has not changed drastically. De Gaulle is still immortal in France and, although under internal pressure to improve cooperation with other Western European countries, Germany included, still holds onto his idea of a "Europe of fatherlands" and still blocks British entry into the Common Market and into Europe. The Nixon Administration has disengaged to some extent from Viet Nam and Asia and pays more attention to Europe, but only marginally so in the context of the isolationist mood of the American people. There are still pressures from Congress for a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. In the East, meanwhile, the situation has been stabilized to some extent in Czechoslovakia, and the overall hostile mood toward West Germany has abated somewhat. The German elections have propelled into power a somewhat tenuous coalition of the SPD and FDP. Under those assumed circumstances, what would be the basic policy of the (in effect) SPD government?

Bahr found it difficult to buy the part of the scenario dealing with an SPD/FDP coalition government. He projected that the elections in the fall will probably feature marginal gains in strength for the SPD and

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FDP, and some corresponding marginal losses for the CDU. He estimated that the NPD would gather somewhere in the neighborhood of 5 per cent of the vote. If the NPD managed to get into the Bundestag, then a continuation of the SPD/CDU coalition was predetermined. Even short of such a contingency, however, an SPD/FDP coalition would not command very much strength.

Bahr furthermore qualified that the policy of an SPD/CDU coalition would not be markedly different from a policy pursued by the SPD alone or in conjunction with the FDP. He suggested that the current stresses and strains in the coalition were due to the upcoming elections, and that they would quickly disappear with the formation of a new government. But, having stated these reservations and warming up to the scenario, Bahr acknowledged that an SPD/FDP coalition would "make things easier." Whereupon he discussed the likely policy of such a government.

Background of Ostpolitik. Bahr disputed the implication in a question of mine that the German Eastern policy had not been successful. He pointed out that, in shifting gears toward the East, the Kiesinger government faced a rather demanding job of shattering more than a decade of the frozen Adenauer policy. He revealed that the German timetable for success of the policy was projected to 1973. He acknowledged that the initial targets of the Eastern policy — Rumania and Yugoslavia — might not have been the best ones, but he argued that these could not be avoided. After both countries, in turn, had accepted without any reservations the German conditions for the resumption of diplomatic relations, Bonn had no choice but to follow through on diplomatic recognition, even if the FRG did entertain some doubts about the prudence of beginning its drive in the two countries regarding which the Soviet Union seemed to be the most apprehensive. In any event, the German efforts were successful. After Rumania and Yugoslavia had entered into diplomatic relations, according to Bahr, the Germans received overtures from the Poles and the Hungarians, who made it clear to Bonn that they saw the beginning of a bandwagon and did not want to be left behind. He felt that the German offensive had a great deal to do with the events in Czechoslovakia — that the Czechs felt that they could stage their reforms precisely because they did not feel threatened by the Germans. Even the Soviets showed signs of climbing on the bandwagon, but they faced the choice — momentarily at least — of going along with the crowd or stamping down on Czech developments. Bahr believes that, in repressing the Czech reform movements, the Soviets did not in any way exclude the possibility of dealing with the West Germans. They wanted to consolidate their position in Czechoslovakia first before possibly proceeding.

The Present Situation. Unfortunately, according to Bahr, the events in and after Czechoslovakia have thrust Ulbricht and the GDR into the powerful position of exercising veto power in the Eastern bloc vis-à-vis any potential West German links with the countries of Eastern Europe. There is a more or less explicit agreement in the East, exacted by

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Ulbricht, that no new country will enter into diplomatic relations with West Germany unless and until three conditions are met: (1) Germany pledges not to produce any nuclear weapons; (2) Germany recognizes the existing borders in the East, including the Oder-Neisse line; and (3) the Federal Republic recognizes the existence of the GDR. Inasmuch as the three provisions make a single package — and since Ulbricht alone is in a position to determine whether he is being "recognized" by the FRG — the GDR can block any further West German initiatives in Eastern Europe.

Bahr does not foresee any immediate readiness by the GDR to respond to West German initiatives. Ulbricht is not likely to ease the West German way in Eastern Europe — even at the point of some form of West German recognition of the GDR — until he feels that his position at home and in the Eastern bloc is completely secure. There is some short-term hope, however, of combining an offensive against East Berlin with diplomacy vis-à-vis Moscow, to persuade the Russians to put pressure on Ulbricht in order to make him scale down his stand. Bahr thought that Germany's signature on a nonproliferation treaty and the currently negotiated nonaggression agreement with the Soviet Union could be the West German bargaining cards in this direction, but he refused to elaborate.

In any event, Bahr believes the priority of German *tactics* in Eastern Europe now has to be changed. Under the Schroeder conception, the priority of German efforts lay in East European countries other than the GDR (and by implication other than the USSR) with the aim of isolating the Ulbricht regime. Under the Kiesinger government, the idea was to press ahead in Eastern Europe, while at the same time attempting to open the door to Pankow and Moscow. In the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, the gateway clearly was reduced to East Berlin and to Moscow. And it is in this direction that the policy of the SPD government in 1970 would have to be pressed.

Step 1: *Recognition of the GDR.* The first effort of the SPD government, therefore, would be a general arrangement incorporating a comprehensive *modus vivendi* (*Generalbereinigung*) with the GDR. Bahr drew a distinction in legalistic terms between *staatsrechtliche* and *voelkerrechtliche* relations with the GDR. The gist of this is that Bonn would attempt to arrive at a comprehensive arrangement with Pankow — which would feature an exchange of plenipotentiaries without entailing *de jure* recognition of the East German regime in the international legal sense.

Step 2: *Nonviolence Agreements and Diplomatic Relations with East European Countries.* Once the door to Eastern Europe is opened via East Berlin, the next step would feature the conclusion between West Germany and the various East European countries of a system of "renunciation of force" agreements, similar to the one the Federal Republic is now attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union. These agreements would

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have the effect of affixing West German recognition of the existing borders of Eastern Europe, including the Oder-Neisse. The agreements would serve to reduce fears of Germany in Eastern Europe, and would then pave the way for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Bonn and the remaining East European countries.

Step 3: *Reduction of Forces in Germany.* The next step, according to Bahr, following the resumption of full and normal relations between West Germany and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, would be negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact leading to the reduction of American and Soviet conventional forces in both parts of Germany. Bahr lashed out against unilateral U.S. reductions, which have already begun, staged in the absence of commensurate reductions by the Soviets in East Germany. He thinks that the level of the current American military presence in West Germany is unnecessarily high — that it could be reduced by about one half without losing its deterrent capacity so long as it continued to be backed up by a credible nuclear guarantee. At the same time, however, the aim — at least from the German vantage point, as well as a presumably Western interest — was to force an easing of the Soviet military presence in East Germany. So long as the West indulged in only unilateral reductions, all the Soviets had to do was sit back and wait.

A genuine bargaining process between NATO and the Warsaw Pact ought to produce a reasonable and credible balance of conventional forces in the two parts of Germany. He projected that the reductions could range from 30 to 50 per cent of existing force levels. He believes that no physical means or instruments of inspection and control would be necessary in this process, because the intelligence capabilities of both sides in the two parts of Germany were more than adequate to insure compliance.

In the context of Bahr's proposed reductions, we discussed West German security and the concept of political warning. Bahr stated flatly that he would have no fear whatsoever if the Soviets withdrew one half of their nineteen divisions in East Germany to the Soviet Union, and the United States withdrew one half of its conventional forces from West Germany to the United States. He acknowledged that the return of American forces to West Germany in any contingency (which he considered unlikely) would depend on the decision-making courage of the American President, but he felt that this courage would be forthcoming. He argued that there would be more than enough political warning to permit the return of the forces. Czechoslovakia did not place the question of ample warning time in doubt, because from the beginning it was recognized by German intelligence and by other Western intelligence services that any action in Czechoslovakia would not be aimed at the West. Czechoslovakia, in short, was not a surprise and did not bear meaningfully on the German defense problem.

Step 4: *The Creation of a European Security System.* As the last step

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in the process outlined by him, Bahr envisaged the establishment of a collective security system in Central Europe. The members of this system would be, on the Eastern side, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. On the Western side, they would comprise the FRG, Denmark and the Benelux countries. If Rumania, Bulgaria and perhaps Yugoslavia decided to join this system, the system could be broadened in the West to include Italy and perhaps Norway and Sweden.

France and Great Britain would not be allowed into such a system, because the basic character and rationale of the system would be that of a club of nonnuclear powers whose territorial integrity would be guaranteed by the nuclear powers — certainly the United States and the Soviet Union, and perhaps France and Great Britain as well. There would be a "balanced conventional relationship" among the countries within the system, although he did not specify what this balance was to be. The members of the system, as well as the outside guaranteeing powers, would sign a kind of "Locarno pact" guaranteeing the existing international borders within the system, and they would enter into a collective security arrangement whereby all would pledge to come to the aid of a country within the system which is attacked by either another member of the system or a country outside the system. In this way, the Eastern European countries would not have to fear German aggression, and the Western members of the system would be secured against Soviet attack.

All American and Soviet forces would be withdrawn from the soil of countries belonging to the system. I asked him whether, in his view, NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be continued as alliances outside the system or overlapping the system. He answered that undoubtedly the two alliances would have to be dissolved and replaced perhaps by new bilateral relationships between the superpowers and the remaining countries in Europe outside the collective security system itself.

At this point the interview was ended.

The "Game Plan" in Retrospect

I recall leaving the interview with Bahr, in the evening of January 9, 1969, with a sense of disbelief. After all, here was a highly placed official of a government tightly allied with the United States, who had just projected a radical departure from the foreign policy of his country — a departure that was to culminate in the dissolution of the alliance. There was the possibility that Bahr, as head of a planning staff, had simply been playing with ideas. Yet, once Bahr had "warmed up" to the scenario I had presented to him, the projected strategy had been spelled out by him quickly and in logical sequence of assumptions and policy steps. It had all the earmarks of a strategy concept that had been thought out clearly. Moreover, it was presented as *the* strategy

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under the scenario assumptions I outlined — particularly the assumption regarding the advent to power in the Federal Republic of a "small coalition" led by the SPD — which, as Bahr had put it, would "make things easier." No alternative strategies were discussed by him.

The irony is that this latter assumption, which I had invoked simply for scenario purposes and which Bahr had difficulty in accepting, became reality with the formation of the Brandt-Scheel coalition government in October 1969. And the fact is that the *Ostpolitik* of this government has since unfolded in startling conformity with the step-by-step strategy projected by Bahr in the interview.

There is neither the space nor the need here to detail the progress of West German *Ostpolitik* until the end of 1972. Suffice it to note its consistency with the Bahr "game plan." The preliminary steps of the strategy adduced by him — the accommodations with the Soviet Union on the road toward an accord with the GDR — were accomplished by the West German signature under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in November 1969 (barely a month after the installation of the Brandt-Scheel government) and by the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on August 12, 1970. Step One (recognition of the GDR) was traversed in December 1972 with the signing of the Basic Treaty by the FRG and GDR. Step Two (accords with other East European countries) thus far features only the Warsaw Treaty with Poland, signed in December 1970, but treaties with Czechoslovakia and perhaps Hungary apparently rank high on Bonn's policy agenda for 1973.

To be sure, the progression of these events has not exactly followed the sequence projected by Bahr in the interview. Thus, the timing of the Warsaw Treaty with Poland has not tallied with that sequence. Yet Bahr's assumption in January 1969 was that the doors to Eastern Europe would be closed pending an accommodation with East Berlin. Apparently the negotiations that led to the Warsaw Treaty were the result as much of Polish as of West German initiative. The fact that the negotiations were successfully concluded before an accommodation could be fashioned with the GDR may have done violence to Bahr's original assumptions, but certainly not to his basic strategy. Indeed, the "premature" developments in this respect can be assumed to have facilitated the strategy if the Warsaw Treaty placed added pressure upon the GDR to deal with Bonn.

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Also, the "game plan" that Bahr described in 1969 did not include a Four-Power accord on Berlin. Whether this was simply an omission or whether Bahr did not then foresee the role of a Berlin agreement in his proposed web of arrangements with the East is a somewhat marginal question. The point is that, quite aside from its other intrinsic merits from Bonn's vantage point, a clarification of the situation in Berlin emerged as the logical precursor of the negotiations with the GDR leading to the Basic Treaty. The fact that the Berlin accord could also be regarded as a general gain for the West and a commensurate Soviet concession only added luster to *Ostpolitik*.

The above is not intended to give short shrift to the *Ostpolitik* of the Brandt Government or to define the complex tangle of East-West arrangements that has emerged. The essential point, in the context of this article, is that the strategy Bahr adduced in early 1969 reached a major target by late 1972: namely, the *modus vivendi* with the German Democratic Republic within a broader accommodation with the Soviet Union.

How Much of *Ostpolitik* was Prearranged?

In the light of these developments, and of the apparent secret contacts and conversations that preceded them, some questions inevitably present themselves. Did Bahr ever communicate his strategy to "the other side" before or in the course of his negotiations? How much had been prearranged prior to October 1969? Is this why Bonn's *Ostpolitik* was able to shift into gear so soon after Brandt's assumption of the government in 1969? Is this how the Brandt Government was able to execute so sharp a shift in West German policy — and one marked by so complex a skein of treaties — in so short a period as little more than three years?

These questions can be answered only by Bahr and his counterparts in the negotiations. The amazing consonance of accomplishments with the original game plan, however, suggests several possibilities: (1) there was at least an overall prior understanding between Bonn and some or all of its negotiations partners in the East regarding the general thrust of common bargaining objectives, if not the details of the agreements to be hammered out; (2) Bahr proved himself to be a single-minded negotiator who was able to carry through a series of difficult diplomatic assignments according to preconceived plan; or (3), as his political opponents in the Federal Republic charge, Bahr's alleged accomplishments represented little more than West

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German concessions to the demands of the Soviet bloc -- for example, as these had been articulated at Karlovy Vary. Perhaps the truth lies in a combination of these possibilities.

Bahr will admit that Bonn has made it clear to the Soviet Union that, more than an acceptance of the status quo in Europe, West Germany's *Ostpolitik* is aimed at changing the status quo in order to achieve the ultimate objective of West German policy: the reunification of Germany. The following exchange in a television interview in June 1972 between Bahr and Günter Gaus, a well-known West German TV personality, illuminated not only this question, but also Bahr's broader strategic concept:

GAUS: Do you assume that this concept of a recognition of the *status quo* in order to change the *status quo* is familiar to . . . our treaty partners, for example the Soviet Union?

BAHR: Of course this has not remained unknown. We have not remained silent on this score. But I would only like to add the following to avoid any false implication. When one says *status quo,* this is usually understood as territorial *status quo.* My meaning goes beyond the territorial *status quo.* The political *status quo* of the European freeze, the non-relations — I don't have to enumerate all that — will be changed in fact through the decision of all participants only if one proceeds from the territorial *status quo.*

GAUS: And how, in the end, will the changed *status quo* in Europe be characterized? It should also make Germany's reunification possible?

BAHR: We have said in general terms that over many stations — a European conference, and perhaps, hopefully troop reductions — a situation should be achieved in which the German right of self-determination will find a place.

GAUS: This would also be then a territorial change.

BAHR: Territorial changes that are made with the agreement of the participants are always possible. That is the sovereign right of the participants. This is also not excluded through renunciation of force [agreements].[22]

Ostpolitik AS A NATIONAL POLICY

Willy Brandt has heralded *Ostpolitik* as a "peace policy" and "policy of reconciliation." As the foregoing has suggested, at least in Bahr's eyes the policy is addressed to considerably larger stakes, and to conspicuously German ones. "Reconciliation" with the countries of the East is simply the precondition and starting point

[22]Interview on the program "Zu Protokoll" on June 4, 1972, reported in *Kommentarübersicht,* June 6, 1972.

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for an active West German strategy designed to set in motion, and subsequently to shape, a complex and far-reaching process of change in Europe which will lead, at some as yet indeterminate point, to the restoration of the German nation.

The concept of "nation" seems to permeate Bahr's outlook. When asked, during the TV interview with Günter Gaus, whether he considers himself a nationalist, Bahr replied: "For God's sake, a man who is conscious of nation does not have to be a nationalist!"[23] But Bahr likes to dwell on nation as a "value of feeling" — a value that will "in the long run prove stronger than ideology" because "the nation is for the individual the possibility to identify himself."[24]

This preoccupation seems to belie the "left-wing" and "pro-communist" labels that often are attached to him in the political combat of Bonn. Indeed, Bahr might be described as "anti-ideological" — at least in the context of the competing ideologies in Europe. He feels that to the extent that the partition of Europe and the division of Germany represent ideological cleavages, the necessary bridges of policy can be constructed only upon nonideological pilings. Ideological values must be taken out of policy as much as possible, if only because "as soon as matters get into the realm of ideology, it is regarded by the eastern side as dangerous, because they have had the experience that . . . ideas are attractive when they come from the west."[25]

Whether and when the reunification of Germany can be achieved cannot, according to Bahr, be predicted with any degree of confidence. But the door to national restoration must be kept open in the form of direct relations between the two German states and the encouragement of national consciousness in the German Democratic Republic.[26] And that door itself must be approached via sweeping change in Europe — a process of "many stations."

Bahr's European Security System

In his January 1969 interview by this author, Bahr marked out

[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Der Spiegel, op. cit.*
[25] Statement made on the television program, "Ost-West-Runde," June 14, 1972. Reported in *Kommentarübersicht*, June 15, 1972.
[26] Bahr defended the Basic Treaty of December 1972 on primarily those grounds: "There is the question whether the Germans in ten years or more will still be a nation. This question cannot be decided; millions of people will decide. . . . But the chance that they will feel as a nation has become better with the Treaty than [it would have been] without it." Television interview on December 26, 1972, reported in *ibid.*, December 27, 1972.

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the milestones of that sweeping change in Europe: reductions in American and Soviet forces in both German states, the creation of a collective security system embracing various countries in Eastern and Western Europe, the total withdrawal of American and Soviet military forces from the member states of that system in the context of a dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the replacement of these alliances by bilateral ties. Because of time constraints, the interview never got into such questions as how this multinational process of change would be engineered, on what grounds the two superpowers and the other European countries would be induced to agree to the process and to the European settlement that would crown it, and what role West Germany could play in order to bring it about. Nor was there a discussion of how this political settlement would be related to the existing economic systems in Europe.

Yet several things are interesting in retrospect. In January 1969 the idea of reciprocal force reductions in Europe was not a novel one: it had been formally proposed by NATO in Reykjavik in June 1968. Worth noting, however, is Bahr's apparent conviction at the time that American forces in Germany could be reduced by about one-half without unduly compromising the effectiveness of the American strategic deterrent and the military defenses of Europe.

In his interview with me, Bahr did not specifically mention a European security conference by name. Yet, at that time the separate identity that has since emerged between a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) — and the division of scope between them — had not been firmly established. The fact that the Federal Republic endorsed the idea of a European security conference in the context of the Moscow accords of 1970 is a matter of record. As far as MBFR is concerned, it is interesting that Bahr has since described the Soviet willingness to discuss force reductions as a "consequence" of the Moscow Treaty.[27]

Thus, two of the vehicles in Bahr's strategy (perhaps originally conceived by him in terms of a single one) are nearly on track. But, even if they become entracked and gather momentum, will they lead to Bahr's collective security system? It is useless to speculate over a possibility that at best lies well beyond present political horizons. Perhaps more relevant questions are: Did Bahr

[27]Radio interview by Gottfried Vetter, August 13, 1972. Reported in *ibid.*, August 14, 1972.

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fabricate his fairly specific concept of a collective security system from whole cloth? Was this concept discussed in the clandestine conversations with representatives of the Italian Communist Party? If the concept continues as a target of his strategy, are the Soviets aware of it?

These questions, too, can only be speculated about. The concept of a "collective security system" has long been a centerpiece of Soviet propaganda. It has been generally undefined other than implying an "all-European" alternative to the present confrontation of systems in Europe. The Karlovy Vary meeting of communist parties in April 1967 also called for the "creation of a system of collective security," and identified this in terms of a general treaty among all European states on the renunciation of force and mutual noninterference in internal affairs, the "normalization" of relations among all the states, the specific conditions for the Federal Republic noted earlier, the "liquidation of the artificially erected obstacles in the economic relations between the socialist and capitalist countries," and the creation of "Europe without military blocs."[28] Clearly, these topics must have been discussed, singly and in context, in the secret SPD-CPI meetings.

Yet, Bahr's blueprint of January 1969, while partaking of most of the denominators of Karlovy Vary, was a great deal more specific with respect to geographical scope and the nature of and membership in his "system." It bears noting that in general scope and in its characteristic as a "club of nonnuclear powers" the system evokes comparison with the Rapacki and Gomulka plans of the late 1950's. Whether or not Bahr shared his blueprint with communist conversation partners, he might have been justified in assuming that his plan was compatible with the general principles of Karlovy Vary.

The larger question of the feasibility of the plan, and therefore its realism, depends on variables too multitudinous to warrant serious attention. Did (and does) Bahr assume its acceptability to the Soviet Union? If so, did (and does) he believe that the road leading to it might be carved largely by means of a Russo-German concert of policy?

The question of acceptability to the Soviet Union hinges not only on the imponderable of ultimate Soviet designs in Europe, but also on the key question, whether Moscow would be prepared to accept, let alone help to engineer, the reunification of Germany in any form (other than the communization of the FRG) and in

[28]Statement, "For Peace and Security in Europe," *op. cit.*

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any contextual environment. How German reunification would evolve from Bahr's collective security system was not discussed during the interview. Yet it did not have to be discussed because Bahr's assumptions seemed clear. With Soviet (and American) power removed, a process of political convergence would undoubtedly grip the members of the collective security system. At the very least, the importance of borders among them would dwindle. The German "nation" would thus become once again a fact, if not a formality.

Policy Toward the West

The reach and realism of Bahr's vision and objectives may be the grist for intriguing discussion. Of more immediate importance, however, are the implications for basic West German policies in the NATO alliance and Western Europe.

Bahr, in consonance with the position of the Brandt Government more generally, has stressed the compatibility of *Ostpolitik* with alliance strategy. He has identified Bonn's eastern treaties as the "consequence of the treaties with the West."[29] He has asserted that "without an alliance at my back I should never have been in Moscow."[30] In light of the basic thrust of Bahr's projected policy and objectives, however, some interesting nuances of meaning can be read into such statements. Could they mean, for example, that without the protection and bargaining power derived from the Federal Republic's alliance ties there would be no effective *Ostpolitik*?

In any event, the weight of Bahr's perceived priorities was revealed by him sharply, and with startling candor, in the Gaus interview cited earlier. Again it is worth quoting from that interview at some length:

Gaus: . . . Why is the national reunification at the end of this long-term, step-by-step process so important to Egon Bahr?

Bahr: I do not see that there will be until then a European federal state in which the identity of the nations will have been dissolved.

Gaus: And in truth you would not want it? You have always privately considered de Gaulle as a fortunate phenomenon?

Bahr: I have considered him a realist in this question.

Gaus: Let us assume that you would have the choice between the Europe of the national fatherlands and the Europe which has

[29]Egon Bahr, "Die Unterschrift kam zur rechten Zeit," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), August 11, 1971.

[30]Statement in a television round-table discussion on November 8, 1972, as reported in *Kommentarübersicht*, November 9, 1972.

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left the national units behind. Let us assume this: from the standpoint of sentimental value which, you said, every high-quality political man needs . . . do you decide in favor of the national solution?

BAHR: Yes, of course, because *it* [the national solution] *embraces within it the tremendous progress toward Eastern Europe and toward the East European peoples,* whereas to the contrary I fear—that may not be right, but I fear—that *the other* [the political unification of Western Europe] *can be obtained only at the price of renunciation* [of Ostpolitik].

GAUS: You mean that Eastern Europe will not be able to come along on the other road?

BAHR: Yes!

GAUS: Does that mean a slowing down in the realization of the West European ideas which were developed in the 1950's?

BAHR: The ideas of the 1950's no longer exist in that form in practical policy. Because *that which we do today is an especially qualified form of cooperation with the aim of a political union, but no longer of supranationality. . . .*[31]

The import is too clear to need elaboration. Any meaningful political integration of Western Europe cannot be reconciled with a successful continuation of *Ostpolitik*. And *Ostpolitik* has priority. Given Bahr's broader strategy and expectations as described above, his conclusion to that effect is both logical and obvious.

There is another interesting nuance in these statements: Bahr's definition of European "political union" as the aim of "an especially qualified form of cooperation." The "political union" of Western Europe has generally been held aloft by the Brandt Government as a goal of its policies. The term "political union" may be interpreted by many to connote political unification or even political integration. In Bahr's definition, it means a great deal less than that.

NEW MANIFESTATION OF OLD MALAISE

The phenomenon represented by Egon Bahr may seem startlingly new to a postwar generation in America that has grown accustomed to perceive West Germany in the image shaped by Konrad Adenauer: as an ally of unquestioned loyalty, as the forward sentinel of NATO, and as a driving force in the welding together of a region which has been a cockpit of past conflict and has twice in this century pulled a good part of the world into conflagration.

[31]Interview on "Zu Protokoll," June 4, 1972, *op. cit.* (Emphasis added.)

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Yet, the phenomenon is hardly new. Throughout its relatively brief modern history, that region in Central Europe that has called itself Germany has been plagued by the problems of self-identity and relationship to the surrounding world. In the course of the century of its formal nationhood, this search for role expressed itself in the struggle between the basic idea of Bismarck, which defined Germany essentially as a Central European nation that must balance her way between hostile power aggregations to the east and to the west, and the later Stresemann concept, which held that Germany should link her destiny with the concert of democratic Western nations.

Bahr's conceptions call to mind both the Bismarckian idea and the romantic nationalism that several times wrenched Germany into disastrous veers of policy. They also remind of a recurrent malady of which German students of their own history are acutely conscious (a malaise, incidentally, that Bismarck did *not* fall prey to): a German propensity to overestimate their own ability to shape, manage and exploit their political environment on the Continent.

Yet the phenomenon of Egon Bahr must be viewed not only in this German context, but also in light of the political changes and uncertainties that now sweep the European part of the Atlantic Alliance. From the American vantage point, it must be regarded above all with an eye toward the vagaries that American policies (but not only American policies) have introduced into the transatlantic partnership during the last decade. As such, it must be appreciated as a loud warning bell for American policy in NATO and the Atlantic Community.

The dangers can be exaggerated. As has been suggested, the real extent of Bahr's grasp on West German policy has not been proven. Particularly as *Ostpolitik* moves from its bilateral accomplishments into the multilateral arenas of negotiations and into the domains of security policy, others on the decision-making level in Bonn, who do not share Bahr's views and are conscious of the dangers, may progressively assert themselves. One would hope so.

We should not, however, fall victim to one grave error: namely, the comforting judgment that Egon Bahr seems to be pursuing illusion. History has proven that, to the extent that it drives policy, illusion creates its own kind of reality.

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STRATEGIES FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE

by Robert Leider

WITHIN the next decade what has been called "the environment" holds promise of emerging as the most troublesome of all international irritants. Complex enough in a physical sense, the issue grows even more intricate on the political plane through its powerful association with health and survival. National interests that may hitherto have been difficult to define shed their turbidity under an onslaught of new and immediate concerns — the depletion of vital resources, the threats to life support systems, and the question of continued growth. In this charged atmosphere, options become limited. The policies flowing from them tend to channel nations in directions that make strife, conflict and collisions all but unavoidable.

Three Constraints

A deterministic matrix is being superimposed over the free conduct of international relations. Its elements are already operative and discernible. One is the spreading realization that pollution, despoliation and degradation are not isolated issues but the dark side of progress, prosperity and development. Any action in one area evokes consequences in the other. The two are not inseparable, of course, but the price of severing them may range from sizeable costs to economic stagnation and bankruptcy. Some nations are reluctant to pay this price. Instead, they are searching for means that permit continued growth but shift the ensuing environmental penalties to other nations or mankind's common property of oceans and atmosphere.

Another element, even more unsettling, is the growing fear that the globe cannot provide all men with a Western style of life. There are distinct limits to its ability to furnish raw materials, absorb wastes and withstand massive alteration to its surface. For the vast majority of humanity, this knowledge draws the curtain on a vision of unlimited frontiers lying just ahead, where all nations can find the good life now enjoyed by a handful. The visualization of the home planet as a finite spaceship turns the hopes of poorer nations from the future to the present. It inspires

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them with two new goals — to take what can still be taken and to develop what can still be developed — and it adds greater urgency to their demand for an equitable share in the world's resources and wealth.

A third element is the exploding knowledge of the behavior of pollutants. Many cannot be confined to their source but travel freely with the wind, on the currents and through food chains, respecting neither checkpoints, tollgates nor borders. Particulates entering the atmosphere of the United States move to the Azores, and British pollutants descend on Scandinavia. Pesticides sprayed in the south reduce the number of migratory birds that return to nest in the north. Inland dams diminish the catch of anadromous fish in international waters. The river an upstream nation uses as its sewer is the source of drinking water for a neighbor downstream. The scientific disclosure of these movements, and of the harm they cause, prompts concerned nations to take an increasing interest in matters that, but a few years ago, would have been judged to be sovereign, inviolate, and above outside scrutiny. It arouses them to take actions that lead to fundamental revisions in relationships. There may be protests, unilateral acts in international waters, proposals for a joint clean-up with a strategic foe, or severe sanctions against an ally. Above all, the movement of pollutants raises a host of new and puzzling questions about national sovereignty and a state's obligation to protect its citizens and terrain from externally caused harm.

Cooperation or Conflict?

These trends should stimulate more intensive international cooperation. The environment, after all, is indivisible and no nation can cope on its own with the problem of universal degradation. The scientific community, which discovered ecology, has been in the forefront of advocates who urge the formation of an international regime, with detection, monitoring, standard-setting and enforcement mechanisms to bring order to the environmental chaos.

Unfortunately, however, such schemes are easier proposed than enacted. When translated from the abstract to the concrete, nations note quickly that they exact sacrifices, create new inequities, shift or limit power, and place lids on ambitions. The environment may be indivisible, but cultural, social, economic and spiritual values are not. They are fragmented. Some neighbor-

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hoods are more attractive than others, and there are strong forces in operation to keep it that way.

Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect nations to embrace meaningful international controls at any time before global decay assumes a visible and terrifying shape. Until then, they will characteristically face up to the problem on their own terms, in line with their unique character and status, and in accordance with immediate goals and aspirations.

In fact, it should not be ruled out that some nations may seek out global pollution to manipulate like a volatile stock in the hope of deriving profit from the losses incurred by others. The tally sheet is rich in opportunities that stem from the unequal distribution of concern, the unequal perception of the problem, the unequal capabilities, resources and will for solving the problem, and the unequal physical capacities for absorbing environmental abuse. So long as the air is tolerably breathable, it will be these inequalities, and the political, economic and social realities that derive from them, that influence the behavior of nations; and not, as scientists may hope, an idealistic response to the physical effects of environmental degradation.

This essay is an exercise in political ecology. It attempts to classify the behavior of nations as they adjust to the new environmental realities. From there it seeks to project the altered concepts and power ingredients that may emerge and that could redefine national interests and supporting strategies in the coming decade.

Essentially, there are but two methods by which the environmental issue can enter the international arena. It may be introduced by choice as a novel tactic for securing a political objective. Or — and this method is ultimately far more significant for national security — it may burst on stage in a dominant part, as a determinant of action.

Political Use of the Environment

In illustration of the first method, a nation may employ an environmental issue as an exploitative tool for advancing a traditional goal not associated with ecological well-being. For several years now, the Soviet Union has linked participation in international environmental conferences with what should be the entirely separate issue of recognition of East Germany. The Soviet stance has delayed efforts to clean up the badly polluted Baltic, downgraded to a symposium the 1971 Prague Conference

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(sponsored by the Economic Commission of Europe), and led to an Eastern boycott of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm.

Where the propaganda gains will finally accumulate is hard to say, but the USSR holds the stronger cards. The Western democracies are under much greater public pressure than the East to participate in international environmental conferences. Hence, they are more likely to make concessions on the extraneous, political stumbling blocks.

Mainland China, too, has learned to use the environment to advance political goals. Its representatives are among the most forceful spokesmen to link environmental issues with the dialectics of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. According to the current line of reasoning, the developing world is ready to concede the existence of domestic ecological problems, but attributes their cause to external sources: the greedy accumulation of a disproportionate share of the world's wealth by a handful of industrialized nations; the plundering of the earth for private gain; and the squandering of scarce resources on expensive military technologies. In this *Weltanschauung*, a direct domestic attack on environmental ills would be self-defeating. Correction must wait until the developing nations have won absolute self-determination to control their own economic, social and political life and assume ownership of their natural resources.

Environmental rationales become part of the techniques of eviction. A war between a Western power and a developing nation is characterized as "ecocide." Strategically important regions, such as straits, must be "neutralized" to minimize the risks of a massive oil spill. Even more "far out" reasons should be expected to enter the bargaining arsenal. Overflight rights could be denied because jets destroy protective ozone layers. Docking rights may be withheld because nuclear power plants aboard ship expose harbor waters and the port city to the dual dangers of radioactivity and accidental explosions.

The Environment as a Determinant of Action

In its other method of entry, the environment is not subordinated to a political objective. Rather, it becomes the objective itself or, at least, a source of conflict. It may attain this central role by design. More commonly, however, the environment appears at the vortex suddenly and unexpectedly, as the unanticipated consequence of policy, or lack of policy, for en-

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vironmental considerations are yet to be accorded weight in the problem-solving apparatus of strategists and diplomats. Once it becomes the nucleus of events, it sets in motion actions that tend to alter power accounts and modify relationships. A variety of phenomena, effects, perceptions and crosscurrents operate in surfacing environmental problems. For the purpose of this essay, they can be segregated into four interrelated sets of determinants.

The Great Lock-in. Under the first category, a nation will appropriate or damage environmental assets that it shares with neighbors or the world in general in pursuit of the welfare of its inhabitants. The offending nation may feel that it had no other choice; that it was driven to its act by the need to take care of an expanding population, to maintain a planned rate of economic growth, to test the effects of a new weapon, or to hitch its future to a technology such as nuclear power generation.

Destroy and Search. The second category of determinants comes into play when nations grossly mismanage their domestic ecology or approach the limit of their environment to absorb industrial pollutants. In either case, they reach out beyond their borders to compensate for mismanagement or to maintain continued growth. Thus, ocean fishing fleets are built to fill the gap left by a pollution-caused decline in river and lake fishing. Smoke-belching factory complexes are dispersed from heavily industrialized nations to the developing world to take advantage of its rich assets of clean air and water.

Environmental Protectionism. The third form of determinism stems from the desire to protect one's own country from pollution and despoliation. It creates an aura of public opinion that limits technology and growth and forces extractive industries, smelters and other heavily polluting processes to leave the homeland and find shelter abroad with nations that, for the time being, still value payrolls more than they fear pollution. It leads to domestic pollution standards which cannot be met through domestic resources. Clean-burning fuels may have to be imported. Finally, the sentiment bars any activity that might lead to a role as a pollution haven for other nations. A country unwilling to be torn open to satisfy its own needs will develop obvious reservations about undergoing surgery to meet the needs of trading partners. Thus, the net effect of protectionism is to embroil environmentally conscious nations in new and unplanned dependencies while trade deficits become progressively larger.

Finite Universe. A final form of determinism emerges from

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fears about the globe's ultimate resource limits. With future vistas eliminated, the ocean now becomes the last frontier. Expropriation of formerly international waters accelerates, and the overall assessment of the ocean's importance shifts from its role in trade and transport to a new use as the resource of last resort. Concurrently, nations may eye the distribution of existing resources and absorptive capabilities, and begin to ask disturbing and unsettling questions about them. For instance: Can thinly spread populations continue to command vast resources, while other parts of the world face a halt in growth because they are approaching a pollution barrier? For that matter, can land-rich nations be asked to burn nothing but dirty fuel, of which there is a plentiful supply, so that the scarcer, clean-burning power sources — e.g., natural gas — can be allocated to densely settled, more highly industrialized regions?

Expected Behavior

The evidence of global decay is accumulating. Scientists are filling in the grim mural, but by bits and pieces, as though it were a gigantic paint-by-the-numbers set. Jacques Cousteau tells of dead stretches of sea that were brimming with marine life when he began his underwater career. The computers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology grind out ominous curves showing the intricate relationships among capital investment, pollution, resource consumption, population and the quality of life. Stimulate one and it drives up the others until Nature halts the growth, either because her riches have been exhausted or because the poisonous accumulations in the air, water and soil can no longer sustain life.

Barry Commoner draws up an indictment against technological choices, such as the substitution of aluminum for iron, which require more power for production and cause more problems in disposal. E. J. Mishan, in analyzing current economic measurements, notes that every inch of growth leaves in its wake a foot of deferred social and environmental costs. But the unfolding of this evidence, frightening as it is, is not sufficient to overcome the selfishness of nations. Even if a well-intentioned state proved willing to alter its course, its resolve would weaken as less principled nations seized on gaps in our knowledge of the environment — and there are many — to justify further depredations.

Thus, the nation endeavoring to place clean products on the market must contend with competition from ten others willing to engineer cheaper but dirty models. For every SST not built, there

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is a Tupolev or Concorde ready to fly. For every defensive weapon not tested for environmental reasons, an offensive system is produced to exploit the breach. If aid is withheld because a project may prove harmful to the ecology, a competitor will gladly advance the funds and engineering assistance.

In short, a display of hesitancy by the few nations sensitive to the environment becomes a source of strength to the many that are not. For the latter, the temptation is great to use a domestic capacity to absorb pollution and a willingness to take chances as newfound weapons in a contest promising shares of the world's unequally distributed wealth as the ultimate prize.

What lies ahead, then, is not a stronger United Nations but a deadly game of who-can-hold-out-the-longest under pollution. And here the Soviet Union's unique geography and centrally controlled political and economic system endow it with the potential to emerge as the winner. Its enormous land mass represents an absorptive capacity beyond that of any other nation. The width and depth act as a titanic filter, with more air, soil, water and vegetation than anywhere else to purge, cleanse, recycle and regenerate pollutants. At the same time, the Marxist system can sidestep the concept of profits and growth — two elements of the capitalist system that bedevil the best efforts to come to grips with environmental decay.

Changing Concepts

"Now everything is changed," Einstein is reputed to have said after the first atomic blast, "except the picture in men's minds of what their world is like." This contrast, between what is and what man's institutions strive for, may well be the root cause of the great difficulties that lie ahead.

There will be an increase in conflict opportunities because the actions that stem from environmental contacts and environmental fears lead so readily to the clash of national goals and objectives. It may be well-nigh impossible to avoid collisions: potential opponents are driven by matters they deem essential to survival; the issues are easily understood by the citizenry, and they appear in stark colors. Under these circumstances, the chances are slim that what is under contention can be negotiated or compromised into a peaceful settlement.

But there should also be opportunities for increased cooperation, for any trend that creates new opposing interests must also bring to life new partnerships. What may be unsettling to present

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long-range plans is that the emerging arrangements for conflict and cooperation stand apart from known patterns of alliances and enmities. New interests create new groupings. It may develop that nations sharing a wind pattern, a major drainage basin, or a resource like the Mediterranean are held together by a common bond stronger than any treaty could forge, whereas nations competing for the remaining, diminishing resources, in the knowledge that this is a finite earth, may oppose each other with great ferocity, regardless of the cultural and ideological bonds they share.

Many of the basic concepts on which international relations rest must change under the pressures of new environmental concerns and knowledge. How will a nation assert its rights to territorial integrity now that it must protect its land, air space, rivers and seashores not only from enemy missiles, planes, ships and soldiers but also from the infiltration of unfriendly, debilitating pollutants? Nations have pushed their sovereignty into international waters and claimed jurisdiction over straits to protect their coasts from harmful agents dumped or spilled far offshore. Will the trend stop there? Or will the day come when nations reach out farther and farther to suppress a pollutant at its source of emission? Should that day come, the purpose of military power could shift from the exercise of territorial control to the prevention of territorial damage.

Major geographic features such as rivers and mountain chains have always been thought of as military obstacles. As a result, nations have used them to mark their borders, while tactical thinking has been devoted to the development of means to cross them. But the new knowledge emphasizes the need for unity of control over ecological systems. A nation may find it more important, for survival, to exercise political authority over a major drainage pattern, to include the mountainous headwaters, tributaries and delta, than to use the wide river itself as a protective ditch to keep enemies on the other side.

The oceans assume new roles that may overshadow their present value. Trade, commerce and shipping lanes remain important, but to these uses must now be added the mining of fuel and minerals, the harvest of fish and aquatic plants, and the preservation of the sea's life-sustaining powers under an onslaught of filling, spilling and dumping.

Under the pressures of knowledge, present concepts that are thought to be entireties may have to be separated into parts. Nations sharing a river have negotiated, habitually, on the quan-

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tities of water to be delivered; these discussions must now be expanded to include the infinitely more complex consideration of water quality. The idea of sovereignty over a territorial sea embraces control over both water and the sea bottom. But it becomes hard now to assert ownership of waters that science has shown to be constantly in motion. The wastes one nation dumps into what, ostensibly, is its own property, appear in due time on another nation's shores. The sea bottom, on the other hand, is fixed and stands a better chance of resisting challenges to ownership.

Even the concept of what constitutes national power must be augmented. To the traditional factors of technological superiority, economic might and military strength must now be added ownership of, or access to, large reservoirs of clean air and water.

New Strategies

To stay afloat in the unsettled years ahead, a nation will have to reach for strategies for which there is no precedent. The United States may well consider the following five suggestions in preparing for the coming decade.

(1) The United States must not delude itself that the environment is an internal problem, or a scientific problem, or a matter for biologists and sanitarians to uncover in their laboratories and settle in international conferences with foreign specialists who share their knowledge and point of view. Due credit belongs to these disciplines for discovering the problem. But enough is becoming known about it — and its ramifications — to divide the labors clearly. The study of the physical phenomena belongs in the house of science. The international implications of the environment are the proper concern of diplomats and strategists.

(2) Military agreements and treaties with other nations must be unbundled from economic and trade arrangements. The environment introduces factors which obviate the possibility that the relation between any two nations can continue to be wholly cooperative or wholly conflictive. Under these circumstances, military commitments would become greatly weakened if they became drawn into or dependent on areas in which the partners found themselves in serious dispute.

(3) Threat analyses and force planning guides must develop an intense sensitivity to environmental matters. Environmental needs (almost 40 per cent of the world's raw materials) and environmental usage (almost 40 per cent of the world's pollution)

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tie the United States to the rest of the globe by bonds that are stronger than treaty arrangements. These ties, how they may be threatened, or how they may be perceived as threats, could prove to be a far more realistic starting point for determining force needs than the listing of treaty obligations. Concurrently, the dimension of threat analyses must be broadened to allow for more than a fascination with technological capabilities. To the question, "What if Nation X develops a nuclear warhead and launch capability?," must now be added the more penetrating query, "What are the strategic consequences if X suffers an ecological disaster of the first magnitude?"

(4) Access to clean air and water forces the industrialized nations into the developing world. Strategies must be designed to channel these movements in ways that avoid friction and competition between major powers on matters of survival. The United States has yet to join the trend, but if Washington waits until rising pollution levels and depleted resources make outward expansion necessary, it may find No Vacancy signs posted everywhere. Logically, the United States should create a cooperative survival strategy now, one that embraces the nations of the Western Hemisphere — Canada, Central America, Latin America — while Europe establishes its partnership with Africa and Japan joins the free nations of Asia.

(5) The march into the ocean is inevitable. If anarchy is not to prevail, the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference must resolve the many disruptive issues relating to the extent of the territorial sea, ownership of the sea bottom, ownership of the water, the regulation of anadromous and migratory fish, and the rights of free passage. Acceptance of the bold and imaginative United States plan for international control of the seabed and the more recent proposals on fishing rights could be a large step in removing the sea as a source of contention.

Questions for the Future

New situations create the need for new strategies. How does one cope with alliances that are based on economic rather than geographic bonds, when copper producers in Africa and Latin America and oil producers in the Middle East, North Africa, South America and Southeast Asia act in concert? How does one nation design strategies to bend another to its will when, in effect, both may be enmeshed in a cocoon spun by the same transnational problem? Is the nation-state still the starting point for solving in-

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ternational problems? Or must one commence with a transnational phenomenon like global pollution and work backward to the nation-state? Problems that overlap the sovereignty of several states introduce complexities overshadowing the problems themselves. Yet, these very complexities create handgrips for novel and previously unknown manipulations for imposing one's will. What new pressure points are being generated in the clash between environmental realities and national objectives? Is there, anywhere on this new console, a button so sensitive as to constitute what Clausewitz called the center of gravity?

If the development of nuclear weapons represented the start of one age, an increased consciousness of the environment and its limits may be the beginning of another. There are parallels. The dreaded power of the bomb altered international relations in ways that had not been expected. While the bomb was fitted into national strategies, the nations, in turn, had to adjust to the presence of the bomb. A damaged environment is an infinitely more powerful force for destruction than nuclear might. It is not too early to include the environment and all that it implies in our strategies and to think about how strategies, unwittingly, may be affected by this awesome new factor.

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THE PHILIPPINE MAOISTS

by Justus M. van der Kroef

ON July 9, 1972 Philippine armed forces and Constabulary units launched a combined sea-air operation against some 200 regulars, backed by 800 "local guerrillas," of the Maoist New People's Army (NPA) around Digoyo Bay in the Palanan area of Isabella Province in northeastern Luzon. Focus of the operation was a mysterious vessel, subsequently identified as the 91-ton *m/b Karagatan,* which was suspected of landing personnel (presumably foreign trained) and weapons destined for the NPA. Controversy erupted as to the vessel's origin after an armed forces spokesman announced that the ship's logbook revealed North Korean registry, and a Philippine Constabulary (PC) boarding party had come under heavy NPA attack, including automatic rifle fire. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos later established that the ship was Philippine owned, but by this time his political opponents, long skeptical of his "red scare" tactics, had begun to ridicule the incident, even though a PC spokesman pointed out that the NPA was also being supplied and supported by Dumagat tribal people from the nearby Sierra Madre Mountains. Marcos admitted to being mystified by NPA tactics. He wondered publicly whether the NPA force was fighting so tenaciously in order to protect "a permanent depot of arms" or "rural sanctuary under the Maoist doctrine" for purposes of subsequent expansion.[1]

Only two weeks earlier, after an inspection trip to the Bicol region of southeastern Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao, Marcos

[1]See *Philippines Herald* (Manila), *Manila Chronicle,* and *Manila Times,* all for July 10, 1972; *Philippines Daily Express, Manila Bulletin,* and *Manila Chronicle,* all for July 11, 1972; *The Nation* (Bangkok), July 9, 1972, and *Bangkok World,* July 8, 1972. The NPA vessel had initially been described as a "mystery" submarine (*New Nation* [Singapore], June 30, 1972). According to President Marcos, submarines had been sighted earlier in the area (*Manila Chronicle,* July 11, 1972).

The *Karagatan* was chartered for fishing purposes by five young Filipinos who have since disappeared and whose addresses turned out to be fictitious. Even before the incident there had been reports of small boats landing supplies along the Palanan coast, and the discovery by a Philippine Army patrol of various arms caches in the Digoyo beach area led to the investigation of the *Karagatan* and the fighting that ensued. The caches, containing M-14 rifles and ammunition (the latter British made), rockets and rocket launchers (of apparent Chinese communist manufacture), have raised questions about whether various foreign powers (including the two Chinas, North Korea, or the CIA), gun runners, or even Philippine businessmen and politicians were involved. Cf. the perceptive report from Palanan by Peter R. Kann in *The Wall Street Journal,* September 1, 1972.

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had warned of an alarming expansion of NPA activity throughout the country and declared in an interview by a leading Asian newsweekly, that "leftist extremists" would launch an "open insurrection" when he retired from office in 1973.[2] Some Philippine commentators, reflecting the widening public controversy over Marcos' policies, charged him with unduly magnifying the danger of subversion; the President, it was said, appeared to be swallowing all that military commanders were telling him in briefings "which he readily passes on to the public."[3]

Whether or not these accusations are justified (in the highly partisan and politically charged atmosphere of Manila it is often hard to tell), there is no denying that the Digoyo Bay incident marked a high level of NPA action and focused attention on this new dimension of the Philippine insurgent movement which formally identifies itself with Maoist doctrine and which has been winning praise in People's China.[4] Before analyzing the present scope and tactical concerns of the NPA and its supporters it is necessary to glance first at the recent history of Philippine communism.

I

The NPA was created by a decision of a "Conference of Red Commanders and Soldiers of the People" at an undisclosed location in central Luzon on March 29, 1969. The date marked the twenty-seventh anniversary of the organization of the Anti-Japanese People's Army or *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (commonly known as Hukbalahap), the resistance movement in the Philippines during World War II.[5] After the war this organization was renamed the People's Liberation Army or *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (HMB). For a while it became the principal Philippine communist and radical nationalist insurgency movement before splitting and largely degenerating into a racketeering and gangster organization. Even so, some later Huk

[2]*Manila Chronicle,* June 26, 1972, and *Far Eastern Economic Review,* June 24, 1972, p. 11.

[3]Apollonio Batalla in *Manila Bulletin,* June 26, 1972. Columnist Ernesto O. Granada remarked in the anti-Marcos *Manila Chronicle* of June 28, 1972, "Since the government cannot seem to stop the rising price of bread it is apparently trying to offer us circuses as a diversion. And these in the form of endless warnings about the rise of subversion. . . ."

[4]See, e.g., *Peking Review,* January 14, 1972, pp. 18-19.

[5]On the founding of the NPA and the CPP(M-L), see especially *The Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines* (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Short Paper No. 52, Bangkok, September 1971), pp. 4, 21. (Hereafter cited as SEATO 52.)

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leaders retained an ideological commitment of sorts toward the underground Philippine Communist Party.

Formation of the NPA had been preceded by a "Congress of Re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines," which met from December 26, 1968 (Mao Tse-tung's seventy-fifth birthday) to January 7, 1969, probably at the town of Capas, in southern Tarlac Province, Luzon. This congress reflected the increasing dissatisfaction of young Philippine radicals with the state of the shattered and underground Philippine Communist Party (*Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* — PKP). Founded in 1930, the PKP had been largely ineffectual before the Second World War, though it did merge with the noncommunist, but radical, Socialist Party of the Philippines in 1938, and subsequently played a major role in mobilizing anti-Japanese resistance. It had been outlawed since June 1957, in the wake of the Philippine government's anti-HMB campaign. As early as October 1950, the PKP's Politburo had fallen into government hands, and by May 1954 one-time Huk "supremo" Luis Taruc had surrendered. The last remaining principal party leader, Politburo member Jesus Lava, had been arrested in May 1964.[6]

In its underground state, however, the PKP, through Jesus Lava and other leaders, had set itself the task of building a united front with any "anti-imperialist" and/or radical nationalist organization in the country, and operating through a plethora of fronts. During the 1960's a number of such groups emerged on the political and economic scene. Meanwhile, widening dissatisfaction with the

[6]Alfredo B. Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila Publications, 1969), pp. 68-71. There is no comprehensive, up-to-date history of Philippine communism. Useful data can be found in Renze L. Hoeksema, *Communism in the Philippines: A Historical and Analytical Study of Communism and the Communist Party in the Philippines and Its Relations to Communist Movements Abroad* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1956); Conrado S. Sabelino, *A Study of the Legal (or Parliamentary) Struggle of the Communist Movement in the Philippines* (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 1958); *Report on Red Threat* (Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities, House of Representatives, Republic of the Philippines, Manila, 1957); Luis Taruc, *He Who Rides the Tiger* (New York: Praeger, 1967); *The Communist Movement in the Philippines* (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Short Paper No. 46, Bangkok, March 1970 — hereafter cited as SEATO 46); "The Huks," *The Asia Magazine,* September 1, 1969; Alvin H. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer to Communism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955); and Frances L. Starner, "Communism and the Philippine Nationalist Movement," *Solidarity* (Manila), February 1971, pp. 9-26. (I have drawn particularly on this last informative article for the concept of PKP united front tactics in the 1950's and 1960's.) See also the bibliographical articles by William Pomeroy and Ben Kerkvliet on source materials on Philippine revolutionary and radical movements in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,* Summer-Fall 1971, pp. 74-90.

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alleged corruption and ineffectualness of the Philippine constitutional and two-party system, and with the sluggish state of the economy and its close ties with and dependence on the United States, provided a suitable seedbed for radicalization, especially among workers, peasants, students and other youth.

Pivotal roles in this radicalization and front-building process were played by such groups as (1) the National Youth or *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM), founded in 1964 and headed by José Maria Sison, former college teacher who was shortly to emerge as the principal leader of the "Maoist wing" of Philippine communism; (2) the Labor Party or *Lapiang Manggagawa* (LM), founded in 1962, whose early leaders included Ignacio Lacsina, a liaison figure in erstwhile Indonesian communist influence in the Philippines, and Cipriano Cid, head of a major outlawed communist labor front organization; (3) the Free Peasants Union (*Malayang Samahang Magsasaka — Masaka*), founded in 1964, and led by Felixberto Olalia, one-time chairman of the principal PKP farmers' organization, together with a few "ideological" (i.e., communist-oriented) Huk underground leaders and some noncommunists; and (4) the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), founded in 1967, which initially attracted prominent noncommunist intellectuals and political figures, although its political orientation appeared evident from the fact that its first general secretary was the earlier named José Sison. (Sison eventually lost interest and more moderate leaders assumed control.) [7]

Overlapping leaderships and memberships, no less than factional disputes, facilitated formation of other fronts and splinter organizations. Among these were the Socialist Party of the Philippines (successor to the pre-World War II group of the same name), largely formed out of the LM in 1967 with Olalia as presi-

[7] On these groups, see especially Arthur Zich, "The Many Faces of Philippine Communism," *Life* (Asia edition), July 10, 1967; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communist Fronts in the Philippines," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1967, pp. 65-75.

MAN and *Masaka*, as well as such organizations as the Philippine chapter of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, with a following among leftist intellectuals; the *Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino* (Free Union of Filipino Youth — MPKP), a 2,000-member student group; and the *Ang Kapatrian Sa Ikauunlad Natin* (Brotherhood for Our Development — AKSIUN), a federation of the unemployed, have been described as "mass" organizations that "rejected and condemned the Maoist intrigues" (W. J. Pomeroy, "The Philippines: Neo-Colonialism in Crisis," *Marxism Today*, March 1972, p. 79), and may be characterized as among the principal groups still influenced by the PKP. Some members of all of these organizations, however, and especially of MAN and *Masaka*, began to drift toward Sison, the CPP(M-L), the KM and other Maoist-influenced groups from 1969 onward.

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dent and Sison as vice president, which later seemed to drift in a Moscow-oriented PKP direction; and rival offshoots of KM like the *Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan* (Democratic Youth Organization) or SDK, also established in 1967. Other youth groups such as the Movement for a Democratic Philippines, established early in 1970 and dominated by KM, must be considered as part of the same communist-infiltrated, radical nationalist organizational complex, along with a number of trade union allies. The ideological position of this complex will be considered presently. It is to be noted now, however, that the NPA and its parent organization, the "Re-established" Communist Party of the Philippines — or more properly, as its constitution prescribes, the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) or Communist Party of the Philippines (Mao Tse-tung's Thought) [8]—emerged as the culmination of this developing organizational complex and its effectiveness in radicalizing and mobilizing certain segments of the urban intellectual, trade union and peasant societies, particularly in Luzon.

Ironically, much of the initial impulse for this development had come from the united front directives of the PKP leadership. But the self-styled Maoists of the CPP (M-L) determinedly set themselves against the "modern revisionism and Right opportunism" of Jesus Lava, his brother José, and other PKP leaders. Generally considered Moscow-oriented, the latter were quick to respond in kind. Today the PKP, which continues to exist, albeit ineffectually, in a few dozen furtive branches and cells and in a small number of satellite trade union executive committees, is using its media to denounce the "cowboy ideology" of the CPP (M-L) leaders who have "turned the gun into a fetish."[9]

The breakaway of the Maoists and the formation of their own party had causes beyond the fact that the PKP had, to all intents and purposes, become a paper party, hoping for the survival of the radical Left through new fronts. Other factors must be considered briefly. These include (1) the businesslike brigandage of the HMB and its *de facto* integration in the Philippine political establishment; (2) the appeals and influence of People's China and the concurrent emergence, especially in student circles, of a

[8]Cf. Article 1, Section 1, of the "Re-established" party's constitution: "The name of this organization shall be the Communist Party of the Philippines. If ever the need arises the Party shall further differentiate itself in name and substance from the Communist Party of the Philippines (merger of Socialist and Communist parties) by appending the phrase Marxist-Leninist or Mao Tse-tung's Thought in parentheses." SEATO 52, p. 44. Henceforth in this article the "Re-established" Communist Party of the Philippines will be designated as CPP(M-L).

[9]Cf. the PKP's "internal bulletin," *Ang Komunista*, February 1971, p. 13.

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cult of revolutionism drawing inspiration from Maoist and Guevarist doctrines; and (3) a heightened and widening public awareness, again particularly in urban intellectual circles and among the youth, of the inadequacies of the Philippine constitutional and party system, and the weaknesses of its U.S.-oriented economy and foreign policy.

The HMB by the middle 1960's had become primarily a gangster organization, although a Marxist ideological element, maintaining a tenuous connection with the PKP, was never missing from its leadership.[10] The Huks were extensively involved in vice and extortion rackets, working in close alliance with corrupt public officials some of whom owed their election to Huk money and influence, and operating as an invisible "counter state" or "alternative government" with their own "law" and "tax collectors." Sometimes they dispensed rough Robin Hood justice on behalf of an exploited tenant farmer and against extortionist landlords.[11] Unlike the earlier Huks, "The present HMB is a Mafia-like organization which provides protection to individuals or groups for a fee," one Philippine reporter charged in 1968.[12]

In the later 1960's Pedro Taruc and "Commander Sumulong" (Faustino del Mundo) established a crude leadership hegemony over Huk operations and attempted to give them a revolutionary ideological quality by calling their organization the *Bayung Fuerza Democratika Ding Memalen* (New People's Democratic Force).[13] But by mid-October 1970 Sumulong had been captured

[10]Commanders Pedro Taruc and Sumulong (Faustino del Mundo), identified with the Huks at their most gangsterlike stage in the later 1960's, declared in an interview that they were not communists but nationalists; that they wanted a truly free Philippine government not dominated by U.S. military and economic interests in collusion with Philippine "sugar barons" and officials. (Ron de Paolo, "Huks," *Life* [Asia edition], July 10, 1967, p. 21.) Sumulong, from time to time, also sought to portray himself in "populist" terms as a champion of the rural oppressed, but he appears never to have developed a coherent political philosophy; while denouncing "romantic anarchists," he admired some of Mao's tactics of "encirclement." *Philippines Free Press,* May 8, 1971.

[11]On Huk involvement in the vice and protection rackets in the City of Angeles near American-manned Clark Air Base, and elsewhere in Pampanga in this period, see, e.g., *Philippines Herald*, June 11, 1966 and February 20, 1969. On Huk political and "counter state" activities, see "By Huk or by Crook," *Philippines Free Press*, November 6, 1965, pp. 10, 16; "The Huk Situation," *ibid.*, August 6, 1966, pp. 2, 3, 41, 69; and "Huk Election Drive," *ibid.*, September 27, 1969, pp. 9, 34. By the end of 1968 Huk influence over "governors and mayors" and other political leaders was reported to be giving the government grave concern. *Straits Times* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), January 1, 1969.

[12]Eddie M. Magat, "What Are the Huks Up To?," *Philippines Free Press,* May 4, 1968, p. 10.

[13]On Pedro Taruc and Sumulong, see Eduardo Lachia, *Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971), pp. 136-154.

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and Pedro Taruc had been killed. In any case, to the emergent Philippine Maoists and nationalist radicals neither the severely compromised HMB nor the *Bayung Fuerza* could qualify as a genuine "people's liberation" army. The NPA was designed precisely to fill such a need. (It might be noted that in 1969, under circumstances not yet clear, the older PKP underground leadership had formally dissociated itself from any connection with the HMB main organizations led by Taruc and Sumulong. "Ideological" Huk minority factions drifted eventually to PKP and CPP (M-L) control.)

Communists among the Chinese community collaborated with the PKP probably even before World War II, and certainly during the war and again in the postwar Huk movement. Reports of varying degrees of reliability on the existence of an all-Chinese Huk squadron, a nationwide Chinese Politburo functioning as a counterpart of the PKP Politburo, even the inclusion of a Chinese in the top PKP leadership, all have had currency since the late 1940's and early 1950's.[14] In the 1960's Philippine armed forces and congressional sources repeatedly called attention to Chinese-run training centers in Bicol and the Visayas, and to the influx of Chinese agents and instructors from the mainland. (President Marcos confirmed this publicly during his U.S. visit in 1966.) Meanwhile, Philippine Chinese and Filipino students were reportedly traveling increasingly on all-expense-paid tours to People's China.[15] In July 1966 a number of KM leaders, whom the

[14]SEATO 46, pp. 12-13, 28; *Manila Chronicle,* November 20, 1951; George H. Weightman, *The Chinese Community in the Philippines* (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1952), p. 139; Sheldon Appelton, "Communism and the Chinese in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs,* Fall 1959, pp. 376-391.

Chinese veterans of Mao's Eighth Route Army provided guerrilla training to the Huks. Later, because of disaffection with the Huks' "amateurishness," Chinese communist guerrillas in the Philippines formed their own "Wachi" unit which operated independently against the Japanese. Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of War: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 7.

[15]*Manila Times,* September 28, 1965; *Philippines Herald,* March 27 and 29, 1966; Nestor Mata, "Troubadours of Peking's Line," *ibid.,* June 7, 1966; Oscar S. Villadolid, "Peking's Squid Tactics," *Manila Bulletin,* June 7, 1966; "Meet the Press" interview with President Marcos, NBC Broadcast, September 18, 1966 (Washington: Merkle Press), Vol. 10, No. 38, p. 6; and *Far Eastern Economic Review,* November 16, 1967. Prior to the abortive coup of September 30, 1965 in Indonesia, Chinese communist influence in the Philippines was greatly amplified by infiltrating Indonesian communists, then generally Peking-oriented. (Cf. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Philippine Communism and the Chinese," *The China Quarterly,* April-June 1967, pp. 137-140.) Also, after the 1965 coup, underground and exiled Indonesian communists and illegal Indonesian immigrants were reported to be establishing contact with Huks and Chinese communists in the Philippines. See, e.g., *Djakarta Times,* April 21 and September 13, 1967, and *Armed Forces Daily Mail* (Djakarta), December 14, 1966.

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author interviewed in Manila, claimed to have traveled to China, several repeatedly. At the same time some Huk cadres were reportedly being sent to the Chinese mainland for training and indoctrination.[16]

Noticeably, after 1967, China began stepping up denunciations of the Marcos "U.S. puppet" government, praising anti-American student and worker demonstrations in Manila as well as the "vigorous guerrilla warfare" of the Huks (described by Peking as "the People's Liberation Army"), and declaring that the prospects and conditions for revolution in the Philippines were "splendid."[17] In the islands the most tangible aspects of this developing Sino-Philippine interaction were sympathy, especially among the youth, for a generalized cult of revolutionism (which elsewhere has been termed "Pop-Maoism"[18]), admiration for the achievements of People's China, and a conviction that the Maoist "people's war" doctrine is applicable to the Philippines. In evidence was a trend toward the creation of a genuinely revolutionary "people's liberation" force in the Philippines.

Finally, from the widening mood of dissatisfaction with the Philippine political establishment there has developed a conviction that only drastic, perhaps revolutionary force can effect any meaningful change. In 1966 one perceptive young Philippine journalist commented on the "atmosphere of ferment," "a sense of the country's reaching a turn in the road," that could lead either to a new political stability or to a period of unrest.[19] Today, the graphic words of a veteran editor of a Manila news periodical — "our country is crawling with revolutionaries of all hues, shapes and sizes"[20] — exaggeration aside, are suggestive of the prevailing popular frustrations and discontent.

An analysis of what ails the Philippine establishment lies

[16]Bernardino Ronquillo, "Huks Push South," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* August 21, 1969, p. 453. I was informed by Philippine armed forces intelligence sources that Huk and later NPA cadres had trained in "people's war" camps on Hainan Island and at Nanning in Kwangsi Province in People's China since 1966. Agents trained at Nanning were reported to have established a "Philippine Liberation Army" in the southern Philippines early in 1968. *Djakarta Times,* January 6, 1968.

[17]*Peking Review,* September 15, 1967, p. 38, and August 23, 1968, pp. 28-29; *Sabah Times* (Kota Kinabalu), May 31, 1967, and *Straits Times,* September 4, 1967.

[18]Justus M. van der Kroef, "The 'Pop-Maoist' Syndrome," *Contemporary Review,* February 1969, pp. 76-80, 90.

[19]Lorenzo J. Cruz, *The Asia Magazine,* June 26, 1966, p. 14.

[20]Leon O. Ty, *The Examiner* (Manila), June 3-17, 1972, p. 1.

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beyond the scope of this article. But certainly the record notes corruption and malfunctioning in virtually all the public services, aggravated by graft, influence-peddling and nepotism. Gross inequalities in wealth and income distribution are rendered even more nefarious by an antiquated and inept tax system. (One study by the Philippine Congressional Economic Planning Office indicated that in 1965 about 50 per cent of all families earned less than 1,500 pesos or about $230 a year, while only 2.6 per cent earned 10,000 pesos or $1600, and "the top 5% of income earners earned more than those in the bottom 60%.") The seeming inability of the political party system to deal effectively with these problems has alienated many citizens. And the widely held belief that the Philippines, because of the power of the rich in such areas as the sugar industry and the import sector, has remained too closely tied to U.S. foreign policy and trade interests, adds to the discontent.[21]

Increasingly, a nominally democratic political system, dominated by an oligarchy of a dozen or so powerful families controlling public affairs and the economy, has been seen as unresponsive to the need for change; political life, meanwhile, seemed wholly preoccupied with "the endless pursuit of influence and security through the exploitation of patronage, relationships of personal fealty and volatile alliances with equals who provide transient security in the shifting political battleground."[22] In June 1971, a much vaunted Constitutional Convention began deliberating in Manila on a new fundamental law for the country, which would replace the 1935 Constitution now considered too "American" in construction. But partisan political wrangling, and charges of bribery and influence-peddling, quickly robbed "Con-Con" of most of its promise. On October 20, 1972, however, as the effects of martial law imposed by President Marcos on the country on September 22 made themselves felt (see below, Part V), the Constitutional Convention adopted a formula which would permit Marcos to become premier in a parliamentary-cabinet form of government. He would keep his present presidential powers, including his martial law authority, until he was ready, at a time of his own choosing, to have an interim parliament designate the

[21]Edward R. Kiunisala, "Roots of Discontent," *Philippines Free Press,* May 9, 1970, p. 8, and Gracianus Ryes, "Vision for Violence," *Solidarity,* April 1970, p. 5.

[22]Frank H. Golay, "Some Costs of Philippine Politics," *Asia,* Autumn 1971, p. 46, and P. D. Hutcheon, "Power in the Philippines: How Democratic Is Asia's First Democracy?," *Journal of Asian and African Studies,* July-October 1971, pp. 207-216.

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cabinet leadership of the new government. This Constitutional Convention decision, in effect, gave Marcos unlimited time to stabilize his powers and future position.

Especially in central Luzon, nearly a decade and a half of land reform legislation has brought but small gain for the tenant farmer. Between 1963 and 1971, only 53,420 tenant lease rentals were fixed, out of a goal of 640,000, and little more than one-half of one per cent of the 600,000 hectares to be expropriated for redistribution were acquired. One leading agronomist, Romeo T. Herrera of the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines, has estimated that it would take 1300 years at the present rate to implement the 1963 agricultural reform code and related measures and turn tenants into owner cultivators.[23] There is no doubt that the "grinding poverty" and usurious sharecropping and debt relationships with landlords in which hundreds of tenant farmers find themselves in such provinces as Pampanga (tenancy rates in some municipalities go as high as 95 per cent) provide a sounding board for radical political appeals and/or Huk support, although the degree of the interrelationship is difficult to establish.[24] Conversations with Manila intellectuals and student militants in the 1960's gave me the impression that the Huks were admired: they represented at least an attack on the Pampanga landlord establishment and its political ancillaries in the capital, although Huk brigandage was seen as hopelessly compromising the "revolutionary purity" of this attack.

In the radicalization process carried forward by the communist united front complex, urban identification with the Huks proceeded steadily. Eventually it reached the point where Huk "Commander Dante" (Bernabe Buscayno), the Tarlac sharecropper's son who became Sumulong's protégé and subsequently a principal leader of the NPA, acquired an aura like that of Che Guevara — at least for the KM and youthful militants. "Dante for President," students reportedly shouted as they attempted to storm the presidential palace, Malacanang, in Manila, on the night of January 30, 1970, when the NPA was not quite a year old, in one of the country's worst political riots in recent memory.[25]

[23]Editorial, *Philippines Free Press*, July 18, 1970, p. 1; Teodoro M. Ela, "Basic Defect of the Land Reform Program," *The Examiner*, June 3-17, 1972, pp. 8, 28.

[24]Donald E. Douglas, "An Historical Survey of the Land Tenure Situation in the Philippines," *Solidarity*, July 1970, pp. 65-79. See also Edward J. Mitchell, "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion," *American Political Science Review*, December 1969, pp. 1159-1171.

[25]*Sunday Times* (Manila), February 1, 1970.

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This January riot, climaxing previous manifestations of student unrest, reflected an accelerating urban radical momentum, with important linkages to trade unions and to some young "activist" Roman Catholic priests and nuns; both the unions and the clergy were now frequent participants in anti-government student demonstrations.[26] Simultaneously, KM, SDK and other youthful militants, probably spurred by the recently formed CPP (M-L) and NPA, were going into the provinces to hold "teach-ins" among rural youth and workers. By the middle of 1970 KM chairman Nilo Tayag was charged with incitement to rebellion, and the KM organization as a whole was being linked by Constabulary and Defense Department spokesmen to a communist plot to overthrow the government. One opposition Pampanga congressman declared that there was evidence that "some Communist oriented students have established a direct link with Commander Dante, whose ideological rebellion has captured their imagination."[27]

The extent of the ongoing radicalization, undoubtedly a basic calculation for the organizers in their formation of the CPP (M-L) and the NPA, could perhaps be gauged by the results of a nationwide poll and analysis of public attitudes toward "peace and order" undertaken for Senator Helena Benitez at the close of 1969: 20 per cent of the respondents favored violence as the only means of bringing about change. Another poll, in March 1970, indicated the readiness of 30 per cent of the respondents to take the law into their own hands.[28] The opening of the Philippine Congress in

[26]The political radicalization of the Philippine clergy in recent years awaits analysis. Its scope can perhaps be gleaned from the forming, in February 1972, of Christians for National Liberation by a group of both Catholic and Protestant clergy and church workers committed (1) to oppose "imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism," and (2) to "mobilize" the masses for a "struggle on all fronts." *Breakthrough* (Quezon City), February 1972, pp. 3, 11. On September 2, 1972, *De Volkskrant* (Amsterdam) reported that more than a quarter of the Roman Catholic clergy, including prominent bishops, were affiliated with an association of Philippine priests which sharply attacks U.S. "imperialism," "feudalism," and urges clerical involvement in the country's "liberation."

[27]José B. Lingad, "The Students and the Huk Rebellion," *Philippines Free Press*, February 28, 1970, p. 11. For an interpretation of the thought-world of radicalized Filipino students, with their disdain for the *burgis* (rich oligarchs) and the *tuta* (anyone associated with American "imperialism"), see, e.g., Ferdinand Z. Littaua, "Some Insights into the Student Movement in the Philippines," *Asia Quarterly*, No. 3, 1972, pp. 203-215.

[28]Russell Johnson, "Is the Philippines Next?," *Liberation* (New York), November 1970, p. 27. The results of the Benitez inquiry seem to contrast with analyses of Philippine political culture as carried out by H. A. Averch, F. H. Denton and J. E. Koehler in *A Crisis of Ambiguity: Political and Economic Development in the Philippines* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, Report Prepared for the Agency for International Development, R-473-AID, January 1970); see

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January 1971 was marked by angry demonstrations of some 4,000 students and young workers who staged their own "Congress of the People" and denounced the "feudal" and "imperialist" establishment; their slogans proclaimed "Revolt Is Necessary" and "Welcome to the NPA." Thus the CPP (M-L) -NPA, created at the beginning of 1969, was capitalizing on the earlier stages of the radicalization process and on the gradual "town-country" merger of Mao-sympathizing rebels. It would seek to speed up the process through new confrontations with the government, in the Luzon hills and plains no less than in the streets of Manila.

Before turning to the program, organization and tactics of the CPP (M-L) -NPA, brief attention should be paid to the ideology of the communist united front complex in the 1960's, since it is this ideology that Philippine Maoists have employed and continue to accentuate. A useful index is the official KM program, which emphasizes that the Philippines is in a "semi-colonial and semi-feudal" state, dominated by "American imperialism," and frustrated in its own historic revolutionary development.[29] Placing class analysis in the foreground, the program notes a principal "contradiction" between "compradors and the big landlords," minions of "imperialist interests," on the one hand, and a broad united front of classes on the other, consisting of national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, working class and peasantry ("to which the vast majority of Filipino youth belong"). The KM conceives of itself as having a "national democratic"[30] mission, which is to combat U.S. "monopoly capital" and implement (1) genuine land reform, (2) a more diversified economic development open to assistance from "all possible sources," (3) "a "nationalist industrialization" process that will benefit Filipino youth, and (4) a

especially pp. xviii, 41-52, 204 and 207. The latter study appears to downgrade the role of social unrest, particularly in relation to the appeal of the Huks, and stresses the generally positive attitude of Filipinos toward their institutions of government (though not necessarily toward those holding office), and the relative stability of the country based on political traditionalism in the rural areas. The RAND report makes for surprising reading in light of the steady radicalization of Philippine political life, the discontent of students and intellectuals, and the growth of leftist opposition groups in lay circles and in the Roman Catholic Church since the middle 1960's. To all of these highly visible manifestations the study pays insufficient attention.

[29]"Programme of Kabataang Makabayan," *Progressive Review* (Quezon City), No. 6, 1965, pp. 68-73. Edited by José Sison, *Progressive Review* was during much of the 1960's a principal organ of the communist united front policy in promoting a radical and nationalist organizational complex.

[30]The reference to "national democracy" in the program of KM and its allies is particularly suggestive of communist influence. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Communist Concept of 'National Democracy'," *Studies on the Soviet Union,* Vol. 4 (1964), No. 2, pp. 39-63.

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new cultural policy that will preserve the Philippine national identity against the "powerful onslaughts" of American cultural "imperialism" — "Hollywood films," the Ford, Rockefeller and other foundations, the Peace Corps, the Voice of America, and so on.

With nuances and variations, these same themes appear in the programs and slogans of KM's united front allies. In the 1962 *Lapiang Manggagawa* platform, also, the Philippine economy was described as "colonial" in nature, and the party dedicated itself to "social justice," including "land for the landless," and a foreign policy free from colonial control and committed to "universal peace."[31] LM's successor, the Socialist Party of the Philippines, declares in its 1967 manifesto that "the Philippines is semi-feudal and semi-colonial," and that "a national democratic power" must therefore be developed by the people to the end of achieving "national emancipation." "Thorough-going land reform" and "nationalization of the economy" are demanded, along with withdrawal of all American military bases ("instruments of a perpetuated imperialist aggression and conquest"); in foreign affairs there is commitment to "a true internationalism of the working class and all exploited peoples."[32]

The "general declaration" of the founding congress of the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), issued in February 1967 in Manila, states that the mass of Filipinos, having seen the Philippine struggle for freedom earlier in this century "frustrated" by "American aggression," and having borne the brunt of "alien dominance of our economy," have now committed themselves "to the difficult struggle for national liberation." Castigating "imperialism," which has turned many Filipinos into "dummies" of "foreign interests," it commits the organization to combat the domestic "upsurge of fascism" and repressive government measures, to support a "moral regeneration campaign" with emphasis on "self-respect, self-reliance, self-denial and assertion of Filipino dignity," and to propagate a "determined and incorruptible nationalism."[33] An informal ideological vade mecum for those caught up in the united front action was Sison's *Struggle for National Democracy*, which asserted that "development of the Filipino national democratic or nationalist movement" had

[31]"The Lapiang Manggagawa Platform," *Progressive Review*, No. 1, 1963, pp. 58-63.

[32]"Socialist Manifesto," *ibid.*, No. 10, 1967, pp. 46-50.

[33]*Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism. Basic Documents and Speeches of the Founding Congress* (Quezon City: Phoenix Press, 1967), pp. 20-25.

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reached the point where "a new class leadership must rise and must be recognized by all other classes in a viable national united front in accordance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Principle of Democracy."[34]

How much manpower was available for this "new class leadership" — more specifically, for the CPP (M-L)-NPA which Sison was to lead? Assessments must be made at different levels. At the postwar low in the Huk organization, in the early and middle 1960's, the hard-core Huks (as opposed to the "mass base" or "service support" groups) rarely numbered much over 100.[35] But there is general agreement that Huk cadres grew significantly later in the decade, probably not least because of the interaction of the KM and its front allies with the rural areas. One authoritative estimate, early in 1970, put Huk forces at between 2,000 and 3,000 (only 200 to 400 of whom were designated as "regular ideologues"), with support coming from an additional peasant "mass base" of 26,000 in central Luzon. A year and a half later the Philippine Armed Forces Chief of Staff declared Huk strength to be equal to that in 1946, when more than 12,000 "officers and men" operated with a mass following of about 55,000.[36]

There has been much skepticism about Constabulary and other official estimates of Huk strength (its inflation by Constabulary spokesmen at the time of congressional budget hearings has led to the derisive term "budget Huks"). But by January 1969, when the CPP (M-L) came into being, there is no doubt that a hard-core cadre of at least 300 "ideological" Huks could be counted on; a much smaller force, probably less than a hundred, were at this point gravitating toward the PKP-dominated *Army ng Bayan* (Army of the Nation) under a shadowy Huk leader known only as "Commander Diwa." To the 300 must be added some 2,000 predominantly urban KM actives, several hundred more in KM offshoots like SDK, and at least 1,000, many in trade unions, who drifted away from the Socialist Party of the Philippines and toward the new CPP (M-L) when the split between Sison and his Maoists and the older, Moscow-oriented Lava leadership of the

[34]José Ma. Sison, *Struggle for National Democracy*, edited by L. V. Teodoro, Jr. (Quezon City: Progressive Publications, 1967), p. 111.

[35]Cf., e.g., the estimates of Philippine Constabulary spokesmen in *Manila Chronicle*, June 27, 1966, and *Philippines Herald*, July 17, 1966. See also the report on the Huk organizational "pyramid" (a top layer of hard-core or "24 hour" Huks, controlling "12 hour" or "combat support" Huks, a "service group," and finally a "mass support" base of up to 25,000) in Quijano de Manila, "The Hard Huk Heart," *Philippines Free Press*, August 6, 1966, p. 42.

[36]SEATO 46, p. 34, and Benigno Aquino, "Philippines—Youth in Revolt," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 10, 1972, p. 23.

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PKP became irreparable in the course of 1968.[37] Sison's followers in MAN numbered perhaps only 200 of the more youthful activists and trade unionists when he withdrew from the organization at the end of 1968, irreconciled with MAN's moderates. *Masaka,* which by 1968 claimed 65,000 members, also split, in April 1969, with one radical faction continuing to recognize Olalia's leadership.[38] Of about 3,000 *Masaka* radicals, the greater part must be considered an informal "mass support" peasant base for the PKP's *Army ng Bayan*; the minority of about 1,000 can be viewed as filling a similar but more active role for the NPA. Thus, allowing for unorganized or partly organized individual sympathizers, the entire CPP (M-L) -NPA complex at the time of its formation consisted of about 5,000. The active guerrilla force numbered at least 500 if additions from KM and its allies are also considered.

II

In early June 1969, in the course of anti-Huk operations, Philippine troops discovered in a tunnel near the town of Capas in Tarlac Province, Luzon, a quantity of documents that revealed the creation earlier in the year, probably also at Capas, of the CPP (M-L) and the NPA.[39] Most of these documents were subsequently made public by the armed forces under the title "So the People May Know," and they provide useful insights into the program and organizational structure of the Philippine Maoist movement.

The documents also confirmed the three-way split in the Philippine insurgency.[40] As was noted above, in mid-1969 the PKP (still under the nominal leadership of José and Jesus Lava, who alternated as its secretary general during the postwar crest of Huk activity, and despite imprisonment remained influential) broke its affiliation with the HMB, then largely under the direction of Pedro Taruc and Sumulong. There is some evidence that the break came with reluctance, although the Lavas' underground

[37]Zich (*op. cit.*, p. 27), writing in mid-1967, said KM had 5,000 members, *Masaka* 21,000, and the *Lapiang Manggagawa*, before becoming the Socialist Party of the Philippines, 200,000. My figures are derived from Philippine armed forces intelligence sources.

[38]Gerrit J. Huizer, "Philippine Peasant Organizations," *Solidarity,* June 1972, p. 30.

[39]SEATO 52, p. i, and SEATO 46, p. 39.

[40]For data on the circumstances resulting in this three-way split, I am grateful to Philippine armed forces intelligence sources which I am not at liberty to identify. See also T. J. S. George, "Maoists: More to Come," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 12, 1970, pp. 12-13, and SEATO 52, pp. 1-3.

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followers had for some time been dissatisfied with the "unrevolutionary" gangsterism that had overtaken the Huk organization. A similar dissatisfaction had been brewing among the united front radicals, led by Sison and his Maoists. While the Taruc-Sumulong leadership had an ideological commitment of sorts,[41] there was apparently resistance to formal adhesion to the PKP's brand of Marxism-Leninism, and in any case their earlier-mentioned New People's Democratic Force was doctrinally and tactically unacceptable. Thus the PKP came to develop its own Army of the Nation (*Army ng Bayan*) with which armed *Masaka* followers affiliated. Soon deprived through death and capture of Taruc's and Sumulong's leadership, the HMB disintegrated by the end of 1970 into a half a dozen lesser underworld fiefdoms, based almost exclusively on the smaller towns in Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija provinces. There has been some "gravitational pull" toward the NPA among the more adventurous HMB rank and file, but both NPA and *Army ng Bayan* recruiting procedures have been selective.

The necessity of a PKP break with the HMB was apparently discussed as early as the secret party conference of April 1968, which was also attended by Sison's representatives and other Mao-leaning radicals. Reportedly, the need to bring the insurgency to a new and "higher level" of "revolutionary action" by organizing a full-scale "people's war" was a major item on the agenda. In the conference discussions the HMB found few defenders, though emissaries of Taruc were present, and though the Lava faction seemed disinclined at first to heed Sisonite insistence that the entire approach to insurgency in the Philippines be reformed and a "true liberation army" be created. This reluctance pointed up an ideological-tactical difference that has been basic to the Sino-Soviet split generally, and everywhere evident in the confrontation between Moscow- and Peking-oriented communist parties, viz., that the demand for a full-scale "people's war" can be dangerously premature and a manifestation of that "left wing communism" which Lenin had branded an "infantile disorder." Indications are that the Lava faction saw a resort to arms at that point as endangering the benefits accruing from the radicalization being carried forward steadily by the militant united front complex. It was upon this issue that the Sisonites afterward broke with the Lava faction and proceeded, at the close of December 1968, with their own Capas conference "re-establishing" the Philippine

[41]See note 10 above.

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Communist Party on the basis of formal "Mao Tse-tung Thought."

The subsequent organization of the NPA, however, gave the Lava-dominated PKP concern, particularly regarding future control over the HMB and its remaining manpower and organization. Apparently fear that the NPA would wholly appropriate the image of dynamic revolutionary action, which was appealing increasingly to Manila's youthful militants and *Masaka* radicals, motivated the PKP to create the *Army ng Bayan* three months later. Thus the rump PKP and the CPP (M-L) each acquired its own fighting force. But it was evident from the start that the *Army ng Bayan* was little more than a token gesture. The Moscow-oriented Philippine communists would in no way permit it to interfere with the PKP's "parliamentary" road and united front activity, now progressing in conjunction with the Socialist Party and its trade union allies. The more so since relations between the Marcos Government and Eastern Europe were slowly beginning to warm and an exchange of embassies between Manila and Moscow was considered to be only a matter of time. At the close of 1970, PKP Politburo member Jorge Maraville castigated the CPP (M-L) -NPA openly:

> Small as it is, this revisionist grouping is publicised widely by the imperialist media in order to promote splitting and to bring discredit upon the popular movement. Its chief harm is done by its highly provocative behaviour in precipitating violence during demonstrations, thus alienating sectors of the population otherwise prepared to support the popular cause, in projecting ultra-extremist phrases and slogans that distort and confuse issues, and in advocating and seeking to promote immediate armed struggles in wholly premature and unfavorable conditions. The value of the Sison group to the imperialists and neo-colonialists can be seen in their efforts to use its provocations as an excuse to move towards suppressing the popular movement as a whole.[42]

In turn the CPP (M-L) attacked the "modern revisionism" of "Lavaism and Tarucism." Even at its founding congress it had adopted a resolution entitled "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party," which excoriated the "subjectivism" of the Lava

[42]Jorge Maraville, "Philippines: Results, Difficulties, Prospects," *World Marxist Review*, December 1970, pp. 21-22. Despite such attacks on the CPP(M-L), the PKP was prepared to admit within a year that the "poor peasantry," in close alliance with the working class which would direct it, could play "the leading role" in the "national democratic" struggle, and that the party had "not yet learned to make proper use" of the revolutionary potential among students and intellectuals. Francisco Balagtas, "The Philippines at the Crossroads," *ibid.*, November 1971, p. 42. This PKP deference to the poor peasantry and the student radicals, perhaps the principal recruiting targets of the CPP(M-L), seems a direct result (like the creation of the *Army ng Bayan*) of the Maoists' competitive influence.

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leadership and its failure to develop "rural bases," as well as "agrarian revolution" and "armed struggle," in accordance with Maoist precepts.[43] According to the resolution, during the party's pre-World War II history the leadership had rejected the creation of rural base areas "because the Philippines was a small country and an archipelago having no rear adjacent to and contiguous with a big friendly country." Concentration of party strength in the greater Manila and central Luzon areas, failure to build a national mass base, and, earlier, failure to give proper attention to the "urban petty-bourgeoisie" as a class ally, were among the PKP's other tactical and organizational errors.

These criticisms found expression in various CPP (M-L) pronouncements such as the lengthy "Program for a People's Democratic Revolution," a copy of which was captured along with other documents at Capas in June 1969.[44] The Program is standard Maoist. It describes the Philippines as a "semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, dominated by the U.S. imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlords and the bureaucrat capitalists," who exploit Philippine raw materials in a disadvantageous exchange for American finished products. The rural poor, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and (though it vacillates) the national bourgeoisie can be led in a "people's democratic revolution": "a new type of national democratic revolution" directed by proletarian revolutionaries who are guided by "Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought." Only the "road of armed revolution," with "people's democratic forces" in the countryside encircling the cities, along with the formation of a broad united front, can bring about the consummation of the Philippine revolution.

Establishment of a "people's democratic state" and of a "coalition or united front government," prepared by a broadly based "national liberation front" which in turn is created "in the course of the protracted people's war," is the aim of the struggle. The "main content" of this struggle and "people's democratic" revolution is satisfaction of the "basic demands of the poor peasants and farm workers for land." But foreign capital dominance will also be ended, and economic life will be organized on the basis of three "sectors": "the state sector, the cooperative sector and the private sector." In foreign relations the hold of the United States and its "reactionary allies like resurgent, imperialist Japan" is to be broken. Close alliance will be sought instead with Albania and

[43]For a paraphrasing and discussion of this resolution, see SEATO 52, pp. 27-32.
[44]The document is reprinted in Lachica, *op. cit.*, Annex B, pp. 283-301.

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People's China, the latter being the "iron bastion" and "reliable friend" of the Filipinos. The new "people's democratic" regime of the Philippines "shall give moral and material support to the revolutionary movements of oppressed peoples abroad," and will be guided by the policies of "the international united front."

One suspects that José Sison had a hand in writing this Program, because its themes dovetail with his earlier writings and with the main ideas of his subsequent analysis of the necessary future course of the revolution in Philippine society, published under the pseudonym Amado Guerrero (Beloved Warrior).[45] The latter, in organization, terminology and substance, reminds one of the analysis of Indonesian society and revolution written nearly a decade and a half ago by the late chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, Dipa Nusantara Aidit; and Aidit's work in turn hearkens back to Mao Tse-tung's essay on *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, originally published in 1939.[46] To be sure, Sison ("Guerrero"), unlike Aidit, specifically acknowledges the "incalculable impact" of "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought." But in its analysis of the Philippines as a "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal" society, its stress on the "national democratic character" of the Philippine revolution, its description of the classes in Philippine society and its assessment of their revolutionary potential, "Guerrero's" work strikes familiar chords for the student of Aiditism and Maoism.[47] This is by no means to deny the originality of much of the book, particularly its first historical chapter describing the Philippine "puppet regimes" of yesterday and today in relation to "U.S. imperialism," its survey of the "basic problems" of the Philippine people, and its analysis of land tenure problems and the corruption of "bureaucrat capitalism." "Guerrero" stresses, however, that contemporary social reform movements in the Philippines, such as those emanating from the Christian churches, are as pointless and harmful as the "modern revisionism" of the Lava

[45]Amado Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution* (Manila: Pulang Tala Publications, 1971).

[46]Cf. Aidit's essay, "Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia," especially pp. 287-300, in the collection of his writings, *D. N. Aidit. Pilihan Tulisan* (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1960), Vol. 2, and Mao Tse-tung, *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* (third edition; Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960).

[47]Without formally acknowledging an intellectual debt to Mao, Aidit in his writings consistently applied Maoist emphases to Indonesian social analysis and, not least because of the volume of his work, might be considered a pioneer in this respect, certainly among Asian communist-movement principals. See Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1965), pp. 129-165.

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"gang" and "Soviet social-imperialism." His prescription is unequivocal:

> It is an absolutely foolish hope that legal possibilities can be exhausted before waging an armed revolution. There can be no end to lawmaking and parliamentary hocus-pocus if the reactionaries are not opposed by an armed revolution. . . . Revolutionary base areas and guerrilla zones must be created in the countryside first. It is here where the enemy has to be defeated before the final seizure of power in the cities. The New People's Army shall advance wave upon wave over a protracted period of time to destroy the enemy in the whole country.[48]

At the CPP (M-L) congress "re-establishing" the Communist Party of the Philippines (December 26, 1968-January 7, 1969), a party constitution was adopted, Politburo, Central Committee and other officers were elected, and plans were implemented for the formal organization of the NPA. The constitution provides that the CPP (M-L), armed with "the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung," will develop Philippine "revolutionary forces" in the rural regions preparatory to encircling the cities from revolutionary base areas.[49] Admission to membership is carefully arranged, workers and peasants qualifying for a much shorter probationary period than those coming from other social classes. "Democratic centralism" governs the hierarchical levels of party organization (from National Congress, Central Committee and Politburo on down to provincial, district, branch and section party conferences and committees). Among the general responsibilities of every party branch is "to muster material and moral mass support for the armed struggle waged by the New People's Army" (Article 7, Section 3c). The NPA, to which a separate constitutional article is devoted, is described as "the main weapon of the Party in the people's democratic revolution and the subsequent socialist stage" (Article 9, Section 3); it functions under the Military Commission, which in turn is responsible to the Central Committee.[50] Noteworthy is the constitutional directive that in labor, peasant, youth and other organizations not under party control, secret groups shall be created by at least three party members, while

[48]Guerrero, *op. cit.*, pp. 224, 289. Philippine Maoist tactics from the beginning called for violent confrontation of U.S. interests in the country so as to compel the Manila government to use its forces to protect them, "thus exposing the real puppetry of the local reactionaries." *Ang Bayan*, August 1, 1969, and *Philippines Free Press*, October 25, 1969, p. 9.

[49]For the text of the CPP(M-L) constitution see SEATO 52, pp. 43-59.

[50]In emulation of the well-known code of conduct laid down for the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the CPP(M-L) constitution, in Article 9, Section 6, prescribes for the NPA "eight points of attention," among them admonitions to "speak politely," "return everything you borrow," and "do not damage crops."

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"Party members in bourgeois institutions of wide scope shall likewise organize themselves secretly into Party Groups" (Article 8, Section 2).

Some of the main personalities of the Philippine Maoist movement now need to be spotlighted briefly. Elected party chairman of the CPP (M-L) at the founding congress was indefatigable José Maria Sison, then twenty-nine years old, an honor graduate and former teacher of literature and social science at the University of the Philippines and later at the Lyceum of the Philippines, a minor poet and the principal organizer (and multiple office-holder) of the communist and radical nationalist united front complex of the 1960's. Sison's chief lieutenant was Arthur Garcia, University of the Philippines graduate and one-time Manila high school teacher who was recruited, like so many other party cadres, through the KM and its offshoots. Garcia subsequently became an officer in an "ideological" Huk unit (led by José Buscayno, "Commander Dante's" brother), and still later a major party propagandist before being shot by one of his Huk companions in a quarrel.

Initial commander-in-chief of the NPA, and CPP (M-L) Military Commission chairman was thirty-one-year-old Bernabe Buscayno ("Commander Dante"). He is the Tarlac peasant's son who evolved into "one of Sumulong's most efficient killers,"[51] but who later fell out with the Huk chief over whom to support in the 1967 Tarlac city mayoralty election and over Sumulong's alleged betrayal (intentionally or through incompetence) of one of Bernabe's closest friends and ideological mentors, the "idealist peasant reformer" known as "Commander Freddie" (Efren Lopez), in early January 1969.[52] Bernabe was well on the way to forming a significant Huk force of his own, predicated on his hazy, Guevarist revolutionary ideology, when the opportunity to ally with the Sisonite Maoist intellectuals presented itself. Significant links in forging this alliance were some of Sison's KM friends who, like Garcia, had joined the "ideological" Huks. The latter, by early 1968, had largely come under Dante's hegemony. As "Commander Dante," Bernabe was able to induce a number of his lieutenants (including his brother José) to join the NPA.

[51]Lachica, *op. cit.*, p. 157. I have drawn extensively on Lachica's useful study for background data on Garcia and Commander Dante and the latter's quarrel with Sison.

[52]At the time "Commander Freddie" was killed, fifteen-year-old Marietta Cacang, who had joined the Huks, revealed to her government captors that while serving with Freddie's unit she got "her ideological lessons from shortwave broadcasts from Peking radio." *The Herald* (Melbourne), January 13, 1969.

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Reportedly, however, only three months after the NPA's formal founding, Dante became disenchanted with Sison's doctrinaire leadership. At a time when a stepped-up government military campaign seemed to spell imminent disaster for the NPA, Dante had little use for the Maoist tactic — upon which Sison at first insisted — of establishing secure base camps, e.g., by means of Viet Cong-style underground tunnels, because these were so likely to be revealed by informers.

After nearly a year of tactical floundering, it was the CPP (M-L)'s urban leg which gave the party and the NPA new support, as student radicalism increasingly enveloped the Maoists in the hills in a new aura of romantic heroism.

On December 29, 1970, Philippine Army Lieutenant Victoriano Corpus, a twenty-six-year-old graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, led a daring raid on the academy's armory at Baguio, seized a quantity of rifles, machine guns and ammunition, and left a note saying that he was joining the NPA.[53] Manila's student militants now had a new hero. By early 1971 Corpus had all but replaced "Commander Dante" (variously reported to be ill, or deeply alienated from Sison) as NPA military commander, and the Maoist insurgency rapidly rose to a new intensity. Meanwhile, NPA documents and spokesmen accused the Philippine armed forces and Constabulary of committing "massacres" of "ordinary civilians" in their "counter-revolutionary" campaign in the Luzon countryside.[54]

III

Corpus' defection — which in the CPP (M-L) mouthpiece *Ang Bayan* (*Our Nation*) he subsequently described as a demonstration to his military colleagues of the "right road" to the country's future, and as having widespread popular support — alarmed the Marcos regime because it dramatized the Maoist appeal among a segment of the Philippines' disaffected young.[55] As recently as September 1969, during his re-election campaign, President Marcos had minimized reports of stepped-up insurgency and con-

[53]*Manila Bulletin,* December 31, 1970 and *Manila Chronicle,* January 1, 1971.

[54]Cf. the NPA statement, signed by Dante and Sison, "The Counter-Insurgency Tactics of the Reactionary Armed Forces," in *China Journal* (Hong Kong), March 1970, pp. 53-59, and Armando Gaston, "Counter-Revolution in the Philippine Countryside," *Eastern Horizon* (Hong Kong), Vol. 9 (1970), No. 5, pp. 43-47.

[55]The reference to *Ang Bayan* is taken from Bernardino Ronquillo, "Eyes Left — Eyes Right?," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 23, 1971, p. 22. Ronquillo notes that "According to a former classmate, Corpus was not the first PMA cadet to go over to the 'other side'," and that Corpus claimed that the armed forces had already been infiltrated by "Maoist forces."

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fidently declared that "We can handle the Huk threat."[56] The Sison-Dante schism may have contributed to this confidence, although Constabulary sources later reported that there had been more than sixty clashes with the NPA in sections of Luzon during 1969 and early 1970. Moreover, at the close of January 1970 there occurred the earlier-noted student riot at Malacanang Palace in Manila, during which five were killed, and which Marcos claimed had been caused by "local Maoist Communists."[57] Armed forces intelligence disclosed that a score of Dante's provocateurs had infiltrated the student demonstration, and Marcos said that the students had shouted "Dante for President!"

In February and March 1970 the crescendo of student rioting and demonstrations continued, with KM and the "Movement for a Democratic Philippines" in the van. When, nevertheless, a bipartisan criticism of Marcos' "red scare" tactics was mounted in the Philippine Senate, the President on May 1, 1970 predicted an "inevitable confrontation" with the "Maoist Communists." By September even the *Manila Times,* which has generally been skeptical of the extent of alleged communist activity in the country, was reporting that the NPA was being "supported by young Communist suspects among the studentry."[58] Three months later Corpus' dramatic raid seemed to justify the Marcos prognosis still further.

Throughout 1971 Constabulary and other forces fought running battles with well equipped and highly mobile NPA units in central Luzon. Marcos claimed at the end of August that the NPA now numbered about a thousand in the front line, and had the active support of an additional fifty thousand.[59] This estimate was made shortly after an NPA unit, equipped with grenade launchers and mortars, had attacked the headquarters of Task Force Lawin at Echague, Isabella Province, destroying two air force helicopters (the NPA also claimed a "reconnaissance plane"). Within a week six soldiers (the NPA claimed thirty) were killed in a clash with a band of about fifty at Barrio Usur, in the Isabella town of San Agustin. On August 26, 1971, according to the NPA periodical *Pulang Bandila (Red Flag)*, over a dozen government "village support" troops were killed or wounded in a two-day clash near the city of Iriga, in the province of Camarines Sur.[60] The last

[56]*Sarawak Tribune* (Kuching), September 3, 1969.
[57]*Sunday Times* (Manila), February 1, 1970.
[58]*Manila Times*, September 17, 1970.
[59]*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, September 25-October 2, 1971, p. 24852.
[60]Radio Peking, New China News Agency (NCNA), International Service in

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engagement suggested that the NPA was steadily widening its operations.

Next to the Philippine Maoists' own periodicals, *Ang Bayan* and *Pulang Bandila*, the Peking media have been keeping the most complete score on NPA engagements with the government. Thus in August 1970 Peking reported the killing or wounding of "74 enemy troops" by a fighting NPA "propaganda team" in Pampanga Province the previous September. In November 1970 reports covered an NPA attack on the Voice of America transmitter in Tarlac, a clash in which six military were purportedly killed, as well as NPA ambushes of "reactionary constabulary forces" in Quezon and Cotabato provinces and the destruction of a military helicopter in Zambales. In December 1970 Radio Peking, citing *Ang Bayan*, claimed that in the past year "more than 200 reactionary Philippine troops and police," as well as fifteen U.S. military personnel, had been "wiped out" by the NPA "in over 80 operations." In December 1971 the NPA was said to have "knocked out" over 320 men of regular Philippine military and paramilitary village security forces during the first four months of the year. In April 1971 the Chinese media, reviewing various alleged NPA successes, described "the present situation in the Philippine revolutionary armed struggle" as "excellent," and repeated this assessment frequently thereafter. In January 1972, in another review of NPA successes, *Peking Review* noted that "with guns in hand" the Philippine people, led by the newly re-established Communist Party, had brought about "an excellent revolutionary situation." In May 1972 Peking media reprinted much of the text of an article in the special March 29, 1972 issue of *Ang Bayan*, marking the NPA's third anniversary.[61]

Peking's official optimism over the maturing revolutionary situation in the Philippines no doubt also took note of the continuing urban unrest in the country, much of it instigated by KM and its student allies, and the political dissension over its causes. A protest campaign, ostensibly over price increases for fuel and other oil products, led to student barricades at the University of the Philippines, the throwing of homemade bombs, and sharp student clashes with police and army in early February 1971. After continuing tension, on August 21, 1971 two grenades were thrown at

English, 0841 GMT, December 26, 1971, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), December 29, 1971.

[61] *Ibid.*, 1556 GMT, August 24, 1970 (FBIS, August 25, 1970), 1725 GMT, December 29, 1970 (FBIS, December 30, 1970), and 0841 GMT, December 26, 1971 (FBIS, December 29, 1971); *Peking Review*, November 20, 1970, p. 22, April 9, 1971, p. 21, and May 26, 1972, pp. 18-19.

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a public meeting of major Liberal Party leaders in Manila, as a result of which seven were killed and scores injured. President Marcos suspended habeas corpus and charged that extremists were attempting to establish a "Marxist-Leninist-Maoist" regime with the aid of a "foreign power" (subsequently identified as People's China).[62] Within hours new and violent demonstrations erupted and other bombs began exploding elsewhere in the capital. Among the targets were the homes of two congressmen. Almost immediately, too, there were new NPA clashes with government forces in the Bicol area of southeastern Luzon, where Constabulary spokesmen said there were 500 NPA's equipped with "highly sophisticated weapons."[63] The arrest of KM leader Luzvimindo David and other prominent radical intellectuals and supporters of Sison in connection with the bomb attacks came as Marcos promised to "liquidate" the communist movement. The President summarized developments:

> Those who might question the existence of armed rebellion should know that as early as 1946 the Communists sought to take over the government. They have been at it since that time and while their first attempt failed in 1953 the movement merely ebbed but did not die. By 1968 the new Maoist movement led by José Maria Sison and Arthur Garcia joined up with Commander Dante and formed the New People's Army —the resurgent Maoist Communist group in the country today.[64]

Meanwhile, however, Marcos met with a mounting chorus of criticism for having suspended habeas corpus. His opponents, some in the Senate, charged that the military had really been responsible for the August 21 grenade attacks. But the President maintained that Philippine Maoists had had a "July-August plan" to burn Manila, kill prominent national leaders and bomb various installations, including those of the JUSMAG (Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group).[65] On September 12, 1971 the election commission declared that because of the NPA upsurge, military units would be called upon to provide protection during the forthcoming congressional elections. Public pressure led Marcos by mid-September to restore habeas corpus in about a third of the country's provinces and order the release of some of those arrested in connection with the August 21 incident — although new arrests,

[62] *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, loc. cit.* See also Edward R. Kiunisala, " 'Making the Scene' at UP," *Philippines Free Press,* February 20, 1971, pp. 6-7, 45-46.

[63] *Manila Bulletin,* August 28, 29, 1971.

[64] *Ibid.,* August 29, 1971.

[65] Cf. Oscar Villadolid, "Marcos Celebrates Behind Barred Gates," *New York Times,* September 19, 1971.

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mostly of KM and other youth activists charged with subversion, were made in November. Moreover, a report by a special Senate Committee, headed by Senator Salvador Laurel, issued early in September, sparked a new controversy between Marcos and his critics. Though admitting the prevalence of lawlessness, the report found that there was "no clear and present danger of a Communist inspired insurrection or rebellion" in central Luzon, and stressed that NPA activity "poses no real military threat to the security of the country."[66] Continuing reports of NPA clashes in central as well as southeastern Luzon tended to strengthen Marcos' rebuttal that the Senate report was politically motivated.

By this time there was little question that Philippine Maoism was "walking on two legs," i.e., fusing a rural insurgency with urban violence spearheaded by students and trade union allies. Sison specifically linked the student struggle to "the achievement of national democracy" and noted that since many students were dropping out of school for economic reasons it would be a good thing for the drop-outs "to engage in a political struggle that seeks to improve their lot and that of the people."[67] This was no idle exhortation: in 1971-1972 as NPA infiltration and armed clashes were being reported along a widening crescent in eastern Luzon, ranging from Isabella Province in the north to Camarines Sur in the south, the insurgents seemed to rely more and more on preparatory propaganda work in a given area by youthful KM teams from Manila and other towns. Through clandestine "teach-ins," these teams sought to make a rural populace more receptive to informal and then formal recruitment efforts by regular NPA "armed propaganda units" (APU). The latter, spreading their influence through local peasant or youth organizations (or in their absence creating appropriate fronts) would constitute the NPA cadre until such time as a CPP (M-L) branch or district committee could be formed, whereupon the APU would move on. It was essentially this pattern of penetration that President Marcos described when, after an on-the-spot survey late in June 1972, he termed NPA expansion in southeast Luzon "alarming."[68]

These infiltration tactics, it might be noted, are of themselves revolutionary: it is not customary in Philippine rural society for elders to be ideologically and politically motivated and led by the

[66] *Manila Times*, September 6, 1971. See also Henry Kam, "Tour Finds Little Evidence of Philippine Rebels," *New York Times*, September 3, 1971.

[67] José Ma. Sison, "Student Power," *Eastern Horizon*, Vol. 8 (1969), No. 2, p. 55.

[68] *Manila Bulletin*, June 25, 1972, and *Manila Chronicle*, June 26, 1972.

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young. But NPA tactics are obviously geared to rural youths, who, confronting an economic future often as bleak as that of the educated unemployed or semi-employed of the cities, provide a fertile recruiting ground.[69] Moreover, to a much greater degree than was the case even with the "ideological" Huks in the days of "Commander Freddie" and "Dante," systematic ideological training is emphasized by the KM and APU propagandists. Organizational commitment to the insurgents' cause is to be based not on greed and terror, in the method of the discredited, crime-oriented Huk majority, but rather is to be founded on a principled idealism and readiness to make sacrifices. Again unlike their Huk predecessors, NPA units have sought from the beginning to make a favorable impression on the peasantry: faithful adherence to the Maoist "eight points of attention" is the norm. They have also demonstrated a readiness to engage in small-scale, but sustained, "set piece" battles, and to concentrate on capture or destruction of military or "imperialist" targets, e.g., helicopters, Voice of America equipment, and local government "task force" and military installations.

What is known of the NPA's internal organization suggests a strong reliance on intelligence and scouting, in contrast to the Huks' more haphazard hit-and-run attacks, and a preference for operational units of about forty to fifty men with a calculated and defined level of firepower. Reportedly, in the battle at Digoyo Bay, in July 1972, it was the coordination and tactical maneuverability of the five or so NPA units involved that surprised the Philippine armed forces and in effect compelled the latter to call in air and naval reinforcements. There has been growing speculation that the NPA is being led by cadres with considerable formal military training, probably acquired at guerrilla training camps in mainland China. Other reports suggest that numbers of retirees from the armed forces have been joining the NPA (or have turned to crime), "having become discontented or desperate for lack of means to support their families."[70] Certainly in the course of 1971-1972, NPA operations assumed greater tacti-

[69]Senator Benigno Aguino, a principal Marcos opponent, has noted that of the 1,007,133 college-educated Filipinos in 1969, only 60.6 per cent were employed. Only 38.3 per cent of the 1,041,004 persons with one to three years of college education were employed, and only 78 per cent of the 1,038,306 high school graduates had work. Aquino adds: "The agricultural youth sector scarcely presents a better picture. Between the spiralling costs of farming and the unavailability of more arable lands, they are driven to the big cities in search of work. There, they find there is not much to fight over." Aquino, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[70]"NPA Huk Haunts," *Pace* (Manila), June 16, 1972, p. 13.

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cal sophistication and were spread over a wider area, as the network of rural sanctuaries afforded opportunities to fan out to other provinces.[71]

IV

What are the chances for success of the CPP (M-L) -NPA complex? Amidst conflicting estimates of its numerical strength — coming from such varied sources as an alarmed and politically embattled President Marcos, KM zealots, skeptical journalists, government intelligence and Constabulary spokesmen mindful of their service budgets, and ex-Huk informers — the writer believes that the NPA now numbers about a thousand hard-core, "full time," generally well equipped troops, and no more than 6,000 supporters in "local guerrilla" and party and front groups throughout the northern and central Philippines. An additional 15,000 persons in the same region should be considered inactive sympathizers, many in student clubs, trade unions, farmers' organizations or other interest groups. In a formal military sense, the complex constitutes no great danger to the Philippine government. (Marcos has repeatedly said that the NPA threat has created an "alarming" but not a desperate situation, and that the government has the capacity to handle the problem.) [72] If this is what the controversial Laurel report of September 1971 also meant when it said that there was "no clear and present danger" to the country from the insurgency, the President and his critics appear much closer on the issue than their verbal pyrotechnics would suggest. Even if the NPA should swell to four or five times its present size in the immediate future, its proportionate military threat could be contained, particularly as an anti-communist backlash would most likely bolster the government. For this reason there is a tendency, both in the Philippines and abroad, to underestimate the NPA's significance.

But the fact is that the NPA and its supporters are engaged in a protracted, long-haul struggle, in an environment of widening disenchantment with established constitutional and political procedures and sharpened consciousness of the economic and social inequities and stagnation that plague the Philippine nation. They

[71] *Manila Times*, December 17, 1971. By mid-1972 heavy NPA infiltration, noted by military authorities in the provinces of Camarines Norte, Camerines Sur, Albay and Sorsogon, was spilling over into the eastern Visayas. In the four provinces, NPA "Commander Benjie" (Benjamin Halliones) was said to be operating with some 100 riflemen, backed by a "service support contingent" of 300 armed guerrillas. *Manila Bulletin*, June 27, 1972.

[72] *Manila Chronicle*, June 26, 1972.

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are counting on a slowly gathering revolutionary momentum, the duration and outcome of which are uncertain. The "main strategic principle" of the NPA, a captured document about its organization says, "is a protracted people's war"; to carry out its armed struggle, according to another statement, different units will be developed, from "regular" and "guerrilla" forces to "city partisans."[73] Time is an essential factor: a fatal error would be a precipitate, all-out drive to power, in the manner of the Peking-oriented Indonesian Communist Party in 1965. Rather, Philippine Maoist tactics call for (1) the steady radicalization of as many social strata and segments of public life as possible, and (2) a widening of the conviction that drastic reform measures are needed, combined with (3) a drawn-out armed insurgency, which erodes government authority and credibility, and which is identified with a disciplined, essentially youth-oriented, idealistic "liberation" movement.

In these "protracted" tactics People's China functions as an inspirational guide and more: reports of Chinese assistance — with arms, agents and training facilities — first to the Huks and later to the NPA, have been varied and numerous over the years. Such assistance is in keeping with Chinese aid to insurgencies elsewhere in Southeast Asia,[74] and the present author knows of no reputable sources, including President Marcos' critics, which deny Peking's active support for the NPA.[75] China has been interested for some time in identifying itself with the seemingly endemic insurgency in the Philippines; well before the NPA's founding, it repeatedly described the Huk organization in the days of Pedro Taruc and Sumulong as the "Philippine People's Liberation Army."[76] Since the NPA came into existence the Peking media have played a

[73]The documents are reprinted in Lachica, *op. cit.*, pp. 315, 318.

[74]Cf. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Peking, Hanoi and Guerrilla Insurgency in Southeast Asia," *Southeast Asian Perspectives* (New York), September 1971, pp. 1-67. It is curious that there is resistance in some academic quarters to assessing the accumulated evidence on the extent of Peking's assistance to communist insurgents, and on Chinese efforts generally to subvert Southeast Asian neighbors. Typical is the review article by Maurice Freedman, "China Facing South," in *The Round Table,* October 1972, pp. 425-440. Freedman marks those who present data on such subversion as adherents of a "right" wing version of Chinese history, "simple minded," falling "victim to cliché," given to seeing "the Yellow Peril" or "the Red Menace," and so on. Nowhere does he bother to deal with the evidence of what he calls the "right" version, apparently preferring to rely on the Pavlovian reflex slogans of academicians in the McCarthy era.

[75]On Chinese aid to Philippine communism, see notes 15 and 16 *supra.* On April 8, 1972, President Marcos charged again that Philippine communists were being trained in China, adding that both Indonesian and Chinese communists had been involved in the local communist movement.

[76]*Peking Review*, June 30, 1967, pp. 46-47, and September 15, 1967, p. 38.

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major role in giving international publicity to its exploits; they rarely fail to mention anti-American demonstrations or eruptions of student unrest in Manila and regularly take note of and eulogize NPA anniversaries. In turn "Amado Guerrero" as "Chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines" is described as sending greetings to Peking on such occasions as the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.[77]

As the Marcos Government steadily moves toward the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the USSR and other East European countries, however, it remains loath to do the same with respect to People's China. The reluctance persists even though a sixteen-member delegation of the Association for Philippine-Chinese Understanding arrived in Peking at the close of April 1972, at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, nearly simultaneously with a twenty-member delegation of the Association of Women Doctors of the Philippines.[78] The first-named association, led by a few prominent Philippine figures from the political, publishing and business worlds, is closely identified with militant nationalistic and anti-U.S. currents in the country. Had it not been for Marcos' proclamation of martial law on September 22, 1972, and the intensified drive against the NPA connected with it, Peking's influence on the Philippine scene would quite likely have grown even outside the CPP (M-L) -NPA context.

V

The pattern of developments described above was crossed by Marcos' Proclamation No. 1081, signed on September 21, 1972 and formally implemented at nine o'clock the next evening, which placed all of the Philippines under martial law. Speculation has it that the proclamation was decided on soon after the *Karagatan* incident, in light of General Staff reports that "a well laid conspiracy was moving steadily into its final stage."[79] Marcos' critics have contended that the President himself provoked and exaggerated a constitutional emergency by having arms caches "planted" so as to perpetuate his administration. On the other hand, in the weeks following the *Karagatan* incident the Philip-

[77]*Ibid.*, August 13, 1971, p. 13; May 26, 1972, pp. 18-19; June 23, 1972, pp. 20-21.

[78]Radio Peking, NCNA International Service in English, 1741 GMT, April 28, 1972, and 1939 GMT, April 29, 1972 (FBIS, May 2, 1972).

[79]T. J. S. George, "Martial Law: How it Happened," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 30, 1972, p. 16.

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pines was troubled by a deepening crisis of order which the government and its intelligence agencies rightly or wrongly attributed to the CPP (M-L) and NPA.

On August 25 the Constabulary Chief, Brigadier General Fidel V. Ramos, warned that the NPA was intending to carry out an intensified "urban guerrilla" struggle, particularly in the Manila area, and that "hit and run activities by decentralized terrorist groups" would increase. On September 1 the National Defense and Security Committee of the lower house of Congress, after a series of hearings, reported that the country was facing an "alarming" threat of communist subversion. Almost simultaneously National Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile asserted that ranking NPA cadres had slipped into Manila to supervise planned "liquidation" and sabotage missions and a stepped-up urban recruitment drive. Throughout August and September there were bomb explosions in Manila, damaging or demolishing stores and public offices: two blasts that shattered a number of City Hall offices on September 9 represented the fifteenth such incident in the greater Manila area within two months. Early September also witnessed renewed clashes between Army and Constabulary units and the NPA in Isabella Province, and National Defense officials revealed NPA assassination moves as outlined by a captured "September-October plan" that also provided for sabotaging Manila airport facilities. Skeptics and critics of the government doubted that the NPA was involved in the bombing incidents at all, attributing them instead to the work of common criminals, although it was noted that the NPA organ *Ang Bayan* did not deny reports that it was to blame for the bombings. *Ang Bayan* merely ridiculed a government report that police had clashed with NPA elements in a Manila suburb.[80]

After new bomb explosions occurred at the site of the Constitutional Convention at Quezon City on September 19, and apparently at the urging of his military advisers, including Secretary Enrile, Marcos signed the proclamation of martial law. News that he was about to do so was leaked, for earlier on the day the decree was signed leftists from PKP and CPP (M-L) fronts demonstrated at the Plaza Miranda in Manila, denouncing the "pattern of fear and repression" that was leading to "an impending imposition of

[80]Associated Press dispatches, Manila, August 26, September 6 and 11, 1972; Reuters dispatch, Manila, September 2, 1972; *New York Times,* September 9, 1972; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 9, 1972, p. 5, and September 16, 1972, p. 25.

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martial law."[81] On the following night, September 22, Secretary Enrile's car was ambushed by unknown gunmen, said by Marcos' critics to be in the pay of the government. Although Enrile was unharmed because he had been riding in an escort vehicle, this incident prompted the President to impose martial law at once.

In a lengthy address to his nation the next day, explaining the extent and details of the martial law condition, Marcos said "There is no doubt in everybody's mind that a state of rebellion exists in the Philippines," and called particular attention to the "lawlessness and criminality" prevailing in Manila.[82] In Isabella Province alone, he continued, the NPA was "now in control of 35 municipalities out of 37" and the communist "invisible government" had been organized through Barrio Organizing Committees (BOC), of which there were now "207 in 25 towns" as opposed to the early 1970's when "there were only 161 BOC's in 12 towns." Communal farms and "production bases" had also been established, and NPA operations were starting to expand in Kawayan, Ocagayan, Nueva Viscaya, Quirino and even the mountain provinces. The NPA was said to have grown to "about 10,000," which "includes regulars as well as farmers in the daytime and soldiers at night." This, Marcos claimed, was an increase of 100 per cent in a six-month period. (This presidential calculation seems difficult to reconcile with an earlier estimate, made in August 1971, that the NPA numbered about a thousand front-line troops and an active support group of 50,000.) Now, according to Marcos, the CPP (M-L) itself had grown to 100,000, while among the front groups KM had "increased its chapters from 200 in 1970 to 317 at the end of the month of July this year [1972]," and its members from 10,000 to about 16,000 in the same period. The SDK "now has 1,495 highly indoctrinated and fanatical members."

Marcos also stressed the "increase in the capability," especially "the manpower and the firepower," of the NPA as evidenced by the discovery of arms caches — for example, in connection with the *Karagatan* incident. According to him this indicated:

(1) That the claims of the New People's Army that they are well funded, have plenty of money, have a basis in fact.

(2) That they now have sources of funds and equipment not only from inside the Philippines but also from outside our country.

[81]George, "Martial Law. . . ," *loc. cit.*

[82]Text of Marcos speech, in English, several Manila radio stations, September 23, 1972, 1100 GMT; FBIS, September 25, 1972. Citations are from this source.

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(3) That the Communist Party and the New People's Army are capable of landing armaments, military equipment and even personnel in the many points, unguarded, in the long seacoast of the Philippines, which seacoast is twice that of the United States.

He added that reportedly the communication system of the Philippine Constabulary had been "utilized" by "the subversives" and that the latter had also organized "urban partisans" in Manila which "still are very active." He noted, too, the "violent disorder" in Mindanao and Sulu, where in fighting between Muslims and Christians thousands had been killed, wounded or rendered homeless. Marcos stopped short of linking this religious conflict directly to the activity of the CPP (M-L)-NPA, although the context in which he referred to the Mindanao fighting seemed to suggest such a linkage. (Earlier in the year he had cited military intelligence reports on gun-running and communist infiltration into the Christian-Moslem struggle, specifically mentioning partial communist infiltration of Muslim armed bands.) [83]

In light of all these developments, Marcos announced in this September 23 address, and in order "to eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our republic," the institutions of the country had to be reformed, "for we are against the wall." Accordingly, in the days and weeks following Proclamation No. 1081 a barrage of reform measures descended upon the Philippine nation. A new land redistribution decree was issued, limiting holdings to about 17.5 acres, and telling the peasants to form cooperatives. A firearms ban was announced, carrying the death penalty as maximum sentence for violations. Work programs for the unemployed and tax reforms were promulgated. Official campaigns urged the populace to drive properly, maintain suitable decorum in public, and stand in orderly line when shopping. Within hours, too, scores of prominent Filipinos were arrested, among them provincial governors, members of Congress, leading journalists and publishers; by the beginning of October, according to one estimate, some 2,000 persons had been detained under Proclamation No. 1081.[84] Extensive press and media controls were gradually lifted, but strict official surveillance over all reporting was maintained.

The effect of these and other measures cannot now be adequately assessed, except to note that reports of urban terrorism in the government-controlled media ceased, although clashes with

[83] *Manila Chronicle*, June 22, 1972; *Manila Bulletin*, June 24, 1972.
[84] *Amnesty International Newsletter* (London), November 1972, p. 2.

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NPA units were said to be continuing in other parts of the country. On October 2, 1972, for example, Information Secretary Francisco Tatad announced that an undetermined number of NPA members had been wounded in an exchange of fire with government forces in Camarines, southern Luzon, the previous week. On October 22 Tatad said that a "Maoist uprising" had occurred in Mindanao, where the city of Marawi had been attacked and a "Maoist flag" had been hoisted on a military barracks before government forces put the insurrection down. Scores were reportedly killed in this attack.[85]

Earlier in October NPA units, according to armed forces intelligence, were concentrating in the difficult terrain of Quezon and Rizal provinces, for what was expected to be an all-out assault on the capital, and the Manila *Daily Express* (a virtual government mouthpiece) reported that communist "suicide squads" had been formed to kill Marcos and Enrile.[86] Constabulary Chief Ramos indicated that the NPA "strike force" aimed at Manila was composed of 350 insurgents. The notion that the Philippine capital might have anything seriously to fear from so small an insurgent force struck some observers as ludicrous. Others speculated on the connection between the seemingly dormant guerrilla organization in Manila and the "strike force" outside, pointing to its significance as part of the long-range NPA strategy of demoralizing public confidence in established authority.

Last June, in what appeared to be a fit of personal despondency, President Marcos described his country as "a sick society," and with remarkable alacrity and intensity the media began commenting on this characterization and the alleged "immorality and amorality pervading national life" in the Philippines.[87] Whatever its long-term results, Marcos' promulgation of martial law has clearly been designed to tie the government's anti-NPA campaign to the program of reform and rehabilitation which the President hopes will cure his nation's illness. The initiatives taken implicitly acknowledge that the appeals of the CPP (M-L) and the NPA spring from the wide sense of constitutional, public administrative and economic *malaise* observable in the Philippines for more than a decade. To the degree that Marcos fails to implement his desired

[85]Associated Press dispatch, Manila, October 2, 1972; Agence France Presse dispatch, Manila, October 22, 1972; *The Times of India*, October 23, 1972.

[86]*New York Times*, October 8, 1972; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 21, 1972, p. 5.

[87]"Beleaguered Republic — The Sick Society," *Pace*, June 16, 1972, pp. 15-19. See also Vic Barranco, "Our Sick Society," *The Examiner*, June 3-17, 1972, pp. 3, 34, and "Sick, Sick, Sick!," *Philippines Free Press*, June 24, 1972, pp. 1, 62.

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reforms (and some, like the landholding limitation and redistribution program bring to mind the failure of similar measures in the past), the temptation to perpetuate or magnify the danger posed by the CPP (M-L) -NPA will become almost irresistible, in turn deepening the political polarization between the President and his many, including noncommunist, critics.

NPA tactics are clearly geared to such a contingency. In the wake of the major arrests almost every student activist felt uneasy — and was further radicalized: in the provinces youthful militants, afraid that their names are on wanted lists, have gone underground, some joining the NPA bands in the mountains.[88] Intelligence reports in the middle of October indicated that in Isabella landless rural workers and peasants, backed by NPA units, had taken over the holdings of large landowners. Fighting between the landlords' armed retainers and the NPA was often bitter, and the animosities thus intensified are not likely to be assuaged by Marcos' land reform measures. There is no question that the network of CPP (M-L) Barrio Organizing Committees is widening, and no evidence that present security measures are dealing significant blows to the Maoists' front groups such as KM. On the other hand, at the close of November the boldness and sweep of Marcos' reform decrees and plans seemed to have captured the imagination of most Filipinos if only for the time being.[89] On the whole, public support for the President appeared strong, even in restive Manila. An all-out NPA attack on the capital, if it ever was likely, has not materialized. As was the case a year ago, the NPA is still no direct threat to the government. But it remains highly mobile, well supplied, and is making excellent use of terrain; it is probably stronger than ever as alarmed dissidents take to the hills. Marcos has bought some time — but time is also the Maoist guerrilla's main ally.[90]

[88]Tillman Durdin in the *New York Times,* October 10, 1972.

[89]For the effects of Marcos' reform policies, see my "Communism and Reform in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs,* Spring 1973 (forthcoming).

[90]The CPP(M-L) organ *Ang Bayan,* on October 1, 1972 issued a call for the "armed overthrow of the fascist government" of Marcos, claiming that the party was the "most prepared" to lead such a struggle and pledging to cooperate "with all forces" opposed to the "U.S.-Marcos clique." (Also cited in *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* Vol. 2, No. 4, 1972, pp. 458-459.)

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POLITICS AND PROFESSIONALISM: THE SOUTH AMERICAN MILITARY*

by Charles D. Corbett

CONTRARY to the hopes and expectations of many U.S. scholars and policymakers, military officer corps continue to play a role ranging from key to dominant in the politics of Latin America. With the February 1972 addition of Ecuador, five of the ten Latin countries of the South American subcontinent have military governments that acceded to power by coups. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru are the others.[1]

Much analysis since the mid-1950's has been devoted to the theme of civil-military relations in the region; or more accurately, to considerations of shifts in what is frequently viewed as a struggle for dominance between the forces of *civilismo* and *militarismo*. The tenets of political liberalism have most often been the guideposts against which the gains of one side or the other were measured. A generally accepted sentiment of the 1960's held that Latin America had long suffered from militarism (or neo-militarism), but that increasing professionalization of the armed forces and the emergence of middle sectors as prime power contenders in developing societies would swing the balance toward *civilismo*. An appropriate role for soldiers in the national development process became an important component of the discussion.[2]

*This article is adapted from a paper presented at the Second University of Miami Conference Regarding the Current and Prospective U.S. Situation in Latin America and Its Interrelations with the East-West Struggle, held November 4-5, 1971. Some of the material also appears in the introductory chapter to the author's monograph, *The Latin American Military as a Sociopolitical Force: Case Studies of Bolivia and Argentina* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972).

[1]Paraguay has an elected regime with strong military influence. In Uruguay, civil-military relations are in a state of flux following the officer corps' assumption of broad civil powers during the campaign against the Tupumaro guerrillas. The officers show no inclination to relinquish their new power; indeed there is every prospect that they will seek to expand their role. The Marxist government in Chile and the two broader-based governments in Venezuela and Colombia comprise the other elected regimes. The latter two face presidential elections in 1973 and 1974 respectively.

[2]For a typical expression of liberal anti-militarism, see Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1961); the developmentalist view is posited by John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). José Nun summed up the most common models used by U.S. analysts during the decade to discover the structural causes for military intervention: (1) A liberal model finds the causes in the armed forces

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Social scientists who puzzled over the *civilismo-militarismo* dichotomy were handicapped in two respects. Little was known about the institutional nature of the military establishments or their peculiar structural location in the societies, and both these factors were undergoing changes during the period that were to make questionable some of the basic premises of the analysis. Recent scholarly works have begun to fill in the blanks and to take cognizance of far-reaching changes within the armed forces that challenge both our images and some aspects of our policy toward the region.[3]

Militarism vs. Professionalism

The concepts of militarism and professionalism are central to our perceptions of the Latin American military. The persistence of the former and the failure of recognized gains in professionalism to stem it, have puzzled academicians and policymakers. The classic examples of militarism resided in the historical alliances in many European countries between the officer corps — comprised of second sons of the aristocracy who frequently practiced the profession of arms as an honorific occupation — and the traditional ruling classes. The officer corps formed an interest group dedicated to the support of the existing system. Its salient characteristics were "a domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals and scales of value"[4] and "an attitude toward public affairs which conceives of war and the preparation for war as the chief in-

themselves, because of typical traits attributed to the institution and what is seen as an officer caste system. (2) A developmental model underlines the heteronomous character of interventionist pressures; the army must compensate for the absence of modern skills in countries with a low level of socio-economic development. (3) A socialistic model locates the structural factors both within and without the military establishment; hence, the suppression of interventionism as an interference with the expression of the will of the people is a function of the disappearance of the bourgeois state and the deliberate subsequent politicization of the officer corps. *Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup* (Berkeley: University of California Press, Institute of International Studies, monograph, 1969).

[3]Among them: Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Nun, *op. cit.*; Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, 1971); Lyle McAlister, *et al., The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies* (Washington: The American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970). Robert Potash's *The Army & Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), provides an excellent in-depth analysis of an earlier period which will be extended in a new work. Einaudi is preparing a book-length work on Peru.

[4]Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1937), p. 11.

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struments of foreign policy and the highest forms of public service."[5]

The classic maneuver to break up this alliance and remove the military from the political equation — or at least limit its influence drastically — was "professionalization." Officership was made a full-time paid profession, requiring long years of specialized preparation for advancement through a rigidly bureaucratized system. The structural location of the military within the society was fixed within the long traditions of civil control, and its role was defined as an apolitical one. Except for the deep-rooted martial spirit that persists in modern-day Paraguay, the reflections of old-world militarism that were evident in the post-independence period have long since disappeared in South America.

Civil wars were endemic following independence but the region has been characterized by its generally peaceful international relations.[6] Recent research tends to undermine the image of a region-wide nineteenth-century alliance between the oligarchy and the military, and certainly the various officer corps have in this century been largely middle-class bodies. (Indeed the intensive socialization process of the career system, described later, brings into question the weight assigned in the past to class analysis as a technique in studying military institutional change.) A neo-militarist predilection for the frequent use of military power to dominate domestic processes, on the other hand, has endured despite the advent of conditions that saw the demise of militarism in "Western" experience elsewhere.

Because they are based on "Western" experiences, Samuel Huntington's distinguishing characteristics of the military professional — expertise, responsibility and corporateness — are helpful but not sufficient to define professionalism in the Latin American context. In the first instance, the controlled application of violence is singled out as the peculiar skill of the officer; that this be utilized only for socially approved purposes is the imperative of the second; and the bureaucratized, hierarchical and socially delimited nature of the military institution contributes to the third.[7]

An astute analyst of civil-military relations in Latin America has posited these requirements for a professional army: (1) the

[5]*Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. I (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 446.

[6]See Peter Calvert, *Latin America: Internal Conflict and International Peace* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969).

[7]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1957), pp. 7-18.

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specific duty to act as guarantor of the state's security against foreign aggression; (2) the inculcation of strict patterns of authority with emphasis on the necessity for discipline and obedience within a hierarchically organized command system; (3) formal training for officership; (4) institutionalization of a military career with a regular salary and a clearly defined pattern of promotion and advancement within the organization, based on the universal criteria of ability and achievement.[8]

Both sets of requirements presuppose a narrow, functional area of expertise for the officer and sharply limit the military institution's role in society to the primary socially acceptable use of violence, i.e., security against overt aggression.[9]

General Benjamin Rattenbach, an Argentine military sociologist, differentiates between "organic" and "vocational" aspects of professionalism. The first signifies placing the military career on a stable basis through the satisfaction of two conditions: education of career officers in a formal school system; and promulgation of laws that assure regularized and fair promotions, assignments, retirements and administrative actions. The second requires that the officer dedicate full time to his profession. General Rattenbach agrees that *apoliticismo* has not followed from professionalization, but argues that the phenomena are independent in the Latin American context and likely to remain so:

> The old European professionalism could create a theory of conduct appropriate to its ends — *apoliticismo* — that worked well for its environment of developed political culture. Among us it did not work, and we now know why. Consequently we must create a new theory more appropriate to our environment that takes into account the logical and very real relations between politics and the armed forces so that they cease being constant factors of perturbation and assist the country to achieve development and greatness. In other words we have to define anew the role of these forces in the breast of the society, differentiating it from the European or North American *schema* and molding it to the reality of nations under development. Thus, for example, one could say that they have for a current mission in such countries not only that of exterior defense and internal security, but also that of contributing to the development of the nation in the economic and social aspects as well as the cultural and political. They are not indifferent to any of these aspects, feeling as they do that they are integral components of the society.[10]

[8]Liisa North, *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, Politics of Modernization Series, No. 2, 1966), p. 14.

[9]For a critical analysis of Huntington's model from a U.S. military point of view, see Lt. Col. Zeb Bradford and Maj. James Murphy, "A New Look at the Military Profession," *Army*, February 1969, pp. 58-64.

[10]El Profesionalismo Militar en el Ejercito Argentino," *Temas Militares* (Buenos Aires), March-April 1967, pp. 9-16.

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That the armed forces not only are "not indifferent" to these aspects, but are increasingly determined to play an institutional role in national development in its broadest terms, is indicated by the officer-led "revolutions" since 1964 in four South American countries. Before examining these, however, a more generalized look at some common phenomena is worthwhile.

The Career System and Formation of Political Elites

What comprises the "armed forces?" Do they include all of the institutions that society arms for its order and security? In Panama or Nicaragua where the "national guard" provides police services as well as guaranteeing territorial integrity and defense against external aggression, the entity is easily definable. In Argentina and Brazil, these functions are differentiated in complex structures. Specially designed organizations are charged with customs and border patrol duties, provincial and federal police jurisdictions are carefully defined, and *internal* defense roles of *military* forces are amorphous, whereas their classic mission of defense against external threats is clear and universally accepted. If we accept the "armed forces" as comprising all of society's armed institutions, and the "military forces" as being those concerned primarily with external defense, there are still gray areas in the definitions. The air force most closely fits the "military" definition but the coast guard functions of the navies and the territorial defense missions of all armies distort the distinctions in their case.

Obviously there is no single voice of the "armed forces" in those countries where the coercive forces of the state are complexly organized. However, little practical difficulty is encountered — no matter what the theoretical problem — in delimiting that sector of the "armed forces" in the larger South American countries that has been directly involved in national politics since World War II.

First, one can say that the armies predominate in political activity. Only a handful of officers from the navy have held important political posts, and since the air forces became separate after World War II, only Bolivia has had a chief executive from that service. Second, only the officer corps participates actively in the political game. Enlisted men have not achieved important political influence, and although there have been attempts (e.g., in Venezuela and Brazil) by politicians to manipulate them, the rank and file generally have followed the orders of their officers in political fights. Third, only field grade officers of the line, of the "combat arms," play important political roles. Junior line officers,

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lawyers, doctors, veterinarians, finance officers, quartermasters and maintenance officers do not figure in political councils. And in rather a marked change from the past, retired officers are generally out of the picture unless they maintain strong contacts within the active establishment.

Usually a small group within the larger body of command corps officers makes the decision on whether the army will play a hand in any given situation. Exercise of the coup option requires only the ability to mobilize the support necessary for a temporary power advantage. The hierarchical nature of the institution and the pattern of loyalty established by the annual reshuffling of general officers will normally give the command group that power. Ensuing decisions are infinitely more complex, and participation in the deliberative process much more broadly based. Coups may in some cases still be personalist (as in Bolivia in 1964 and 1969) but the consequences are institutional concerns. The capability to move the government apparatus, and through it the society, in a desired direction depends on the accrual of broad support from the field grade command corps officers. The mobilization and maintenance of this support calls for widespread contacts on the part of the leaders and the careful manipulation of many control mechanisms in a highly sensitive and rank-conscious organization. As will be demonstrated, officer corps have become increasingly heterogeneous in viewpoints, and failure in this intra-institutional political task leads to a counter-coup by a group that more nearly reflects institutional sentiments.

The mobilization, by a military junta, of institutional support for political programs is complicated not only by the variety of views within the officer corps, but by the nature of the career system. Popular perceptions notwithstanding, that system is geared to the production of military professionals who, in their formative years, do not conceive of the presidency as the capstone to a military career.

In South American armies all members of the command corps are graduates of the military academy. There are no career line officers from any other source. Branches (cavalry, infantry, artillery) are chosen early, usually during the first year of the four-year course, and form the basis for lifelong association. Technical officers (quartermaster [*intendencia*] and ordnance [*material de guerra*]) also attend the academies, but their training is differentiated from that of the line cadets after the first year and the associations are not nearly as close. Academy life is

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rigorous, with every aspect of the daily routine carefully structured and controlled. Only the cream of the officer corps is selected to command and administer the academies, and great attention is devoted to the top priority task of character formation. All academies have a mixture of civilian and military *profesores*; some of the former are tenured professors, others are part-time instructors from national or private universities. Tradition is carefully nurtured.[11]

The *subteniente* receives his ceremonial saber, usually from the President, at elaborate graduation ceremonies, and goes off to join a regiment. Officers with a high class standing get a choice of the more desirable units — but all are committed to several years of duty with troop units after commissioning. Discipline is rigid within the officer complement; the colonel's whim is absolute law, and in isolated areas the society approaches that of a "total institution."[12] Near the cities life is less confining, but the colonel will still take an interest in the *subteniente's* social life and overall behavior, and he must have the permission of higher authority to marry. After about four years he is promoted to *teniente,* and sometime during the next couple of years he will attend a six-to-eight-month course at an *Escuela de Aplicación* to sharpen his talents in his combat specialty and broaden his capabilities as a company officer. Promotion to captain will come at about his eighth year and he will probably return to an advanced course at his branch school.

The overriding imperative now is to get into the Command and General Staff course and gain the coveted title of *diplomado de estado mayor* (general staff officer) which opens the road to positions in the higher headquarters and eventual promotion to colonel. Attendance may be by application or selection, but in either case it involves months of intensive preparation for the qualifying examinations, which cover a dismayingly broad range of academic

[11]One Brazilian writer on military affairs says the academies produce a man with a singular image of the national reality, "very subjective and very romantic . . . the nation is an idolized and venerated woman, a kind of fragile mother figure that demands all from her sons. Patriotism is characterized as a manifestation of pious virtue. The nation is perceived as an abstract quality that claims blind and eternal dedication." (Vicente Barreto, "La Presencia Militarista," *ibid.*, pp. 35-39.) Although similar beliefs are quite common among Latin American intellectuals, the present author's familiarity with several academies and association with cadets from seven countries at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, leads him to believe that Barreto's formulation is overstated. It might not have been twenty years ago.

[12]It provides a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered life. Erving Coffman, *Asylums* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. xiii.

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and military subjects. Once accepted, he faces one to three years of intensely competitive study, with under-achievers being dropped from the course at the end of each year.[13] In addition to military organization, administration and tactics — generally keyed to the division level — he will study theories of revolutionary warfare, psychology, sociology, economics, political theory, and massive doses of military history.

He will hear the views of the army's "intellectuals," those senior officers who by reason of their positions or reputations have come to be looked upon as spokesmen for the institution. He will also hear a variety of civilian speakers, and the "academic" side of his education will be in the hands of civilian professors. The course will include tours of his country's strategically important locations, and a trip abroad that frequently incorporates a tour of the United States.

Those officers who survive the full course and become general staff officers find new opportunities open to them as planning or action officers on the general staff of the army or in important territorial headquarters, as instructors or directors in the school system, and as commanders of battalions and groups.

Graduation from the general staff course marks a kind of watershed in the officer's orientation. Up to this point (and for a few years afterward), he has seen himself first and foremost as a military professional, schooled intensively in the military arts and sciences. He takes his profession seriously, assiduously follows developments in organization, tactics and weaponry in other parts of the world, and in many cases writes and publishes on military-related topics. He chafes at the obsolescence of his equipment and the lack of money for maneuvers, and compensates with intellectual activity and meticulous, detailed planning for any conceivable contingency.

The core of his curriculum in the Command and General Staff course is directly related to improving traditional military skills in the management of violence on a large scale and over great distances.[14] If he is sent to a U.S. school during these years his

[13]The full course is three years in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile, two years in Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, one year in Colombia and Venezuela.

[14]All general staff schools in Latin America routinely use division- and even corps-sized operations as teaching vehicles, many drawn directly from World War II European battles. There has been a recent tendency to make staff college exercises conform more closely to actual capabilities in terms of the size of units employed in map maneuvers (i.e., regiments and brigades instead of divisions and corps), but little inclination to limit employment of highly sophisticated forces that are not likely to be counted in Latin American inventories for some years.

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course will concentrate almost entirely on military techniques and will stress the personal satisfaction to be gained out of becoming proficient at them.[15]

There is a distinct "professional" air about any gathering of South American officers at the *jefe* level (majors and lieutenant colonels,) and they feel not in the least intimidated in any professional conversation with a U.S. counterpart by the latter's combat experience in two or perhaps even three wars. Among officers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru there is a noticeable flavor of superiority in another sense. Their training and the high degree of institutional socialization involved cause them to look upon the military officer as a superior being. In the officer's view, his calling and its high purpose set him aside from other men, and lend to his actions an unselfish aura that is uncharacteristic of his environment, where opportunism is the norm among politicians, lawyers, businessmen and other professionals.

Most of those selected for promotion to colonel, after about twenty years' service, will attend a one-year Higher Military Studies course devoted to national problems and goals at the broadest level, which considers all the dynamic forces of the society — military, political, economic, sociological and psychological. The product of these courses is usually a national strategy paper advocating general plans and guidelines for reaching the goals agreed upon in seminar sessions. The small student body includes important civilians from government and the professions, and lecturers from government, industry and the academic community address the students. Graduates will fill key staff and command positions and form probably the most influential element of the military political constituency. These are the officers whose support is essential to the stability and success of any military government.

The point at which liaisons are established between officers and important civilian elements varies by country and is always changing. Schools at the war college level obviously are important to this cross-fertilization process. Alfred Stepan has identified, by profession or occupational grouping, civilian students at the Brazilian Superior War School (*Escola Superior de Guerra*) over a number

[15]Some 765 Latin American officers had attended Command and General Staff courses in the United States through 1969, according to data gathered by Ernest W. Lefever of the Brookings Institution and made available to the author. Through 1971, another 246 had graduated from the course at the School of the Americas in Panama, which is essentially the forty-week course from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth translated into Spanish.

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of years, and the range is surprising. By 1966 some 599 officer graduates had been complemented by 224 students from private industry and commerce, 297 from high levels of government, 39 congressmen, 23 judges, and 107 from the professions.[16] Luigi Einaudi says that civilian attendance at the Peruvian Center of Higher Military Studies became routine in the 1960's, and that 16 of the 43 students in the 1971 course were civilians.[17] In Bolivia the normal course complement is about half officers and half civilians; through 1967, 93 officers and 58 civilians had graduated.[18] In 1970, the National War School class in Paraguay counted a senator and a congressman among its 14 students.

The Argentine army war college (*Escuela de Altos Estudios*) does not admit civilian students, but they are traditionally in a majority at the National War College. The 1971 class counted 27 students from ministries and state enterprises, eight from private industry, four from police and paramilitary units, one university professor and 11 officers. Venezuela's new war college (*Instituto de Altos Estudios de la Defensa Nacional*) counted 11 civilians from government ministries and state enterprises among the 31 students in its first class, which got underway in January 1972. The "colonel's courses" in Colombia and Chile are designed primarily to qualify officers for promotion to general, although some government functionaries do attend the latter.

Other links are established by territorial commanders and their staffs with local political leaders, and the common practice of appointing military governors, mayors and police chiefs (interventors) in times of crisis and civil strife acquaints a wide number of officers with political figures from the civilian side. The large military household staffs that surround most Latin American presidents (the *casa militar*) afford many rising officers an opportunity to get to know important political figures. Traditional family alignments and associations also influence the political contacts and orientation of officers.[19]

Expanded Security Doctrines

Once the officer's professional or military-oriented education is

[16]Einaudi and Stepan, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[17]*Ibid.*, p. 25.
[18]These data and those immediately following were gathered by the author in visits to various military schools of the region in 1970 and 1972.
[19]See, for example, Rogelio García Lupo, "Los Alsogaray: Una dinastía militar," in *Politica* (Caracas), March-April 1968, pp. 29-39. The article traces the long affiliation of the Alsogaray family, many of whose sons have been army officers, with "liberal" political factions.

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rounded out by graduation from the general staff course, and he finds himself involved in larger issues, he becomes concerned about the anomalies of his profession in a region that has had a minimum of international conflict. In the absence of a serious, short-range external threat, he frequently universalizes the communist threat to the "Western, Christian" world and posits a role for his country in countering it. Military interpretations of the local manifestations of that threat, and considerations of the nature of the military response, have led in recent years to a redefinition and great expansion of the concept of national security. The salient characteristic is a nexus of security and economic development that transcends the definitions of national security policy generally ascribed to by other Western countries.[20] Brazilian writer and military critic Vicente Barreto complains that the amplification of concepts of national security has given the military carte blanche to intervene against internal enemies or

against anything that contributes or could contribute to the weakening of the nation. The nature of the threats to national security [is] thus subject to the absolute judgement of the formulator of the doctrine. The expanded concept of national security subordinates each and every social activity to its criteria. National security comprehends not only the military protection of the nation, but principally all manifestations of national life, whether in political, economic, social or cultural areas.[21]

Latin American military men are not given to public exposition of their thoughts on political theory or national security matters, but the following quotations, culled largely from "in house" speeches, indicate the pervasiveness and scope of the new philosophies of national security.

An inseparable tie characterizes, in the Brazilian case, the dual concept (*binomio*) of Security and Development. All the actions of the government that tend toward national development contribute, in themselves, to the strengthening of National Security. This is the concept that we have not only of the national problem, but of all the [South American] continent. *General Lyra Tavares, Brazilian Army Minister.*[22]

[20]See, for example, Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 1. The two primary components of national security policy are military security policy (the external threat) and internal security policy, which deals with the threat of subversion. Huntington's formulation of "situational security policy" is particularly attractive to Argentine theorists. It "is concerned with the threat of erosion resulting from long-term changes in social, economic, demographic, and political conditions tending to reduce the relative power of the state."

[21]In *Cadernos Brasileiros* (Rio de Janeiro), November-December 1966, pp. 35-39.

[22]In a March 1969 speech to the Brazilian Naval War College, "El ejercito brasileño y la actual coyuntura nacional." Reproduced in *Estrategia* (Buenos Aires), July-August 1969, pp. 43-56.

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In short, one can say that in national policy, development and security are strongly integrated concepts, each one of which is directed toward emphasizing or making clearer different angles or focuses of the same concept of nation, understood from a dynamic perspective. . . . Security and development are concomitant concepts . . . the fundamental objective of national security is to [give] a nation the capacity to [determine] its future. *Major General Osiris G. Villegas, Argentine Army, former Corps Commander and former Director of the National Security Council.*[23]

Economic aggression has been the most characteristic form of external aggression in Latin America. The identification of the diverse modes it adopts is a subject of politico-strategic interest to the armed forces. It would be unpardonable if we [the armed forces] dedicated ourselves, for example, to our technical-professional preparation with a view to an armed conflict on our frontiers while external interests took control of entire basic sectors of our national economy. The defense against this penetration and against doctrines outside the national interest that put in doubt our capacity for autodetermination and independent development, is a primary component of national security policy. *Major General Juan E. Gugliamelli, Argentine Army, former Corps Commander, former Commandant of the School of Higher Studies.*[24]

The threat has varied over time. At first it was narrowly military in nature. Then new and subtler psychological and ideological threats arose against the security of each country. Today we face a new threat: economic aggression. Just as we fought against the violent aggression generated by guerrillas and by different forms of terrorism, so we are now fighting against economic aggression. *General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Foreign Minister of Peru, in the period following the 1968 coup.*[25]

The armed forces do not have to be . . . typecast as organizations exclusively dedicated to checking the political phenomenon of international communism, but fundamentally as co-participants and efficient agents of the battle against . . . economic underdevelopment from which [follows] . . . the subversive struggle in the continent. . . . the arch conservatives see in the armed forces an exceedingly efficient instrument to return to the night of the past while they remain allied with the foreign monopolies. For their part, the popular classes look at the armed forces as the truest instrument of redemption since they no longer accept the role of simple wardens in an unjust order. *General Juan José Torres, former President of Bolivia and former Commander of the Armed Forces.*[26]

Einaudi's perceptive essay cites four long-term concerns of the

[23]In Villegas, *Politicas y Estrategias Para el Desarrollo y la Seguridad Nacional* (Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1969), pp. 151-152, 239.

[24]In an August 1969 speech to the Buenos Aires Officers Club (Circulo Militar), "Las fuerzas armadas y su mision general prioritaria: desarrollo integral del potencial nacional." Reproduced in *Circumil* (Buenos Aires), January-March 1970, pp. 123-144.

[25]In an April 1969 speech before the United Nations. Quoted in Einaudi and Stepan, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[26]In a November 1969 speech to the visiting Inter-American Defense Board. Reproduced in *Estrategia*, November-December 1969, p. 29.

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Peruvian army that existed before the 1968 revolution: (1) institutional autonomy and survival, (2) public order and the control of remote areas, (3) foreign policy and boundary questions, and (4) national development.[27] This listing could apply without much change to other major South American armies. The significant fact of recent years has been the general change in emphasis from classic "military" concerns, which encompass the first three in the list, to the last one, which is in its essence political.

As a key element in the professionalization process in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, the war colleges have served to institutionalize this concern, formulate doctrine, and prepare cadres to carry out the perceived military tasks in the developmental process, including political tasks. The doctrines are reflected in the schools of smaller neighbors. Their applicability, if any, to the more military-oriented courses in Colombia and Chile, and to the new war college in Venezuela, requires more research.

Many of the civilian professors at the schools, particularly the economists, are of the Marxist school that seems to predominate in most Latin American centers of higher learning, and their influence shows in developmental doctrines. Also influential are the revisionist historians who provide an intellectual rationale for the rejection of political and economic liberalism, a revival of a somewhat xenophobic nationalism, and a move toward authoritarianism.[28]

Two issues raised by the expanded national security concepts predominate in school discussions and condition policy recommendations: the politics of development and the military role in the process. There is almost unanimous agreement on the existence of a nexus between economic development and national security, but there are deep divisions within the various officer corps over specific policies and goals. Two important schools of

[27]Einaudi and Stepan, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

[28]As typified in Claudio Veliz' Introduction to Veliz, editor, *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 11-13: "It appears that in 1929, with the breakdown of the system based on the free flow of exports to the markets of the northern hemisphere, Latin America started the painful road back to find her own level of economic and political awareness. This road led away both from upper class affluence and from the pluralistic liberalism which the hitherto powerful ruling groups had embraced with such gusto. In fits and starts since 1929, the countries of Latin America have been returning to their own Hispanic, hierarchical, and more or less authoritarian political traditions." Veliz, like revisionist historians in most of the countries of southern South America, views political liberalism as an "artificial adaptation of upper class creoles between 1830 and 1930." It failed, he says, because it had no foundation in Latin American tradition or history, which lacked the feudal experience and the religious-political nonconformity that gave it birth in Europe.

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thought can be identified. Both have nationalist overtones and elitist proclivities, and demarcations are not always sharply defined; in any given country it might be difficult to classify General A or General B in either category. However, the differences are real and will probably intensify during the decade, and an attempt at defining them even in a general manner is worthwhile. Rubrics and labels are misleading, but necessary. For lack of better terms we could call one school "liberal-internationalist" and the other "authoritarian-nationalist."[29]

Officers identified with the first have a commitment to democratic forms, but are not averse to a period of tutelary rule by the military. Mobilization politics is seen as ruinous. The role of the armed forces during the tutelary period is complex, but emphasis remains strong on classic "territorial security" concerns, force modernization and increased professionalism. Interest in industrialization centers on its importance to national mobilization and its contributions to the attainment of true sovereignty through strong, autosufficient security forces. There is a strong concern for "situational" security policy in the regional context for the short term, and in the world context for the longer view. The primary security threat is seen as internal subversion aided and abetted by the world communist movement, and close ties with the United States and other Western countries form a necessary component of the response. There is no deep objection to state enterprises and state control of certain sectors, but private enterprise remains the driving force of the economy and foreign investment is viewed as essential.

The "authoritarian nationalists" hold that development means much more than the old liberal goal of economic growth. Important elements believe sweeping structural revisions of existing socio-economic patterns are required. The old liberal political philosophy, with its concern for abstractions like liberty and democracy, has proved unable to put together and sustain a development program. An alternative to a Cuba-style revolution must be found in each country, and it must fit that country's unique traditions and imperatives. The internal enemy is frequently pictured as that sector of society allied with foreign and international markets. Continuing nineteenth-century integration of domestic economies with the international economic and

[29]Alfred Stepan uses these classifications in his excellent study of the Brazilian military, *op. cit.* I have generalized them somewhat for the purpose of this exposition.

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monetary systems is viewed as detrimental to the development process; arguments for free trade and the international division of labor are specious ploys to permit continuation of what is seen as a steadily declining relationship between the industrialized center and the raw material producing periphery. The external enemy is identified as economic imperialism. Its steady penetration and influence undermine national sovereignty in the political sphere as well as the economic (e.g., when attempts are made to subordinate national decisions to global objectives of great-power strategy, such as sanctions against Cuba, the Latin American nuclear free zone, the Inter-American Peace Force).

Insurgency and subversion are seen by the authoritarian nationalists as the effects of underdevelopment; national security demands development and it is therefore an implied mission of the armed forces. The latter are truly national institutions, in touch with all sectors of society and represented in the farthest reaches of the national territory. They are able to coordinate conflicting interests and distribute the inevitable sacrifices of the development process equitably, since they are above narrow sectoral interests. An indeterminate period of military rule is necessary for the transformation of society. Old liberal distinctions between civil and military government are no longer relevant; the distinctions now are between sectors of the society that support national development and those that would maintain the status quo.[30]

Brazil

The three military governments that have ruled Brazil since 1964 have demonstrated varying degrees of conformance to the two descriptions given above, according to Stepan's study.[31] After deposing Goulart in 1964, the first regime under Marshal Castelo Branco, dominated by officers with strong links to the *Escola Superior de Guerra*, was characterized by: (1) an active, anti-communist foreign policy based on the interdependence of the Free World; (2) a preference for a semi-free enterprise economic

[30]For representative formulations that include some or most of these concepts, see Francisco Arias Pellerano, "La participacion politica de las fuerzas armadas," *Estrategia*, July-August 1969, pp. 23-39; General Gugliamelli, *op. cit.;* General Villegas, *op. cit.;* General Tavares, *op. cit.;* General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, "Politica y Estrategia Militar en la Guerra Anti-Subversiva," *Revista Militar del Peru,* November-December 1967, pp. 4-33; General Alfredo Ovando Candía, "Carta-Mensaje Del Gral. Ovando a Los JJ. y OO. de las FF.AA.," *Revista Militar* (Bolivia), April-June 1969, pp. 151-154.

[31]*The Military in Politics, op. cit.*

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system supported and guided by a strong central government; (3) a dislike and distrust of "irrational nationalism" and an emphasis on technical solutions; and (4) an intellectual commitment to democracy.[32]

Castelo Branco's "liberal" doctrine of austerity and internationalism was opposed by a more "humanitarian and nationalist" sector of the officer corps, which objected to even a limited revival of political party and congressional activity (the *linha dura*). These officers achieved greater representation with Marshal Costa e Silva in 1967, and many of the earlier economic and political policies were reversed or vitiated. When Costa e Silva became incapacitated in 1969 there was another succession crisis within the military, turning largely on the same issue. General Medici's selection as President probably represented a partial victory for the "nationalist" sector. Brazil's complex economy and the importance of the private sector, especially the industrial south, somewhat blurs the distinctions between the two schools. They can be seen in sharper detail in other countries.

Argentina

The 1966 coup in Argentina was intended from the start to bring about a vast transformation of the society, and the institutional infighting has been at once more visible and more bitter than was the case in Brazil. Initially, however, there was widespread agreement within the officer corps as to the necessity for a change. In the June coup, no shots were fired, there was no real resistance and there were no exiles or political prisoners. A military junta comprised of the three service commanders took control, and during the next twenty-four hours dissolved the National Congress and all provincial legislatures, replaced the elected governors, replaced all the members of the Supreme Court, and dissolved political parties.

Following a long, legalist tradition that puts great stress on form and style, the coup was legitimated in an "Act of the Argentine Revolution." Its prologue explains that the three commanders decided to take their drastic step after a last, exhaustive analysis of the general condition of the country. The analysis made clear, the document states, that structural faults in the society and failures to apply adequate systems and techniques to contemporary realities had led to apathy, chronic deterioration of economic-financial matters, the breakdown of authority and deep social unrest.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 230-231.

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Economic stagnation, inflation, and the "fallacy of a formal and sterile legality" which in the name of liberty and electoral freedom had fostered a "vote-seeking system" that divided the country and mocked true democracy, were cited as serious problems of the society. The fundamental cause of the disintegration was "the division of all Argentina [into] different sectors, and the existence of a rigid political structure, coupled with anachronistic political and economic measures. . . ." The object of the revolution was said to be the transformation and modernization of this structure.[33]

The junta agreed on General Onganía as President, but almost immediately deep divisions over government policy began to manifest themselves between "liberal" and "nationalist" military factions and their civilian allies. There was apparent agreement that the institutional structure of the government had proved inadequate to the tasks of the mid-twentieth century, yet no agreement upon what forms could replace it. There were grumblings inside the armed forces that Onganía completely ignored the service chiefs. When General Pistarini, army commander and prime mover of the coup, sought a greater voice in government councils, Onganía fired him out of hand and to the surprise of many observers made it stick with ease. He brought in General Julio Alsogaray from an arch-liberal family as army commander but continued to maintain a balance between "liberal" and "nationalist" elements. Alsogaray in turn was involuntarily retired in 1968 and General Alejandro Lanusse, a less doctrinaire liberal, replaced him. Debates over development policies and the political future continued unabated within the army. Onganía's bias toward the "nationalist" wing, especially his refusal to agree to discussions on future elections, brought about his ouster by Lanusse and the dominant Liberals in 1970.[34]

For reasons that are still somewhat obscure, Lanusse did not

[33]The Revolutionary Act, with its annexes, is reproduced in Villegas, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-321.

[34]It would be an oversimplification to say that this was the only cause. The national convulsion caused by the kidnaping — and, as later discovered, murder — of former President General Pedro Aramburu, and the growing labor problems in Rosario and Córdoba, created the conditions for Onganía's ouster. The Buenos Aires press, however, viewed the change in the perspective of political differences. The weekly newsmagazine *Confirmado*, of June 24-30 (pp. 12-16), opined that under the change "the liberal line assumes the leadership of the political process, the nationalist camp will attend to the functioning of the public infrastructure. . . . All tendencies being present in the higher ranks of the armed forces, a solution was sought by bringing together all the sectors. . . ." The new Minister of Economy was seen as a liberal, the Foreign Minister as a nationalist. Both had served as professors at the Advanced Naval War School for many years.

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assume the presidential office. In a rather bizarre and unprecedented action, the three service chiefs decided to bring in Brigadier General Roberto Marcelo Levingston, a career intelligence officer, chosen perhaps because he had no personal following in the command corps.

His selection proved to be a grievous error on the junta's part. He not only refused to play the figurehead's role, but upset the delicate balance that had been meticulously maintained between "liberals" and "nationalists." Following a brief settling-in period, Levingston came out strongly on the nationalist side and electrified the country with an October 1970 announcement that elections would not be held for four or five years. He also outlined a five-year plan providing for the "Argentinization" of the economy that restricted the role of foreign capital.[35] On March 23, 1971 Levingston was ousted. The junta announced that it would "resume political power until the Argentine revolution has been completed." Lanusse became President, and on July 9 announced a "moderate nationalist" economic program calling for a high degree of state intervention, but with guarantees for foreign and domestic private investment in specified areas.[36] He also promised early elections and subsequently set the date at March 25, 1973.[37]

Bolivia[38]

The Bolivian case offers an even sharper example of institutional infighting over developmental policies.

After a stormy and chaotic political history marked by 179 military coups in 126 years of independence, Bolivia experienced a true revolution in 1952, described by one authority as "the most profound movement for social change which has swept any Latin American country since the Mexican Revolution of 1910."[39] The country was governed for the next twelve years by the civilian *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR), until its overthrow in 1964 plunged the Bolivian military back into politics. After a period of junta rule, legal process was re-estab-

[35]See the description of the five-year plan in the *New York Times* of December 25, 1970. See also Levingston's address to the Special Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank in Buenos Aires on March 1, 1971; reproduced in *Proceedings* of the IADB (1971), pp. 15-18.

[36]*New York Times*, July 9, 1971.

[37]*Ibid.*, September 18, 1971. [Editor's Note: In the presidential election held on March 11, the Peronist candidate, Hector Campora, won by a wide margin.]

[38]The analysis in this section is adapted from the author's monograph, *Military Institutional Development and Sociopolitical Change: The Bolivian Case*, *op. cit.*

[39]Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. vii.

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lished in 1966 with the election to the presidency of General René Barrientos Ortuño, who had led the 1964 coup. Military support, or at least political neutrality on the part of the army, was critical to the survival of his regime, but the military institution did not assume the full weight of responsibility for the direction of national policy until Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1969. That event set off a protracted political crisis that produced three successful coups in two years and a kaleidoscopic oscillation in national orientation between Barrientos' generally *laissez-faire* stance, two radical-populist military governments and what is now described as a rightist-nationalist regime.

The MNR did not destroy the old army after its victory in 1952, although it could have done so. Despite the misgivings of the party's radical wing, President Paz Estenssoro apparently believed that he could control the institution, and for the first time in Bolivian history, he did effectively neutralize it as a political force by sharply reducing its strength, purging the hierarchy, removing its uniformed leaders from party councils, and putting it on a starvation budget. A countervailing force of armed miners and party militants was instrumental to the process, which during the period 1952-1958 led to a high degree of what Huntington has defined as "objective" control over the military.[40]

Only halfhearted measures were taken to associate the officer corps with the MNR political and social programs. Relieved of any real responsibility or capability for contributing to domestic policy and goals, the army hibernated for some years within its surprisingly complete institutional structure, nurturing a "professional" elite and seeking its role in the revolutionary society. After 1958, when the MNR's changing politico-economic orientations and subsequent power shifts within the party nucleus alienated leaders of the armed irregulars, which now included strong peasant bands, a long-term effort was begun to regain control of the state's coercive power by concentrating it in the regular armed forces. Cold War tensions brought sharply increased U.S. assistance for counterinsurgency capabilities and civic action programs. Taking advantage of their increasing influence and affluence, military officers re-entered the policymaking councils of the government after 1960. Objective control waned, and subjective control was never established.

[40]"Objective" control is achieved by turning the military inward to its specific duties and competence; "subjective" domination is achieved by causing military officers to identify with the political grouping in control of the state. *The Soldier and the State, op. cit.*, pp. 80-85.

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There are indications that the armed forces enjoyed almost complete institutional autonomy during the early 1960's, facilitating the decision made in 1964 by the top-level leadership, largely in pursuance of personal ambitions, to seize on the MNR's disarray and a legitimacy crisis to overthrow the civilian government. The army finally gained a measure of dominance over the irregular militias in mid-decade and was successful in putting down a Cuban-sponsored insurgency in 1967. But scandals in the wake of that victory, and the low-key but festering rivalry between President Barrientos and the ambitious armed forces commander, General Alfredo Ovando, displeased influential members of the professional elite who reached general rank in that period. Their attempt to limit Ovando's ambitions was a factor in his adoption of a populist-leftist stance in a search for alternative sources of support.

Barrientos' death in 1969 propelled Ovando to power earlier than he had anticipated and before he could neutralize his opposition in the officer corps hierarchy. He adopted a radical revolutionary style, nationalized Gulf Oil and annulled the old petroleum code, and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He had to modify his policies somewhat to placate the opposition, but the officer corps was sufficiently divided when the elite moved against Ovando in 1970 that another ambitious officer and associate, General Juan José Torres, was able to pre-empt the coup with an appeal to the radical Left. Torres increased the level of "revolutionary" rhetoric, expelled the Peace Corps, and allowed a "popular assembly" to meet in the old congressional building. He in turn was overthrown in August 1971 by a coalition of officers from the "professional elite" and political leaders of the old MNR and a rightist party. Colonel Hugo Banzer Suarez became President.

Graduates of the 1941-1944 military academy classes (*promociones*) have been most visible and influential in the events of the last few years. All are products of a school system with a strong "professionalist" bent during a decade of general political impotence on the part of the military, and a majority also attended foreign schools, particularly U.S. courses. Since 1960 they have become more and more politically sensitized. Attendance at the School of Higher Military Studies — opened in 1960 — has influenced their views on domestic policies, as have the correlations between national security and economic development growing out of U.S. and other foreign internal security doctrines. This group,

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and other *promociones* of the 1940's, tend to the "liberal-internationalist" view. The younger officers who supported Ovando and Torres tend to extreme nationalism, and appeared to be agreeable to a populist coalition of students, workers, peasants and soldiers, headed by an enlightened military elite.

The ethos of the military is also greatly influenced by Bolivia's powerful neighbors. Officers who attend command and staff schools in Argentina, Brazil and Peru are prime candidates for the elite nucleus, and usually serve one or more tours in the Bolivian career school system. They are enormously impressed by the sophistication of the doctrines they encounter in these foreign schools, and frequently become ardent spokesmen for them upon return. Ovando was obviously influenced by the Peruvian experience, and once spoke of "ideological confederation" between the Bolivian and Peruvian armed forces, and Banzer and several of his coterie are obviously attracted to the Brazilian experiment.

Peru

Peru's revolutionary military government has been in power just over four years at this writing, and to date offers the most clear-cut example of the transfer of "nationalist" war college security doctrines to the executive offices of government. Shortly after assuming power in October 1968 the military junta nationalized the International Petroleum Company's holdings, expelled the U.S. military missions, and undertook a far-reaching program of social reforms that included the most drastic agrarian reform since the Mexican Revolution.

The unprecedented shift in allegiance of the Peruvian officer corps, from underwriters of the most deeply entrenched oligarchy in South America to champions of social reform, is deserving of much fuller analysis than the scope of this study will allow.[41] As a broad generalization it can be said that the officer corps has taken power or exercised a dominant political presence during periods when civil authority was ambiguous or following periods of particularly inept or ineffective government. The relationship of the officers to the anti-oligarchical *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA) party was the principal factor bear-

[41]Early recognition of this shift, and some astute observations on its causes and possible consequences, are evident in Liisa North's monograph, *op. cit.* All observers of the phenomenon owe a great debt to Peruvian author and former officer, Victor Villanueva, especially for his book, *Un año bajo el sable* (Lima: Empresa Grafica T. Scheuch S.A., 1963).

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ing on military political intervention from the time of the party's founding in the 1920's until recent years.

The 1962 coup and the military government that followed it signaled a change in the priorities of military political concerns. In the June elections of that year an impasse developed among the three principal candidates, APRA's Haya de la Torre, *Acción Popular's* Fernando Belaúnde and former President General Manuel Odría. Although each had some military support, Belaúnde was favored by the majority. No candidate acquired a majority, and the officers were unwilling to countenance an Odría-Haya coalition which began to form to give the office to Odría. The army brought charges of fraud before the election board in an attempt to force new elections, but the board refused to consider them. On July 18 a military junta took power and immediately announced new elections for June 1963. The junta promulgated a new electoral statute whose effect was to enhance Belaúnde's chances, but otherwise acted generally as a caretaker regime except in the area of land reform, where it undertook the country's first significant land distribution program.

Military enthusiasm for Belaúnde, elected in 1963, waned when he failed to meet the initial high expectations. The President's *Acción Popular* lacked a majority in either house of Congress and faced persistent and well organized opposition from a coalition of APRA and the National Odrista Union on virtually all important legislation. The outbreak of guerrilla warfare in the Andes in 1965 precipitated direct military pressure on Belaúnde when he appeared reluctant to admit the seriousness of the insurgency and to take strong measures, at least in public, to suppress it. One general was quoted as saying at the time: "Most of us do not want another military dictatorship . . . but if the civilians are blind to the communist danger, we would feel duty bound to step in."[42]

Despite the army's success against the guerrillas, the experience deepened military sentiments that had been signaled by the land reform project, and the episode was dissected and analyzed within the heart of the institutional structure in succeeding years.

The lessons the officers were deriving from their analysis were clearly spelled out in a series of speeches that General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, who was to become Foreign Minister and chief theoretician of the revolutionary government, made during a visit to U.S. military installations in 1967. To quote from one of them:

[42]*Time*, September 24, 1965, p. 44.

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In general, the process of the ideological capture of the masses in Latin America is being carried out on the basis of delay or postponement in the carrying out of promised reforms. Castro-communist activists and agitators are giving wide publicity to what they call the lack of capacity of the governments to carry them out and are impressing upon the working and peasant masses that only through "violent revolution" can they achieve the order and justice they seek; in this way they rapidly succeed in having large sectors of the population lose their confidence in their governments. . . . We must point out that the process of development which Latin America has undertaken in the decade of the sixties, although slow, is the primary arm that is holding back the intensification of subversive action. . . . There exists an evident direct relationship between development and subversion. The battle against subversion has come to illustrate the intimate relationship that exists between development policy and security policy. Without development there is no security and vice versa.[43]

On the subject of the military's role General Mercado had this to say:

The armed forces of the hemisphere have a full appreciation of the communist danger, and will not tolerate its implantation on the continent. But the anti-communism of the armed forces will not be sufficient to guarantee and preserve our liberty if the policies of the nations are not directed to economic development, without privileges to groups, and to structural changes that bring about an effective social justice that permits the elimination of existing contradictions.

The military intervention against the Belaúnde Government in October 1968 must be viewed in the context of its achievements against this standard, although other factors also were at play. The apparent spark was the highly unpopular contract with International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, which was announced in September. In the predawn hours of October 3, a well-planned coup placed a military junta headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarando in office, and the officers embarked on a far-reaching program to implement policies the military institution had derived from its particular vision of national security. Significantly, thirteen of the nineteen members of the first cabinet were graduates of the Center for Higher Military Studies.

Important institutional strains have not yet surfaced in the Peruvian experience, although there are increasing indications of differences.[44] In his perceptive essay Einaudi concluded:

The internal political diversity of the armed forces . . . over the long run

[43]From a copy of the speech in the author's possession. General Mercado was named army commander in January 1972.

[44]See, for example, President Velasco's 1971 Army Day speech attacking elements seeking "to undermine the unity of the armed forces." *La Prensa* (Lima), December 11, 1971.

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may inhibit the adoption of consistent development policies. The very bureaucratic complexity of the military allows the development of some diversity. But it also acts as an internal self-regulating mechanism inhibiting policies whose effects . . . might threaten to increase internal diversity to the point of endangering the viability of military institutions themselves. Should the military officer corps produce individual leaders whose personal vision of the struggle for development exceeds institutionally established limits, such men will have to resign [or] be replaced. . . .[45]

Conclusions

The experience of the last two decades has called into question many of our perceptions of the South American military, particularly its image as an uncompromisingly conservative socio-political force. New doctrines of revolutionary warfare and theories of national development have prompted an intensive concern respecting socio-political questions within the military institutional structure, subsumed under peculiarly Latin American concepts of military professionalism. The schools of "higher military studies" that stand at the apex of the elaborate officer education system, with their broad curricula, have come to serve as an institutional base for this concern and the response thereto.

The search by military men for new political forms has produced a variety of experiments in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. The directions of these efforts are not yet clear, but of the four earlier cases only in Peru and Bolivia have the officers taken a truly radical course. Despite continuing revolutionary rhetoric and "independent" foreign policy moves (e.g., resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba), institutional constraints are likely to moderate the Peru experiment. A Thermidorean reaction within the army has markedly checked the one in Bolivia.

Constraints on the potentially overwhelming political clout of the various officer corps grow out of ideological pluralism within the institutions and generational differences, both of which are accentuated by the career system. The manifestations of these intra-institutional tensions are diverse. In some countries older officers, products of *promociones* of the early 1940's, have supported or led radical reform movements, while in others this generation has resisted the politicization of the officer corps. It is certainly an oversimplification to attribute the new socio-political concern to "young officers" or to an allegedly greater middle-class representation. The new concepts of national security have prompted in-

[45]Einaudi and Stepan, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

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stitutional concern for the military role in national development that crosses generational and class lines.

The lower profile of the military in other South American countries is the product of diverse factors that cannot be treated here. In Chile and Colombia a different perception of professionalism within the officer corps is not the least important of these factors. The Venezuelan military is only now reaching the stage of professionalization characterized by serious self-examination of roles and functions and has yet to articulate its perceptions; the new National Defense Institute will probably play a key part in that effort.

In the countries treated here, however, there is little basis for expectation that the officer corps will decline in importance as powerful political elites in the decade ahead. The combination of traditional power, continuing education and concern for broad national issues is unique to them as a political grouping within their national societies. Despite institutional differences, their power is likely to grow under the aegis of expanded national security doctrines that reconcile professionalism and political activism.

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PAKISTAN'S SECURITY PROBLEM: A BILL OF CONSTRAINTS

by Anwar H. Syed

DURING the past quarter-century India has been Pakistan's main security concern. The two nations have fought three wars, the last of which, in December 1971, resulted in Pakistan's dismemberment and East Pakistan's emergence as a separate state named the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Despite frequent references by Pakistani spokesmen and others to a "balance of power" in the Indian subcontinent, there has never existed an equality of power between Pakistan and India. Militarily India has always been much stronger. Pakistan's military capability was sufficient only to hold an Indian invading force at the border, away from her urban centers, long enough for great-power diplomacy to bring about a disengagement and a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. But even in this limited sense, the "balance" has now broken down. Pakistani security planners will face a most difficult task in the foreseeable future. In considering the constraints likely to affect their range of choice, let us see first if the security problem itself can be made less acute.

I

Is there a way of mitigating Indian-Pakistani hostility? This is not only a matter of reaching diplomatic agreements to take or avoid specific actions at given times. It is also a function of the two nations' perceptions of each other. Pakistanis are convinced that for most practical purposes India is a Hindu polity determined to destroy the separate cultural and political identity of the Muslim community in the subcontinent, and that in pursuing this goal she has sought to undo Pakistan ever since the latter's independence. The more optimistic among them believe that even if India does not want to annihilate Pakistan formally and legally, she intends to destroy Pakistan's independence effectively by making the country into a satellite. In Pakistani eyes India is arrogant, aggressive, imperialistic, expansionist, hypocritical and deceitful. Her secularism is thought to be phony and her treatment of Indian Muslims discriminatory and undemocratic.[1]

[1]Pakistani fear and distrust of India should be well known to students of South Asian affairs. Those needing documentation may usefully refer to the following

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Most Indians, on the other hand, have tended to regard India's division and Pakistan's establishment in 1947 as a tragedy resulting from the "false" doctrine that the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent were a separate nation — a doctrine invented and sustained by the British in accord with their strategy of divide and rule. They have viewed and projected Pakistan as a medieval, authoritarian, militaristic theocracy, her people as religious fanatics, her social order and her ethos as feudalistic. Pakistanis are said to lack a modern basis for their national identity. Sometimes they are referred to as "brothers" of the Indian people, but their "aggressive," "malicious," "saber-rattling" rulers and leaders have throughout told them "lies" about India and fed them on a "hate-India" diet. The very mention of Pakistan, says Satish Arora, arouses "deep and disturbing" emotions among the Indian elite and has, at times, caused anxieties "no less real than those primordial fears generated by the names of Aurengzeb, Genghiz Khan, Timur Lane. . . ."[2]

India and Pakistan need to make a peace settlement and formally end the 1971 war. From the Pakistani standpoint, India ought to be more than content with having detached East Pakistan from the West, and should promptly return the Pakistani

sources: M. Rafique Afzal, editor, *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1967), pp. 563-564; Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), Chapters 9-10 and *passim*; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Compendium of Speeches Made in the National Assembly of Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964) and *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Sharif-al-Mujahid's essay on India-Pakistan relations in Latif Ahmad Sherwani, *et al., Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Karachi: Allies Book Corporation, 1964); Sherwani's *India, China and Pakistan* (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1967), Chapters 2-3 and I. H. Qureshi's Foreword to this volume; Mushtaq Ahmad, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1968), Chapter 2.

Pakistani intellectuals find confirmation of their perceptions of India in the writings of certain Indian social critics. Notable among them is a Bengali Hindu, Nirad C. Chaudhuri. His book, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), an Indian classic widely known in Pakistan, contains extended expositions of a deep-rooted and far-reaching Hindu hatred of the Muslim. See especially pp. 225-232, 401-413. From time to time Indian newspapers and periodicals point to discrimination against the Muslims and other routinized breaches of secularism. A few recent writings in this vein may be mentioned: B. G. Verghese, "Bangla Desh and the Crisis of Identity," Overseas *Hindustan Times*, July 3, 1971; V. R. Krishna Iyer, "How Secular Is Secular India?," I and II, *Illustrated Weekly of India*, January 30 and February 6, 1972; M. R. Dua, "The Meos," in *ibid.*, January 30, 1972. Dua cites the amazing case of the government of Rajasthan once joining a campaign to convert the Muslim Meos of Alwar to Hinduism.

[2]Satish K. Arora and Harold D. Lasswell, *Political Communication: The Public Language of Political Elites in India and the United States* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 153-154.

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prisoners of war she is holding. The Indians, on their part, hoped to persuade Pakistan to accept a package deal containing the following elements: Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh; a revision of the cease-fire line in Kashmir, presumably to India's strategic if not territorial advantage, and its acceptance as the international frontier between the two countries; a no-war pact and a commitment to solve all disputes bilaterally, that is, without the intervention or participation of third parties.

A beginning toward a settlement was made when President Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi concluded their meetings at Simla on July 3, 1972. They agreed to withdraw their forces from their international border but would, for the time being, adhere to the line of actual control in Kashmir. They would respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality. They would refrain from the threat or the use of force against each other and settle their disputes by peaceful means. They agreed to discourage hostile propaganda and prevent acts detrimental to peaceful and harmonious relations between them. The repatriation of prisoners and a final settlement in Kashmir would be negotiated in subsequent meetings.[3]

The Simla agreement, and the ones that may be reached in coming months, could turn out to be more enduring than the "Spirit of Tashkent." But the developments during the year since the last Indo-Pakistan cease-fire are not altogether encouraging. Both governments continue to speak, in the same breath, as it were, of their desire for peace and their increasing preparedness for "defense." An incredible amount of wrangling has preceded the delineation of the new "line of actual control" in Kashmir and the withdrawal of troops behind their respective frontiers. India is keeping the 90,000 or so Pakistani prisoners of war as hostages and, as of this time, does not intend to release them until after a satisfactory overall settlement has been attained. It is clear that the present state of relations is still charged with considerable tension. The main difficulty appears to be that Pakistani leaders are unwilling to accommodate themselves to the Indian view of an acceptable Pakistani role in South Asia and in international politics. This Indian view, crucial to the future of Indo-Pakistan relations, merits more than a passing reference.

The Indians are asking Pakistan to accept the "new realities" in Southern Asia: her own weakened position after the 1971 war, the

[3]The text of the Simla agreement will be found in *New York Times*, July 4, 1972.

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emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state, and the emergence of India as the "dominant" power in the area. There are several dimensions to this Indian position. Mrs. Gandhi has asserted that Indo-Pakistan relations will not be normal until Pakistan demonstrates the genuineness of her declared desire for peace. She must not rearm to the point of being able to threaten India.[4] The Indian Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, has interpreted Pakistan's acquisition of Chinese aircraft and tanks to supply her war losses as evidence of a continued "posture of confrontation." Such moves on her part, he warns, will hinder the "speedy normalization of relations" between the two countries.[5]

Indian spokesmen argue also that Pakistan belongs to the Indian subcontinent and should make friends there, not on the outside. This demand is expressed variously. Mrs. Gandhi says India will not tolerate the interference of outside powers in the affairs of the subcontinent and will not permit them to "use" Pakistan as, allegedly, they have done in the past. Swaran Singh hopes Pakistan has learned the "lesson that help from other countries can at best be marginal" and will not be "misled" by them.[6] Satish Kumar, a journalist and formerly an official in the Indian Ministry of Information, spelled out the condition more explicitly:

> Another requirement of the situation, as regards Pakistan, is that it should stop looking outwards for friends and partners, and establish such a relationship with countries of the region, namely India and Bangla Desh. Hitherto Pakistan has been cultivating the Muslim countries, in addition to some major powers, as allies in fulfilment of its national objectives. . . . But such an approach proved to be of no special advantage to Pakistan in the past. Therefore, Pakistan must now identify and utilise the areas and opportunities of cooperation within the region.[7]

In the Indian government's view, the idea of an external role, even such as Soviet mediation at Tashkent or the judicial arbitration of the Rann of Kutch dispute, has been "thrown overboard."[8] Mrs. Gandhi, while publicly disowning any desire for hegemony on India's part, asserts nevertheless that, in the interest of peace and economic development, "foreigners should withdraw from this region."[9] Her officials have been more outspoken. Swaran

[4] *New York Times*, April 5 and 29, May 6, 1972, and Overseas *Hindustan Times*, April 8 and May 6, 1972.
[5] Overseas *Hindustan Times*, April 8, 1972.
[6] *Ibid.*, June 10, 1972.
[7] *Ibid.*, March 25, 1972.
[8] *The Hindu*, March 19, 1972.
[9] *Indian and Foreign Review*, May 1, 1972, p. 24.

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Singh recently assured Parliament that the Indian government would do all in its power to normalize relations with the United States on the basis of the latter's recognition of the "new realities" in the subcontinent. Elaborating on this statement, a senior Foreign Ministry official said the United States "should recognize and treat India as the dominant power in South Asia."[10]

Some of India's opinion-makers see her emerging role on a grand scale, as a role in which she enforces not only peace but a congenial political order in the region. Inder Malhotra, noted journalist and author, says India must increase her military might if she is to play her "rightful" role in South Asia, "for it takes power to be a power." Pakistan will be restrained only if it sees plainly that India is powerful enough to "cut it to pieces." India should also be able to deter any Chinese "nonsense" in NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) or Ladakh. A. B. Shah, editor of *Quest,* thinks India should "reassure the people in the disaffected areas of Pakistan about their future" were they to break away from a "militarist dictatorship." Harji Malik speaks of India's "natural obligation" to help people free themselves from military rule and political or economic exploitation "wherever it may be." On the other hand, G. S. Bhargawa urges Pakistan to reconcile itself "forever . . . to its present size and importance in Asian and international affairs."[11]

Even those who write about Pakistan from sympathetic understanding, such as B. G. Verghese, are not content with peaceableness on her part. They want to bring her back into the fold. Verghese hopes Bangladesh, Pakistan and India will eventually come together in a "common market, commonwealth, or a loose confederation," which Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, Ceylon — and perhaps Burma and Afghanistan — might in time join.[12] Another factor to be kept in mind is that Indian analysts do not anticipate a Pakistani or even a Chinese attack, yet the Indian government has increased its military budget for 1972-1973 by nearly 13.4 per cent over the 1971-1972 budget.

These role images call for a militarily ineffective and politically isolated Pakistan that has ceased to be an independent or dynamic international actor. To use an Indian mode of thought and ex-

[10]*New York Times,* December 1, 1972.
[11]Malhotra, "After Victory What?," *Illustrated Weekly of India,* January 30, 1972; Shah, "India in 'New' Asia," *ibid.,* January 9, 1972; Malik, "India's Peace Role in Asia," *Indian and Foreign Review,* April 15, 1972, p. 18; Bhargawa, Overseas *Hindustan Times,* February 5, 1972.
[12]Overseas *Hindustan Times,* April 1, 1972.

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pression, they envisage the role of a "younger brother" for Pakistan. In the Indian tradition, the younger brother may be protected and loved but he is not treated as an equal or conceded independence. As might be expected, President Bhutto has declined the station and role the Indians would seem to have in mind for Pakistan. He regards India's demand that she be treated as the "dominant" power in South Asia as a provocation. "The friendship of India," he says, "we are prepared to accept. But the hegemony of India we will never accept." And again:

> The present reality, according to Swaran Singh, is that India is the only dominant power in the sub-continent . . . which means that India wants to keep Pakistan under its shadow and hegemony. When India wants that its hegemony be recognized by the foreign countries, we will have to make ourselves strong to protect the sacred soil of Pakistan.[13]

None of the states in Southern Asia, other than India and Pakistan, has any military capability to speak of. In the Indian view, Pakistan's should stop short of being able to resist India. Ideas of the balance of power are said to be not only old-fashioned but mischievous. The foreigner should go away. These prescriptions, together with India's insistence on excluding outside powers or agencies from the resolution of international problems in the region, are bound to be disconcerting to her smaller neighbors. What if a neighbor's disputes with her are not settled except on her terms? India's might will make right unless one may assume that in her dealings with neighbors she will proceed from a sense of equity and a solicitude for their interests untypical of great or major powers. At this time, Pakistanis have scant basis for making such an assumption.

Pakistan is not ready to establish organic links with India: the idea of their forming a commonwealth or confederation is one for which the time has not arrived. Larger vistas of cooperation are not likely to appear until the Indian Muslims find release from their present disadvantaged position and Pakistanis can see that the Indian society has become secular-minded, that it values, instead of resenting, the Muslim contribution to its own heritage and respects the Muslim community's cultural identity. In the meantime, any significant de-escalation of Indo-Pakistan tension will require these minimum conditions: Pakistan's willingness to end the Kashmir dispute, effectively even if not formally, on a

[13]President Bhutto made the first of these statements to Loren Jenkins of *Newsweek* and the second to a Pakistani newsman. See *Pakistan Times,* December 12 and 18, 1972.

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basis approximating the status quo, and her aloofness from any other power's anti-India drives; India's willingness to respect a peaceable Pakistan's independence. But if India insists on being the "dominant" power in Southern Asia and Pakistan rejects a subordinate role, Pakistan's security problem will remain severe. Still, another war between them is not imminent. There may be time for Pakistan to mend fences. What kind of fences can she build or mend?

II

A Pakistani policy of assembling a military deterrent will require a level of military capability sufficient to insure that India's cost of a victory over Pakistan will be intolerably high. Apart from imponderables such as the relative quality of training, internal cohesion and coordination, strategy-making skills, and leadership characteristic of the two military establishments at the time of conflict, the performance of Pakistan's weapons must match or surpass that of India's best in some crucial categories even if her inventories are numerically smaller. Disregarding each side's war losses in 1971, let us take the case of air power, which India's defense planners now regard as decisive.[14] Pakistan cannot rely on her F-86's and MIG-19's to repel India's MIG-21 and SU-7 planes, which are counted among the Soviet Union's more notable high-performance aircraft, and of which India has eight and six squadrons respectively. Pakistan has one squadron of F-104A interceptors and two squadrons of Mirage IIIE fighter-bombers. She expected to have two squadrons of Mirage V in late 1972,[15] which would give her the means of dealing effectively with the MIG-21,

[14]This was set forth in the Indian Defense Ministry's annual report to Parliament last May; see Overseas *Hindustan Times,* May 13, 1972. India lost 54 aircraft and Pakistan 83 during the 1971 war. On the basis of the International Institute of Strategic Studies' *Strategic Survey 1971* (London, 1972), pp. 50-52, at least 23 and possibly more of the planes on the Pakistani side were F-86 fighter-bombers. Some of those lost were MIG-19's. A companion IISS publication, *The Military Balance 1971-1972*, credited Pakistan with having one squadron of I1-28 bombers (p. 50). But the 1972-1973 edition of this series makes no mention of I1-28 in its listing of Pakistani combat aircraft (p. 53). If this is not an oversight, it may mean that the entire I1-28 squadron was lost. Losses of F-104's and Mirage III's were minimal, if any. Pakistan received a small number of F-104's and F-5's from Jordan and Libya during or shortly after the war. In the spring of 1972 she received 60 additional MIG-19's from China.

[15]Details of Indian and Pakistani military capabilities (army, navy, air force) are given in *The Military Balance 1972-1973* (London: IISS, 1972), pp. 49, 53. This publication puts the number of Pakistani combat aircraft at 200, whereas the 1971-1972 issue listed 285. The latest figure, 200, is apparently derived by subtracting the war losses. This means that it does not include the 60 MIG-19's Pakistan received last spring. The report about Pakistan getting Mirage V's appeared in the *New York Times*, March 29, 1972.

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India's best interceptor with some ground support and attack capability.[16] A Pakistani squadron normally consists of 16 planes. This means that of high-performance aircraft Pakistan has 48 and expected to have 32 more in late 1972. India has about 160 MIG-21's and 72 to 150 SU-7's. Both sides have other types of combat planes also. The totals are: for India, 650; for Pakistan, 200 and possibly 260. The picture of relative air power emerging from these figures cannot be comforting to Pakistani defense planners, and the situation is not much different with regard to the army and the navy.

Modern warfare can break the financial back of a developing country. Manpower expenses could conceivably be reduced to tolerable limits through organizational adjustments: the volunteer army might, for instance, be augmented by a draft system that trains a substantial part of the adult population in the use of modern weapons. But the weapons, or rather the weapon systems, are prohibitively expensive. The so-called cheap F-5 costs $1.5 million. The United States has been selling F-4 Phantoms to Israel at $4.5 million each and has sold them to Iran at $5.0 million. The Soviet Union has sold SU-7 fighter-bombers to India at $1 million each, payable in rupees, which appears to have been a special price.[17] Prices of naval craft are even more staggering. A patrol boat can cost a quarter of a million dollars and a "Daphne" submarine $11 million. A few years ago a frigate cost 5 million British pounds and a 30,000-ton aircraft carrier, without the aircraft, 50 to 60 million pounds. Armament prices keep rising not only because of inflation but because of the increasing sophistication of weapons. According to one estimate, it cost six times as much to equip a British infantry battalion in 1968 as it had five years earlier.[18]

After East Pakistan's separation from the West, India is almost ten times as large as Pakistan. She assembles and/or produces many types of weapons in her own plants. These include MIG-21, HF-24 and Gnat interceptors, HS-748 transports used for dropping paratroops, trainers and helicopters; medium tanks, anti-tank

[16]The relative capabilities of these aircraft may be seen in William Green, *The World Guide to Combat Planes* (London: Macdonald, 1966), I, 76-79, 110-114, 133-140, 143-150.

[17]See the register of major weapons transfers to developing countries for 1969 in *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1969-1970* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1970), pp. 342-356, for an indication of prices at which various types of weapons have recently been sold.

[18]This and the figures for naval craft will be found in David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford, England: Clarendon, 1967), pp. 65-66.

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guided weapons, some artillery and a variety of small arms; naval escorts and patrol boats.[19] In the business of making weapons, time is not on Pakistan's side.

During the last several years Pakistan has been spending between 3 and 4 per cent of her GNP on defense. This does not seem to be high. Corresponding figures for the United States, the Soviet Union and India for 1970 are 7.8, 11 and 3.4.[20] But some additional considerations may afford a fuller understanding of these percentages. In the case of a developed country such as the United States, a higher proportion of the GNP committed to defense might result in nothing worse than a thinning of the proverbial icing on the cake. In a developing country it may cause the cake virtually to disappear by precipitating a sharp decline in the availability of essential supplies and services that were already at a depressed level. A GNP percentage may be especially unrevealing of the burden it represents if the country's tax system is regressive. It may therefore be more instructive to place Pakistan's defense appropriations alongside the national government's total revenue receipts (not including domestic borrowings or foreign aid), as in the following table.

	Total Revenue Receipts	*Defense Appropriations*		*Defense Appropriation as Percentage of Total Revenue*
	(in millions of rupees)			
1970-1971 (revised)	7,873	3,200	Approx.	40.6
1971-1972 (estimated)	8,773.4	3,400	Approx.	38.7
1972-1973 (estimated)	8,510	4,240	Approx.	49.8

Sources: The figures for 1970-1971 and 1971-1972 may be seen in Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C., "Pakistan's Fourth Five Year Plan: Interim Report Series," June-July 1971. For the 1972-1973 figures see *The Times* (London), June 19, 1972. *Pakistan Economic Survey* (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1972), pp. 94-95, places defense expenditure at 56.17, 59.33 and 56.89 per cent of the national government's total expenditures for the years 1970-1971, 1971-1972, and 1972-1973.

Pakistani defense spending for 1972-1973 will thus absorb nearly 50 per cent of the national government's total revenue receipts.

[19] *The Military Balance 1971-1972*, p. 75.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

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This is not a level that the society and economy can easily sustain. The breakaway of East Pakistan has severely disrupted the economy and it will be some years before alternative markets for Pakistani surpluses can be found and related dislocations overcome. There are other constraints, too. The serious beginning toward social reform and distributive justice promised by the ruling parties will require a larger share of public funds than that which programs of social amelioration have traditionally received, yet this endeavor cannot long be deferred without inviting social upheaval and political turmoil. On the other hand, if the military is once again to be subordinated to civil authority presided over by the people's representatives, its share of national resources will have to be rationalized. The 1972-1973 defense budget should be viewed partly as the government's response to a situation of uneasy cease-fire arising from a war that was lost and a peace that is still to be made.

As Pakistani democracy advances, and with it the people's aspirations, it will be increasingly difficult to find both guns and butter: butter enough to keep the people in reasonably good humor, and guns sufficient to deter Indian military pressure. The prospect of assistance from external sources will turn on two factors, the degree of external interest in the maintenance of Pakistan's independence, and the production and stockpile capabilities of countries willing to assist her.

III

China has been among Pakistan's more important friends for the last ten years. She has given Pakistan substantial economic assistance, including outright grants and interest-free, long-term loans. She has supplied weapons including combat aircraft and tanks. She has given Pakistan vigorous diplomatic and political support against India, especially during the 1965 war. She has built a strategic road linking Sinkiang with Gilgit in Pakistani Kashmir. The political party currently ruling Pakistan, Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), claims to be not only socialist but pro-Peking. China's relations with India have been strained since before the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962. It is therefore reasonable to assume that China has a positive interest in preventing the extension of India's control or influence over Pakistan. But while China has an interest in containing India, India and the Soviet Union have a common interest in containing China. India and the Soviet Union are now formally linked by a treaty of

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"friendship" which is also a mutual defense treaty. It became operative during India's last war with Pakistan and will doubtless be invoked in case of a Sino-Indian conflict.

China is now the Soviet Union's active and serious competitor for influence in the developing world. During 1970 she is reported to have made aid commitments totaling $709 million as compared with the Soviet total of $204 million for the same year. She is supplying weapons to North Viet Nam, North Korea, Albania and Pakistan. During Bhutto's visit to Peking last February, China converted some earlier loans amounting to $110 million into an outright grant. [21] Last May she sent Pakistan 60 MIG-19 fighters and 100 T-54 and T-59 tanks, as well as some other weapons. These supplies were said to be part of a $300 million economic and military aid agreement Bhutto had worked out with the Chinese during his visit.[22]

In the future, also, China may be willing to supply weapons to Pakistan on generous terms. But at this time she cannot match the high-performance Soviet weapons India has and may receive. China produces the MIG-19 in substantial numbers but, as noted above, it is inferior to the MIG-21. Nevertheless, Chinese armament production is going forward. It now includes the Tu-16 medium bomber, the MIG-21, the T-59 medium and T-62 light tanks, and armored personnel carriers (APC). The Chinese have developed and put on the assembly line, since April 1971, a new fighter, designated the F-9, which can fly at twice the speed of sound (Mach 2). These fighters are being produced at the rate of about ten a month.[23] It will be several years, however, before the Chinese build an F-9 inventory sufficient for their own needs and can begin to supply them to friendly countries in any significant number. The same may be said of their MIG-21 and Tu-16 whose production rate is no higher, and possibly smaller, than that of the F-9.

China has a severe security problem of her own vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One-quarter of the Soviet army (44 divisions) is posted along, or close to, the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviet forces are said to be equipped with nuclear weapons and they have far greater air support, firepower and mobility than the Chinese. Soviet IRBM's and MRBM's cover about 70 targets in China and Japan.[24] China might, in any case, be reluctant to intervene in an

[21] *New York Times*, March 5, 1972.
[22] *Ibid.*, June 3, 1972.
[23] *Strategic Survey 1971, op. cit.*, p. 56.
[24] *Ibid.*, and *The Military Balance 1971-1972*, p. 6.

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Indo-Pakistan war to relieve pressure on Pakistan. She did not do this in 1965 or 1971. But even if the Chinese wished to take such an action, were able to surmount the problems of terrain and logistics, and were willing to absorb the cost, they would have to be able to deter a Soviet retaliatory attack on their territory and installations before they could consider it seriously. Could they deter such a Soviet attack by threatening a nuclear response?

The Chinese are believed to be capable of fabricating about 20 H-bombs a year, probably of the three-megaton variety. By contrast the Soviet stockpiles of nuclear weapons (as also the American) are reckoned in the tens of thousands. The Chinese have reportedly developed a new intermediate-range missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads to a distance of 1,500 to 2,500 miles. Launched from Sinkiang, it could reach Soviet cities beyond the Urals, and possibly Moscow. Chinese progress on ICBM's remains unclear: according to some estimates they could have 10 to 25 operational by the middle or late 1970's. It would seem, then, that over the next several years the Chinese might be able to launch a limited, but only a limited, nuclear attack on Soviet targets. Unquestionably the Soviets could absorb such an attack and retaliate with hundreds of nuclear warheads on Chinese targets, virtually obliterating China.[25]

Will the Chinese attack India if India invades Pakistan? Will the Soviets attack China if China attacks India to relieve pressure on Pakistan? Can the Chinese make a credible nuclear threat to the Soviet Union that would deter a Soviet attack upon themselves while they attacked India? These questions cannot be answered with any reasonable degree of assurance. The Chinese are a cautious people and so are the Soviets. It follows that while the Sino-Soviet conflict of interests remains acute and Soviet-Indian amity continues, Pakistani policymakers cannot assume that in the event of another Indo-Pakistan war the Chinese will intervene in their behalf.

IV

The United States is not amenable to a foreign power's nuclear intimidation. She could conceivably intervene in an Indo-Pakistan conflict if it suited her interests. She also has the production and stockpile capabilities to supply modern weapons to Pakistan. Several considerations, however, including her "new" Asia policy, enter into a prognosis of her likely disposition toward Pakistan.

[25]A. Doak Barnett, *A New U.S. Policy Toward China* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 104-105. Also see *Strategic Survey 1971*, p. 57.

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The prime objective of the earlier U.S. policy was to maintain an American military presence in Asia, enabling Washington to act as a world policeman defending a "world order" or a "Pax Americana." Containment of communism, and more especially the containment of China, were among the specific goals of this policy. It was to be served by a system of military alliances into which Pakistan was inducted partly because of India's non-availability. The Pakistan-American alliance was not directed at India; the American side never contemplated the deployment of U.S. forces in Pakistan's defense against India. Indeed the Sino-Soviet rift and the Sino-Indian border conflict, beginning in the late 1950's, were followed by nearly a decade of parallel Soviet and American efforts to build India as a counterpoise to China, which in turn induced a Sino-Pakistan *entente cordiale*. The United States did not come to Pakistan's aid in the 1965 war with India. Instead she suspended military supplies to both countries, knowing that these were crucial to Pakistan and almost superfluous to India.

That America's "imperial role" in Asia will be abandoned is not certain, despite the growing feeling in the United States that it has been intolerably expensive and largely counterproductive.[26] The new Asia policy does, however, seem to call for a period of recuperation from the exhaustions of Viet Nam. Two other elements in it are striking. First, it envisages for the United States, at least for the period of recuperation, the less expensive role of a balancer in a balance of power system in which the Soviet Union, China, and subsequently Japan, may be the other actors. (In power political terms, India is not considered to be ready to play the role of a principal in such a system.) Second, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger appear to have determined that, despite the relatively moderate quality of Moscow's anti-American rhetoric, it is the Soviet Union, not China, that poses the greater threat to

[26]A few years ago George Liska argued that while the American imperial role (which he compared to that of ancient Rome) might usefully give way to a balance of power strategy in Europe, the same could not happen in Asia. The Soviet Union might become a fit and acceptable candidate for a position of "primacy or paramountcy" in Europe. But in Asia there was no one to take America's place. China, he thought, was not respectable or moderate enough to be trusted with wider responsibilities in the area. He maintained also that a premature American withdrawal from Asian affairs would be symptomatic of the imperial community's decline and decay "both as an international actor and as a national body politic." *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 81, 110-113. The opposing argument, to wit, that such a withdrawal will have no adverse effect on America's security or the quality of her domestic life, is presented in Robert W. Tucker, *Nation or Empire?* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).

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American interests in Asia and elsewhere, mainly because the USSR is militarily and economically the more powerful.

A balance of power system can transcend ideological distinctions, operating from the premise that capitalists can do business with communists and that communists — or democracies — can have conflicts of interest and fights among themselves. It assumes that politics have a rationality of their own so that, after ideological fervor has had time to cool, political actors everywhere will respond to similar drives. The Soviet Union now has considerable influence in Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh and North Viet Nam. If and when the American presence recedes from Southeast Asia, Moscow will doubtless attempt to enlarge its influence in the area. The Chinese are likely to resist such a move. The idea of a Chinese brake on the advance of Soviet influence is quite satisfactory to the United States. Hence the declaration, in the Shanghai communiqué of February 27, 1972, of Sino-American opposition to the "efforts of any other country or group of countries" to establish hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

The earlier Soviet-American collaboration against China would now seem to have been imprudent: it is an elementary rule of power politics that a great power ought not to join another great power against a smaller power. Were China to collapse, it would be the Soviet Union, the power in China's neighborhood, and not the United States, that would profit from such a turn of events. Her capabilities augmented, she would pose an even greater threat to American interests than she was able to do before. Hence, China's advancement to a position of power where she is no longer subject to Soviet intimidation is a necessary condition for her effectiveness as an actor in the balance of power system envisaged in America's new Asia policy.[27] It follows that Washington will no longer be interested in an Indian counterpoise to China. Nor does the United States stand to gain from India's rise to a hegemonious position in South Asia. That India is democratic is irrelevant. More important is the fact that in international politics she is allied with the Soviet Union. On major issues between the two superpowers she has hardly ever seen fit to side with the United States. America's interest, or perception of stake, in India's advancement as an international actor is therefore likely to decline.

[27]There has been some talk of American assistance in China's industrial development. If it were offered, and if China were to accept it, her industrial capacity could rapidly advance to a point where, given her present asceticism at home, she could offer the Soviet Union stiff competition in Asia and elsewhere. This would lighten American burdens and enable the United States to compete with the Soviet Union more selectively.

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How does Pakistan figure in all of this? The loss or serious weakening of Pakistan's independence under Indian or Indian-Soviet pressure will further strengthen the forces opposed to an American imperial or balancing role in Asia. In this sense the maintenance of Pakistani independence is an American interest. But the dimensions of this interest are modest, as a review of the U.S. response to the Indian invasion of Pakistan in 1971 will show.

Indian troops moved into East Pakistan on November 22 and war came to the Western front on December 3. In Washington, the Anderson Papers reveal,[28] the National Security Council's Special Action Group, meeting on December 3, 4 and 6, anticipated, without any feeling of alarm, that Pakistan's resistance in the East would collapse within two weeks and that her forces there would be trapped. On the other hand, Henry Kissinger told the group that the President was not inclined to let the "Paks" (meaning West Pakistan) be "extinguished." Yet by this date (December 6) the matter of sending emergency military assistance to Pakistan had not received the President's attention.[29]

The United States took no military action to help Pakistan. Washington's actions were diplomatic and political in nature, and their impact on the course of events remains problematic. The Administration called India the aggressor in the war. It canceled Indian licenses for military purchases in this country and suspended some economic assistance to India. At the UN Security Council it called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces behind their respective frontiers, knowing that the Soviet Union would veto these resolutions. The Nixon Administration has claimed, and President Bhutto has acknowledged, that it saved West Pakistan by taking the following actions: (1) Proceeding from intelligence reports that India fully intended to push into West Pakistan as hard as she could after taking the East, it advised the Yahya Government to surrender in the East and accept a cease-fire in the West. (2) It advised the Soviets that if they did not restrain India on the Western front, President Nixon's scheduled visit to Moscow might be reconsidered. (3) The President ordered a

[28]Washington columnist Jack Anderson somehow obtained and published secret memoranda, from the files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, covering the Special Action Group's meetings. The texts of these documents may be seen in *New York Times*, January 6, 1972.

[29]The group noted that because of a Congressional ban on the supply of weapons to Pakistan none could be sent to her even through third countries. After the war it transpired that she had received, possibly on a loan basis, a few F-104's from Jordan and F-5's from Libya. But it is not known whether these countries acted with the Nixon Administration's prior knowledge or consent.

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naval task force led by the *Enterprise*, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, to move from Singapore into the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate the seriousness of American interest in the survival of West Pakistan.

A threat is effective only if the party to whom it is addressed fears that noncompliance on his part will cause the party issuing the threat to carry it out. The Moscow visit would have been an item of leverage if the issues to be negotiated there were vital to the Soviet Union but not to the United States. Since this was not the case, the threat of cancellation could not have carried a high degree of credibility. Whether the naval move deterred India on the Western front would depend on how New Delhi interpreted it. Considering American disenchantment with military action in Asia and the generally pro-India, anti-Pakistan mood of the media, academia and Congress, it is altogether unlikely that the ships would have attacked Indian targets in case India drove deeply into West Pakistan. If they were not to attack, their presence in the Bay of Bengal accomplished nothing beyond an affront to Mrs. Gandhi's government.[30]

It seems to me that the *Enterprise* mission, the resolutions in the Security Council, the naming of India as the aggressor, and the public expressions of dissatisfaction with Soviet policy during the crisis were addressed as much to China and Pakistan as to India and the Soviet Union. The Nixon Administration was plainly dismayed by the Indian invasion and it had an interest in the survival of West Pakistan. But beyond these it wanted to convey to China its disapproval of Indian actions. To appear to have abandoned Pakistan, its own ally and China's friend, under attack from India with Soviet help — both China's enemies — would hardly encourage the Chinese to trust American engagements or inspire confidence in American understanding of Soviet designs in Asia. The Administration also wanted to have a talking point in its approach to the future government of Pakistan. The *Enterprise*, the UN resolutions, the signals to Delhi and Moscow, would be cited to show that the United States had defeated India's objective of annihilating Pakistan.

The Anderson Papers would seem to support this in-

[30]The *Enterprise* mission had no impact on the course of events in East Pakistan. By the time the ships were ordered to sail (around December 12), the Nixon Administration already knew that the Pakistani army was about to surrender. As I was told by a senior Pakistani diplomat at the UN, General Farman Ali's request for safe conduct out of East Pakistan was received in the UN Secretary-General's office in the early morning of December 10 and circulated to the members of the Security Council later the same morning.

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terpretation. The officials gathered in the Situation Room at the White House thought it did not matter that the American resolutions in the Security Council would fail. The important thing was to go on record, "to make clear our position relative to our greater strategy."[31] In their public comment on the suspension of American aid to India, they were to emphasize aid that was cut off and not aid that would be continued. The Administration took a harder line toward India publicly than it had taken privately. This unusual posture cannot be understood except with reference to the necessity, thought to be overriding, of conveying certain impressions to Pakistan and China.

As noted before, the United States has never contemplated using her forces in Pakistan's defense against India. This position is not likely to change. Nor can Pakistan expect the revival of a large-scale grant of American weapons such as she enjoyed between 1954 and 1965. The Cold War strategy of which that policy was a part has long since been discarded. There is much impatience in Congress with the whole idea of foreign aid, especially military aid. There are tasks of social reconstruction at home, and money is tight.[32] Pakistan may be able to buy limited quantities of sophisticated American weapons if she has the money to pay for them. In this she will have to contend with serious opposition from the Indian government and the India lobby in the United States. One might recall that India has been able to abort numerous Pakistani attempts to buy arms in the United States and Western Europe since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.[33] In operational terms, this is the measure of America's interest in Pakistan's security in the foreseeable future. Add to it, if you will, a certain amount of good will, economic aid (mostly loans), and diplomatic support from time to time depending on the specifics of the case and the general international situation.

V

The Soviet Union assisted India in dismembering Pakistan. Now that that has happened and East Pakistan has become

[31] *New York Times*, January 6, 1972.

[32] Along with these dispositions is the one against any U.S. military undertaking in Asia after a withdrawal from Viet Nam is effected. How America could then be the balancer in Asia is not clear. If in the foreseeable future America's power is to rest at home, her exclusion from the Asian balance of power is the more likely development. In that case, Soviet and Indian pressures against Pakistan may become more severe.

[33] T. N. Dupuy, *Almanac of World Military Power* (New York: T. N. Dupuy Associates and Stackpole Books, 1970), p. 299.

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Bangladesh, what will Moscow's policy be? Without doubt the Soviets will want to retain influence in the area. They could adopt one of two approaches. They might choose to work through the intermediary agency of India, that is, concede India the preponderant role in the region and hope that under Indian dominance its governments will pursue foreign and domestic policies congenial to the USSR.[34] Alternatively, they might wish to reach these governments and peoples independently of India. The matter of approaches is relevant because India is eager to be recognized as the dominant South Asian power. At this particular time, while her relations with the Soviet Union are those of mutual assistance and cooperation, her desire for dominance might not seem to be prejudicial to Soviet interests. But India is too large to be a Soviet satellite or stooge. Over time her posture toward the USSR may change. She may include the Soviets in the list of foreigners no longer welcome in her neighborhood. It follows that in the long run the Soviet Union will not tolerate the prospect of an Indian veto on her relations with the smaller states in the region. It follows also that further enlargement of India's size or power at the cost of Pakistan need not be a Soviet interest.

In Bangladesh Moscow's strategy remains undefined except for the conclusion of aid and trade agreements. The Communist Party (pro-Moscow faction) has surfaced and opened offices all over the land. Last May pro-Moscow leftists won sweeping victories in Student Union elections at the University of Dacca and two other Bangladesh universities. India, not the Soviet Union, has made a twenty-year treaty with Bangladesh including mutual defense assistance clauses similar to those in the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971 — thus linking the new state with the Soviet Union in defense matters, albeit indirectly.

[34]Precedents of indirect control exist in the experience of both countries. The British system of indirect rule in India's princely states is well known. Until about the end of 1947 the Soviet Union treated Albania as a sub-satellite of Yugoslavia. Stalin professed to be ready even to endorse Albania's and Bulgaria's unification with Yugoslavia. But he changed his mind when he found that Tito and his colleagues would not be unquestioning and obedient tools of Soviet interest and policy: Tito's example might disrupt Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Hence the break with Yugoslavia and the Cominform's public call for the overthrow of Tito and his associates. For further detail, see Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 422, 461-467, and his *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), Chapters 3, 4. Also see Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1962), pp. 135-185. Soviet policy and tactics have undoubtedly become more sophisticated than those of Stalin in 1948. India in 1972 is different from Yugoslavia in 1948. But this earlier phase of Soviet policy does suggest the possibility of Soviet-Indian tensions developing over relations with other states of the subcontinent.

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The present Soviet posture toward Pakistan is firm, almost hard. The USSR is careful not to cause anxiety to India. During Bhutto's visit to Moscow last March, the Soviets agreed to restore aid and trade relations which had been suspended in 1971. At his luncheon for Soviet dignitaries Bhutto made a most conciliatory speech. He recalled his own contribution to the development of Soviet-Pakistan relations when he was Ayub Khan's minister. He praised the excellence of Soviet technology and the USSR's "revolutionary social justice." He appealed for Soviet understanding of Pakistan's concern regarding her men and territory held by India and the "disastrous situation" of the Biharis in Bangladesh. In return Kosygin went out of his way to justify his government's policy toward Pakistan during the events of 1971 and delivered a warning. The "recent crisis," he said, had involved a clash between the "forces of national liberation" and "an anti-popular military dictatorship that had joined ranks with external aggressive circles hostile to the people of 'Hindustan,' including the Pakistani people." He added that "if history were to repeat itself, we would again take the same position, because we are convinced it was correct."[35]

Bhutto's speech implied a recognition of the Soviet Union as an arbiter of international disputes in Southern Asia. Twice he expressed the hope that his talks with Soviet leaders would bring peace to "our part of the world." Kosygin agreed, but not the way Bhutto might have wished. He linked the improvement of Soviet-Pakistan relations with the normalization of relations among Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. He called for an end to the era of confrontation and a commitment to the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes between the countries of "Hindustan." He said nothing about the concerns Bhutto had mentioned. Instead he wondered what was preventing progress on agreement to hold talks among Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, and asked Pakistan to "display a realistic approach" to this matter.

It is apparent that the Soviet leaders declined to use their good offices to bring about an Indo-Pakistan peace settlement the way they had done at Tashkent in 1966. They endorsed Mrs. Gandhi's position that Pakistan would have to negotiate a settlement directly with India and Bangladesh. Moscow did not wish to interfere with India's opportunity to obtain whatever concessions

[35]Texts of these speeches will be found in *Pravda,* March 18, 1972. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* April 12, 1972, carries an English translation and also contains the text of the joint Soviet-Pakistan communiqué issued at the end of Bhutto's visit.

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she could from Pakistan while showing that any concessions she might make in return were determined of her own accord without external pressure. The joint communiqué issued at the end of Bhutto's visit is almost barren from the Pakistani point of view. It announces agreement on matters far removed from Pakistan's urgent and immediate concerns: the desirability of ending Israeli occupation of Arab territories, withdrawing foreign troops from Indochina, complete and general disarmament, banning bacteriological warfare, eliminating colonialism, respecting the UN and its Charter.

In recent months Pakistani officials have referred to evidence of Soviet attempts to build secessionist movements in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier regions of Pakistan.[36] This harassment, if not subversion, may be calculated to augment Indian pressure on Pakistan to obtain a satisfactory peace settlement. It could also be a response to President Bhutto's unfortunate suggestion, soon after coming to power, that the United States and China had a common interest in containing Soviet influence in Asia and that Pakistan might have a role to play in such an enterprise.[37] Kosygin, in the speech referred to above, denounced "external aggressive circles," meaning China, and "imperialism," meaning the United States, which, he said, were "sowing discord and animosity" among the nations of South Asia. There is even the possibility that the Soviet move was intended to induce Bhutto to let the pro-Moscow National Awami Party (NAP), which had the edge in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan assemblies, form the government in these provinces. In early May the NAP assumed the governorships and formed ministries in NWFP and Baluchistan, and since then its spokesmen have been emphatic in asserting their dedication to national unity.

The Soviets have greater freedom of action with respect to South Asia than either the United States or China. They are not subject to another power's nuclear intimidation as China is to theirs. They are not tired of Asian involvements as the United States is. The pressures of public and legislative opinion do not bear on their government as heavily as they do on the American Administration. They are physically located next door to Pakistan and India. They have an abundance of modern sophisticated

[36]Information on this point was gathered from conversations with senior Pakistani diplomats, although reports to this effect have appeared in the press. See Peter Kann's massive account of his interview of Sher Mohammad Marri, a Marxist advocate of Azad (Free) Baluchistan, in the *Wall Street Journal*, April 6, 1972.

[37]Bhutto's interview by C. L. Sulzberger in *New York Times*, February 13, 1972.

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weapons. All of this means that they are in a position to guarantee Pakistan's frontiers should they so desire. Having helped India to detach East Pakistan from the West and thus having eliminated any Pakistani threat to Indian security, they could now call a halt to India's further harassment or nibbling of Pakistan. Such a policy would imply the assertion, on their part, of an imperial role in the area. Whether they will play this role remains to be seen.

The best Pakistan can hope for at present is that the Soviets will not foment subversion within her territory or encourage another Indian invasion. For such self-restraint the Soviets will expect Pakistani reciprocity. They will not tolerate Pakistan offering herself as an American-Chinese outpost against the Soviet Union. They may not insist that Pakistan change her China policy from one of friendship to one of hostility, but they will object to her cultivating or maintaining a "special relationship" with either China or the United States. There are many lessons for Pakistan to learn from her recent defeat and dismemberment. One of them indubitably is that she cannot invite Soviet hostility except at her peril. Neither the United States nor China will protect her from its consequences.

VI

None of the great powers is likely to guarantee Pakistan's security. Their politics seem to be in a transitional phase. The era of the Cold War has ended, but the premises governing their interaction in an era of competitive coexistence in a multipolar world have not fully emerged. The most powerful of them, the United States, will be engaged during the next few years in rethinking her national purpose and role with respect to the outside world. In any case, American interest in Southern Asia will not approach the level reached before the Sino-American détente began to develop. The Chinese may not suffer from gnawing doubts about their policy goals, but they are restrained by Soviet opposition. The Soviets themselves stand in an interlude between two policy periods: the breakup of Pakistan closes one fairly long era of Soviet policy toward the Indian subcontinent; their broader strategy for the next phase is not yet apparent.

The current disposition, alignments and relative power positions of the great powers will some day change again, and when that happens the nature of Pakistan's security problem and her options may change also. But the present situation, while it lasts, suggests a certain setting for Pakistan, a setting in which she con-

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centrates on mutually profitable economic relations with the great powers, avoids political connection with all of them, and devotes herself to the domestic tasks of economic and social reconstruction. Where does this leave her security problem vis-à-vis India?

Given the insufficiency of her military capability and foreign connections, Pakistan will have to strengthen the political and other nonmilitary elements of her defense.[38] On the diplomatic front, she must take care not to arouse Soviet hostility. A posture of equidistance from the great powers may suffice to ensure a modicum of Soviet good will. Although Pakistanis will be loath to accept the role of India's "younger brother," they will have to do their part in ending the politics of confrontation with India. This implies the following positions in addition to those mentioned earlier. Pakistan will have to leave it to the Indian Muslims and Kashmiris to work out their own destiny. A change of approach may even further her interest in these people: it may help to release the Indian Muslims from the frequent and humiliating call to prove their loyalty to India and thus enable them to assert their rights within the Indian polity more vigorously. Again, where her own vital interests are not engaged, Pakistan need not be the standard-bearer of opposition to India in international forums and elsewhere, the challenger of India's claims to higher virtue at home and abroad. There are others who will play this role.

It should be borne in mind that the alternative to confrontation is not necessarily romance and marriage or even "friendship." A limited relationship — modest trade, occasional cultural exchanges, easier travel, and a halt to hostile propaganda against each other — may also be possible. India will probably press Pakistan for broader "cooperation" among the nations of the subcontinent. In this she may have the support of the Soviet Union. But Pakistan's unwillingness to join these ventures need not become a *casus belli*. In the actual day-to-day workings of

[38]Some students of national security problems argue that a small nation, threatened by a great power and lacking the protection of a rival great power, cannot defend herself by military means. If she cannot bear the financial burdens of maintaining a modern and sufficient military capability, it is useless to build a partially effective establishment. It is safer to rely exclusively on political, psychological, legal and moral factors inhibiting great-power aggression or making it difficult for the aggressor to hold the small state if the initial act of aggression could not be prevented. See Vital, *op. cit.*, and his new book in which he further develops this argument, *The Survival of Small States* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). Also see V. V. Sveics, *Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts* (New York: Exposition Press, 1969). However, Pakistan is not likely to disband her military establishment even if it is not fully modern or effective.

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diplomacy smaller nations have some leeway. A peaceable Pakistan under Indian pressure will evoke considerable international sympathy. She may evoke some sympathy even within India. However, her ability to resist Indian pressure will derive mainly from her domestic political cohesion and vigor. If India wishes to coerce Pakistan, she is not likely to begin with a frontal military attack. She will first exploit Pakistan's domestic divisions. But she can subvert Pakistan only if Pakistanis, in large enough numbers, are disaffected with the prevailing political order.

The East Pakistani secession has shown that Pakistan cannot be defended unless the people of her various regions are determined to remain together as an independent nation. They will be so determined if they believe that their well-being will be greater by remaining together than it might be otherwise. If the political system now being designed commands general acceptance, an essential basis for safeguarding Pakistani security will have been laid. The fences that Pakistan must mend first are the frontiers of domestic policy.

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BAB EL MANDEB, STRATEGIC TROUBLESPOT

by J. Bowyer Bell

FEW areas of the world offer as little charm or possess as meager resources as the southern Red Sea littoral. There is some potential for intensive agriculture in the highlands of Ethiopia and Yemen. Thanks to several adequate harbors, entrepôts have grown up at the edge of barter economies. For the rest, one notes a few fish, some ill-kept relics of Western technology, and endless miles of sand, eroded rock and scrub. The inhabitants have mostly been isolated and primitive tribesmen, nomads following goats through the wilderness, subsistence farmers or huddled families in decayed towns. Only a few centers of neo-colonial activity exist to balance the crumbling ruins of more ancient societies. In relatively modern times and until the construction of the Suez Canal, the Red Sea was for the most part a means to Mecca; after Suez it became a hot and unpleasant lap on the route to India, a bit of the British imperial lifeline. Although imperial aspirations clashed in the Horn of Africa and farther inland, most European grand designs were baffled by the climate and the sand, if not — as the Italians were at Adowa in 1896 — by the natives.

On the eastern shore began the dead land of *Arabia Deserta*, sand, lava fields, a dry, burning hot, barren wilderness. The western shore was no better, despite the presence of the British, French and Italians. For much of the twentieth century it attracted the interest of "explorers" more readily than the concern of strategists or the eye of the developer.

Until the 1950's, the Arabian Red Sea area slumbered almost untouched, deep in the Islamic dark ages. In Yemen in February 1948, the old Imam Yahya had been murdered, and his son, Ahmad Bin Yahya, had assumed the throne, hunted down the assassins and had them decapitated. Ahmad possessed the power of a direct descendant of the Prophet's son-in-law, Ali, as spiritual leader of the Zaidi and Imam of Yemen. He ruled by terror, the executioner's sword, and a system of hostages, intimidation, bribery — the entire resources of medieval tyranny — in a Kingdom of Silence. For a decade Yemen remained locked away from the outside world, until the first shipment of Soviet arms in 1957 signaled the easing of isolation. In the following year the Imam,

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recognizing Nasser's new magic, attached himself like an ancient nimbus to the new United Arab Republic.

To the south of Yemen, along the southern coast of Arabia, just touching the Red Sea at Cape Bab el Mandeb, lay Lahej, the richest state of the eighteen Western Aden Protectorates tied by treaty to Britain. But outside of Lahej town and the cotton fields, the state was a wilderness without roads or order. The other protectorates, ruled erratically by sultans of varying merit and devoid of resources, were breeding grounds of endemic warfare as isolated as Yemen. Only Aden, a free port, major bunkering harbor and British base with an economy vastly enlivened in 1954 by the construction of the British Petroleum oil refinery, showed signs of life. Beyond Aden colony, a visitor moved back into the past with each mile as the road dwindled into camel tracks and the tribes collected transit toll under threat of murder. In the 1950's, without any great sense of urgency, the plan called for the various protectorates to meet in a British-sponsored federation, thereby giving some coherence to South Arabia.

A number of developments, especially the spread of Arab nationalism with Nasser as the new messiah, worked vast changes on both sides of the Red Sea after 1954. Fallout from the Suez debacle and the decay of empire eroded the British presence in South Arabia and opened up another area of penetration for Arab nationalism. Across the Red Sea, the Sudan, proclaimed an independent republic in 1956, immediately fell on bad times that led to a military takeover in 1958. Farther south, the British and Italians departed from the Horn of Africa. In 1952 the United Nations had approved the federation of Eritrea with the Ethiopian Empire, and in 1960, despite an appalling paucity of resources, British and Italian Somaliland were combined to form the new Somali Republic. In Yemen the 1962 coup and subsequent civil war brought tens of thousands of Egyptians into the isolated Yemeni highlands, and with them the Soviets.

Overall, notwithstanding the wars of Yemen and South Arabia, the new flags in Khartoum and Mogadishu, the Red Sea states maintained an ancient continuity of tribalism, disorder and turmoil in an area of apparently limited and declining importance to the outside world. In Yemen the old vices remained: the tribes husbanded their feuds and watched the Egyptians or Soviets with suspicion. In Ethiopia, where the Emperor ruled by divine right, the weight of tradition and the lack of resources limited rapid change and hampered economic development. In any case,

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changes seemed less likely in conservative Addis Ababa than in progressive Asmara, in Eritrea, though beyond Asmara or the ports of Massawa or Asab the tribes lived in a distant past. The nomadic Somalis, deprived of their traditional grazing lands in Ethiopia and Kenya, had opened a sporadic border war in 1960 with their only military weapon, the *shifta*, old bandits in the service of the new state's desire for a Greater Somalia. Amid the stagnation of tribal societies, the endemic wars and feuds, the isolation from most of the major world currents, only the future of Aden seemed from its broad strategic implications to be a contemporary problem.

Yet, after 1956, as Nasser opposed the West and favored the East in varying degrees of intensity, the strains of the Cold War added to the disorder in South Arabia. The Soviets and later the Chinese aided the Yemeni Republicans and revolutionary Arab nationalists. The Americans backed the Saudis, who supported the Yemeni Royalists. The British held the fort in Aden. For much of the 1960's, the result was a stalemate. The Egyptians were unable to win in Yemen and unwilling to lose. The Saudis, despite dour predictions, held firm under Faisal. British efforts to create a viable South Arabian government centered in Aden came to nought and the outcome was an ignominious withdrawal in November 1967 and the triumph of the National Liberation Front (NLF). At the same time, Egyptian troops were withdrawing ingloriously from Yemen. Eventually, a compromise of sorts was reached that permitted as much civil order as the tribes in the area ordinarily managed. The Yemen Arab Republic evolved as a "neutral" distinguished by limited Soviet and Chinese interest; Aden territory became the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Southern Yemen), avowedly revolutionary but without visible resources.

At this point, with the departure of both the British and the Egyptians, the area seemed to have earned a period of benign neglect. The East-West competition was muted and the anti-imperialist struggle was over. There was no oil to covet, and no heavy demand for harbors in consequence of the closure of the Suez Canal. There appeared to be no reason why the lower end of the Red Sea should offer more than subsistent government and tribal economies, along the sides of a sea route leading nowhere. However, the vacuum was illusory. The June 1967 arrival of the Israelis in Sinai to the north, and the approximately concurrent appearance-in-strength of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean to

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the southeast, transformed the Arabian rimlands into a potential asset for several distant but interested investors.

II

Increasingly, over the past five years, developments near the Red Sea that previously were determined by long-standing and complicated historical factors have taken on more than local significance. For example, in earlier days the name Perim might have struck a familiar chord only for the collector of bits of British imperial nostalgia. Small, bleak, steep-sided, crescent-shaped, all that is left of the northernmost crater of a volcanic chain with Aden as its more famous link, Perim Island has two lighthouses, the ruins of a British bunkering station, a decayed fishing village — and command of the southern entrance to the Red Sea at Bab el Mandeb. From its formal annexation in 1856 until its somewhat reluctant cession to the new government in Southern Yemen,[1] it played no significant strategic role, largely because Britain already controlled the southern entrance to the Red Sea from Aden. Britain had "picked up" the island merely to remove a counter from the board before someone else recognized its potential value.

Since coming to power in November 1967, the NLF in Aden has had neither the capacity nor the interest to invest in Perim — and in any case there is no longer a northern entrance to the Red Sea. Perim blocks an already blocked estuary. Yet in a Middle East amply beset with crisis spots, Perim and another little-known Red Sea landmark 300 miles to the north, the Dahlak Archipelago — an incredibly hot, snake-infested clutch of islands off the Eritrean coast — are strategically located. They could become as familiar as Sharm el Sheikh, the scruffy artillery post on the southeast tip of Sinai, and for the same reason. The Israeli-Arab confrontation has crept southward to the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

The Israeli threat is felt on the periphery of the Arab Middle East not solely because of the geographic proximity of Israeli troops. The extent of the Israeli "aggression" and the magnitude of the "setback" in 1967 were appalling shocks, though the Arabs had absorbed defeat and humiliation before and continued as before. This time the impatience and frustration of a new genera-

[1]When negotiations concerning the terms of British withdrawal from Aden finally began with leaders of the NLF in November 1967, the British hoped to internationalize the island, but after some dithering they let it go along with the rest of South Arabia. "We conducted our referendum on Perim one afternoon and it passed peacefully to South Arabia." Humphrey Trevelyan, *The Middle East in Revolution* (Boston: Gambit, 1970), p. 261.

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tion led in 1969 to the establishment of revolutionary-military governments in the Sudan and Libya dedicated to rectifying the consequences of their elders' failures. In this, they were joined by the NLF in Southern Yemen. These young men who came to power after the June War had an ideological parent in the Arab National Movement of George Habash and an ideological kinship with the Palestine *fedayeen*. Arab revolutionary ideology thus perceives Israel not simply as an enemy, an alien aggressor, but as the point of the imperialist lance that threatens Aden as much as Damascus. Israel is the stalking-horse of a worldwide imperialism that aspires to recolonialize the Middle East. Naturally, such an analysis is encouraged and applauded by the Arabs' Marxist allies, who hold similar views. The result is that the radical Arabs' bipolar world view is reinforced. The battle against imperialism/Israel can be waged in the Sudanese desert or the islands in the Bab el Mandeb; given the Suez stalemate, perhaps it can *only* be fought on the flanks. Ideologically, the Red Sea states are in the front lines. Yet, as it turns out, there is a real Israeli presence in the area rather than simply a perceived Israeli threat.

III

For a great many years, quietly and patiently, the Israelis have pushed an aid and development program in those parts of the Third World where they were welcomed. In the process they have won many friends in Black Africa and denied the Arab cause ideological hegemony. One area where they have been involved for a considerable time has been Ethiopia. Until recently, the Israeli presence apparently did not relate directly to the Arab world, although Ethiopian ambitions and intentions ran counter to those of the Somalis and Sudanese. The Somalis had not called off their *shifta* war until 1967. The Sudanese suspected that the Ethiopians gave covert aid to the rebels in southern Sudan. Another factor was Ethiopia's absorption of Eritrea in 1962, thus abrogating the federal relationship. Many Eritreans resented the maneuver and feared assimilation into a less developed Amharic culture with feudal control in the hands of the Emperor; but this too, did not appear to be an Arab issue. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), founded in 1961, decided to oppose the absorption by force of arms if need be. Opposition to the annexation had both Christian and Islamic support, but those who decided on an armed struggle probably represented only a small minority. Even combining the *shifta*, who were delighted to ply their bandit trade

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with new weapons,[2] and trained guerrillas, who used more sophisticated tactics, the ELF failed to gain any significant momentum.

The ELF was troublesome, but everyone in Eritrea had lived with banditry a long time and the scuffles in the wilds did not adversely affect the economy or upset an administration that did not in any case bother to administer the more barren areas. Increasingly, perhaps at first to solidify support, the ELF sought aid and comfort from the radical Arab states, particularly Syria. Ultimately its spokesmen saw the struggle as one for Arab liberation from an Ethiopian despot — although only half the population of Eritrea is Moslem and many of those would not identify themselves as Arabs. From Damascus, ELF Secretary-General Osman Saleh Sabbe stressed the aspiration for an independent Arab republic at the same time that Tedla Bairu, nominally the vice-president and the only Christian on the executive of the ELF, insisted that the only aim was a return to the federal relationship of 1962. Still, the ELF was in the field as a radical Arab liberation movement, backed by Arab radicals, fighting the Ethiopians, who were backed — as might be expected — by the Americans and the Israelis. Eritrea became an Arab front, albeit a minor one, in the general confrontation with the forces of imperialism/Israel and was so identified by Radio Damascus in 1969.

The Eritrean battleground is wild, isolated, beyond all but tribal order and the power of rifles. Down through the ravines and across the dusty valley floor, a single railway line runs to the west but does not reach the Sudanese border. There is a road in declining repair that links up most of the towns between Asmara and Kassala, in the Sudan. North of the axis is a rugged, rarely traveled wilderness of ravines and *jebels* cut by a few trails. The risk of bandits begins, no matter in what direction, hard upon the suburbs of Asmara, the tame and charming Italianate provincial capital. There are two or three other recognizably Western towns, but indigenous African styles and habits take over at their outskirts. Eritrea, in fact, offers a great many attractions as guerrilla country. Effective, centralized control from Asmara has never really existed, and that which does exist depends on the few all-weather roads. Vast, wild areas offer ample haven for the fugitive,

[2]One curious asset of the ELF was the desire of the tribesmen to spend a proving period as young outlaws. Every ambitious family wanted its sons to be able to afford the rifles that would allow them to follow a brigand's career — my son the bandit. All the ELF had to do was import the rifles and reap the harvests of disorder.

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as they have for centuries to the *shifta*. Many of the tribes are nomadic and warlike, ideal recruits to violence whatever the motive. As long as ELF tactics were in the *shifta* style, and as long as the Front's capacity for effective action was limited, there was little difference between traditional and modern forms of disorder, except for an occasional spectacular operation in or around Asmara.

By 1968 the worst of the guerrilla campaign seemed to be over. The ELF's conversion to Arabism seemed to limit its appeal, and some of the original converts defected. The movement looked rather like a self-perpetuating confidence game: the leadership raised money among the radical Arabs so that it could pay the *shifta* sufficiently to cause enough trouble to attract additional radical Arab money. The June War had interrupted the arms supplies from Syria until mid-1968. The one big ELF operation in September 1968, an attack on the isolated Hal-Hal commando police post far to the northwest, collapsed in disaster with at least sixty guerrillas killed. Observers felt that the *shifta* strategy had nearly run its course. Ethiopia trained a counterguerrilla force but tended to keep anti-insurgency operations to a minimum — why defend wasteland? — and waited for the ELF to go away. But the ELF did not go away despite the Front's divisions and failures. In 1969 it launched into the air-hijacking business to stir up waning interest. Beyond the four strikes at Ethiopian airlines, it also sabotaged the main Asmara power plant and the Franco-Ethiopian railway terminal in Djibuti.

One advantage that Ethiopia had exploited had been the ability to limit Sudanese aid to an "Arab" liberation struggle. Essentially, the Ethiopians had indicated to successive governments in Khartoum, in word and then deed, that any Sudanese commitment beyond quiet words of comfort to the ELF would result in Ethiopian aid to the southern Sudanese rebels. Across the Red Sea, the Southern Yemen government could not be easily pressured by Ethiopia. Aden became an ELF supply center. Then, the military coup in Khartoum in May 1969 brought to power Colonel Gafaar al-Nimeiry and the Sudanese radicals who advocated a compromise solution of the southern Sudanese problem. For the ELF, the coup raised the hope of help from an ideological ally in power. Al-Nimeiry seemed willing to go much farther in risking Ethiopian retaliation than his predecessors. Yet within three years he had turned moderate and reached a regional autonomy agreement in March 1972 that ended the sixteen-year-

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old southern problem — for the time being. He made his peace with Ethiopia and even recognized the United States. The ELF held fast, still arrayed with the radical rebels against what they perceived to be the reactionary, American-financed forces of the past.

The American presence in Ethiopia is considerable. The listings under United States Government in the Addis Ababa telephone book run on through various agencies, offices and programs. U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia averages over $12 million a year, and sustains a permanent military mission of one hundred. Rumor has it that the monarchy has been underwritten by an American guarantee to intervene if need be. In Asmara, there are 3,200 Americans, including dependents, at the United States' Kagnew military communications station, a $60 million complex. Here the American presence could hardly be more visible as huge, futuristic, deep-space dishes dominate the landscape and a twist of the radio dial brings acid rock and country blues from the armed forces radio station into every transistor. To the ELF, the American Consul General is as much a part of the feudal system as Governor General Debebe Haile Mariam across town in the palace. ELF activists made their position quite clear in September 1969 when they seized Consul General Murray Jackson and for two hours treated him to their views at length.

The Israeli presence, as is often the case, is low profile. Perhaps symbolic of the Ethiopian posture is the apparently even division between Thompson and Uzi sub-machine guns carried by the army, to which the odd AK-47 captured from the ELF is added for display purposes. The ELF and the Arabs, however, insist that the Israelis do more than supply Uzi sub-machine guns and train the police; they are held to be responsible for Ethiopian anti-guerrilla training and tactics in cooperation with the Americans and to be active in the field, not only in Eritrea but in southern Sudan. The Arabs for several years have accepted as proven Israel's support and guidance of the southern Sudanese Anyanya rebels.[3] The Americans have repeatedly denied that there are guerrilla-war ex-

[3]Western journalists had reported Israeli advisers in the forces of Colonel Samuel Alu John, commander of the Anyanya concentrated in the Zande area near the Congo frontier. Israeli missions in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia were "reputedly" supplying arms and training to the insurgents. The Sudanese claimed to have captured American and Israeli arms from the rebels in 1970. Whether there were Israeli agents among the Anyanya or not is probably less important than the Sudanese conviction that there were. After all, in Arab eyes the Israelis have never elsewhere denied themselves opportunity to maim the Arabs; why would they not have been in the southern Sudan and Eritrea?

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perts aiding the Ethiopians or that Green Berets are involved or that Washington is particularly concerned with the Eritrean situation, considered to be essentially an internal matter — so far. The radical Arabs are unconvinced. The Israelis have made no comment.

So far there have been only a few ELF-U.S. incidents like the genteel kidnapping of the American Consul General. Mystery surrounded the shooting of a U.S. soldier on January 11, 1971, on the Massawa-Asmara road, apparently with an AK-47 or SKS semi-automatic. Both weapons are used by the ELF, but also by the neighborhood bandits, long a hazard in the Ghinda area. The shooting might, therefore, have been *shifta* rather than ELF, but the Americans in Asmara were advised to travel in two-car convoys and no farther than two hours away from the American base.

The switch from the marginal ELF *shifta* campaign that had wound down by the beginning of 1969 to the far more ambitious and effective attacks at the end of 1970 had been made possible by the change of government in Khartoum and the redefinition of the enemy in Ethiopia as imperialism/Zionism. Where once the Front could manage an office only in Syria, by the end of 1970 new offices had been established in Aden, Baghdad, Beirut, Khartoum and Mogadishu. It had a pledge of $7,200,000 from Libya, and avid supporters in Iraq and Syria, the latter forwarding Chinese-made AK-47's for its use. China and Cuba were enthusiastic about the Eritrean movement. The new aid and the growing radical Arab militancy made possible a series of operations during November 1970 that are still largely cloaked in Ethiopian censorship and ELF exaggeration. Apparently a number of ambushes and attacks took place along the Asmara-Keren-Agordat, east-west axis. Two Christian villages were burned and many of the inhabitants murdered. The Ethiopians responded, reputedly with air strikes, and as many as 17,000 refugees, mainly women and children, withdrew into the Sudan.

For the ELF the single most important strike was the ambush of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian Second Infantry Division, Major General Teshome Erghetus, who was killed on November 21, only four hours after his decision to leave Asmara. The Teshome ambush indicated a high degree of intelligence and operational capacity — or considerable luck. On December 16, Ethiopia proclaimed a state of emergency for two-thirds of Eritrea — all the areas along the Sudanese border — "in the face of in-

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filtration by bandits supported by foreign governments."[4] The Emperor called an unusual press conference on January 18 to reiterate charges that "outside nations and groups" were backing the guerrillas. Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru had made these charges before but the Emperor's statement underlined the seriousness of the renewed ELF challenge.

The old tactics — pressure on the Sudanese and lax administrative control in the wilds — depended on Khartoum's vulnerability and ELF inefficiency. To observers neither condition seemed to obtain any longer. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian response remained low-level. The government's action was limited to shifting some of the population to protected villages and replacing the Governor General of Eritrea, Raz Asrate Kassa. The Emperor could see more dangers in a growing army than in the almost traditional bandit tactics of the ELF.

Then came the Sudanese shift. In Khartoum, al-Nimeiry's regime, tempered by the experience of office, began to reconsider various ideological commitments. By early 1971 the ELF alliance was no longer worth the price that had to be paid in the southern Sudan; an agreement with the Ethiopians was quietly reached. Addis Ababa had no qualms about an accommodation since, if necessary, the Anyanya rebels could be adequately supplied from General Amin's Uganda, where the Israelis also had excellent contacts. Al-Nimeiry moved even farther away from radical Arab causes after the trauma of the failed coup in Khartoum in July: in January 1972 he entertained Haile Selassie on a two-day visit to the Sudan and in March the autonomy agreement with the southern Sudanese was signed in Addis Ababa. Even without Sudanese aid, however, the ELF, supplied in part through Aden, could continue to be a vexatious problem for Ethiopia.

IV

To the southeast, Ethiopia was still beset by potential foes and uneasy borders. On Friday, June 11, 1971, a Liberian-flag tanker chartered by Israel was fired on in the Straits of Bab el Mandeb from an unmarked launch. Bazooka shells ripped three holes in the *Coral Sea* but failed to fire the 30,000 tons of crude oil. The attacking speedboat with three armed men aboard turned and disappeared among the Arab fishing boats nearby. The *Coral Sea* continued through the eighteen-mile strait and on to Eilat. In

[4] *New York Times*, December 19, 1970.

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Beirut a spokesman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — like the NLF in Aden a descendant of the Arab National Movement — claimed credit for the attack supposedly launched from Aqaba in Jordan, over 1,300 miles to the north. Few doubted that the PFLP launch had embarked from Aden with the assistance of the NLF. Israel underplayed the event. The NLF made no comment and announced no "blockade," and the PFLP returned to more traditional tactics.

Meanwhile the Somalis had not abandoned their territorial hopes — Greater Somalia — although in July 1970 Major General Mohammed Siad Baree, President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, had stressed the need for peaceful settlement of all disputes. As far as the Somalis are concerned, there *are* disputes, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council has identified Somalia with the radical Arab cause. The walls of Mogadishu are covered with posters reading "Palestine Bleeds" or "Palestine/Viet Nam." ELF spokesmen are welcomed, and the American Peace Corps was asked to leave. Ships flying Somalia's blue flag with a white star trade with North Viet Nam, and Mogadishu followed the radical Arab lead by recognizing East Germany.

To nationalist Arabs, Ethiopia seems to be the spearhead of Black Africa thrust into their lands stirring up brush wars. Across the Gulf of Aden, on the seaward flank, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South) has made no secret of its long-standing sympathy with the ELF and suspicion of the American-Israeli presence in Ethiopia. This antagonism, coupled with the geographic assets of the NLF, could well engender a far more serious crisis in the area than guerrilla bands in Eritrea, the border war with Somalia, or a renewed insurrection in the southern Sudan.

There is no technical reason why the militant NLF in Aden could not declare a blockade of the Red Sea denying passage to Israeli ships from a position on Perim. Such a blockade — or threat of one — with or without a declaration of belligerency, legal or illegal, symbolic or no, could only be viewed by Israel with the most profound concern. Nasser's Sharm el Sheikh blockade of the Straits of Tiran in May 1967 was a symbolic Arab "victory" that had nothing to do with tonnage, artillery ranges or magnetic mines. In Aden, the NLF has the ideological righteousness, probably the desire, and foreseeably the excuse to announce just such a blockade, which could become another symbolic victory. If it also had the military capacity to blockade Israeli shipping, Israel

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would suffer a substantial loss in view of her stake in the heavy oil traffic plying the Red Sea.

At the moment, however, the NLF lacks this military power. In 1971 the air force at its command consisted of ten MIG-17's with student pilots, and its navy had a couple of patrol boats. Soviet military aid to Aden in autumn 1972 has made little change. The reluctant Sudanese ally has six coastal patrol boats, sixteen MIG-21's, and a mixed bag of sixteen other combat planes. The Somalis, still being armed by the Soviets, are not *that* keen on being part of radical Arab initiatives. The Yemen Arab Republic is too deeply embroiled in domestic disasters to become involved in a foreign adventure. To the north, Egypt has shown a remarkable tolerance of Israel's Red Sea shipping in order to protect Cairo's exploitation of oil resources opposite Sinai. Since 1967, the Arab capacity to inflict any sort of "defeat" on Israel beyond a transitory symbolic "diplomatic" success or a *fedayeen* "spectacular" has been repeatedly revealed as somewhat limited. During the same period, as long as the Soviet presence did not interdict Israeli retaliation, there were few Arab redoubts invulnerable to Israeli attack. The Israelis have already unofficially indicated that Perim is within range of their base in southern Sinai. As yet there are no SAM's on Perim. In any case, the June 1971 incident in the Bab el Mandeb left the NLF with "officially" clean hands — the PFLP claimed to be responsible.

The real point is that military capacity to deny Israel access to the Red Sea does not lie in Arab but in Soviet hands, and Moscow's intentions in the Gulf of Aden remain something of a mystery. A trial balloon may have been sent up in August 1970 when "reports" circulated that Soviet marines had landed on the island of Socotra off the South Arabian coast and/or that the island would be turned into a Soviet base. Socotra is nearly as obscure as Perim and much less significant strategically: 220 miles off the Arabian coast, 120 miles off Cape Guardafui on the eastern horn of Africa, comprising 1,400 square miles without visible resources or natural attractions, the island gives shelter to 15,000 Arabs scraping out a living from fishing and goats. As soon as the reports appeared, Israeli newspapers warned the Soviets and the NLF in Aden that any move to choke off Israeli routes to Eilat would be resisted, and noted the air mileage to Aden and Socotra from Sinai. The Israeli government did not comment.

In Aden, the NLF denied the stories about Soviet marines, a Soviet base, or a Soviet presence to anyone who would listen, and

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finally flew some journalists out to see the island. Socotra would be a small prize compared with the magnificent harbor and facilities at Aden, where the Soviets have only visiting privileges. Aden would give Moscow the key not only to a Red Sea capacity but to a major grip on an Indian Ocean position. But the NLF, which spent years prying the British out, has turned a deaf ear — twice — to Soviet requests for more extensive naval privileges. Even if the cease-fire to the north breaks down, the Soviets are not capable of sealing the Red Sea without access to Aden, assuming that they would want to take the considerable risk of such an open confrontation with the Israelis. Thus the NLF might consider a blockade but lacks the substance to make it credible and has no desire to place Aden in hock to an outside power in order to acquire that substance. With a hold on Aden the Soviets could make the move with credibility but might still lack the desire for such a confrontation. Altogether, the possibility of a Perim blockade seems remote.

Yet the Israelis worry about any matter, however slight and unlikely, that might affect their security. A blockade of the Red Sea exit assuredly comes under this category, and the *fedayeen* "attack" *did* occur. Thus, even if some sort of agreement could be reached to open the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, a potential strangle hold to the south by revolutionaries who might not recognize any "agreements" with the Zionists would still remain a "threat." In Aden, the NLF is convinced that the Israelis are leaving no stone unturned to build a counterpresence in the area — in particular in the islands off Massawa, the Ethiopian Dahlak Archipelago. NLF intelligence has gathered ample data, Aden feels, to indicate that the Israelis are in Ethiopia on more than a "training" mission, that in fact they have their own Zionist Perim farther up the Bab el Mandeb — just in case.

V

That the southern Red Sea should have been left in frugal comfort and general obscurity not only by Israel but by the major powers would have been a reversal of history.[5] The southern littoral of the Red Sea has never been completely ignored by the

[5]The late John Franklin Campbell expressed that hope in his excellent article, "Rumblings Along the Red Sea: The Eritrea Crisis" (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1970, pp. 537-548), when it still appeared that Eritrea was largely an Ethiopian matter: "Here," he wrote, "is one long-festering international problem which begs not for intervention but for restraint, which admits of solution by the people directly concerned without complicating recourse to big-power involvement."

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mighty. There were always odd resources such as slaves or frankincense to exploit. In modern times Anton Besse built from scratch a trading empire, sufficiently profitable to permit him to endow a new university college at Oxford, Saint Anthony's, with a gift of over a million pounds sterling — undevalued sterling. At the crossroads of French, Italian and British aspirations in the nineteenth century, a nexus on the way to British India, the Red Sea was always someone's vital link, and there is no reason to assume that there will be a decline in interest. The period of apparent calm after the evacuation of both the Egyptians and the British in 1967 was simply a moment for gathering second wind. Long before the British departure the Americans had settled into Ethiopia and the Soviets were active in Yemen. Neither presence was imposed, but the Anglo-Arab competition had gradually been replaced by an East-West struggle for influence. At the northern end of the Red Sea, the Israelis added the Zionist complication after June 1967.

So far, all those concerned have been content with or capable of contemplating contingencies rather than exploiting options. Until the Soviet navy's trips into the area caused a considerable flurry in Western naval circles, it even appeared that the Americans had decided to cut down drastically in Ethiopia. Now, although Soviet naval visits are still probes, and the Soviet presence more symbolic than strategic, Washington, or the Pentagon at least, has had second thoughts. Muted as it is, the East-West rivalry does add to regional strains. Most of the Arab governments suspect the West and look to the East, but not to replace the expelled imperialists by assigning to the Bear what had been won from the Lion. What serious competition exists seems to be between the Chinese and Soviets. The Israeli presence in Ethiopia, the question of Perim and a blockade, and the tankers flying the Star of David add to the divisive factors occupying attention to the detriment of indigenous needs.

Another era of benign neglect might permit the various rivalries to be settled without recourse to more elaborate tools of violence, if not peacefully, and allow local resources to go at least in part for development instead of ideological plots or brushfire wars. But it seems certain that neglect is not what the area faces. As always, the aspirations of the great powers, the demands of the Middle East power struggle, the desire of distant states for prestige and position will manipulate the Red Sea regimes, twist local ambitions, warp loyalties, impose new stresses on old rivalries, and in-

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troduce alien ideas and unnecessary responsibilities as well as good advice, skilled talents and development investment. Nothing reveals the new strains more clearly than the emerging significance of Perim. For if the Red Sea past is truly prologue, few navigators — particularly if they sail under the Star of David — will now pass Perim without sweeping their glasses across the old ruins in search of new fortifications, the outward symbol of the Middle East crisis that has crept south to Bab el Mandeb.

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THE U.S. MILITARY: PATTERNS OF ADAPTATION FOR THE 1970'S*

by Terry J. Busch and Ronald J. Stupak

THERE is no longer any novelty in the statement that the United States military establishment has undergone fundamental changes since the end of World War II. The past decade alone, starting with the publication of Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960), has produced numerous accounts of the evolving characteristics of the "new military," its partnership in the military-industrial-labor-university-congressional complex, and its pervasive influence on American society.

Because of its size and scope, the American military establishment has become one of the world's largest institutions. It provides more work for more people than any other institution and in addition serves as an educator on a massive scale. It houses, clothes, feeds and propagandizes in gargantuan fashion. In the postwar era it has had an enormous influence on foreign policy, on race relations, on technology and management and on the intellectual and scientific communities.[1] It is therefore no longer debatable that the military establishment affects the lives of most individuals, the style and temper of society, the range of alternatives open to political decision-makers and the decision-making process itself. Even the structure of the establishment has changed. Redesigned patterns of internal organization have significantly civilianized it and fundamentally altered the nature of the modern military man.

This rapid alteration of the military is only one facet of a transformation in American society produced by an overwhelming commitment to technology. America has reached the stage where science and technology are considered the paradigms to be sought after as social "goods" connected to a progress that promotes security and affluence. Harvey Brooks suggests two themes derived from this commitment that have pervaded American culture and enhanced the undisputed position technology holds: Americans have resorted to believing only what can be proven, and this

*The authors wish to express their special thanks to Brooks T. Hozier for her helpful suggestions in the development of this analysis.

[1]Adam Yarmolinsky, *The Military Establishment* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. xi.

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evidence must be in accordance with some form of empirical method.[2]

Because of this affinity for proof, a trend toward greater conservatism has been established. Only those findings that can be legitimately inferred from given evidence are accepted, with extrapolation shunned or denied. Everything must be technical, belief resting on "experts." More and more, the common man has been shoved down the ladder of influence in everyday life. He is ruled by the experts who have developed in all areas of society — economists, social scientists, political bureaucrats, military strategists. Social problems are now attacked from purely technological viewpoints, and man's shortcomings are either to be circumvented or capitalized on. The military is no exception, for with the introduction of the hydrogen bomb man's instinct for self-preservation has been so increased as to create a virtual stalemate for the use of this weapon.

Science and technology have been the means of lessening doubt in man's life, or at least guiding and controlling this doubt toward an ordered direction. Along with this forcing of the future has come an increasing bureaucratization and professionalism, because only the experts are believed and permitted to take action affecting the normal functions of society. The American military is merely one example of this new rule of "expert bureaucrats"; their evolution characterizes other segments of American society as well.

But it is not the purpose of this discussion to continue with a replication of these and similar facts, well documented in the literature of the past decade. Our aim is to illustrate the dynamic character of the evolution these facts describe. For even as we accept the current developmental state of the modern military, we must also recognize the ongoing process of change. As a social system, the military must adapt itself to its environment, sustain its existence within that environment and adjust to its change. This process is part of the system maintenance function that every ongoing system must perform. The manner in which any system responds to the stimuli for change within its environment will determine how successful it will be in fulfilling its goals.

In the 1970's the military's environment is undergoing sweeping change, thanks to a new social awareness, technological advancement, and the war in Viet Nam. To adapt itself to this

[2]Harvey Brooks, "Scientific Concepts and Cultural Change," in Emmanuel G. Mesthene, editor, *Technology and Social Change* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 39.

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change, it has charted the continuing evolution of five basic cross-service patterns which the professionals are convinced will meet their future needs. They relate to: (1) the technological imperative, (2) the intellectual professional, (3) modernization, (4) resource allocation and policymaking, and (5) a new image. Fundamentally, the military seeks not only to maintain its own existence and fulfill its assigned functions but also to exercise some form of control over the manner and means by which these objectives are fulfilled. These patterns of adaptive change, already being implemented by the armed services and defended in their professional journals, are specifically designed to achieve these ends.

The Technological Imperative

The development of modern science and advanced technology is a widespread phenomenon of modern industrial societies, and contemporary military power has come to depend intrinsically on its use. Since the end of World War II, the American military establishment has undergone a technological revolution in weaponry, equipment and organizational patterns. The extent to which modern science and technology have been integrated into ongoing military operations and strategic considerations has made it almost imperative that future developments follow a similar pattern. As with the modernizing evolution within the military as a whole, its technological aspects are dynamic in nature. Encouraged by the simple fact that certain developments are possible and practical, and by the competition provided by other nations, especially the USSR, technological innovations develop their own logical demands for further innovation, improvement and advance. Thus, despite the level of technological sophistication already possessed by American military forces, the military establishment is not likely to be satisfied with the status quo.

The fact is, retired Air Force Colonel John Bex argues, although we have outdistanced all competitors in several areas of technology, our safety and increased national security depend upon future development and exploitation of these and other scientific and technological breakthroughs to the fullest extent that our enormous wealth and productivity will allow. With manpower levels decreasing and defense appropriations likely to be more tightly controlled, Lieutenant General Austin Betts suggests that if we are to keep the potential of other nations within our control, our only alternative is to pursue the kind of programs of technological research and development that will assure qualita-

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tive superiority, prevent technological surprise, and be as economical as the risks will allow.[3]

Military research and development programs for the 1970's will therefore most likely be designed to broaden the scientific and technological base of our armed forces, so as to increase our options for strategic choice. Since a fundamental operating premise of the military establishment is the assumption that other nations with sufficient technological capability will push toward their own breakthroughs in the military sphere, it follows that we must do so as well in order to avoid falling behind. This is part of the rationale that helps to support the nuclear arms race with all the sophistication in weapons and equipment it requires. But it is also of critical importance on the subnuclear conventional level, where historically military technology has been a vital means of changing the balance of power in the world. Although there are signs that the stalemate dominating the nuclear level is beginning to develop on the subnuclear level as well, the military will want to maintain that state of parity as a minimum objective and will undoubtedly seek some measure of superiority in any area where it is possible.

There is no need to discuss the likely areas of technological advancement at the nuclear level, since such concepts as ICBM, ABM, MIRV and FOBS have received wide coverage. However, at the subnuclear level sweeping, though less publicized, innovations are clearly at hand. For example, breakthroughs in electronic and computer technology have significantly improved radar capacity and the location of and ability to strike targets. Devices are already available for coping with battlefield darkness: one of these can detect differences in the temperature of objects at a distance and produce a warning image on a television screen; another, known as a "people sniffer," can detect changes in the environment caused by body wastes and human effluence.

In order to provide the systems for using these and other new devices, a concept called the "integrated battlefield" is being developed. The object is an integrated system uniting the individual systems of weapons, support, manpower, intelligence and organization and tying all of them into the decision-maker through sophisticated communication links. The eventual result could well be a computerized battlefield information and coordination center, where a small group of intelligence experts

[3]See Col. John E. Bex, "U.S. Development of Optimal Defense Technology," *Military Review*, August 1970, p. 74.

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will manage the collection of thousands of bits of information, sort, screen and analyze them, and produce a battlefield overview for the appropriate commander for a decision.

The concept of an "electronic" or "automated" battlefield received its first notice in 1966, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara suggested the construction of an electronic fence across the Viet Nam DMZ to cut off infiltration from the North. Since then, however, almost unnoticed, all three services have been working on and supplying the funds for various components of an automated combat system. The Navy has pursued research on oceanic sensing devices. The Army through STANO (Surveillance, Target, Acquisition and Night Observation) developed detection devices that were used in Viet Nam. The Air Force championed the seismic sensor and computer system which enabled airmen to destroy almost 80 per cent of the traffic coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos after October 1970.[4] When completed, the automated battlefield would consist of a system including sensing devices, instantaneous communication and feedback links, and an attack mechanism for the application of highly lethal firepower.

Although we have not yet reached the stage of manless combat, conducted with pilotless drone helicopters, robots, or laser-guided bombs, there is little question that the technology for such devices is available. With research and development already well advanced in the areas of controlled thermonuclear reaction, lasers, bionics, microelectronics, cybernetics, particle acceleration, climate control and synergistic effects, even a most conservative projection for future military potential would stagger the imagination. For this and previously mentioned reasons, the military establishment is likely to remain abreast of the latest technological developments, always alert to their ultimate tactical and strategic potential.

One final point must be made, however, with regard to the technological imperative: beyond purely military and strategic considerations, the very existence of the science-industry-labor-military-government-education team that comprises the overall military establishment depends to a large degree on the continuation of today's scientific and technological trends. For this is a complex of elites doing $80-billion-plus business a year, which employs approximately one out of every ten Americans, contracts

[4]John Rothchild and Paul Dickson, "The Electronic Battlefield: Wiring Down the War," *The Washington Monthly*, May 1971, pp. 8-9.

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with most of our nation's largest corporate interests, and designs, plans, researches, develops, produces and purchases the latest and most advanced hardware for the military arsenal, and it has a powerful incentive for continuing development to meet its needs. Although much recent criticism has been directed at the almost unlimited flow of resources into this highly integrated complex, there appears to be little evidence that its powerful status will be downgraded significantly in the foreseeable future.

The Intellectual Professional

In the fast-moving age of technology, as weaponry, management, organization and warfare itself have become increasingly more sophisticated, the military establishment has grown fully aware that past military experience and expertise are no longer sufficient to prepare today's professionals in the art of decision-making. Likewise, having experienced the McNamara revolution at the Department of Defense, military personnel have developed an appreciation for the modern managerial and decision-making techniques utilized by civilian intellectuals and analysts with whom they have worked.

From 1948 to 1960, the economists at the RAND Corporation, under the leadership of Charles Hitch and Alain Enthoven, did much of the "think-tank" research for the military. When McNamara's arrival at the Department of Defense in 1961 brought Hitch and Enthoven into Assistant Secretary positions, the result was the rapid superimposition of many of the advanced managerial techniques upon the entire Department. By 1961, two new management tools — systems analysis and cost effectiveness — were available and a whole new programming system was introduced in order to effect centralized management of the defense establishment. With the implementation of this programming system an interrelated planning, programming and budgetary system (PPBS) was set up, temporarily accomplishing further unification of the various armed services within the DOD and a tightening of civilian control over the military.

But the military-civilian competition these new methods engendered led quickly to the development of a matching systems analysis capability within the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Soon military experts were competing at every stage of the scientific decision-making cycle — operations research, cost effectiveness, systems analysis — and had helped to make possible such innovations as the *Five Year Defense Program*. The military quickly

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adjusted to the centralization of the decision-making function, and to the increased need to make economic use of limited resources and justify its demands statistically, by developing experts who paralleled their civilian counterparts in the Department of Defense. Since this trend continued unabated throughout the 1960's, a second cross-service pattern of adaptation which is certain to undergo further development during the 1970's is the institutionalization of the military's in-house intellectual capability, i.e., among its professional officer corps.

Each military service has now accepted as standard procedure for its professional officers and commanders the scientific approach to management, decision-making and, ultimately, "the management of violence." Instruction in advanced management and decision-making techniques is part of the curriculum at every service school and at the command, staff and war colleges as well. At these and at some of the nation's most prestigious civilian institutions, military professionals are increasingly mastering the techniques of quantitative analysis, research design and systems analysis.

As one peruses each service's respective professional writings, he finds article after article in praise and justification of quantitative scientific methodology. Since quantitative methodology has long been used at the highest business levels to deal with such problems as opportunity identification, situation analysis, course of action definition, alternative evaluation and alternative selection, military intellectuals are apparently persuaded that these same techniques can be extrapolated to equivalent levels of military decision-making. Given the use of computers, commanders and a team of analysts will be able to sort through vast amounts of data, using statistical methods and dynamic models to select relevant factors and essential aspects of a problem for solution. Communications and computer technology will permit decision-makers to employ modeling, simulation, operational analysis and gaming to test theories, plans and possible courses of action. Alternatives can be quantified, weighed, and a variety of stimulus-response techniques utilized to establish potential reactions to future threats and courses of action. Although automation has traditionally been viewed as a means of data storage, processing, reduction and read-out, Brigadier General Peter Delonga says that computers can actually serve as decision-makers themselves, when the variables can be quantified along with clearly stated decision rules. This would free commanders to deal with non-pro-

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grammable decisions while relieving them of routine administrative tasks.[5]

The systems approach, writes Dal Hitchcock, and advanced computer technology, have already been applied in almost every area of military operations — personnel, logistics, procurement, maintenance, supply and service, strategic planning — and the continuing advance of the state of the art in management sciences, coupled with the coming of the third and fourth generation electronic data-processing and communications environments, will contribute to the further evolution of management analysis functions. "The primary techniques will be linear and dynamic programming for use in allocating resources; model construction and simulation for use in guiding research and development, evaluating operating programs, selecting weapons and support systems, and designing force structures."[6]

The above description provides only a glimpse of the future that military intellectuals envision for the utilization of the latest in scientific managerial and decision-making techniques. But it is enough to suggest that a continuation of the present trend is bound to have a profound effect on the professional officer corps. It will hardly be possible to keep on stereotyping the professional officer as a technician of destruction, cast in a mold of rigid conformity and suspicious anti-intellectualism. As a man who will spend approximately one-third of his professional life receiving some of the most specialized education available anywhere, he will become known less for rigid conformity than for intellectual initiative, and his distrust of intellectualism will pass as he grows to be recognized as an intellectual in his own right. Army General John Hay views the future as the coming of age of the military as a profession. In discussing the newly accredited postgraduate program at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College leading to a Master of Military Art and Science degree, he applauded the further development of analytical minds, able to search out information, identify problems, and make decisions.[7]

Given the technical complexity of the present state of the military art, and the intellectual capacity demanded to master it, today's professional elite are truly a new breed of men. They have been seasoned by years of professional education, training and ex-

[5]Brig. Gen. Peter R. Delonga, "Logistics Planning for the 1980's," *Air University Review*, July-August 1970, p. 49.

[6]Dal Hitchcock, "The Environment and Functions of Management Analysis in the 1970's," *ibid.*, January-February 1970, pp. 31-32.

[7]Maj. Gen. John H. Hay, "A Profession Comes of Age," *Army*, April 1969, p. 47.

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perience. They have attended a series of professional and graduate schools that few institutions, industries, or civilian branches of government have the resources to match. They have been taught to command and manage organizations with the most sophisticated techniques, to plan complicated operations using the most technologically advanced equipment and weaponry, and to wield influence as well. Finally they have co-opted civilian intellectuals, civilian universities and civilian "think tanks" in making their intellectual leadership an in-house commodity. This has transformed military tactical and strategic planning into an intellectual process, lending the results the support of a metaphysical and intellectual framework.

In short, says Adam Yarmolinsky, there is now a growing number of military officers who in their knowledge of science and political matters are classed among the best trained men in the government. With the Ph.D. rapidly becoming an acceptable prerequisite for promotion to the highest officer ranks, such men wholly defy the shopworn stereotype of the military mind.[8] They have become a sophisticated collection of military managers scarcely distinguishable in talent and ability from executives in the upper echelons of the civilian corporate structure. There is no need to be a disciple of C. Wright Mills to see this fusion of leadership characteristic of bureaucratic organizations in all modern societies.

It may be premature to claim that the day of the military hero is over. But it is no overstatement to point out that among our recent personages a heroic soldier is difficult to find. The changes in American public opinion during the past few years, wrought by the Viet Nam war, have allowed little glory for combat exploits. Rather, the military professional has been on the defensive, protecting his profession and seeking to reshape its image. Perhaps Admiral Elmo (Bud) Zumwalt, current Chief of Naval Operations, is a prototype of this new professional and intellectual elite. At fifty, he is the youngest man to hold the Navy's highest office, having passed over thirty-three senior officers in his elevation to the top. Suave, intellectual, a disciplined logician and Soviet expert, he rose from Captain to full Admiral in only nine years. A skilled specialist in electronic warfare and surveillance, he was also a former director of the Pentagon's Naval Operations Systems Analysis Group. Although he possesses an accomplished combat record, it is not emphasized as were those compiled by the heroes

[8]Yarmolinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

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of the First and Second World Wars. That a man noted for sophisticated managerial and decision-making skills has been chosen to deal with the problems of the modern Navy tells us a great deal about the intellectual qualifications of those professionals likely to assume leadership positions in the military from now on.

Modernization

It would be impossible for the military to continue evolving toward higher technological sophistication and intellectually professional leadership without undergoing certain essential changes in its organizational and skill structures as well. The cross-service modernization process has been taking place for some time. New reforms and renovations, stimulated by recent changes in the rest of U.S. society and by reactions to the Viet Nam war, which has dealt military prestige a severe setback, will undoubtedly accelerate this adaptive process of change.

Prior to World War II, observes Samuel Huntington, American liberalism fostered hostility toward any manifestation of a professional military organization. Large military forces were viewed as a threat to liberty, democracy, economic prosperity and peace. While they ideally favored no military organization at all, liberals insisted on refashioning what organization was required, so that it would lose its peculiarly military characteristics.[9] In such an atmosphere, the military man became and remained an outcast in his own nation, a second-class citizen, fundamentally different from his civilian counterparts. Not until World War II did this attitude disappear.

After the war, the expanded role of the United States as a world leader was founded on military power. American fears respecting a giant military establishment gave way to fears of communism and increased concern about national security in the threatening Cold War. Professional military people were not only popular heroes but respected opinion leaders as well. In a time of national readjustment, the organizational and operational techniques of the highly trained and confident military elite spread throughout American culture. Equally significant, however, we had become a nation of war veterans, with the number exceeding twenty million by the early 1950's. To these individuals, the majority of whom had recently known the service, and to those whose viewpoints

[9]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 155-156.

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they influenced, career military service no longer seemed an alien way of life.

The general-public view of the career military man was further enhanced by the changing quality of his skills as the postwar technocratic framework generated the need for new nonmilitary expertise in the electronic, technical and repair fields. The Air Force took the lead as the most technical of services, with the Navy a close second. The Army opened up many new career specialties with the introduction of the MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) system, while cutting back the number of combat-type positions. Even the growth in sophistication of weaponry began to dispel the old image of a combat arms assignment as basically an unskilled position.

This burgeoning of new skill requirements, the increasing importance of nonmilitary education, and the diversification of military careers, can all be viewed as part of the civilianization of the modern military. But the process of becoming one of the most technologically advanced sectors of society is not free of problems. First, the easy transferability of militarily acquired skills to the civilian labor force cuts down on retention rates. Second, extensive training of non-career-oriented personnel is not only a waste of time, training and money but creates chronic manpower problems as well. Third, the intelligence required for the new military skills has encouraged a greater independence in thinking that challenges the old conformity of thought and action to the traditional way. Fourth, the war in Viet Nam has not only lowered the prestige and desirability of the military as a profession; it has reminded the nation and the soldier that even the most sophisticated armed force in the world may not be able to escape the painful experiences of a protracted land war. The pervasive requirements of combat set a limit on civilianizing tendencies and clearly illustrate that no matter what challenging tasks may be assumed in the interim, the ultimate military responsibility is the demands of war.[10]

In order to offset these problems, a number of changes are now taking place. Provided that the U.S. military is not saddled with another Viet Nam, the overall size and force strength of the armed services will be reduced. This will enable each service to be far more selective in seeking career-oriented personnel for recruitment and retention, while allowing for the elimination of dissident, dissatisfied and deviant individuals who are dysfunctional to service morale. In fact, the military services are doing many

[10]Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 33.

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specialized studies in conjunction with the Department of Defense to make sure that the transition to the all-volunteer service is managerially smooth, economically efficient and professionally effective. The desire is to optimize the selectivity of a smaller military force in the present environment of lessening military commitments.

Commanders at all levels are demonstrating an acute awareness of the need to modernize recruitment policies and to renovate the old system of indoctrination and early socialization. There is widespread recognition that today's military force is no longer a must-be-led mass of individuals. Rather, it is a reasonably educated, technologically advanced and information-oriented organization with respect to which the authoritarian model of management is outmoded. The traditional goals of developing an organizational consciousness, group goals, the acceptance of authority, and the internalization of certain military values, will remain. But awareness of recent socio-cultural changes will dictate the need for a broadened, motivation-oriented, individualist approach. According to Colonel Samuel Hays, today's young man brings his own social values with him into the military. He is concerned about equality, his individualism and his future, and is repulsed by the ugly connotations of violence, any emphasis on punishment and fear, and the destruction of one's self-image. To deal with him, argues Hays, the military must constantly encourage reinforcement, reward and recognition and avoid fear and degradation.[11]

Looking to the future, the military expects that the development of more sophisticated weaponry, and technology such as the "integrated" and "electronic" battlefield, will remove man ever farther from personal combat in war. This will permit a cutback in the size of the U.S. military force and a reduction in the number of individuals assigned to jobs for which there is little motivation. A competitive pay scale, educational opportunities, acceptable benefits, increased emphasis on the soldier's self-image and a more sophisticated, democratic and motivation-oriented management system should enable the military to meet its manpower needs while making a concerted effort to regain its lost prestige.

These modernizing changes, coupled with the two cross-service patterns of adaptation previously discussed, will strengthen the

[11]Col. Samuel H. Hays, "What Is Wrong with Induction Procedures," *Military Review*, May 1970, pp. 5-6.

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structure and operations of the military organization. Yet they are not likely to produce maximum effects without the continued involvement of the military in the foreign and defense policymaking process. The military's influence on policy has been an important fact of American life since the 1940's and the current evolution of its participatory role prescribes a fourth cross-service pattern of adaptation that will mark the 1970's.

Resource Allocation and Policymaking

The classical military ethic views the military professional as a servant of the statesman and applauds civilian control as essential to military professionalism. Politics, proclaimed Clausewitz, is beyond the scope of military competence; what is more, the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtails their professional competence, divides the profession against itself and substitutes extraneous values for professional values. But this classical pattern has never governed civil-military relations within the United States. The separation of powers and the division of authority over the military within the Executive branch has been a constant invitation drawing the military into the political process.

Since the end of World War II, whether bickering with the Secretary of Defense over a weapons system, going directly to the President on a strategic matter, or lobbying before Congress for increased appropriations, the military organization has played a ubiquitous role in the politics of policymaking in defense and foreign affairs. Its influence was temporarily eclipsed during the early McNamara years, when the services failed to develop integrated doctrines based on the capabilities of the defense establishment as a whole, and the Joint Chiefs and their planners continued to rely on outdated rituals for planning and decision-making. But assimilation of the techniques of scientific decision-making rapidly reversed this process. Today McNamara's civilian defense analysts are gone from the Department of Defense and the revitalization of the National Security Council's machinery during the Nixon Administration has reopened a formal channel for the Joint Chiefs, direct to the White House.

The increased involvement of the Pentagon and the military commands in the policymaking process has had the effect of rationalizing many of our foreign policies in military terms. Political problems when thought of in military terms become military problems, thus emphasizing the military options available

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to the President in a time of crisis. Under the "flexible response" concept of strategy adopted during the Kennedy Administration, military options were strengthened at the expense of political and diplomatic flexibility. Theories of limited war and programs to widen the President's range of choice made military solutions to our foreign problems both available and attractive. Massive allocations of resources were devoted to developing military potential, which in turn strengthened the rationale for its use in times of crisis. It is therefore not surprising that during the Cuban missile crisis 90 per cent of Washington's deliberation time was spent considering some use of military power.

Disillusionment over the military's role in the ill-fated Viet Nam conflict has raised questions about the worth of its advice. Although many have called for a re-evaluation of the military's position of dominant influence, it would be misleading to assume that the military's role will undergo much of a change. Personified by the emergent intellectual professionals, military influence may appear less prominent but it will undoubtedly be exerted with as much strength as in the past. Basic frames of reference for viewing the international system will continue to include a significant number of militarily-oriented options, and on many of the foreign policy issues of the coming decade the military will logically demand a voice.

Most of today's professional military elite have had prolonged involvement in foreign affairs, both through extended education and practical experience. Unlike many of their counterparts at the Department of State, they are gifted at handling large organizational problems and capable of functioning as active managers throughout the planning, selection and implementation stages of policymaking. In addition, the introduction of large numbers of civilian specialists into the defense planning process in the early 1960's, and the military's adoption of many of the modern managerial techniques, have forced a civilian-military meshing in the foreign and defense policymaking establishment.

With an eye toward the post-Viet Nam era, the military has begun to articulate its positions on future policy directions. From the perspective of the contemporary military professional, there can be no purely military or purely political solution to our nation's problems. What is therefore suggested for the military is a logical balance between technical military proficiency and politico-military expertise. Granting that developments in technology will demand even higher levels of technical skill, the

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professionals stress that the growing complexities of the international system and the changing nature of modern war require of them the ability to perceive the delicate political implications of their future role.[12]

It is the emerging military view that U.S. policy in Viet Nam drifted as severely as it did because it lacked meaningful political direction — implying that the military either should have been given a freer hand to accomplish the mission or should not have been involved at all. Clearly the military defense for failure to achieve a victory will be leveled at the civilian political leadership's failure in determining our vital interests and objectives, which led to underestimating the costs and overestimating the benefits of the policy pursued. For U.S. military planners, writes Colonel Irvin Kent, future efforts in the Third World should seek optimum ways of giving maximum assistance and advice to the governments and armed forces of friendly developing nations, at minimum cost to the United States in material and manpower, and with minimum visibility for our participation. Since the area of operations will be the homelands of the developing nations, a new theory of political warfare will have to be developed not only to encompass their military establishments but their civilian populations as well.[13]

In all this, the essential point is the full commitment of the military to an active role in the policymaking process. There are few areas of contemporary American foreign policy that do not in some way relate to the use or condition of military forces. Both our deterrence and forward defense policies depend on the way in which our forces are postured and deployed. Moreover, in this technological age, military professionals are not likely to favor the use of ever-more-sophisticated weaponry for the implementation of policies over which they have no control.

A New Image

But the problems of evolving change and adaptation which now face the military are not only those of a technological, scientific, modernizing and positional nature. They include having to withstand an increasing amount of public hostility. Attacked by critics who disapprove of its dominant role in American society, challenged by a new generation of youth who reject its entire *raison d'être,* charged with waste in defense expenditures, suffering from a severe loss of prestige both at home and abroad, the

[12]Col. Donald F. Bletz, "Military Professionalism," *ibid.*, May 1971, pp. 11-17.
[13]Col. Irvin M. Kent, "Political Warfare for Internal Defense," *ibid.*, August 1970, pp. 67-68.

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military must seek to rebuild its image if it is to maintain a reasonable equilibrium (and maybe even organizational viability) in the decades ahead. This effort to establish a new and more favorable image constitutes the fifth pattern of adaptation thought necessary to meet the changing environmental requirements of the 1970's.

The past seven years have worked a series of stunning blows on the strong, proud image the American military establishment had built for itself during and after the Second World War. The conflict in Viet Nam, which many of the military elites welcomed at first as a testing ground for their newly conceived flexible-response techniques, was to become a nightmare of frustration and complexity. Foiled by an enemy they continuously underrated, and restrained (for whatever reasons) by civilian decision-makers from utilizing the fullest potential of their power, the U.S. forces found victory beyond their grasp, and their prestige inexorably declined. Morale ebbed among men largely uncommitted to a conflict that the American people had all but abandoned, and disenchantment prevailed as the grim realities of failure and war atrocities began to emerge. Racial animosities, willful disobedience within the ranks, and the widespread use of drugs further tarnished the image of the military establishment.

Though it is easy to overstate these problems and the extent to which the military has been affected by them, it is clear that they carry within them the seeds of crisis. Today's professionals who have enjoyed the advantage of widespread public trust and support know full well that this nation, with a long history of isolation, has traditionally viewed its servicemen with disdain. Wary of a return of anti-militarism, aware of the dangers of the sudden termination of the draft, fearful that young men will no longer view military service as a desirable career, and cognizant of the deterioration that can result from the loss of internal discipline and control, they are making a concerted effort to forestall these perceived negative trends.

Military personnel, seeking to reaffirm that they were only following orders, now increasingly place the blame for the unfortunate Viet Nam experience on the political leadership in Washington. It is not insignificant that military officers — not the civilians outraged by the horror — have been the prime movers behind the My Lai courts-martial trials. Reasserting that the military has always condemned war crimes, they have forced Calley, Medina, Henderson and others to bear some share of the

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blame. Although Colonel Anthony Herbert's case seems to indicate that there is still no room at the top for one who declines to pursue reform in the officially sanctioned way, changes are nonetheless being made.

Of major importance in shaping a new image will be the military's continuing efforts to liberalize and change many of its now unacceptable ways. To attract a new generation of Americans, "humanized" approaches will be needed, and most of the services have already begun to implement them. Despite the excessive publicity that longer hair, beards, beer in the barracks and "coeducational" facilities have received, these are clearly signs of the coming trend. From changes in traditional military terminology to the elimination of unnecessary, demeaning and resented routines, adaptation is proceeding apace. A recent series of attractive media advertisements featuring a "we wish to join you" approach emphasizes that today one can find, develop and fulfill his own individuality and potential in the military. If the upward swing in enlistments can be taken as an indication, these efforts are already paying off.

But image rebuilding takes time. The memory of Viet Nam and the highly visible shortcomings of the military will be hard to overcome. Programs to combat drug abuse and efforts to promote cross-racial understanding will help, but in the long run the image of the military as death-dealers and destroyers will have to be changed. Obviously, the ability to cope with threats to our national security and to international order will remain the military's prime function, but if it is to be accorded popular support a broader rationality for its existence within a rapidly changing society will have to be developed. The new image will have to inspire more than pride in a powerful and destructive force, so that the sense of purpose evoked will have meaning and utility in peaceful and nonviolent situations as well as war. Maybe Janowitz and others are correct in assuming that the military may become the "ecology heroes" in man's future battles to save his environment. In any case, the attempt to create a new image is only a part of the military's overall effort to redefine itself: internally as a profession, externally in relation to a changing domestic political system, and internationally in relation to a transformed international environment.

The Future

This does not imply that these are the only changes required or

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that they will satisfy all future needs -- they are simply those which are now in progress. Critics of the military establishment seem to direct their attacks at three fundamental grievances: (1) They challenge the tremendous allocation of economic, industrial and scientific resources to military and defense spending, while other social, domestic and international priorities are ignored. (2) They reject as unrealistic the military's education and indoctrination process, which they contend produces a perverted view of international relations leading to overestimates of the threat to our nation's security. (3) They argue that since the end of World War II we have militarized U.S. foreign policy by allowing the military establishment such a prominent role in its formulation and implementation.

Whether or not one accepts these criticisms as accurate descriptions of the postwar condition, there are obvious points of truth in them. What is missing is the realization that the military role has grown, and our foreign policy has become militarized, not only through military initiative but equally because civilians, within both the Executive and the Legislative branches of government, have adopted military ways of thinking about political problems. It is only logical in a bureaucratic society that the military will seek to maintain its power position, or, if necessary, develop a new definition of its proper functions so that it can maintain or improve its dynamic and influential role in the policy process. Given its size, ubiquitousness, in-house capabilities, and multifaceted use as a foreign policy instrument, it would be unrealistic now to expect its influence to be ignored in policymaking matters. Besides, if the danger of military domination of the option-determination, national-interest-selection, policymaking process is to be checked, some of our critical attention must be directed toward those civilian figures of government who have proven more than willing to adopt military attitudes and outlooks at the expense of others.

The American military has never seriously challenged the principle of ultimate civilian control, and today's military professionals are no more likely to do so. It is therefore possible that the end to the Viet Nam war will encourage a reassertion of civilian governmental initiative in seeking nonmilitary approaches to foreign policy issues and the allocation of resources. This might place the military's influence in more realistic perspective and in so doing ease much of the hostility toward the military establishment.

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GAMES FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS PLAY: THE POLITICAL EXERCISE COMES OF AGE*

by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Cornelius J. Gearin

IN December 1959 a Teaching Note in the *American Political Science Review* reported on early efforts by political scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to adapt the techniques of "political gaming" (or POLEX) first experimented with at the RAND Corporation in the early 1950's.[1]

Thirteen years and many a POLEX later, it seems timely to make another report to the profession, particularly since the most recent round of "games" at M.I.T. was aimed, at least in part, at moving this particular art form closer to the main body of social science experimentation and practice.[2]

Contemporary Gaming

Political (or political-military) "games" have been increasingly used in the past decade, chiefly for two purposes — educational[3] and policy planning or analysis. At M.I.T., while the PE has also

*This article is based on the results of a round of political exercises, and research on local conflict in connection therewith, conducted under contracts with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgments and opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other department or agency of the U.S. government. The authors wish to record their appreciation of the collaboration, assistance and cooperation of a number of individuals, notably Robert R. Beattie, Priscilla A. Clapp, John J. Davis, Edmund S. Finegold, James L. Foster, Harold C. Guetzkow, Amelia C. Leiss, Charles E. Murray III, William C. Platte, John D. Steinbruner, and above all the late Max F. Millikan, Director of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies until his death.

[1]Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Norman J. Padelford, "Three Experiments in Political Gaming," *American Political Science Review*, December 1959, pp. 1105-1115. The RAND approach was reported in Herbert Goldhammer and Hans Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," *World Politics*, October 1959. The words "game" and "simulation" customarily refer, first, to a formally-structured competitive interaction with specified payoffs and, second, to explicit computer or other models with well-defined components interacting in a predictable way. The first author's efforts since 1958 fit neither definition and he has therefore styled them "political exercises," "POLEX," or "PE." For variety the other two words are occasionally substituted.

[2]A full report of the research is found in Lincoln P. Bloomfield with Cornelius J. Gearin and James L. Foster, *Anticipating Conflict Control Policies: The Conex Games as a Planning Tool*, Volume II, M.I.T. Center for International Studies, Pub. No. C/70-10. The policy inferences were elaborated in Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "After Neo-Isolationism, What?," in *Science and Public Affairs, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1971.

[3]While this article does not deal with teaching and training games as such, an extensive bibliography is available. It includes Bloomfield and Padelford, *op. cit.*;

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been used extensively for teaching and training, our major efforts have gone into developing its second use.[4] The Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency (heretofore the Joint War Games Agency) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has since 1961 employed something akin to the 1960 RAND/M.I.T. model (which we developed with the collaboration of Thomas C. Schelling) to confront senior and lesser officials from the foreign policy-defense community with alternatives in future contingencies — with mixed results, in our opinion.[5] This type of all-man, role-playing game using "realistic" hypothetical crisis problems has been staged by other groups, both in the United States and elsewhere, to educate policy analysts by projecting international situations that otherwise might not be considered, and to expose diplomats and others to roles their own experience might not otherwise fully comprehend.

Apart from the JWGA, now SAGA, whose games service the broad U.S. government community, few political games seem to have been played inside the government. The one senior in-house political game in the State Department of which we are aware was Exercise PORTER in 1963 (which Professor Lincoln Bloomfield directed), although members of the now defunct Policy Planning Council participated in virtually all our M.I.T. professional-level PE's over the years. An abortive experiment with more formalized man-machine gaming of the Inter-Nation Simulation–World Politics Simulation–International Processes Simulation (INS-

William D. Coplin, "Inter-Nation Simulation and Contemporary Theories of International Relations," *American Political Science Review,* September 1966, and the same author's *Simulation in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968); Harold Guetzkow, *et al., Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Teaching and Research* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); James A. Robinson, *et al.,* "Teaching with Inter-Nation Simulation and Case Studies," *American Political Science Review,* March 1966; John R. Raser, *Simulation and Society* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969); and Charles F. and Margaret G. Hermann, "An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I," *American Political Science Review,* June 1967.

A massive inventory of "games" is found in an equally massive simulation bibliography by Martin Shubik, Gerry Brewer and E. Savage at the RAND Corporation, *Gaming Literature Review: A Critical Survey of Literature on Gaming and Allied Topics* (unpublished). See also David W. Zuckerman and Robert E. Horn, *The Guide to Simulation Games for Education and Training* (Cambridge, Mass.: Information Resources, 1970).

[4]See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Political Gaming," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* September 1960. Also Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, "The Political Exercise: A Progress Report," ORBIS, Winter 1965. Reports of individual POLEXes at M.I.T. are listed in the Publications List of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies.

[5]One of the few public discussions of the JWGA/SAGA experience and techniques appears in Andrew Wilson, *The Bomb and the Computer* (Newton, Mass.: Delacourt Press, 1968). See also Sidney F. Giffin, *The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict* (New York: Doubleday, 1965).

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WPS-IPS) variety was tried out in State in recent years, and the Foreign Service Institute, like the various service war colleges, has attempted sporadically to build simulation into its crowded curriculum. Computerized simulation exercises have, however, been solidly installed in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (where quantities are obviously far more relevant) to evaluate production and logistic problems. Computer-assisted simulations of strategic and tactical military interaction have been employed for several years by the U.S. and European governments to elucidate the military component of foreign policy issues.

Since GENEX I, put on by Bloomfield at the Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva in 1965 at the urging of Jacques Freymond (and understood to be the first European game), scholars such as Jean Siotis and A. J. R. Groom (who both assisted in GENEX I), A. N. Oppenheim and Michael Banks in England, and C. C. Schweitzer in Bonn have used the technique in Western Europe. Others have done so in such countries as Israel. Interest in political gaming has also been growing in Eastern Europe; Bloomfield was invited to include the subject in lectures in Belgrade in 1968 and in both Moscow and Bucharest in 1970.

Of special interest in the international application of political games was a peacekeeping game played in Geneva in 1970, and "recounted" to a diplomatic gathering in Toronto by Bloomfield and Miss Amelia C. Leiss, under the aegis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A "mediation game" conducted at the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, under the auspices of the International Peace Academy in the summer of 1970, involving officials and others from twenty-nine nations, was also directed by Bloomfield with the collaboration of Miss Leiss and Thomas L. Fisher II.[6] Siotis, David Thomas and others conducted a most interesting all-human simulation of a Conference on European Security and Cooperation in Geneva in the spring of 1971 with informal help from many of the governments concerned in formulating accurate opening positions. Moreover, with the assistance of some "political gamers" the technique of both all-man and man-machine gaming has increasingly been applied experimentally to such non-foreign policy realms as the Model Cities Program and other urban and economic issue areas where better

[6]See *Report from Vienna — An Appraisal of the International Peace Academy Committee's 1970 Pilot Projects* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1970). An example of a European POLEX is found in A. J. R. Groom and Michael Banks, "CONEX I, A Simulation of a Middle East Conflict Situation: Nottingham [England], March 25-27, 1966."

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anticipation of possible outcomes and consideration of alternative strategies might be facilitated by role-playing and dynamic simulated interaction. As for classroom use, there seems little doubt that gaming is here to stay.

Games and Local Conflict

The M.I.T. Center for International Studies resumed its intermittent role in the development of professional-level, policy-type, all-man games, or "political exercises," with CONEX I (the CON referring to local conflict) on September 11-12, 1968. The second game, CONEX II, was, like the first, held at M.I.T.'s Endicott House in Dedham, Massachusetts, on December 6-7, 1968; CONEX III also took place there, on March 28-29, 1969. In CONEX IV, September 17-19, 1969, we used as an experimental variable condition the "CASCON" computerized conflict data system we were currently developing under contract to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.[7] Because of the technical requirements of that exercise, which involved computer use not only for CASCON but for game communications as well, it was held in M.I.T.'s Center for Advanced Engineering Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

All of this grew out of substantive research on foreign policy problems, as has all our gaming activity at the M.I.T. Center. The particular problems of study were related — one was a concern with foreign policy planning, particularly of a preventive variety. The other had to do with local conflicts and their prevention.

As early as 1963 a group at M.I.T. began to investigate the nature of local conflict, and the relevance of arms control and conflict control measures aimed at minimizing the chances of small wars, particularly those that might involve the nuclear powers and thus contain the danger of escalation. This initial project, sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was completed in 1967.[8] Among the fruits of the research was a

[7]See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Robert R. Beattie, "Computers and Policy-Making: The CASCON Experiment," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1971.

[8]Reported in Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas: Arms and Arms Control in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Center for International Studies, December 1964). Local conflict was defined as real and potential "small wars," predominantly in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. See Bloomfield and Leiss with L. J. Legere, *The Control of Local Conflict: A Design Study on Arms Control and Limited War in the Developing Areas* (Washington: GPO, 1967), and Bloomfield and Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars — A Strategy for the 1970's* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).

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series of hypotheses bearing on the causes and effects of the United States' policy toward local conflict in the developing world.

At the same time, we felt the need for further analysis of factors in U.S. involvement in low-intensity conflicts in different parts of the world that the historical-analytical case method employed in our earlier study[9] had identified and isolated, but could not explain. The intensification of the Viet Nam war gave urgency to the conviction that this line of research warranted development.

One way of testing our tentative findings would be to expose them to hypothetical situations in which pressures for and against U.S. unilateral military intervention were experimentally generated. The same would be true of reactions to various conventional arms inputs into conflict situations (which we were also studying). This was what we sought to do in the new CONEX series of games, with the benefit of hypotheses and propositions generated by the prior research. CONEX II was the only exercise in the series not concentrated on U.S. policymaking. Its focus was on the behavior of small country decision-makers on war and peace issues, with particular reference to the acquisition of conventional arms; for this we were likewise able to specify hypotheses developed both in prior research and concurrently by colleagues in the Arms Control project.[10]

In turning back to the PE model we had earlier helped to refine, we were acutely aware of its shortcomings. Despite the widening circle of application in its first decade of operational use, the "research" PE remained a highly experimental device whose primary purpose could in honesty only be described as heuristic, and which was still considerably more "social science fiction" than science. Nevertheless, evidence had accumulated that a well-designed and executed PE could have a substantial impact on a professionally-trained person in loosening up some of his policy assumptions by forcing him to "live" realistically with an artificial situation not of his own choosing.[11] It was generally agreed that

[9]Amelia C. Leiss and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *The Control of Local Conflict: Studies of Conflict*, Vol. III, M.I.T. Center for International Studies, Pub. No. C-67-19-C.

[10]See Amelia C. Leiss with Geoffrey Kemp, John H. Hoagland, Jacob Refson and Harold Fischer, *Arms Control and Local Conflict, Vol. III: Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries*, M.I.T. Center for International Studies, Pub. No. C/70-1, February 1970.

[11]Of 82 government officials who responded to an earlier questionnaire survey, 77 per cent reported that participation in M.I.T.'s PE's had broadened their sense of alternative strategies and policies available to the United States in certain kinds of crisis situations. See Richard E. Barringer and Barton Whaley, "The M.I.T. Political-Military Gaming Experience," ORBIS, Summer 1965.

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this value was a direct product of the antagonistic clash of wills generated in a dynamic, interactive role-playing exercise characterized by tension, professionally competent players, a plausible scenario, and a sequential interaction of the actors or teams leading them to unforeseen choice-points. We felt that if we tried to correct for some of its most glaring methodological weaknesses, the still relatively free game might expose for us, better than any other experimental method we knew, the "innards" of the policymaking process concerning U.S. involvement in local conflicts.

We thus used in the CONEX series — with what we believed to be ameliorative changes — the all-man, relatively free, multi-team game which sought to model typical groups of senior officials responsible for making policy and implementing programs on behalf of the United States, in a time frame reflecting the Viet Nam experience.

To elicit the maximum amount of data, we designed hypothetical situations, set in the near future, in which we foresaw the U.S. government as likely to be torn between competing impulses. Such situations should, we felt, at least expose the pros and cons of choices between (a) trying to arrange things so that Washington controls the political and ideological outcome of a conflict — in many ways the model of the 1950's and the 1960's; and (b) a policy either of violence-minimizing regardless of outcome, or (c) of outright abstention from any involvement. For distribution we selected hypothetical areas where by our own a priori assessments U.S. interests were deemed to be "high," "low" or "medium." (These were arrived at by assigning weights to twenty potential crisis areas on the basis of nearness to the United States, treaty commitment, likelihood of significant advantage to powers unfriendly to the United States, and availability of fast-reaction forces.) The scenarios, postulating events that had not yet occurred in the real world, were as realistically constructed and politically plausible as experts could devise.

All four of the CONEX exercises had in common the following characteristics derived from predecessor PE's (they are common to most related forms of simulation):

(1) There were two or more playing teams, each portraying an assemblage of high-level civilian and military officials responsible for making foreign policy decisions on behalf of their national governments; at least one team in each game (and two each in three games) represented the "United States" decision process.

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(2) Each team, relying on the real-life political, diplomatic, military and scholarly experience of its members, was expected to fulfill all of the responsibilities assigned to that "country" in a decision-making style typical of the real-life country. Members' decision-making was assumed to be rational in the sense of a value-maximizing process, but under conditions of information uncertainty also constrained by history and culture; a sense of personal responsibility accentuated by role-playing; and accumulated professional skills.

(3) Each team was assigned a mission specifying responsibilities and limitations, in order to define the context of its participation. These behavioral parameters were largely organizational and did not significantly constrain choices.

(4) Those elements in the international system that either varied from common knowledge, or constituted specialized knowledge, were stipulated for the participants in the "Scenario-Problem" document given to them at the outset of the game and updated at specified points in the exercise.

(5) A "Control" staff provided: updates of the scenario specifying the synthesized "results" of team interactions; means of communicating the actions of one team to others; means of conveying to the teams the behavior of other elements in the system that impinged on their initiatives; a mechanism for administrative control and support appropriate for the size, duration and objectives of the particular exercise; and a system for evaluating and/or observing performance, consonant with parameters of the research design.

(6) The research design ensured that each exercise was designed for its special purpose; an explicit and detailed definition of this purpose influenced all subsequent organizational and methodological choices in the game design.

(7) Team decisions were encapsulated in messages simulating typical government instructions: these included a basic strategy paper, plus unlimited messages to other teams or public statements, all committed to writing on standard message forms, and an occasional face-to-face exchange between prospective adversaries.

New Directions in CONEX

Because of our efforts to create an improved experimental medium, however, the CONEX model differed from earlier PE's in several respects.

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(1) *All of the situations portrayed in the CONEX series were initially framed for the players as non-crisis or pre-crisis problems.*

We were led to this deviation from the typical "crisis game" model out of a conviction as citizens that better advance planning is desperately needed if preventive diplomacy is to be more than rhetoric. We sought to ascertain if games were in fact as dependent on a high-intensity crisis environment as we, and others, had hitherto assumed. On the hunch that they were not — and because we were studying preventive diplomacy — we deliberately designed each of the CONEX exercises in two basic parts. The first part was set early enough in the life of a crisis so that the United States had a substantial range of options open to it. But the second part was portrayed as exigent enough to test some of our fundamental hypotheses about competing policy pressures weighing on the decision-maker. The technique required the players to live with the consequences of their planning decisions, and our inspiration for it was the RAND "SAFE" procurement game.[12]

In the same normative spirit, we were troubled by the frequent assumption, both in real life and in games, that conflict situations are by definition almost exclusively political-military. Clearly, decision-making is strongly influenced by factors other than military; where it is not, it should be. We thus made provision for more specific inputs from the domestic sector than in prior games. All of the CONEX exercises provided for explicit inputs from "Congressional" factions, "interest groups," the "communications media," "budget makers," and other private and bureaucratic competitors for resources, with highly qualified professionals playing these roles. (The growing inverse relationship between defense and domestic political influence in this process[13] is the final reason for wishing to call our "games" political rather than political-military exercises — or, better still, political-economic-psychological-cultural-intelligence-military exercises, for which the acronym would be PEPCIME).

(2) *Specific hypotheses referring to policy preferences, or decisional behavior concerning involvement in local conflict, were selected for examination prior to each exercise.*

[12]The details of the SAFE game were first published in Olaf Helmer and R. E. Bickner, *How to Play SAFE — Book of Rules of the Strategy and Force Evaluation Game* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, November 1961) (as cited in *How to Play SAFE at the Air Force Academy,* Political Science, 484, Air Force Academy).

[13]The declining influence of the military in the councils of government has been persuasively argued by Samuel Huntington in "Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession," *Daedalus,* Fall 1963, and in "Civil-Military Relations," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* 1968.

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Each exercise was designed to produce specific data on selected hypotheses; situations and inputs were planned to stimulate consideration of salient issues directly related to hypothesized behavior.

In CONEX I we had listed six broadly cast hypotheses about predicted U.S. reactions to any new local conflict situation. (For example, we postulated that "preventive policy measures are more available early in a crisis than late, but the United States government typically does not take full advantage of them.")

In CONEX II, III and IV we further refined the process by assigning specific hypotheses to the predicted behavior of each team for each move period. Another change was to flag in advance those hypotheses whose primary data source would be, respectively, team documents, questionnaires, monitor observations of real-time activity, or some combination of these sources. (The role of the "monitors" is explained below.) These improvements proved valuable because they permitted a more precise and relevant design of questionnaires and monitor forms, reduced monitor work load, assured overlap or corroboration as necessary, and expedited post-exercise analysis. In each successive exercise some of the previous hypotheses were eliminated as previous games showed that no useful data could be generated for them. However, we also found that in every exercise we accumulated data on nonspecified hypotheses, thus further substantiating the conviction that policy games are best at generating hypotheses and should be analyzed to discover these propositions.

There is little doubt in our minds that the design for a political exercise for research or policy analysis should be based on a set of precisely formulated questions. Good experimental technique suggests that such questions can best be posed as hypotheses, and games taken as partial evidence in support or disconfirmation of the hypotheses. True, there is not an exact connection between hypotheses about policy behavior and game evidence. One does not predict in advance what the players' exact reactions will be (although that is not totally impossible). But properly used, this kind of undergirding process makes for a more meaningful experiment.

Apart from permitting far more discipline over Control staff inputs, this degree of pre-planning permits better measurement of the input-output relationships geared to the specified hypotheses. One can select or devise measurement devices appropriate not only for the hypothesis, but, more important, for the exercise situa-

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tion in which the hypothesis will be tested. Enumeration of hypotheses early in the planning phase of a PE has the added advantage of rationally determining the appropriate level of conflict (or cooperation) to be gamed.

The separation of move periods into distinct sets of predicted policy events provided a means for comparing the relevance of a specific input to differing environmental conditions. We quite often discarded a proposed event that would have elucidated a given proposition, on the grounds that it would not be compatible with the situation or would pre-empt a logical team alternative.

More generally, this procedure defined the situations most appropriate for inclusion in the scenario and associated background material. It also guided the Control staff in the planning and formulation of responses to team messages, and above all set planned limits on the inevitable and often damaging tendency of Control to "free-wheel" and thereby pre-empt design objectives. In the CONEX exercises the hypotheses were useful as reference points for Control when decisions had to be made about the pace and direction of the exercise. Finally, selection of key propositions to be watched for enabled the real-time monitors to observe selectively the relationship between input and team decisions.

(3) *"United States" decision-makers were simulated by two similarly composed professional "U.S." teams (except in CONEX II), which played separately but simultaneously; their behavior was subsequently compared on the basis of one critical variable manipulated for one, but not the other, team.* (We made every effort to ensure that they were similarly constituted[14] for comparative purposes, except as noted below.)

We are fully convinced of the value of fielding more than one U.S. team in a decision-making PE, if only as a generalized check that the behavior of a single U.S. team is not totally idiosyncratic. For those hypotheses that related to individual behavior, the additional team increased the sample size and consequently strengthened our confidence in statistical findings. Yet in CONEX I, III and IV we risked serious problems in having two U.S. teams interact vis-à-vis a single protagonist "state" (not to mention a single Control staff operating with a single scenario). If the two U.S. teams' policies had diverged significantly, it would have presented acute difficulties to Control in defining a single U.S. position to other participants. The result might have been either

[14]That they did not differ substantially in relevant attitudes or perceptions was demonstrated by the results of pre-game questionnaires and by empirically observed team responses.

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to require the playing of two games simultaneously, or to force either or both of the U.S. teams to modify their positions. We were uncertain as to how well in that case we would be able to introduce Control responses, "adviser inputs" from other actors subsumed under the Control group, and other team moves; previous experience had suggested that this amounts to playing two games, placing an inordinate strain on a single Control operation. It could also have forced the "protagonist" team to alter its behavior to the extent that its actions would not be the result of free, realistic choices.

As it turned out, both U.S. teams in CONEX I, III and IV made fundamentally similar responses to the assigned problem. In successive move periods we saw sufficient essential similarity of the overall moves by the two teams so that virtually all Control responses were identical, and did not require adjustment to differences.

The simultaneous employment of two "U.S." teams also permitted one to be used as an experimental control; an independent variable condition was applied to only one team of each pair. In CONEX I and III we introduced without announcement a focus on "cost-consciousness" in one U.S. team, through the device of special briefings on cost constraints (not only economic, but also opportunity and social costs). The team briefed was strongly led to focus on the varying resource allocations entailed in a range of possible U.S. policies toward a hypothetical local conflict situation. Also in CONEX I and III an economist member was added to the experimental U.S. team to press for consideration of costs and systematic analysis techniques. In CONEX IV the special variable was the availability to one U.S. team of the experimental CASCON Pilot System — a computer-aided system for storing, retrieving and analyzing data on local conflicts.

But curiously, we were not able to determine the extent to which the introduction of inducements to "increased rationality" influenced behavior. For one thing, each attempt was marred by a procedural or methodological weakness that precluded successful observation. It may be that this experience indicates a limit to the ability of a PE to produce clear evidence on a specific phenomenon, for it is difficult to measure the effects of any single input without exerting controls which would fundamentally alter the character of the PE. The slight differences between the behavior of the two teams in each of the exercises could not be at-

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tributed to a single variable. Perhaps more to the point, it was exceedingly hard at the end of the 1960's to get any team playing the role of U.S. decision-makers to decide on unilateral U.S. military intervention anywhere, whether the members were given a cost briefing or not. In general terms, the potential value of comparison would seem indisputable, even if CONEX experience failed to provide solutions for the problem of isolating one experiment without sacrificing the entire exercise.

In a complementary series of student-level exercises (EXCON) of even greater rigor, conducted as a part of this research by Professor John D. Steinbruner,[15] the evidence supporting this hypothesis was much stronger because the primary level of analysis was individual as opposed to group. Quite likely, comparison can best be accomplished on this level. Given the statistical difficulties encountered with aggregating individual decisions, it may be that the effect of this kind of variable can only be observed on the individual level. However, we are encouraged to believe that with sufficient replications, the effects of intervening variables might be washed out to the extent that group comparisons would be useful.

(4) *Various experimental controls were imposed on the behavior of teams in order to improve both the quality of the data and the potential for research.*

(a) In all the CONEX exercises, playing teams were required to describe explicitly not only their strategy, but also their rationale. At the conclusion of the initial planning period each team submitted to Control a strategy paper that included an evaluation of the situation, a list of broad goals and specific objectives, and a strategy outline. In order to give the Control staff maximum reaction time, these papers were summarized orally on television prior to drafting. Most succeeding move periods were concluded by an abbreviated form of the initial strategy paper. (The original contingency estimates remained unchanged.)

This technique clarified the input-output relationship by formalizing team reaction to a changed situation or adversary action. Team-produced documents in this analytical form constituted a record that could subsequently be compared with real-time monitor reports and questionnaire results. The "position papers" also represented the culmination of a typical mutual ad-

[15]See John D. Steinbruner, *Some Effects of Decision Procedures on Policy Outcomes: A Series of Experiments Using Policy Games,* M.I.T. Center for International Studies, Pub. No. C/70-9.

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justment or compromise process. As such, they reflected decision-making reality more faithfully than the parochial opinions of individuals.

The requirement to re-evaluate strategy and formally revise it as necessary is not unrealistic in a simulation of foreign policymaking. It is perhaps unusual for the same people to participate in the solution of long-term problems. Despite this irregularity, a periodic review of strategy appears to be an excellent control in a political exercise, especially when testing hypotheses about changes in values or shifts in attitude.

(b) Questionnaires were administered for all of the exercises in the CONEX series. Some of these questionnaires attempted to ascertain individual values and attitudes related to exercise policy issues, and the results served in part as experimental controls, in part as game evaluation. Those administered prior to the exercise were used to influence team composition. Teams were designed to add up to a balance of attitudes toward the policy issues at stake; the questionnaires gave a gross indication of this balance. We also administered questionnaires during and after the exercise in an attempt to measure shifts in individual attitude. Finally, as in previous PE's, we mailed questionnaires to participants several weeks after each exercise to solicit their views on policy issues and PE methodology.

The pre-exercise questionnaires proved useful in balancing obvious bias in team composition. Individuals were characterized on a scale depicting attitudes toward the policy issues to be addressed in each exercise, and assignments to teams were predicated on these categorical classifications. A balanced distribution of attitudes had the effect of stimulating discussion and encouraging consideration of sharply different alternatives, and helped to ensure that differences in actions would not be attributable to a biased perspective. The questionnaires administered during and after CONEX III and IV were intended to assist in measuring shifts in attitude or perception. For example, in CONEX III each player was asked two questions: first, the degree to which he perceived one or another superpower to be "behind the trouble," i.e., the promoter of the conflict situation; second, to indicate his perception of potential superpower gains from the conflict. Answers were later compared with intentions as displayed by the "superpower" teams, revealing an interesting — and familiar — "parallax" between the object and, so to speak, the foreign "viewfinder."

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Despite their imprecision, the questionnaires also enabled us to determine whether the players correctly perceived situation changes. The cues were understood with few exceptions, and we were able consequently to assume that behavior was not a function of misconceptions. The questionnaires were likewise helpful, although not decisive, in analyzing correlations between input and output. If we depicted an increase in visibility and potential gain for an adversary, and if the teams recognized the change and their policy preferences then changed, there would be a demonstrable coincidence. On the other hand, it was impossible to demonstrate a clear cause-and-effect relationship through the questionnaires. Even when the evidence accrued by questionnaire analysis was supported by other data, the correlations were obscured by intervening variables whose effects were not measured. Moreover, the administration of questionnaires can be disconcerting and an operative variable per se. Particularly when the players are senior professionals, American and foreign, the social science experimenter would do well to act within the famous maxim of Mrs. Patrick Campbell.[16]

In an effort to preclude such adverse influence, we modified the questionnaire technique in CONEX IV. The same questions asked of the players in previous exercises were asked of the monitors about the teams they were observing. At any time during the move period when a message suggesting a change in involvement or prospects was received, the monitor completed a questionnaire. This technique reduced the probability of intervening variables, decreased the "guinea pig" reaction of the players, and increased the number of observations. We acknowledge that this kind of indirect survey in interpreting another person's reaction can have serious disadvantages even when the observer is well informed and sensitive. However, with improvement in the survey technique the administration of questionnaires as both an experimental control and a source of game evidence is both advisable and feasible.

(c) Each "U.S." player was assigned a specific role to play during the exercise. He was instructed to represent the interests of an agency or group, but was not constrained by existing policy. CONEX players were recruited from the agencies they were to represent or were academic specialists. Team chairmen were

[16] "It doesn't matter what one actually does, so long as one doesn't do it in the streets and frighten the horses." Related to this is the clash between the gamer's desire to stop a game and replay a move, and the "re-entry" phenomenon; roles cannot simply be turned on and off.

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generally political figures such as leading members of Congress or others in public life.

The assignment of highly qualified experts to specific roles on each team in the CONEX series was a distinct success. In addition to the obvious advantages of including a cross-section of specialized inputs into the decision process, role-playing encouraged the teams to produce solutions that arose from institutional considerations as well as personal opinions. For example, the player representing the United States Congress might do so imperfectly, but at least the ultimate group decision included consideration of this vital influence. We believe that despite the artificiality of the device, the designation of roles with concomitant responsibilities improved the authenticity of the simulation and powerfully influenced team behavior. We are also convinced that only a political generalist should be asked to simulate the summit of American political leadership, and we have serious reservations about the wisdom of selecting specialists to be "U.S." chairmen in a PE.

Structuring the teams by distribution of attitudes and assignment of roles acted as a control when we attempted to measure reaction to an input, for it diminished the probability of bias or oversight as alternative explanations. There is a strong suggestion that the explicit introduction of institutional and interest group inputs so constrained choices that all proposed actions were incremental, through accentuation of the notorious pressures for consensus. All of the "United States" teams were strongly motivated to produce major policy reform in the face of interventionist-type situations, but in the CONEX games they invariably settled for less ambitious action.

(5) *Data were collected through real-time observation of playing teams by graduate student monitors, via closed circuit television, and recorded on tape for later analysis.*

Evidence in political exercises has usually taken the form of an opening "Scenario-Problem" plus team decisions (moves). In the CONEX series the inputs into the team decision process controlled by the game designers were similarly the Scenario-Problem which provided a baseline, plus game-generated information. The outputs from the teams were their decisions about the extent of involvement or noninvolvement (in the case of the simulated U.S. teams), and internal and external conflict (in the case of the simulated LDC teams). But we wished to go beyond this, to data based on the process of deliberations of professional players

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simulating U.S. and other decision-makers. Put differently, between the independent variables fed into the "black box" of the team decisional process, and the dependent variable of policy outcome, lie intervening variables that link the two, but which generally are taken on faith. To analyze and measure them requires systematic observation of individual and team behavior, in addition to analysis of their game product.

The CONEX exercises were designed to permit evaluation of most of the hypothetical propositions by more than one method. In addition to analysis of team documents which reflect group decisions, all team discussions were monitored via closed circuit television in an effort to identify the most influential factors involved in the decisions. A small camera and several microphones were installed in each team room. Receivers were located in the director's office, the data monitors' space and the visitors' area. Tape recorders were installed in the data monitors' space and the monitors were required to operate the recorder linked to the team they were observing. Graduate student monitors recorded their observations on forms designed to relate individual and group reactions to inputs and team-generated discussion. Tape recordings of all team discussions and post-exercise critiques were available for post-exercise analysis to resolve or clarify ostensible contradictions between real-time observation of discussions and analysis of documents. Further evidence was adduced from participants' comments during the plenary critique and their responses to a post-exercise questionnaire.

The closed circuit television and tape-recording systems conferred several benefits that fully justified the costs. Team discussions were not interrupted by visitors or staff members. Control could monitor discussions and anticipate questions or judge reaction to input; e.g., when a Control expert dispatched a message depicting increased "Soviet" activity, he could observe team reaction and decide whether his message had been correctly perceived. Control also monitored oral briefings of team strategy that were presented on a staggered schedule prior to drafting the basic move period paper, thereby permitting the Control staff to begin work on its scenario projection for the next period while the teams completed their work. The collection of data was enhanced by isolating the observers from players and other distractions. Their ability to follow the discussions enabled them to contribute to scenario projections and post-exercise critique sessions. The tape recordings of team discussions also provide a source of data

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for other types of analysis, e.g., content or transaction analysis of policy discussions that might be accomplished independently of CONEX. The closed circuit television and tape-recording systems were relatively trouble-free and did not appear to inhibit discussion in any way.

(6) *We experimented with computerized interteam communication and with far more face-to-face contact than before.*

(a) Intergroup communications is a vexing problem in any interactive game involving large numbers of people. In a typical PE, move periods are too brief to tolerate real-world message-handling times. Unless message-handling time can be compressed sharply, the vital interaction among teams will be adversely affected. In the CONEX series we accepted several handicaps to expeditious processing: (i) All messages (with rare exceptions) were typed for the sake of clarity and realism. (ii) Messages were distributed to each member of the playing teams and to the Control staff; it was not unusual to reproduce fifty or sixty copies. (iii) After the initial planning session, there was no limit on the number of messages a team could originate; they generally averaged forty to fifty messages per game. (In the JWGA, now SAGA, games, only one message per team is normally permitted for each move period. The pros and cons of the two approaches are still, in our judgment, debatable.)

A manual system of this kind depends on typists, messengers, machine operators and file clerks. Our best efforts to design a game message center to optimize this manual system did not completely eliminate delay and confusion. In CONEX IV we experimented by employing a shared-time computer to transmit, store and reproduce messages. Each team and the Control apparatus were linked by consoles to the M.I.T. Compatible Time Sharing System (CTSS). A simple but elegant computer program devised by G. Allen Moulton, an M.I.T. student, permitted a secretary to type a message and add only a few symbols for distribution. The computer time-coded and internally numbered each message, and transmitted it to all addressees at the first opportunity, automatically blocking messages of one U.S. team from another and performing similar tasks. All messages were stored on disk and could be retrieved quickly for retransmittal, correction or duplication. (One teleprinter's output was televised for instant but quiet read-out by the Control Director and by gaming observers.)

The benefits derived from high-speed message-handling are in-

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creased interaction, transmission reliability, reduced administrative requirements and accurate record-keeping. Transmittal times using the computer system were reduced from an average of ten to twelve minutes to an average of two to three minutes. Employing such a system would be expensive if consoles, data phones and data terminals had to be rented or installed. But if the hardware is available, the computer costs are fully justified by the increase in efficiency. Such a system also makes intercity, interstate or international PE's more feasible. All of the minor problems encountered, e.g., console noise, hardware reliability, and reproduction, are easily solved.[17]

(b) Face-to-face contact between opposing teams or between a team and the Control staff was permitted under special circumstances, although deliberately minimized to avoid prolonged discussions and to capitalize on written documents for post-exercise analysis.

Carefully conceived and controlled face-to-face communications — for example, between "U.S. Ambassador" and "LDC Foreign Minister" — tempered the impersonality of written exchanges, gave the playing teams another realistic option, and reduced frustration attributable to the gamers' common suspicion that a malevolent and insensitive Control has preordered all outcomes. Above all, it enables a substantial increase in the number of steps that can be taken by teams during a single move period by not requiring that a crucial question and answer be delayed until the next move period.

Evaluation

Past criticisms of the PE focused on its uncertainties and ambiguities: its only truly demonstrable value, apart from personalized education, was entertainment, with any policy inferences an unexpected (and possibly unearned) dividend. One consequence of hanging back from the brink of better science was a persistent reluctance to draw policy conclusions from the games, even while policy resources were increasingly committed to this kind of gaming, and in an era in which the more traditional "policy planning" shops around Washington were to close their doors, one after another.

Some pro and con trade-offs of the free-form game had become

[17]For reports on "network" gaming using computers and teletypes for inter-university real-time team moves, see Robert C. Noel, "Inter-University Political Gaming Through the POLIS Network," paper delivered to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in September 1971.

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increasingly evident. Its freedom of play gave the PE almost unique value as a probing tool. But just because of that quality in a kind of structured "brainstorming," and the attendant absence of rigor in design specifications, the PE's policy planning and research values continued to be ambiguous. The community of "simulators," particularly those who had played in serious policy games, seemed to have reached a consensus that for purposes of policy analysis the PE was, at best, a form of organized mind-blowing, with serendipity the chief objective.

Within the wider social science fraternity, criticism grew of the "free game" as a social science method precisely because so little effort had been made to define inputs and measure results in other than gross or intuitive terms. Many "gamers" preferred a more rigorous version which rested on explicit theory, assigned quantitative values, asserted greater control over variables, and thus improved the potential for analysis.[18] The latter efforts produced impressive hypotheses about international relations and foreign policy processes. But one principal disadvantage, particularly on college campuses, was the generally low expertise of players, who were most often undergraduate students (and often high school-level youngsters in boot camp). This clearly threw in doubt the validity of their decision behavior as a reasonable analogue to governmental processes. More serious was the high degree of abstraction in the simulation. It became clear that neither computer programs nor inexperienced players could reproduce the behavior of policymakers with sufficient fidelity to constitute evidence of trends or to forecast possible outcomes — to the extent that any game or other planning device could illuminate those murky realms.

Of all the past criticisms of the PE, however, the basic fault which no rationalization could overcome was that as a foreign policy *research* device it remained unproven because untested, given its highly unscientific nature. As investments of time and energy, the senior PE's were costly and complex: each had direct costs of approximately $5,000, had forty-five to fifty people participating, and required several hundred hours of preparation. Nevertheless, the results were not validated empirical evidence

[18]See, for example, Harold C. Guetzkow's paper in Morton Kaplan, editor, *New Approaches to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968); Kenneth W. Terhune and Joseph M. Firestone, "Global War, Limited War, and Peace: Hypotheses from Three Experimental Worlds," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1970; Gerald H. Shure and R. J. Meeker, "On Line Computer Studies of Bargaining and Negotiation Behavior," System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, TM-2304/108/00.

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which closed the loop on a research question. The lack of rigorous controls made it impossible to conduct a controlled test of specific hypotheses except in the most general way.

For the first generation of gaming we were probably justified in designing "free games" in which the point was to present players with a horrendous crisis problem and turn them loose in order to "see what would happen." For one thing, it was the tool itself that represented our main preoccupation. Second, we assumed that human players would respond only to a high-intensity crisis situation, on the grounds that anything less traumatic would fail to get them past the takeoff point into role-playing. But the result was that the Control team improvised throughout with interventions that were unplanned and unmeasurable, thus running the peril of being unrelated to the main strategy, however imprecise, of the game designers.

In short, without a more purposeful research strategy in which game design and structure were subordinate to the experimental variables under study, it was not possible to use the PE for serious research purposes. The impressive values of the PE as a political-psychological art form were not enough to offset a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with the PE as social science.

In reporting above on our efforts to confront that dissatisfaction, we were careful nevertheless to restate the general consensus among scholars that games cannot test policy hypotheses. This is in turn linked to the judgment that the PE is "unscientific." If the purpose of all experimental social science is to *test* specific hypotheses about policy or decision-makers, this criticism is devastatingly valid. The PE, whatever its acknowledged power as both a teaching aid and a heuristic device in research, still lacks the theoretical base that is common to sound experimentation in virtually any scientific field, natural or social.

But the issue is really what *kinds* of hypotheses can thereby be tested. The PE can demonstrably be used to test propositions about the predicted behavior of individuals or groups who *simulate* official decision-makers. On the other hand, it may be a long time before the PE, however improved, can readily test substantive propositions about foreign policy. (One of our associates, R. Lucas Fischer, suggested that what it can do at best is "examine" them, and we have accepted this formulation.) [19]

[19] R. Lucas Fischer, "The RAND/M.I.T. Political-Military Exercise and International Relations Theory," Center for International Studies, M.I.T., A/69-11, September 1, 1969.

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One element of sound social science method is of course *replication*.[20] In the political exercise this can be either of events, or moves, or teams, or games. Replication has long been the ambition of those who conduct PE's, on the not unreasonable grounds that iteration would permit the PE analyst to employ statistical tests which could produce a probability value for the experimental conclusion, thereby giving a ring of authenticity to the resultant explanation or prediction. Unfortunately, it was invariably sacrificed in the early competition for scarce "policy-gaming" resources, in which the highest value was placed on trying out the technique on as wide as possible a range of problem areas. Moreover, although there are some fairly well accepted guidelines, it was — and is — not easy to find an irrefutable scientific canon that tells one the exact number of replications making for scientific respectability. In the CONEX series we sought a degree of replication within practical limits: by including some hypotheses in more than one game, by repeating observation of a hypothesis during a PE, and by duplicating some senior-level experiments in student-level exercises.

Another issue of scientific rigor was the PE's characteristic failure to identify in precise terms the salient *variables* involved in the experiment. This presented special conceptual difficulties. The heart of the professional-level PE is its believed capacity to come closer to constituting a believable, albeit reduced, model of the real-life system of top-level decision-making than any other available method or tool. Indeed, it was the absence of any believable systematic theory or model of high-level U.S. foreign policy decision-making that made the PE look so interesting. In place of the nonexistent model, one substituted the knowledge, the experience and the routines that lay inside the heads of the players (and nowhere else). The mystery of the process remained unbreached. But the process itself was somehow being approximated.

Yet the latter difficulty was not a good reason for our earlier failure to be more explicit even within the limits of the experiment. The game designer ought to have said just what independent variables he was introducing, through his Scenario Problem, into the implicit model; what precise dependent variables one should be looking for, in the form of specific kinds of policies,

[20]See, e.g., Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), Chapter IV. Also B. F. Wimer, *Statistical Principles in Experimental Design* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962).

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choices or actions produced as outputs of the teams; and (most elusive of all) what "intervening" or "transforming" variables were identifiable in the process that converted input into output. In CONEX we tried to do these things. In addition, we felt it would be particularly instructive to try to control one independent variable for comparative and, perhaps, measurement purposes. Here Professor Steinbruner took the lead, both in clarifying the general concepts at issue and in developing an actual design for a game that would do just that.[21]

We were also influenced by injunctions on the part of fellow social scientists critical of earlier exercises, notably Professor Harold Guetzkow, that we must connect the PE with the ongoing body of social science theory. PE's, we were told, should be designed to take specific account of cognate theoretical constructs such as those found in game theory, small-group dynamics and behavior, cultural anthropology and social psychology, international relations and foreign policy theory (if the latter can be said to exist), and other forms of simulations and games.

This point seems to us to have validity, but in a partial sense. We clearly would benefit from more theoretical awareness, along with more rigorous design criteria. From the start, PE's have drawn on psychological theory in terms of team size and role specification, but the relationship of the PE to mathematical or economic game theory is a distant one. The PE can draw modestly on decision theory, if one keeps in mind that it will bear essentially the same relation to rational utility-maximizing as does real-life crisis decision-making. In its present form, decision theory is only now finding interesting applications to specific cases of foreign policy decision-making. Existing models — "rational," "bureaucratic," "organizational," or whatever — are imperfect approximations of reality, and still in the process of acquiring the necessary explanatory and predictive powers.[22] As with game theory, models based on decision theory represent a still crude approximation of the real thing.

But the single most highly valued quality of the PE is that professional players are seen to act *essentially* as they act in real life. Real life offers a far richer source of data for the validation and elaboration of theories about decision-making than the small and deliberately foreshortened microcosm which is the PE. On the

[21]See Steinbruner, *op. cit.*

[22]See, e.g., Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

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other hand, real-life data are difficult to come by. If the differences between real life and the PE can be continuously adjusted, the PE may become a more valid instrument for the elaboration and controlled testing of decision theories.

There is, however, one major theoretical dilemma that so far has left a high barrier between even the CONEX series of games and the ideal experimental situation. So long as teams are permitted to interact dynamically with the scenario, and with one another's strategy, conditions may be generated in the game that were not in the design plan. Even if the Control group limits itself to implementing its own agreed and previously calibrated game research design (as essayed in CONEX), the interacting teams may move the game away from that design. The price of keeping that from happening may in turn be to undercut the dynamic role-playing process which models the reality one seeks to capture.

The trade-off has not been resolved in games involving scholars and experts (although at the student level Steinbruner's EXCON series experimented with one-team, one-move games in which players responded solely to the designer's pre-programmed moves). In the senior CONEX series every variable was not at all times under the experimenters' control. The search is still on for even better experimental methods to minimize deviations from the planned pathways of game behavior, while not allowing the reaction to drop below "critical mass," so to speak, and thus lose its dynamic quality.

We conclude that wherever related bodies of theory can help one to design an improved form of PE with rigor, elegance and measurable results, one must be eager to see them brought to bear. On the basis of the CONEX series, clearly far more rigor and methodological self-consciousness on the part of the game designer are mandatory if his research effort is to be intellectually coherent.

But a danger exists in excessive scientism: it would in our opinion be a shame to distort the values that already inhere in the PE for the sake of fidelity to often imperfect and sometimes dubious theory. Above all, one should not tamper with the phenomenal "reality" the PE can reproduce at the professional level, given lifelike scenario situations, a continuing air of plausibility, and a minimum of overt temperature- and pulse-taking of the expert players involved. This injunction would appear to be especially applicable to "non-crisis games" where the player unconstrained by time-sensitive pressure is more likely to perceive and resent artificiality.

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Thus it was that despite its improvements on the previous model, the CONEX series was in some degree also vulnerable to the traditional criticisms of social science methodology: the hypotheses remained too general, many important assumptions remained implicit, controls were imperfect, measurement was imprecise, and results were neither integrated into an existing conceptual framework nor statistically impressive.

Nevertheless, given that we never expected the PE to predict behavior or test substantive propositions about foreign policy rigorously, the CONEX results are both encouraging and challenging. It is clearly possible to simulate non-crisis planning and decision-making with at least the same verisimilitude as the crisis game. Although we achieved no solution for the troublesome question of intervening variables, we were able to categorize what appear to have been the significant factors. It was also encouraging to observe the extent to which correlation could be, if not measured, at least identified. Our conclusion, tendered with optimism rather than resignation, is that the PE still represents a form of theory-building more than a source of explication and validation of existing theory.

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PROLEGOMENA ON THE POST-BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

by Ronald J. Yalem

IS there a post-behavioral revolution underway in international studies comparable to the tendency and movement in political science recently described by David Easton?[1] Or is it more likely that the behavioral revolution in international studies is still in process with no antithetical reaction yet discernible? These questions are difficult to answer at this juncture in the evolution of the international relations enterprise, but they are worth raising in order to stimulate thought and creative speculation about the future of the discipline. The purpose of this essay is to present some preliminary observations on the nature of an alternative paradigm for international studies in a post-behavioral framework.

On one matter there can be little disagreement: International relations scholarship long ago shifted decisively in the direction of the behavioral approach with the pioneer contributions of Richard Snyder, Morton Kaplan and Karl Deutsch. While there are no signs of an immediate reversal of this trend, evidences of discontent go back to Hedley Bull's famous attack against behavioralism in 1966.[2]

Bull's critique paralleled the traditionalist response to the growth of the behavioral movement in political science in the 1950's by advocating a return to the traditions of classical and historical scholarship. But if the post-behavioral movement focuses on the future instead of the past, as Easton tells us, the contribution of Fred Neal and Bruce Hamlett may have been the first manifestation of a post-behavioral tendency in international studies.[3] More recently, Michael Haas, a leading behavioralist, articulated a deepening discontent among behavioralists and proposed "multimethodologism" as a solution that would synthesize

[1]David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," *American Political Science Review,* December 1969, pp. 1051-1061. See also Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "International Studies in the 70's," *International Studies Quarterly,* March 1971, and John Herz, "Relevancies and Irrelevancies in the Study of International Relations," *Polity,* Fall 1971.

[2]Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics,* April 1966, pp. 361-377.

[3]Fred Warner Neal and Bruce D. Hamlett, "The Never-Never Land of International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly,* September 1969, pp. 281-305.

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the warring methodologies of positivist behavioralism, theoretical behavioralism and traditionalism.[4] Whether the Haas proposal fits the mood of post-behavioralism is uncertain, since it represents a continuation of the behavioral revolution rather than a reaction against it. Nevertheless, Haas raised some important intellectual questions that need to be considered even though one may disagree with the future direction he proposes for the discipline.

For a better understanding of the attributes of the post-behavioral mood, we turn to Easton's description of the main intellectual components. We may summarize these as follows: (1) In terms of intellectual priorities, the scholar should assign greater weight in his investigations to the solution of urgent social problems than to developing more sophisticated methodological tools. (2) The thrust of behavioral research has been to sustain the status quo with regard to political arrangement. Preoccupation with the facts as they are tends to preclude an appreciation of the desirability of change to improve obsolescent or inequitable political conditions. (3) Behavioral research often leads to a narrow scholasticism that removes the scholar too far from reality. In an era of domestic and international crisis, scholarship should be reoriented toward the consideration and analysis of real problems.[5]

Easton has also asserted that the failure of behavioral scholars to anticipate the great social and political upheavals of the past decade contributed to the post-behavioral revolt.[6] The dominating assumption is that political scientists should devote a far greater proportion of their talents to the anticipation and prevention of future crises, as opposed to the quest for a scientific discipline. In organizational terms, post-behavioralism is perhaps best exemplified by the Caucus for a New Political Science within the American Political Science Association which as yet has no counterpart in the International Studies Association.

Neal and Hamlett, in calling for greater relevance in international studies, warned that "scholarship in international relations is moving away from the problem (or human) focus and has become too preoccupied with theory and methodology as ends in themselves."[7] Though they praise the behavioral revolution for its

[4]Michael Haas and Theodore L. Becker, "The Behavioral Revolution and After," in Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel, editors, *Approaches to the Study of Political Science* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 479-504.
[5]See Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 1052.
[6]*Ibid.*, p. 1053.
[7]Neal and Hamlett, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

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emphasis on the need for objectivity and vigor, they conclude that "the result seems to be more of avoiding the real problems of international relations — theory at the expense of philosophy, data collection at the expense of analysis, quantification at the expense of meaning."[8] This indictment of contemporary behavioralism is repeated in somewhat different language by Haas.

Neal and Hamlett urge a return to the study of contemporary problems in international politics instead of a continued search for rigorous theory and methodology. Scholars must change their field "from an abstract academic game and treatment of non-problems to a discipline that justifies its need by contributing to mankind and human survival."[9] In this connection they propose research into the following topics: (1) the tendency of modern states to rigidify their foreign policies despite the need for flexible readjustment; (2) the relationships between superpowers and small states; and (3) the dynamics of coexistence between ideologically disparate political systems.[10]

In a comprehensive survey of the evolution of international relations theory and methodology, Haas describes the multiplicity of theoretical approaches that have evolved as well as the characteristics of the behavioral approach.[11] His appreciation for the leading behavioral metatheoretical orientations is tempered by the conclusion that "the behavioralist output of the 1960's has been disappointing, not just by traditional standards but in terms of scientific criteria."[12] Systems theory, strategy theory, power theory, communication theory and structural-functional analysis do not measure up to the requirements that theory be parsimonious, rigorous, explicit, operational and correctible, whereas the newer methodologies employed in the collection and analysis of data often leave much to be desired in the way of theoretical underpinning. Haas urges that the present tendency among behavioralists toward the separation of theoretical and empirical investigation be ended, because a science of international relations requires the reinforcing influence of theory tested by empirical examination and the analysis of data guided by theoretical assumptions.

Other evidences of dissatisfaction may be cited. Charles

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 294.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 305.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] Michael Haas, "International Relations Theory," in Haas and Kariel, *op. cit.*, pp. 444-466.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 447.

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McClelland, for example, observes that "without reservation . . . the scientific (or behavioral) approach has failed to produce enough material to support a general survey of international relations."[13] Bruce Russett, a leading quantitative behavioralist, admits that there is a "need for the digestion and evaluation of the scientific achievements of the past decade. Some approaches have failed because it turned out to be virtually impossible to put data into their imaginative theoretical systems; others are being looked at askance from a doubt whether their expensively accumulated data have much to say about the 'real world.' "[14]

James Rosenau is an exception to the previously cited opinions, for he argues that "the maturing of the field has fostered a sense of confidence that the conceptual and methodological equipment with which to comprehend international politics is now available."[15] This, however, appears to be a somewhat optimistic view of the present situation.[16]

Underlying the current dissatisfaction with the discipline is an emerging conflict between theoretical and quantitative behavioralists that has largely superseded the old controversy between traditionalism and science. According to Haas and Theodore L. Becker, "positivist and theoretical behavioralists are isolated from each other in intellectual stimulation and rapport" and evidence that "inner contradictions have appeared within an overly successful and smug circle of behavioralists [suggests] that a new battle is taking shape."[17] Obviously the battle has already begun. What is controversial is the outcome of the present debate. If theoretical behavioralism constituted the successful antithesis of the traditional thesis, and positivist or quantitative behavioralism is an emerging contradiction, can we look forward to a new synthesis in the form of "multimethodologism" as anticipated by Haas and Becker? Or is it more likely that the future of the discipline will be marked by the emergence of the post-behavioral outlook?

[13]Charles McClelland, "International Relations: Wisdom or Science?," in James Rosenau, editor, *International Politics and Foreign Policy,* revised edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 5.

[14]Bruce Russett, "International Behavior Research: Case Studies and Cumulation," in Haas and Kariel, *op. cit.,* p. 439.

[15]Rosenau, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

[16]In appraising the theoretical literature, K. J. Holsti notes that "even the small portion concerned with the polemics of behavioral versus classical approaches is substantial enough to warrant the status of a sub-field." "Retreat From Utopia: International Relations Theory, 1945-1970," *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* March 1971.

[17]Haas and Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 486, 479.

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II

A common-sense interpretation of the term "multimethodologism" might imply the legitimate usage of diverse methodologies as a research strategy in the pursuit of a theoretical science of international relations. It would therefore be compatible with the existing methodological situation, in which a variety of tools are employed in the analysis of international behavior. But according to Haas and Becker the term involves a judicious combination of theoretical sophistication and methodological expertise to insure a more balanced growth of knowledge.[18] Instead of striking a balance among quantification, theory, verification, and the search for regularities in political behavior, behavioral scholars have tended to concentrate on one of these areas to the exclusion of the others. Multimethodologism is advanced to rectify the present situation in which "quantitative strategies seem to have advanced far beyond the theoretical equipment on hand, whereas many theoretically innovative behaviorialists have failed to keep abreast of the newer advancements in research technology."[19] It represents a synthesis of conflicting orientations within the behavioral framework. Post-behavioralism, on the other hand, is an attempt to combine the behavioral emphasis on theory and methodology with the traditionalist focus on the analysis and solution of international policy problems.

Multimethodologism is largely an exhortation to behavioralists to widen their perspectives — but not to the extent envisioned in the post-behavioral outlook. It is a laudable strategy to meet the logical requirements for scientific advance. Yet Haas and Becker are strangely vague about how it may be achieved. Their plea ignores the fact that few scholars are by temperament or training likely to combine the skills of both theoretician and empiricist, no matter how desirable this may be. The current tension between them may thus continue into the indefinite future.[20]

Further, it is questionable whether Haas and Becker are correct in asserting that general systems theory and its derivatives offer the

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 486.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 485.
[20] The conflict is illustrated by Oran Young's critique of *International Regions and the International System,* in which he excoriates Bruce Russett for failing to ground his largely empirical and quantitative analysis of regions in an adequate theoretical framework. See "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics,* April 1969, p. 487. In rejoinder — "The Young Science of International Politics," *ibid.*, October 1969, p. 92 — Russett suggests that Young's publications have been weak in empirical referents.

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means for achieving a multimethodological synthesis.[21] General systems theory is essentially a heuristic and taxonomic device, not a theoretical structure generating significant explanatory or predictive power. Citing Stanley Hoffmann as an early exponent of the testing of theoretical propositions on the basis of historical case studies, Haas and Becker have prematurely assumed that the employment of this approach in three studies is evidence that a multimethodological trend is underway.[22] Not only do three studies provide inadequate evidence of a new research trend, but as an approach to analysis utilizing inductive procedures, historical sociology is the opposite of general systems theory and its derivatives, which stress abstract conceptualization.

A continuing emphasis on methodology will obviously appeal to many scholars whose training and inspiration derive from the quantitative thrust in international studies. As a typical example, Philip Burgess has projected the future of international relations theory with major attention to the perfection of a wide array of research methodologies rather than theoretical needs.[23] But though he deplores the separation of theoretical and methodological contributions in the revised edition of Rosenau's *International Politics and Foreign Policy* as unnatural, in view of the need to dovetail theory and empiricism, Burgess fails to relate seven metatheoretical orientations adapted from Michael Haas to the six methodological tools he finds so promising. Perhaps this is just another validation of an earlier point, namely, the difficulty of combining theoretical and methodological sophistication in a new multimethodologism.

The value of innovative research methodologies has not really been substantiated by the formation of new and significant ideas that assist in our understanding of the international system. In deploring the fact that methodology has become an end in itself in all of the social sciences, rather than a tool for the production of new theoretical insights, Marion Levy raised the following ques-

[21]Haas and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 491. For a trenchant critique of general systems theory and structural-functional analysis, see A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," *American Political Science Review,* June 1968, pp. 425-439.

[22]Haas and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 491. The studies cited are Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963); Bruce M. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* June 1963; and Quincy Wright, "The Escalation of International Conflicts," *ibid.*, December 1963.

[23]Philip Burgess, "International Relations Theory: Prospect 1970-1995," Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September 7-11, 1970.

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tions at a recent conference on methodology in international relations research: "Where has all of our methodological sophistication gotten us in the last four decades? What are the new, improved, powerful and generalized statements containing pauce variables with which we have emerged? Can any of you cite as many as three generalizations of a high order associated with the work of anyone whom you respect in the field of international politics?"[24]

Exaggeration aside, Levy's remonstrance points to a fundamental limitation in the pursuit of methodological sophistication. Most methodologists, however, recognize that the collection and analysis of data cannot substitute for creative imagination; they simply refuse to generalize beyond the scope of their data. On this they are to be commended. Yet the generalizations that have been extrapolated from their data have not been of the high order that Levy desires. In all likelihood this is because "the universe of cases for most political phenomena is so small that empirical regularities are tenuous links at best."[25] Even if Levy is correct about the paucity of such generalizations, theory-building proceeds not only inductively on the basis of empirical data but also deductively through the development of abstract propositions. The fact that so few propositions with rich explanatory power are empirically verifiable may be an indictment of deductive theorists as well as of inductive methodologists.

III

The previous discussion pinpoints two possible directions for the future of the discipline: the post-behavioral outlook symbolized by Neal and Hamlett and the "multimethodologism" advocated by Haas and Becker. Yet these two orientations may not be so divergent on closer examination. If crisis anticipation is a major concern of post-behavioralism, it can hardly be realized without the accumulation of a body of reliable knowledge to furnish a basis for it. Perhaps we can indicate how the talents of both groups may be utilized to reorient the discipline in the direction of a new post-behavioral paradigm.

While it is difficult to project intellectual trends for a field whose theoretical and empirical foundations are less developed

[24]Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Methodology: Means or a Field?," in Edwin H. Fedder, editor, *Methodological Concerns in International Studies* (St. Louis: University of Missouri, Center for International Studies, August 1970), p. 140.
[25]Young, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

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than those in other social sciences, it may nevertheless be desirable to adumbrate the contours of a post-behavioral future. Despite the strong probability that the behavioral focus will continue for the short run, an alternative paradigm is suggested to stimulate scholarly and critical response. Post-behavioralism does not imply abandonment of the progress that has been achieved through behavioral research but a reallocation of research priorities toward the analysis of contemporary and future problems of the international system. How may we conjoin the prevailing behavioral mood with such a reallocation?

The essence of the post-behavioral revolution in political science has been defined by Easton as "a deep dissatisfaction with political research and teaching, especially of the kind that is striving to convert the study of politics into a more rigorously scientific discipline modeled on the methodology of the natural sciences."[26] As we have seen, however, post-behavioralism seeks no blind return to the traditional modes of investigation but looks to the future. It does not rule out the application of behavioral techniques in the analysis of contemporary problems.

That a post-behavioral revolution is underway in international studies is not yet clear. Multimethodologism is largely a plea to further the behavioral revolution through bridge-building between theoretical and quantitative behavioralists rather than to replace the present paradigm with a new one. In suggesting the reorientation of inquiry to real world problems, moreover, Neal and Hamlett are simply calling for less reliance on the behavioral approach in favor of more traditional methods of investigation. One searches in vain for a post-behavioral statement for the international relations discipline corresponding to the normative strategy Easton proposes for political science:

> . . . today we need to temper our behavioral image of the discipline so that in these critical times we no longer see it as commanding us to devote most of our efforts to the discovery of demonstrable truths about politics. We will need to obtain more of our satisfactions from seeking immediate answers to immediate problems.[27]

For international relationists such a strategy is feasible if one accepts the assumption that there is a peculiar urgency to the dilemmas of the nuclear age that overshadows the quest for a theoretical science: ". . . since they involve life on a global scale, international phenomena pose problems that are of a different order, heighten-

[26]Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 1051.
[27]*Ibid.*, p. 1056.

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ing the policy orientation of researchers and lessening their inclination to engage in inquiry for its own sake."[28]

In one sense the post-behavioral revolution may be superfluous. The special urgency to solve problems has been a constant concern of scholars since the dawning of the nuclear age in 1945, whereas the deterioration of advanced industrial societies developed so gradually that evolving internal problems escaped notice until recently. Many scholars have continued to probe the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence, international bipolarity and arms control despite the intrusion and continuation of the behavioral revolution. Moreover, these and other policy topics have received increasing attention from behaviorally oriented scholars. Nevertheless, in international relations as in political science, there has been greater emphasis on the search for patterned regularities of behavior, innovative models, and the accumulation of a body of scientifically established hypotheses and generalizations. Far greater prestige has been accorded to scholars working on the "frontiers of knowledge" than to the traditionalists exploring the problems of the real world.

So, on balance, a post-behavioral movement for international studies may be relevant after all. What are the normative implications for the future of the discipline that would develop from the adoption of a post-behavioral paradigm? Such a shift would obviously decelerate the present quest for a scientific discipline. Some behavioralists would be hostile, fearing a halt in what they consider to be the intellectual progress of the past decade. Concern has been expressed that policy research designed for the purpose of solving contemporary problems will lead to the abandonment of scientific canons of inquiry.[29]

Actually, however, the curtailment of support for international studies by private foundations and the federal government constitutes a more significant barrier to the reorientation of research priorities. It may be possible to move in the direction of post-behavioral inquiry without substantial financial subsidization. If this is done, it will certainly have an impact on the evolution of the discipline, but it need not stultify its development. A rearrangement of research priorities might ultimately supply a needed corrective to the tendency for behavioral research to be isolated from international issues and problems, just as the realist critique

[28]Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, "Tradition and Science in the Study of International Politics," in Knorr and Rosenau, editors, *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 9.
[29]Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

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of idealism after World War II supplied an antidote for the utopian writing during the interwar period.

Further, such a reorientation could be accomplished through the utilization of both behavioral and traditional methodologies. Peace research has been increasingly attractive to behavioral scholars, in addition to the long-standing traditionalist preoccupation with this area. Those behavioralists with trepidations about the impact of the post-behavioral revolution on their devotion to rigor, precision and explicit conceptualization would thus find an acceptable outlet for their talents. Even Burgess admits that some of the best work in this field has been published by behavioralists.[30] The reorientation posed by post-behavioralism would constitute a shift in intellectual emphasis more than in academic ideology.

If it could be demonstrated that the behavioral paradigm promises a significant payoff in the near future in the form of a body of empirically reliable general propositions with explanatory and predictive power for the international system and its various components, the case for preserving this paradigm would be compelling. Since even the most optimistic behavioralists are cautious in this regard, the case for the post-behavioral mood becomes more persuasive.[31]

Should the focus of post-behavioralism in international studies stress mitigation of the dangers of war in the nuclear age, an embryonic framework for a new paradigm can still be found in the topics suggested by Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz as approaches to the achievement of a warless international system: conflict resolution techniques for the control of international crises; the reduction of economic disparities between developed and undeveloped nations; disarmament procedures and policies; the use of the United Nations as an agency to assist the new states in solving internal economic and political problems; and the possibility of developing a more centralized international system

[30]*Ibid.*, p. 11. For an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the behavioral approach to the study of world order problems, especially the feasibility of system transformation, see Ronald J. Yalem, "Toward the Reconciliation of Traditional and Behavioral Approaches to International Theory," ORBIS, Summer 1969, p. 597.

[31]J. David Singer has written that "if operational data and sophisticated, relevant constructs are indeed reasonable criteria, we in the international relations field have a considerable distance to go in the creation of a scientific discipline." Foreword to Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, editors, *Strategy of World Order: Volume 4, Disarmament and Economic Development* (New York: World Law Fund, 1966).

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within which the four previous approaches could be incorporated.[32]

Additionally, research should be initiated in the virgin area of conflict avoidance.[33] We need more information about how certain conflict resolution techniques may be employed to avoid interstate conflict as well as to resolve it peacefully. Suggestions on how the United Nations and leading regional organizations could be utilized more effectively for the purpose of conflict avoidance should be explored. In this modest fashion, international relations scholars might contribute to advancing proposals beneficial to individual states and to the international system as a whole.

A post-behavioral reorientation emphasizing the need for research on significant international problems may also diminish the controversy regarding the proper relationship between theory and methodology. In the interest of developing specific proposals for the improvement of the international system, scholars may be less disposed to engage in academic polemics.

Post-behavioralism, it is granted, ignores the caveat that as scholars we should eschew policy research until scientific understanding of our subject matter is established. Yet as Easton has reminded, "we need to accept the validity of addressing ourselves directly to the problems of the day to obtain quick, short-run answers with the tools and generalizations currently available, however inadequate they may be."[34] At the risk of rendering advice that may not be scientifically reputable, international relations scholars may become more useful by developing bold and imaginative suggestions for a more effectively ordered international system of the future. In the process they may help to rescue their discipline from the malaise into which it has fallen.

[32] *Ibid., Volume 2, International Law,* pp. 15-16.

[33] For an interesting discussion of the possibility of employing "controlled communication" as a technique to avoid international conflicts and to perpetuate peaceful relationships among states where conflict is not anticipated, see John Burton, *Conflict and Communication* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 100-110. Burton states that as yet "no government, international institution, or research organization has developed techniques designed to anticipate and to avoid particular conflicts." (p. 100.)

[34] Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 1055.

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IS THERE A PARADIGM IN THE HOUSE?

by John J. Weltman

THE field of international relations is no stranger to self-analytic essays. Yet there is a difference now. In the 1960's, efforts were directed toward charting a course for a field which had apparently lost what consensus on problems and methods had once existed by virtue of the Realist approach. Today, some claim, a new common focus has emerged.

Within the confines of those who accept the systems approach, it may now be possible to speak of the growing appearance of "normal" scientific work relying on the systemic framework as an unquestioned "paradigm."[1] An analysis of this work may enable us to be more conclusive than before about the utility of the approach. Whose hunches about the future have turned out to be right? Some efforts by Morton Kaplan and others within the last several years provide us with objects for such a study.

I

In "Glimpses into a Philosophy of Politics" Kaplan has given us the opportunity to assess some general points of justification for systems theory, points not previously available to us. His essay[2] is addressed to one of philosophy's essential problems, the search for a link between the "is" and the "ought." Does there exist some standard beyond the purely subjective, by which values may be judged? If so, is this standard capable of being understood by the unaided human reason? The demystification to which Western man has subjected the world around him has more and more seemed to deny higher warrants for human values than man's individual preferences. It has come to seem manifest that the natural sciences reject claims that the objects of their investigation exhibit purposive behavior or reveal a standard which men ought to follow.

Systems theory has claimed the capacity to bridge this gap. The scientific outlook has been correct but limited in its applicability.

[1]The terms quoted are those coined by Thomas S. Kuhn, in his *The Structure of Scientific Revelations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[2]In Morton Kaplan, *Macropolitics: Essays on the Philosophy & Science of Politics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 3-48.

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The Newtonian world-view is correctly applied only in physics where the objects of investigation are "closed" systems. That is to say, the outputs are in some fixed relation to the inputs: if a change in inputs occurs, a concomitant change in outputs also takes place.

However, there is a whole class of appropriate objects of scientific investigation — "open" systems — about which a Newtonian explanation is insufficient. These systems show a characteristic known as "equifinality." In them the relation between inputs and outputs is not fixed as rigorously as it is in "closed" systems; they exhibit the ability to maintain the same output despite changes, within certain limits, in the inputs. The obvious model for the "open" system is the biological organism, which adjusts to a wide range of change in its environment in such a way as to keep certain of its behavior patterns constant. This constancy is an objective "fact" about the system's behavior; without considering it, any explanation would be insufficient. Thus, the concept of the "open" system provides a vehicle whereby the idea of "purposive" behavior may be brought back into legitimate scientific discourse without succumbing to the vitalist sin of attributing otherwise unexplained behavior to the operation of unseen movers.

Those who have attempted to analyze the intellectual basis of systems theory have been forced to ask whether this claim holds up. The claim depends on an assumption explicitly stated in general systems theory. In brief, it is held that "organization" or "purpose" in open systems may be defined with the same rigor as "random" behavior in closed systems.

The central position of this assumption is immediately apparent. If the point is conceded, purposive behavior can be accepted as falling within the scope of rigorous analysis. If not, systems theory's whole claim to a new synthesis collapses. It has been suggested elsewhere that the point is invalid, that "organization" as a term cannot command the precise mathematical meaning that may be attached to "random."[3]

Kaplan has often denied the influence of general systems theory on his work, emphasizing instead the influence of cybernetics, of such writers as W. Ross Ashby.[4] Yet the reader of the essay under discussion is quickly struck by the similarity of Kaplan's argument to the GST position we have outlined.

[3]See my "Systems Theory in International Relations: A Critique," *Polity*, Spring 1972, pp. 301-329.
[4]W. Ross Ashby, *Design for a Brain* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960).

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To repeat, Kaplan is engaged in an attempt to develop an objectively valid test of values. An open system's purpose or end is its "resting state."[5] He dismisses the arguments of those who would claim a distinction between the artificial and the natural — who maintain that purposes are inherent only in the operation of "natural" systems and that so-called purposes in artificial systems are simply the artifacts of their human designers.

He holds instead that "purposive" behavior — behavior directed, in a context of change in inputs, toward the "resting state" — is a characteristic of those systems we commonly think of as artificial as well as natural. Both artificial and natural open systems may exhibit purposive behavior insofar as they are "ultrastable." "An ultra-stable system is a system that can employ negative feedback both to reduce disturbances in the environment and to reorganize itself in a way that maintains some system variable within defined limits."[6] Thus, a machine designed to recharge its own batteries and to go around obstacles in order to reach "particular end or resting states" may properly be termed purposive, even though this purpose is not, so far as we can tell, connected to those thought processes or that state of consciousness with which "purpose" is usually linked in our minds.

The problem of finding a scientific warrant for values now becomes rather easy, at least in principle. Such a process employs the concept of the "resting state" — purpose — as its benchmark. The "values" of the machine mentioned above are obvious enough: whatever facilitates the machine's achievement of its purpose is valuable. That end-point is a precisely definable state.

This way of arriving at the correct set of values for a system may easily be carried over into the realm of the behavior of human beings as individuals and in collectives. Whether they exhibit consciousness or not, what is valuable for all ultrastable open systems is determined by reference to their purposes. For man, "[T]hose values would be best that brought man closest to his resting states."[7]

The parallel character of the arguments employed by Kaplan here and by the general systems theorists should be apparent. In both cases the novelty of the method rests on the claim to establish ends or purposes as objective, rigorously determinable attributes of the system. The question at issue must be, therefore, whether

[5]Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[6]*Ibid.*, p. 25.
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 41.

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Kaplan is more successful in developing the objective character of the resting state for social and political systems than were the general systems theorists in establishing such a character for "organization."

Obviously, men in their social and political lives act in something other than an anarchic fashion. Obviously, an observer from time to time feels that he can discern trends, or the "logic of events." Often we claim in retrospect to see the "inevitability" of this or that outcome, once a certain institutional structure has been created. But to claim that political life is something *other than anarchic* does not provide us with *positive* answers. And the process of drawing trends and inevitabilities from political activity — even from history — is an exceedingly tentative, and tendentious, process. How do we go about defining the "resting state" of a *man*, not to speak of a social system?

In choosing what we feel is the "essence" of a social institution, we must exercise a species of choice among the multitude of aspects the institution presents to us. Since our prevailing linguistic mythology is that of empiricism, our choices tend to be presented as the most "objectively" important characteristics of the entity in view. But our choices owe as much to subjective attitudes about the object as to what is "really" there. Anyone who observes contemporary discourse between — for want of better terms — "liberal" and "radical" scholars about the nature of the American political system today must see this. To the two groups the wellsprings, driving forces and tendencies of the same institution — undoubtedly the most "researched" government in the world past or present — are as different as night and day. It would be only a form of question-begging to insist that one or the other was "wrong" in his assessment of the "purpose" of the system.

This problem appears in international politics also. During and immediately after the Second World War, for instance, the Axis seemed to be a "logical" and "inevitable" result of the common ideological basis of the three regimes involved. Revisionist history suggests that this "inevitability" was no more than "chancy" at times, and that one of the Axis powers was engaged in a process of extrication from the alliance in the months before Pearl Harbor. One might even argue that Washington's ideologically deterministic assessment of Japanese policy contributed to an inflexibility in the American position which forced the Japanese to take actions they might otherwise have avoided.

I have taken up this substantive example only to stress the dif-

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ficulties in treating collectives as if there were some key, which we could apprehend, that would unlock the ultimate motives of their behavior. Kaplan has consistently held this position, going back to *System and Process,*[8] although he has not before, I believe, tried to support it explicitly by denying the distinction between the natural and the artificial.

In *System and Process,* Kaplan spoke of objectively determinable attributes for social systems. Yet we could apprehend these attributes only through methods quite "traditional" and impressionistic. One made an effort to analyze the official ideology, statements of leaders and other such indices, for instance, if one wished to decide if a state's international program was to be considered "hierarchical" or "non-hierarchical."[9]

But without a new and certain way of arriving at the *content* of a "resting state" for a social system, the question of the *existence* of such a state remains only an interesting hypothesis. Intellectual games are fun, and the "resting state" adds a certain formal completeness to the scheme, which is satisfying aesthetically. Unfortunately, though, the game can also cause so much confused thinking that one wonders if "art for art's sake" is a sufficient justification.

Novel concepts are often the lifeblood of a developing discipline. But a novel concept whose content cannot be grounded in replicable investigation is nothing more than metaphysics. Whether or not "natural" and "artificial" systems do in fact share the attribute of an objective resting state is a moot point. Put in this abstract way, it is probably an issue incapable of resolution. As a practical matter, however, accepting the hypothesis facilitates the commission of classic intellectual error in modern dress.

The belief that all the apparent contradictions of this world are resolved ultimately in the mind of the deity is a comforting thought. One may hold it, however, and still be aware that it is totally devoid of understandable implications for specific occasions of choice. Similarly, one may hold an abstract view of the existence of a resting state in a social system, and yet be aware of an inability to specify its content in any peculiarly valid fashion. But one can easily forget this latter point, and instead enhance the "scientific" status of conclusions about collectives — conclusions properly understood as subjective and tenuous — by labeling them as the

[8]Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

[9]For a more extensive analysis of these points, see my "The Processes of a Systemicist," *Journal of Politics,* May 1972, pp. 592-611.

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"resting states" of those collectives. I cannot see how this process is any more valid than — or essentially different from — the anthropomorphisms that abounded in social science in former days. The linguistic style differs but the essential fallacy remains the same.

II

Still, if the systems approach has become the paradigm for "normal" scientific work in international relations, strictures about the validity of its theoretical underpinnings become somewhat bootless. Ultimately the student makes his choices on the basis of style, aesthetics, and hunches about the "wave of the future," as much as logic. Change in scientific disciplines is as much sociological as logical. A new approach takes over through the demise, or the silencing, of its opponents rather than their conversion. The proof of the pudding may well lie in the utility of the approach in the slow process of accumulating knowledge through research.

Recent years have seen the burgeoning growth of a body of literature that attempts to employ the systems approach for the analysis of international political regions.[10] This development represents a healthy corrective to earlier centers of attention in the field. Political bipolarity was a sudden and unexpected legacy of the Second World War. The contrast with the prewar multilateral arrangement was made the more striking by the extent to which the entire globe seemed to have become a field of conflict between the superpowers. The development of nuclear and then thermonuclear weaponry enhanced still further the impression of novel and revolutionary change. It is understandable enough why, in the first flush of these developments, and more by omission than commission, the rest of the world was seen as little more than objects of great-power conflict.

The reasons for the lessening dominance of this focus are as

[10]See, e.g., George Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies: The Case of South-East Asia," *International Relations*, April 1961; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Area Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, January 1963; Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *ibid.*, April 1958. Cf. the following, all in *International Studies Quarterly*, December 1969: Michael Banks, "Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions"; Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems"; John H. Sigler, "News Flow in the North African International Subsystem"; Thomas W. Robinson, "Systems Theory and the Communist System"; Donald C. Hellmann, "The Emergence of an East Asian International Subsystem"; Peter Berton, "International Subsystems — A Submacro Approach to International Studies."

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well-known as those for its initial adoption. Once nuclear weaponry became familiar, its novelty became attenuated, and continuity with the past more visible. One increasingly noted the paradox that the weapons which rendered the superpowers so vulnerable to one another had limited utility *except* by one protagonist against the other. This paradox, the economic revival of Europe, the perceived imminence of nuclear proliferation, and the simultaneous loosening of bonds that had held the bulk of Afro-Asia under the political control of the Old Continent, combined to endow many states throughout the world with a considerable capacity and will for political autonomy. This development followed both for member states of the two great blocs and for states which had remained outside those structures.

The great powers now became aware of the limitations on their ability to control the internal and external moves of third states. Sharpening this perception was the fear that they might be drawn into a collision by the independent action of small states. As might be expected, academic concerns shortly came to reflect these areas of interest for policymakers. It became obvious that small states often interacted with one another in ways that could not be explained solely, or at all, as functions of the worldwide conflict between the superpowers. Explanations would be found instead in local concerns, conditions and conflicts.

Some recent literature may enable us to assess the utility of the systems approach in the analysis of this aspect of international politics. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel employ a systemic framework to develop the concept of regional "subordinate" systems and their components. Their object is to develop a scheme for comparison among the regional systems and finally a typology of such systems.[11]

The systems approach as it appears in this classification scheme is considerably more modest than the set of ideas described in the section above. There is no suggestion of systemic "purposes" or "resting states." The system is defined solely in terms of proximity and commonalty of experience, with no further assumptions about its behavior or its influence on its component units. The advantages of the approach lie in its graphic nature; it facilitates the development of a standardized matrix, by means of which individual systems may be systematically compared. "System" becomes a neutral term devoid of any implications beyond its

[11]Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, editors, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

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function as a shorthand way to define those bits of data the researcher wishes to separate provisionally from the surrounding universe.

But if this is the utility of the approach here employed, is this the only way in which this sort of outcome could be facilitated? The belief that the universe is not a "seamless web," that parts of it may be separated from the whole and made the object of fruitful analysis, is equivalent to a belief that the universe is intelligible. Such a belief is prerequisite to disciplined investigation of any subject matter whatsoever.

As it appears here, then, the systems approach may be an effective heuristic device, facilitating meaningful comparative analysis across regions. Whether it is *uniquely* powerful as such a device remains to be shown. Certainly the basic insight that justifies a regional approach is not dependent on the systems outlook. That considerations relating to great-power interaction are often inadequate explanations for the behavior of other states is a common realization among those engaged in policy or academic analysis of international relations, to whatever methodological school they belong.

Although their approach enables Cantori and Spiegel to marshal a vast amount of material for analysis, it does not provide proof against bias. The definition of the system yields some rather curious results. Israel, for instance, is placed in the "peripheral" sector of the Middle East system.[12] Within their scheme this is understandable. The "core" is characterized by a range of sociocultural similarity, and on these terms Israel is clearly to be distinguished from the Arab states surrounding her. But the conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs dominates the political concerns of each to a far greater extent than any other problem.

Similarly, Great Britain is assigned a place on the "periphery" of the West European system, in spite of a history of involvement in Continental wars, politics and alliances going back well beyond the birth of the modern nation-state. The Cantori-Spiegel study indicated (in 1970) that Britain would join the core sector when and if she joined the Common Market.[13] Formal organizational links were here the most important defining characteristics of the core.

Their choice of criteria for assigning states to differing analytic categories is not disputed. It should be pointed out, however, that

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 8 and 24.

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the criteria chosen both reflect an implicit bias about international politics and involve the student in unnecessary complexity in investigating certain types of questions.

It is difficult to avoid starting from some ontological assumption or other when attempting to examine international politics intelligibly. Phrases such as "anarchy," "fragmentation of sovereignty," "necessity" and "high politics," or "harmony," "integration," "functionalism" and "low politics," symbolize for us alternative world-views and evoke some of their implications for understanding and for policy. These views suggest the most important aspects of reality to study, and provide a model for the sort of behavior expected and often for realizable goals and effective means in the world of activity. Such pictures are crucial to the explanatory process; without them reality becomes an unintelligible mass of patternless data. Yet, they are not produced by induction and frequently lack all but the most indirect and tenuous empirical referents and criteria for falsification. They are necessary to scientific work, yet are not themselves subject to the standards by which scientific statements are commonly understood to be judged.[14]

It may be as fruitless a debate as that over man's "goodness" to try to decide which view of international politics is the "correct" one. But this does not mean that the field must remain no more than an arena in which deaf ideologues shout magic words at one another from their respective sacred texts. While one cannot avoid assuming one or another of these world-views, in all attempts at analysis the presuppositions of the researcher should be made clear in as explicit a fashion as possible. The relevant outlook should be articulated and its implications investigated.[15] This task Cantori and Spiegel have not attempted to perform. Their scheme reflects a definite, yet unexpressed, outlook which tends to draw attention to some forms of state activity and away from others.

For one view of international politics, the essential datum is the state's position as one among many units, most of them armed and

[14]Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), has shown us the extent to which the supposedly "objective" study of American politics is built implicitly on certain assumptions about the nature of political conflict and its resolution.

[15]See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Stanley Hoffmann, "Rousseau on War and Peace," in his book, *The State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965); Robert W. Tucker, "The Rationale of Force," in Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, editors, *Force, Order, and Justice* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Richard H. Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

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not effectively coordinated from above. In such a context the most effective way to ensure getting your way is to rely on your ability to use or threaten violence, when you have the means. Similarly, the prospect that violence may be used against you cannot be ruled out and carries peculiarly grave potential consequences — albeit in many specific situations it is highly unlikely. Thus, this area of actual and potential state action assumes a qualitative importance for the explanation of state activity which may not correspond to the mere frequency of the employment of violence or the occurrence of even indirect threats of it. For those holding this view, certain facts become much more important than others, no matter how often the respective types of fact appear. The beginnings of an explanation of state relations for them are found in factors relating to conflicts between states in which an attempt by one or more of the units to advance its position — or retard that of another — by violence cannot be ruled out. The stakes of those conflicts, the positions adopted with regard to them by the various units, the reasons (historical, geographic, strategic, economic, or whatever) for the content and importance attached to these positions, and the means actually and potentially available to carry on the conflict: these are considered the most significant facts, necessary but perhaps not always sufficient for a powerful explanation. For those of this mind, the expectation tends to be that such factors, though not quantitatively salient from day to day, may be, and probably will be, the controlling variables.

Opposed to this outlook, wherein the greatest significance is accorded to strategic and security issues considered "high politics," is the view that finds these questions unimportant relative to "welfare" issues involving the material needs of individuals, i.e., "low politics."[16] One form the latter view may — but not must — take is functionalism, looking toward the dominance of "low politics" and the consequent disappearance of the state and its replacement by institutional forms most effective in fulfilling welfare needs. Cantori and Spiegel deny that they take this sort of movement as a measuring stick in their analysis.[17] While this may be strictly true, their scheme makes analysis of the "high politics" of a region a distinctly difficult operation and tends to convey to the reader the assumption that it is unimportant.

[16]For an analysis of West European politics employing this distinction and arguing in highly lucid fashion for the thesis that "low politics" have become the dominant concerns in the area, see Edward L. Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies," *World Politics*, April 1970, pp. 371-392.

[17]Cantori and Spiegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11, 382-389.

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Thus, the method serves to facilitate some lines of investigation and to discourage others, to make judgments about questions to be asked and data to be employed, all without acknowledging the necessary arbitrariness of the assumptions on which the choices are made. The method could have been employed just as easily to reflect the influence of the "high" politics outlook, but these strictures would still apply.

Cantori and Spiegel have gone beyond earlier studies of international political regions by developing an explicit matrix for comparison. But they fall victim to many of the shortcomings of the systems approach in the earlier studies. Most of those authors wisely eliminated anthropomorphisms from the systemic terminology. This was done, however, at the cost of removing any claim for a unique utility for the resulting terminology.

Without the anthropomorphisms, systems theory becomes reduced to the mere statement that the universe is connected in an intelligible way. If the approach has usefulness as a heuristic matrix, it can hardly claim any *special* facility in this direction over matrices employing different technical languages. Insofar, however, as the seeming complexity of the approach conceals the origin and substantive content of the ideas underlying the statements contained therein, the cause of lucidity in the profession suffers.

The attempt to apply systems theory to the study of subsystems appears in another form in the analysis over time of subsystems that have existed historically. In two examples from a 1968 publication the systemic language functions as a sort of baggage obscuring an analysis otherwise quite interesting in content, which draws its force from the employment of a comparatively small number of traditionally understood factors as variables.

One study[18] deals with China during the period early in this century when national political authority was all but nonexistent, leaving the field to a number of competing autonomous "warlord" states. The author analyzes such factors as the structure of political authority in the various units, the nature of alliance arrangements made between them, the types of wars and conflicts that occurred, and the role of the common aspiration to re-establish a unified Chinese government as an ideological force transcending the existing political units. He concludes that the arrangement as then

[18]Hsi Sheng Chi, "The Chinese Warlord System as an International System," in Morton A. Kaplan, editor, *New Approaches to International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 405-425.

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constituted was inherently unstable. Domestic authority was maintained in the units by coercion; the only political order widely perceived as legitimate was the nonexistent all-China polity. Thus the existing units were quite fragile; defeat in war tended to mean annihilation of the loser. The defeated state could not continue in diminished form as a buffer state because its defeat would have eliminated its only means of domestic control. The victor had no incentive to hold back from complete annexation, if only because of his knowledge that if he did the vacuum would draw in someone else. It was thus in no one's interest to act in a moderate, compromising manner — an element of the Western tradition that contributed importantly to the relative stability of the classical balance of power in eighteenth-century Europe.

Another essay[19] traces the permutations in alignment relations of the Italian city-states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The writer notes that statesmen in the period had not comprehended the operation of a balance of power sufficiently to be convinced of the utility of forgoing immediate advantage for the sake of preserving a present opponent who might be useful, in some circumstance in the future, as an ally. What moderns would consider shortsightedness had the result, in the late fifteenth century, of isolating one of the principal states of the Italian system, Milan. Because Milan could not find a counterweight within Italy, she was forced to seek it outside. The intrusion of the larger powers of the European mainland meant the end of the autonomous political order in Italy.

In neither of these cases is the systemic framework necessary to the statement of the problem, the marshaling of data, or the rendering of conclusions. The considerable interest of the essays is sustained instead by an intricate substantive analysis of the play of political forces in the two universes dealt with.

III

To speculate on the prospect of continuing prominence for the systems approach, one must bear in mind a distinction between the approach as substance and the approach as style. Those who commit themselves to a scholarly discipline accept as an article of faith that its practitioners will, if only after lengthy trial and tedious exploration of many dead-end paths, develop a consensus as to the usefulness and validity (or lack thereof) of any particular

[19]Winfried Franke, "The Italian City-State System as an International System," in *ibid.*, pp. 426-458.

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way of doing things which has achieved importance. To suggest that substantive heresy may be persisted in indefinitely would be to question the meaning of the whole enterprise.

Given these beliefs, there is not much reason to be sanguine about the future of the systems approach in international relations. One of the most serious intellectual difficulties of American political science (and perhaps our social science generally) is its provincialism, in both a geographic and an epistemological sense. The decline of interest in the study of the history of political philosophy both reflects this narrowness and contributes to it further. The character of the discipline as *epistemologically* provincial concerns us most directly here. An unquestioned acceptance of the pragmatist outlook, an emphasis on technique, a lack of awareness of alternative modes of explanation, and a concomitant unfamiliarity[20] with the difficulties men have encountered before in seeking answers to questions no different in essence from those we ask now — these intellectual blinders cause us to fall into old traps disguised by the use of new words.

Whatever its ambiguities and frustrations, the study of political philosophy, even on a fairly superficial level, should make the student aware that our ideas, as well as ourselves, exist in history, and that our own ideas are as girt round with the styles, myths and metaphors of the moment as were those of men of the past. Only as a consequence of our propensity to absolutize the intellectual jargon of the moment could we have failed to see the obvious anthropomorphisms contained in systems theory in its full-blown form. No less than in older forms of this intellectual error, the conclusions supposedly reached through the method are rendered invalid because of a spurious attempt to portray subjective impressions as aspects of an objective reality.

Much of man's understanding is conveyed through metaphor. Modern man's metaphors are often his own artifacts.[21] In this case the metaphor is from cybernetics. But the use of metaphors must be carefully watched. Carried too far, they hide meaning rather than convey it intelligibly. In its full-blown form, systems theory has reified its central metaphor, something which I expect will become increasingly apparent to students of the discipline.

Many of those who are attempting application of the approach have already come to this conclusion. As we have seen, the remedy

[20]See Crick, *op. cit.*

[21]For an extensive discussion of the role of metaphors in social thought, see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), especially pp. 3-50.

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is to narrow the systemic approach to systems "analysis." This gets rid of the anthropomorphism. But from the perspective of the systems approach the baby has been thrown out along with the bath water. One is left with no identifiable method. Classification and categorization are hardly maxims of procedure applicable only to "systems analysts." Everyone discovers that he has been talking in prose all along.

But I spoke earlier of "style" as well as "substance." Here it becomes impossible to predict the extent of the approach's future influence. One may say the same thing in many different languages; the choice of language is immaterial to the analysis of content. A wide variety of systemic terms and formulations have entered into the discipline's vocabulary. Except from the perspective of the semanticist, or out of concern that the new jargon may impede the successful communication of ideas to those not conversant with it, idiosyncrasies of expression in the discipline need not affect its intellectual development. Hence, only in the limited sphere of scholarly rhetoric may the systems approach be expected to have any long-term currency.

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Reviews

Arms and the World: The View from Sweden*

by James E. Dougherty

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has published its third yearbook designed to describe the major quantitative and qualitative changes taking place in the arsenals of nations and evaluate the efforts being made to control these arsenals. The result is a dignified, carefully documented and highly useful tome. Interspersed liberally with statistics, tables and source notes, it is at first glance bound to seem as fascinating reading as a 600-page report from the U.S. Census Bureau. Actually it contains a fund of interesting material not previously familiar to the professional teacher of international relations who maintains a continuing interest in military-strategic affairs and arms control developments. Without necessarily agreeing with all of the editorial biases of those SIPRI staff members responsible for the text, one must in fairness concede that the volume is competently done and impressive in its comprehensiveness.

A word of background information about SIPRI is in order. The Institute was set up in 1966 as a foundation by the Swedish Parliament, following a proposal by Prime Minister Tage Erlander and a commission study headed by Mrs. Alva Myrdal. Funds are provided by the Swedish Parliament at the rate of about $0.6 million per year, and the Institute operates under a Governing Board of eight members appointed for five-year terms by the Swedish government. The Chairman of the Board is Gunnar Myrdal. The two Directors of SIPRI thus far have been Robert Neild and Frank Barnaby, both of the United Kingdom. There is also a Scientific Council whose members include Kenneth Boulding, Dom Helder Camara, Johan Galtung, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Carl Kaysen, Lord Mountbatten, Philip J. Noel-Baker, Raoul Prebisch, Altiero Spinelli, Carl von Weizsacker and Lord Solly Zuckerman. During its first six years, the Institute has concentrated on such problems as disarmament, arms regulation, international arms trade, biological and chemical warfare, and the development of seismic methods for monitoring underground nuclear explosions. Most SIPRI publications have dealt with these matters.

The *Yearbook* is divided into four parts. The first examines the advances made in strategic nuclear weapons systems and describes the superpowers' bilateral attempt to modulate the pace of their military-technological competition through the SALT. The second treats world

**World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1972.* By the Staff of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1972; New York: Humanities Press, 1972. 611 pp. Sw. Kr. 75.00; U.S. $16.50.

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military expenditures, the arms trade with the Third World, the social and economic consequences of armaments programs, the resources devoted to military R&D, and the pattern of military forces and bases maintained abroad. The third part looks forward, dealing with the possibility of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prospects for a comprehensive test ban, attempts to safeguard nuclear materials, and the disarmament policy of China. The final section analyzes multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts during 1971.

In dealing with the SALT, the authors are both cynical and pessimistic. The negotiations in their eyes have not reflected the sense of urgency that the dangerous world situation warrants. The main objectives of the superpowers have usually been said to include prevention of a further erosion in the strategic balance, avoiding further escalation in the costs of the arms race and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty by trying to convince other states that the two leading powers are making progress toward nuclear disarmament. These objectives, according to SIPRI, can best be achieved by a total ABM ban, a reduction in the number of strategic missiles deployed, a ban on MIRV, a restriction on ASW, and a ban on military R&D related to the foregoing weapons systems. SIPRI concludes that the SALT as presently envisaged "will in no way fulfill these requirements." That was a fairly safe prediction to make on the eve of the Moscow accords of May 1972, but it was not a fair assessment of what could be realistically expected from Phase I of the SALT.

The writers seem skeptical of the idea that there might be "an erosion of the strategic balance," no matter what either side may do by way of increment to its nuclear forces. But they concede that, even though an increment would make no actual military difference (a hypothesis this reviewer does not accept in such a sweeping form), the perception of an eroding balance could have international political implications. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could ignore such a consequence unless it were prepared to concede to the other the reputation of international political primacy.

Although the SIPRI analysts note that uncertainty of numbers and characteristics of strategic weapons contributes to "the feeling of an unstable situation," and that the development of new weapons by one side is often cited by the other as a reason for following suit, the superpowers are given no credit for attempting to reach agreements that would reduce at least some of the quantitative uncertainties and place some limitations on the action-reaction phenomenon which they recognize as having influenced their military-technological choices in the past. Rather, SIPRI interprets the SALT negotiations as a prelude to stepped-up competition for qualitative improvements in multiple warheads, extending the range of naval missiles, development of a maneuverable warhead capable of

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taking evasive action against missile defenses, and increased accuracy of guidance based on a combination of lasers and microwave radar, as well as advanced bombers, warning systems and techniques of anti-submarine warfare.

In September 1972, SIPRI published a brief Research Report No. 5 on Strategic Arms Limitation (Part I) dealing with the SALT agreements. The staff reiterated its fears that SALT signals a shift of the arms race from a race for quantity to a race for quality, that the economic burden of armaments will not be eased, and that the nuclear "threshold" states, which had been promised under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty "negotiations in good faith . . . relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date," will not be satisfied with the agreements signed in Moscow. The SIPRI group finds it noteworthy that for the first time the two superpowers have discussed the sensitive issues of nuclear weapons in concrete detail, reached a measure of understanding, consented to establish ceilings on the production of strategic weapons, and overcome the problem of verification that had proved a stumbling block for such a long time. But when they finish analyzing the SALT agreements, the Stockholm peace researchers conclude with characteristic pessimism: "Limitation may turn into escalation."

The group is adept in spotlighting the circular or mirror-image types of rationalizing in which the United States and the Soviet Union sometimes engage for the purpose of justifying their weapons programs. But SIPRI in its own way lacks a comprehensive political realism. The authors of the *Yearbook* tend to dismiss as sheer propaganda arguments concerning the necessity of making sure that the SALT agreements, once entered into, can remain viable, and belittle the importance of acquiring "negotiating chips"—as if this latter were not a normal part of all negotiations between adversary parties. They fail to recognize either the need for outcomes that are relatively symmetrical for the two parties or the greater difficulty of achieving arms reduction as compared with a freeze on future deployments. Thus they take the position that, if mutual deterrence is the objective, there should be no need for ABM's at all. But the fact is that both sides had already deployed ABM at a low level, and insistence by either side on a zero ABM deployment would probably have delayed the agreement longer; there might still be no agreement a year later.

Elsewhere the SIPRI staff points out that the limitation of U.S. and Soviet ABM systems may increase the credibility of Chinese and French nuclear forces. Perhaps Moscow, with its eye on the credibility of the Soviet-Indian friendship treaty and on other factors, could not contemplate dismantling whatever measure of protection the Galosh system furnishes the Soviet capital against the possibility of a Chinese missile attack during the next decade. The fear of such an attack may not be at all well founded. But Soviet fear may not be completely exorcisable by the

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winds of rationality that blow from Stockholm.

The statistical data on world military expenditures (currently running at about 6 per cent of world resources) can be useful to all students of international relations. They show that NATO and Warsaw Pact countries account for more than four-fifths of world military expenditures, although within the last five years military spending has been increasing at a considerably more rapid rate (about 10 per cent per year) within the developing countries of the Third World than within the industrially advanced countries of the two major blocs, where it is leveling off or decreasing as the Viet Nam war subsides. In the United States, largely as a result of the Viet Nam war, military spending rose 40 per cent between 1965 and 1968, and then fell back 17 per cent during the succeeding three years. Military spending in the Warsaw Pact countries also went up from 1965 to 1969 by 40 per cent and, says the *Yearbook,* has "since levelled off," despite the fact that *Yearbook* charts and tables indicate a continued but slower upward rise of almost 3 per cent from 1969 to 1971. SIPRI estimates of Warsaw Pact military expenditures are lower than those published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. For 1970 and 1971, e. g., the SIPRI estimates are $50.1 and $50.5 billion respectively, whereas the comparable ACDA figures are $72 and $72 billion.[1]

The *Yearbook* gives the reason for the discrepancy. "All U.S. analysts have come to the conclusion that there are important items included in NATO figures which are excluded from Soviet figures. In particular, they are fairly confident that a good deal of research and development expenditure is excluded from the Soviet military budget and included in the science budget." (pp. 75-76.) Western sources also suggest that the Soviets may omit from their military spending figures the cost of civil defense, foreign military aid, military materials stockpiling, military nuclear activities (including development, testing, manufacturing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons), and some investment in arms procurement industries. But SIPRI finds the evidence for these exclusions inconclusive and the consequent upward adjustments highly speculative. The ACDA estimates show a much higher *level* than the SIPRI estimate (by 32 to 44 per cent, depending on when the estimate was made); yet at the same time, ACDA estimates a much lower *rate of rise* in Warsaw Pact expenditures from 1964 to 1970 (16 per cent, compared with the SIPRI estimate of 39 per cent).

SIPRI works from official budget estimates, without any extrapolated additions, and employs an exchange rate factor that allows for the much different cost-per-head of the average soldier in the United States and the Soviet Union. ACDA adjusts the expenditure figures upward, as indicated above, and assumes a rapid price increase

[1]See *World Military Expenditures 1971,* U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Publication 65, July 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 9.

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of about 25 per cent over a six-year period, whereas SIPRI makes no price correction to the published Warsaw Pact figures. Thus SIPRI has no choice but to rely on Pentagon intelligence estimates of Soviet missile strength, since the Soviets never publish their own figures on military capabilities; but inasmuch as statistics are published on Warsaw Pact expenditures, SIPRI in a spirit of international neutrality accepts these as a working basis for its analysis. The *Yearbook* does note the anomalous fact that the 1971 figures for non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries show a continuation of the rapid rise of recent years, while the Soviets have leveled off. Since there is no evidence of a substantial rise in the numbers of men under arms in these countries, it finds no satisfactory explanation of the continued rise in military spending, only a few speculative hypotheses.

The section on trade in major weapons with Third World countries (exclusive of Viet Nam) is instructive. We are told that since 1969 four powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France—have accounted for about 90 per cent of all such arms shipments, and that there is a wide gap between the role played by these four and that of the small suppliers, China, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Sweden, Switzerland and Japan show a downward trend in arms supplies to developing countries.

Most U.S. aid goes to countries in the Middle and Far East—Iran, Israel, Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea. The bulk of Soviet aid goes to the Middle East and India. The Soviets are more selective in their aid programs, sending to fewer countries than the United States. The SIPRI *Yearbook* indicates that more than 80 per cent of Soviet aid in 1971 went to Egypt and India, but a U.S. government intelligence study (reported in the *New York Times,* November 19, 1972) named Egypt, Iraq and India in that order as the principal recipients of Soviet aid in 1971. The same report found that Soviet shipments to Syria, which had been rather low in 1971, had risen considerably in 1972. SIPRI's twenty-five-page precise inventory of the weapons received in 1970-1971 by each of the Third World countries from each arms supplier is informative. The reviewer finds it noteworthy that the Soviets during that period supplied major weapons to no Latin American country except Cuba. Perhaps the most ominous note struck in the section on the arms trade is the mention that, Viet Nam aside, the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1971 surpassed the United States as the primary arms exporter to the Third World, increasing its aid by nearly 70 per cent.

The authors find the pattern of R&D spending particularly disturbing, as can be gathered from the following passage: "If all R&D efforts were abruptly stopped, the manufacture of weapons for replacement purposes might still continue; the quantities of existing weapons might be increased; and the arsenals of the smaller and mid-

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dle powers might even be brought technologically closer to those of the USA and the USSR through international arms transfers. But in its most important form—involving the continual production of new, more dangerous and ever more expensive weapons—the arms race would come to a halt." (p. 150.)

They call attention to the fact that R&D expenditures are markedly concentrated in a small number of countries. The annual figures are estimated at $15 billion or more, of which almost 85 per cent is accounted for by the two superpowers. The United States may have absorbed half of the world's total during the 1960's, while the Soviet share of the world's total is estimated at 30 to 37 per cent. (The Soviets do not publish figures on R&D.) Next in line, but far behind, are the United Kingdom, France, China, West Germany, Sweden, Canada, Japan and India.

The larger the national military budget, the larger is the share of military resources devoted to R&D. (Oddly enough, Sweden is a notable exception; she surpasses France and the FRG in R&D as a share of total military expenditure, at the level of 10 per cent.)[2] Generally speaking, the percentage of expenditures devoted to R&D falls with decreases in the level of military spending. SIPRI postulates a "threshold" of annual military spending, somewhere in the $2 to $4 billion range. Countries above this threshold prefer to fill their weapons requirements through domestic defense production. Countries below the $2 billion budget level, lacking the advantages of economies of scale, usually can procure a wider range of up-to-date weapons systems by importing than by trying to sustain a totally domestic procurement program, including R&D. In analyzing this and related phenomena (such as long-term trends in R&D expenditure and the comparison of trends in military and civil R&D spending) SIPRI provides a valuable service for the professional analyst of military-economic and strategic affairs.

Relying on materials published by the Department of Defense and statements by U.S. defense officials before Congressional committees, the *Yearbook* staff concludes that the United States possesses an across-the-board lead in major weapons systems; that although it claims an average technological lead of only two to three years in military systems in general, the U.S. lead is actually much greater in certain important strategic weapons sectors (e. g., seven to nine years in submarine missile technology); that it has a greater quantity of new and modified weapons systems, particularly in the area of sophisticated conventional weapons, than the USSR; and that U.S. weapons systems are, on the whole, more complex and more expensive — but not necessarily more combat-effective — than their Soviet counterparts. The Soviet R&D military effort is estimated to have been from three-fifths to three-quarters as large as

[2]The authors suggest that the Swedish case may be explained by the desire of a non-allied country "to keep as large a share of procurement outlays as possible within the domestic market." (p. 162.)

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the U.S. effort during the decade of the 1960's.

SIPRI does not try to disguise its fear of an upsurge in U.S. R&D spending in the post-Viet Nam environment. Reference is made to the unemployment of scientists and engineers who make up "an unusually articulate, or prestigious, pressure group for a renewed expansion of the military R&D effort." (p. 171.) The *Yearbook* authors are highly suspicious of Defense Department allegations that the Soviet military R&D effort has surpassed that of the United States in recent years. They concede that there have been substantial increases in the Soviets' total R&D effort, but they charge that U.S. defense analysts ignore civilian R&D needs in the USSR and assume that virtually the entire increase is due to an expansion of the military sector. SIPRI asserts that the United States "could cut its R&D budget by 20 or 30 per cent or more, and still retain technological superiority over the Soviet Union in all weapons systems essential to U.S. defense policy *vis-à-vis* the USSR. . . ." (p. 239.)

The foregoing statement is certainly not compatible with the estimates of U.S. defense officials. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering (whose testimony is frequently cited by SIPRI), in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Moscow agreements, pointed out that the net effect of the SALT agreements has been to limit the size of the Soviet strategic force (especially by fixing the number of SS-9's at 313), while leaving ample room for qualitative improvements. Improvements in the accuracy of Soviet missiles, he said, along with efforts by the Soviets to exploit their greater missile numbers and throwweights (e. g., with multiple warheads), could pose a serious danger to the survivability of the U.S. Minuteman force. Foster emphasized his view that the United States could afford to accept the 3:2 imbalance favoring the USSR in the permissible number of offensive missiles *only* on the assumption that the U.S. technological lead would be maintained.[3] He remarked that the closed nature of Soviet society makes it particularly difficult to follow weapons development programs in the USSR, and that by the time evidence of Soviet progress arrives in the West the program may have reached the deployment stage. Without a vigorous R&D program, the United States might reach a point at which it could no longer be sure of early recognition of Soviet military threats.[4]

I do not wish to leave the reader with the impression that SIPRI researchers are critical only of U.S. policies. As intimated earlier, SIPRI is more than a little resentful of being forced to rely on the Pentagon and the International In-

[3]See *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,* Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp. 218-283.

[4]*Ibid.,* p. 232.

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stitute of Strategic Studies for estimates of Soviet military capabilities, and of having to pull its estimates of the Soviet R&D effort virtually "out of the hat," since the Soviets remain silent on the subject. In dealing with the presence of the powers in military bases abroad, the *Yearbook* contrasts the British withdrawal from "east of Suez" and the U.S. disengagement from Asia implicit in the Nixon Doctrine with a steady rise in the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. It also takes note that, whereas the Western powers officially acknowledge the presence of their military bases on foreign territory, the USSR does not.

One cannot do justice in a single review to a work of this scope. The longest section of the book, for example, dealing with the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation, contains an excellent assessment of the policy positions taken toward the Nonproliferation Treaty by fifteen "critical" countries (India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, South Africa, Japan, Australia, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland), as well as valuable and informative chapters on nuclear safeguards, the test ban, non-seismic detection of underground nuclear tests, nuclear weapon testing programs from 1945 to 1970, world uranium supplies, and China's policies on disarmament and arms control. It would be futile to try to summarize the subjects treated under these headings, which take up nearly 300 pages.

But it may be in order to cite a few representative conclusions, merely to suggest the flavor of what is in store for the diligent reader: (1) Neither India nor Israel seems likely to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. (2) India is more concerned about China than about Pakistan. (3) India's recent military victory over Pakistan in Bangladesh "may so have stimulated its self-confidence that going nuclear becomes an attractive prospect for status reasons." (p. 306.) (One might argue conversely that the Bangladesh outcome shows that a threshold power is in a good position to achieve important foreign policy objectives precisely because none of the great powers wishes to increase her incentive to exercise the nuclear option.) (4) It is probably in Israel's interest to preserve uncertainty over her nuclear intentions for purposes of deterrence, and she may find it highly useful to possess at least a small number of nuclear weapons for possible "last resort" employment (actual or threatened), but without any public announcement of this in "peacetime." (5) Beyond India and Israel, most of the developed threshold countries will probably prefer to pursue a nuclear-option policy within the framework of the NPT rather than outside it. (6) The correlation between enjoyment of the veto power in the UN Security Council and possession of nuclear weapons provides a substantial motive for such status-conscious countries as India and

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Japan to go nuclear. (7) In the final analysis, security is a more important factor than status in the decision-making of threshold countries. (8) A successful outcome of SALT and a comprehensive nuclear test ban would have a decisive influence in forestalling additional nations from going nuclear.

For some years now, SIPRI has been an ardent advocate of a comprehensive test ban (as has Alva Myrdal in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and its successor Conference of the Committee on Disarmament). Four motives are set forth for a CTB—its effects on pollution, on slowing weapons development, on proliferation and on détente. "Another interesting aspect of the CTB," says the *Yearbook* (p. 390), "is that it impinges on testing and development, not on deployment and use of weapons." SIPRI has previously published three reports on seismic methods of monitoring a test ban, and insists, as against the U.S. position, that there has been a marked improvement since 1963 in national verification capabilities, sufficient to enable the superpowers to enter upon a comprehensive test ban without any demand for international on-site inspection. The *Yearbook* also calls attention to the possibilities of such nonseismic monitoring methods as satellite photography (which allegedly can detect underground test preparations and consequences), the monitoring of radio communications connected with tests, and traditional modes of espionage and intelligence-gathering.

The discussion of the testing issue is sophisticated and interesting, and reflects recognition of the fact that the attitude of the superpowers is based more on political than on technical factors. SIPRI contends with some effectiveness that a post-SALT CTB would make more sense if the SALT eliminated ABM entirely rather than permitting a low-level ABM with in-built qualitative improvability. But SIPRI is somewhat naive in thinking that a superpower CTB would place France and China under serious pressure to stop testing; in expressing surprise that the Soviets should seem increasingly unwilling to enter a CTB unless China is also included; and in ignoring the possibility that conclusion of a superpower CTB at a time when the Chinese are beginning to develop an underground testing capability (which might enable them to forgo atmospheric testing within the foreseeable future) could be viewed in Peking as another example of capitalist-socialist imperialist "collusion" further isolating the PRC from the international arms control community.

At various places throughout the *Yearbook,* the critical reviewer can detect a pronounced ideological commitment to the goal of general disarmament, a deep-rooted aversion to military spending, and a feeling that the arms control agreements thus far entered into by the superpowers betray a rather "cosmetic" quality. (The Seabed Treaty, for example, is cavalierly dismissed on page 389 as outlawing

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activities on the ocean floor that no one wishes to undertake.) One frequently encounters the assumption—either explicit or implicit—that any reduction of arms as between the superpowers will automatically lead to greater "stability" (which SIPRI leaves undefined), and any increase, whether quantitative or qualitative, will lead to instability. Such an assumption does not conform to the convictions of most Western arms control analysts, much less their Soviet counterparts.

The authors of the SIPRI volume have also decided in their own minds that the main obstacles to limiting the "arms race" (which they perceive as a more frantic rivalry than it really is) are domestic rather than international. In other words, the interests of scientific-military-industrial groups within countries constitute a more important factor in the world armaments picture than the structure of the international system, with all the consequences of the deficiencies and conflicts inherent in that system for the total psychological, sociological and cultural environments in which governments formulate national security policies. The tendency to lay the blame for armaments competition at the door of selected, sinister subnational groups is, from the standpoint of comprehensive theorists of international systems, a simplistic predilection of dubious validity.

Nevertheless, having said this, I must in fairness reiterate that this is a monumental piece of scholarship, based on an international documentation seldom encountered in publications of interest to teachers and policy scientists alike. Rarely does one come across a volume of research in which the methodology is so fully and precisely spelled out that it invites the scientific critic to state the grounds for his disagreement. This *Yearbook* joins its predecessors as a definitive work in the field. It is a fact-filled and for the most part thoughtful study, from an international perspective that strives toward neutrality on what are undoubtedly the gravest contemporary problems confronting mankind—those of arms and international conflict and their causal interrelationship. The reviewer cannot but be reminded of something Saint Augustine wrote in the *City of God* fifteen centuries ago: "When men resort to arms, it does not necessarily mean that they love peace the less, but rather that they love their own kind of peace the more."

The Communist Powers and Africa*

by W. Scott Thompson

Africa in the 1960's was fertile ground for scholars interested in the relationships between great and small powers. Partly this was because the continent was open to them, but it derived more from the

**China and Africa 1949-1970.* By Bruce Larkin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 268 pp. $8.50.
Soviet Policy in West Africa. By Robert Legvold. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. 372 pp. $13.00.

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intrinsic importance of a subject involving rapid changes in the relations of unequal parties: from no involvement and little interest on the part of all but the colonial powers, to high involvement while the central world system remained polarized, to a reduced level of great-power interest more consonant with the long-term economic and geopolitical importance of the African continent in world affairs. The explosion of interest in the scholarly community happily included the Sovietologists and Sinologists. Two important and well-written additions to this literature are Bruce Larkin's *China and Africa 1949-1970,* which ambitiously attempts to survey Chinese foreign policy toward all the continent during that period, and Robert Legvold's *Soviet Policy in West Africa,* which, while putting Soviet policy in the context of its broader concerns, narrows the focus to the evolution of Moscow's relations with five countries.

Legvold's book delineates clearly the phases of Soviet involvement in Africa from the early skepticism of the 1950's to the heyday of Khrushchev, and to the sober assessments of his successors in a less polarized world, where Americans and Soviets each decided implicitly that Africa was not important enough for them to contest. Fortuitously, the American rescue-paratroop landings at Stanleyville, when Washington found that the Soviets cared insufficiently to react, and thus that the continent was no longer a theater of the Cold War, came just after Khrushchev's dismissal. No longer were some African states—once crowned with swiftly-improvised titles like "building socialism" or "national democratic states" to accommodate them on the margins of communist acceptability—good guys, and others bad guys, on ideological grounds. The demise of their friends, Nkrumah and Ben Bella, had sobered those in the Kremlin.

"The Soviet Union, of course, still preferred certain West African countries to others, but these preferences no longer constituted the vital considerations for Soviet policy. . . . It was not so much that contrasts in internal and external conditions and politics among West African states had diminished, but that Soviet leaders were more inclined to see these contrasts as marginal and, for the first time, as secondary to common characteristics that made variations in the intractability of African politics only a matter of degree." (Legvold, p. 335.) Thus could the Soviets come to extend massive aid to Nigeria, than which few states had appeared more bourgeois in the previous era, while almost ignoring the claims of the ideological purists in Mali—for Nigeria had some weight to bear on international affairs owing to its great size and economic potential. Traditional criteria came to the fore.

Peking got a later start in Africa, had less to offer materially, and therefore was slower in developing interests, again of a traditional sort, that might have governed or at least conditioned Chinese policy. The question one would like answered—and unfortunately Larkin is not a comparativist and does not

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really attempt it—is the extent to which, with an appropriate lag, there was any similarity at all in the way African realities came to impinge on the Soviet Union and China so as to cause some revision in their policies. Obviously events back home were too different in Moscow and Peking for the evolution of policy to be the same, but the feedback would be interesting to compare. What Larkin does make clear—and here is his most important contribution—is that China policy in Africa was and is hardly undifferentiated. Indeed he may make too much of the argument that the separateness of African states enabled individual policies in different states to survive; it was precisely a domino effect that the Chinese were presumably seeking. In any event, they have not done badly in obtaining their primary aim, the generalization of their ties. With Togo, the Malagasy Republic and Zaire recently recognizing Peking, the rest of the hard-liners cannot be far behind. Whether deep involvement and the development of real interests in Central Africa, with the building of the Tan-Zam railroad, will, in fact, radicalize the southern part of the continent or, more pertinently, teach China a little about the complexities of power and the relative intractability of the African situation, remains to be seen.

Students of foreign policy have traditionally had a problem in seeking to write sensitively about the policy of their chosen country as well as about whatever country happens to be the object of that policy. For Sovietologists and Sinologists this has always posed special difficulties, because their discipline requires a sophisticated methodology in the unraveling of official policy to begin with. Hopefully we are getting to the stage where Sovietologists and Sinologists interested in foreign policy, not to mention Europeanists or Asianists, will see themselves in the broader discipline of the comparative study of foreign policy. Then policy would be compared one country to the other and the differences accounted for, and research in the field in the object-area of the policy study would enable the writer to identify the feedback to the implementor on his policy, such as it exists. On this score there is a vast difference between the two books. Whereas Larkin's book is a creditable contribution to the study of Chinese foreign policy and will interest Sinologists, Legvold's is legitimate as a contribution to Sovietology and also comes within the field of comparative politics. The difference can partly be accounted for by the fact that while both authors did extensive content analysis of governmental pronouncements and Soviet/Chinese journals, only Legvold did extensive work in Africa itself.

Consider the bibliographic consequences of this. Larkin appears not even to be aware of what may be the most important single scholarly source on China's activities in Africa: Frederick Hohler's regrettably unpublished Oxford dissertation on Chinese policy toward

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Ghana, one based on a privileged view of government records and a host of other materials that emerged in the aftermath of the 1966 Ghana coup. Legvold, in contrast, made intelligent use of a wide variety of materials and courtesies extended in West Africa. This is shown by his much subtler interpretation of his actor's effect in Africa, and the resulting feedback on subsequent policy. For example, in writing of Chinese and Soviet reactions to the coup that overthrew Kwame Nkrumah—a landmark for both countries, if more important for Moscow—Larkin writes by inference, Legvold from that *and* research "on the ground." Larkin argues that the Chinese, in being truculent in the aftermath, "may have resolved to embarrass the Soviet Union, which waited only a few weeks to acknowledge the Ankrah government." (p. 133.) Larkin, unlike the Chinese, appears not to be aware that the Soviet government (which had a much bigger economic and political stake in Ghana) recognized the new government because it was given a choice of recognition within a week or total expulsion of all Soviet nationals, and a closure of the embassy. Legvold, through careful research, discovers that the Soviet diplomats even "believed it important to undermine rumors that eleven Soviet advisers had been killed during the fighting . . . . involvement of this kind would make other African states nervous, and a disclosure of this kind would magnify tension between the two countries." (p. 267.) Legvold has identified the links between Soviet policy in several states in terms of the existing links between those states themselves.

Larkin has a good feel for the nuances of Chinese policy, but does less well when it comes to interpreting his chosen milieu for surveying China's policy. One of the realities the powers must accept in dealing with Africa is what he calls the "patchwork of separate states." (p. 5.) He argues that changes in regimes—and thus changes in the prospects for China—can occur within national boundaries without repercussions abroad ("unless it sets a pattern copied in others," he notes, oddly). "Bizarre politics can be practiced in small states without important consequences for the continent as a whole." (p. 5.) But surely it is through the types of linkages that do exist that a great power, particularly one like China, on the outside wanting in, will find its greatest chance of multiplying contacts; one need not doubt that the Chinese concerned themselves with this question.

Both Larkin and Legvold have made useful additions to the literature. It is tempting in writing about a communist power to confine oneself exclusively to an exegesis of the official propaganda. Yet there is much that can be examined and verified in the field, particularly with respect to developing countries, and it is hoped that future scholars will follow Legvold's enterprising lead in looking at policy both in its formulation and in its implementation, with the much subtler and more interesting results that ensue.

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Modern German History: Two Interpretations*

by John Stanley Wozniak

Germany's role in modern European history, especially when viewed in the negative sense, has been the subject of innumerable studies, scholarly as well as polemical, in recent years. They have been occasioned in large part by the tragedy of the Nazi era. Immediately following the end of World War II, scholars began to probe German history for the ideological and institutional roots of Nazism. The role of the Prussian Junker class, the influence of the army's General Staff, the ideas of Nietzsche, Wagner and Hegel, and the anti-Semitism of Adolf Stoecker were only a few of the topics selected for special attention by those who argued that the factors most responsible for the Nazi phenomenon antedated World War I and the Great Depression by several decades. Such interpretations of the German past emphasized Germany's political, socio-economic, and, above all, intellectual divergence from the ideals and institutions of West European civilization and located legitimate antecedents of Nazi thought and practice in the sham constitutionalism of the German Empire, the *völkisch* thought of Fichte and Jahn, the corporate political philosophy of nineteenth-century German conservatism, and even in the compromising political attitudes of Luther.

These interpretations did not remain unchallenged. Soon after Germany's collapse in 1945, several American and German historians began to put primary emphasis on the immediate causes of Hitler's rise to power. Stressing such factors as the legacy of the Versailles Treaty, the inflation of 1923 and the Great Depression, their arguments have during the past two decades proved to be the most satisfactory in explaining the Hitler epoch. This revisionist turn in historiography, the simple passage of time, and the radical shift in the balance of power after 1945 provided a fresh opportunity to historians interested in assessing Germany's role in modern European history.

The two books here reviewed are interpretive syntheses that seek to place the most important movements and events in modern German history in the context of Western history and, thus, to analyze the nature and significance of Germany's contributions and challenges to Western culture. Both authors have taken great care to relate specific German developments to major European historical patterns and cultural movements. Hajo Holborn's volume, *Germany and Europe: Historical Essays,* concentrates exclusively on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while Marshall Dill's *Germany: A Modern History* is a comprehensive portrayal of Germany from Caesar's era to the present, with stress on the last two centuries.

**Germany and Europe: Historical Essays.* By Hajo Holborn. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1970. 327 pp. $6.95.
Germany: A Modern History. By Marshall Dill, Jr. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970. 490 pp. $10.00.

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Dill and Holborn are eminently qualified to write on their respective subjects. Marshall Dill, Jr. served with the German Section of the OSS and with the Intelligence Staff of the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. He has taught courses in modern German history at several colleges and universities and is the author of many articles on German history. Until his death in 1969, Hajo Holborn was the most respected and most influential German historian in the United States. Recipient of the first Inter Nationes Award for promoting international understanding, he was a prolific, cosmopolitan scholar and a stimulating teacher whose decades of teaching and advisory activity significantly influenced his numerous students and colleagues. Himself a student of Meinecke, Holborn remained true to the great older traditions of German historiography. His most important works include *The Political Collapse of Europe, American Military Government, Ulrich von Hutten and the German Reformation,* and his magnum opus, the three-volume *History of Modern Germany,* the final volume of which was published in the last year of his life. Theodore Hamerow, Leonard Krieger, Arno Mayer, Henry Cord Meyer and Walter Simon are only a few of the first-rate scholars of modern Germany who were directly influenced by Holborn's teaching and direction.

Dill's book, like all the other volumes in the distinguished University of Michigan History of the Modern World series, is thorough and scholarly in content, yet lively in style. It should prove valuable as a basic text for undergraduate students and as an introduction to modern German history for the general public. Although major emphasis is on the years after Bismarck's appointment as the Prussian minister-president, Dill adequately evaluates political, religious, economic and cultural trends in Germany from the Merovingian period through the Middle Ages and the early modern period. His discussion of the origins and significance of the Reformation is excellent, and he is careful to describe the resultant religious and dynastic warfare, the Schmalkaldic and Thirty Years wars, and the socio-economic and cultural impact of the Reformation and this warfare on the major German states. His treatment of developments during the eighteenth century, especially the rise of Hohenzollern Prussia and its duel with Hapsburg Austria, the work of the German exponents of the Enlightenment and *Sturm und Drang* movements, and the significance of Enlightened Despotism in Germany, is also well balanced. Throughout the book the author is attentive to cultural and intellectual themes. This is most apparent in his treatment of such eighteenth-century figures as Kant, Herder, Goethe, Schiller and Bach.

Dill's narrative takes on depth as it progresses beyond the French Revolution to the 1800's. The French Revolution and the meteoric rise of Napoleon constitute major watersheds in German political development. Dill not only traces the territorial changes

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wrought in Germany but analyzes the origins and influence of liberalism and nationalism during the Napoleonic period and the reactionary *Vormärz* period. Although his discussion of Metternich's influence, the German Confederation, and the revolutions of 1830 leaves something to be desired, his lively treatment of Romanticism more than compensates for this. Chapters on the revolution of 1848, the reactionary 1850's, and the wars of national unification are fairly standard. One of the stronger sections is that on Bismarckian and Wilhelmian Germany. The political institutions, parties and key historical figures are expertly evaluated; the period's major socio-economic trends—industrialization, urbanization, the new unionism and the rise of socialism—are imaginatively presented; and Dill has again done a superb job on the period's cultural and intellectual movements.

It is not surprising that the longest and best part of the book interprets the complex twentieth-century German tragedy. Dill has incorporated into his narrative much of the admirable recent research on World War I, the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, the occupation period, and the contemporary two Germanys. This reviewer was pleased by the outstanding quality of his assessment of political, economic and cultural developments during the Weimar and Nazi periods. His interpretation of the causes behind the Nazi movement and Hitler's rise to power, which stresses an interconnection of social, economic and political factors, is one of the best available in a textbook, and his broad survey of the events of the most recent period will provide the beginner with a succinct and optimistic evaluation of contemporary West German institutions.

The Holborn volume is a collection of ten essays, four of them hitherto unpublished, chosen by Professor Holborn just before his death, on a variety of political, military and intellectual themes. Testifying to his wide-ranging career and interests, topics include: German idealism, Bismarck's *Realpolitik,* Moltke and Schlieffen, Russia and the European political system, the Austro-German alliance in World War I, Weimar diplomacy, Nazi ideology, German opposition to Hitler, America's role in the post-1945 military government of Germany, and the United States and Germany in world politics. The essays on Bismarck's *Realpolitik* and Moltke and Schlieffen are well known and almost classics in their own right.

The collection is characterized by the mastery of subject matter from diverse historical periods, the wealth of background material and the penetrating insight that were Holborn hallmarks. For example, in the article on Weimar diplomacy he discusses in depth the social origins, education and training of German diplomats during the Bismarckian and Wilhelmian periods, and in the essay on Moltke and Schlieffen he examines the origins and evolution of the Prussian General Staff. Each of the essays focuses on issues of political morality and responsibility, which were of

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deep concern to Holborn. His discussion of Bismarck's shortcomings and personal responsibility for the particular variety of sham constitutionalism characterizing the political institutions of the German Empire is an excellent case in point.

Readers interested in the history of ideas will find this volume indispensable, if only for the treatment of German idealism. Those who want to sample representative writings of one of the greatest of all German historians will find these essays highly rewarding.

The Limits to Prediction*

by Barry M. Mitnick

A fundamental aim of science is understanding, which is provided through the explanation and prediction made possible by a full theory of the phenomena of interest. A theory in this sense is a collection of lawlike generalizations—that is, empirically truthful relationships among the variables of the phenomena being studied—that enables one to explain and predict by relating specific cases of the phenomena to the classes of events joined by the generalizations of the theory. Prediction may seem to occur alone, however, as when simple trends are extrapolated into the future or two classes of events are always observed together. In such cases we do not feel that we understand the "why of it" unless we are satisfied to accept the rules used for predicting as the general laws of our theory.

We do not fault the fortune-teller for offering us an accurate fortune—if this is all we desire. But if our goal is a deeper understanding, we are curious about the principles on which her crystal ball works. Our criticism, if any, is directed not so much at the specifics of her prediction as at the quality of the explanation of events those principles give us. If her predictions are regularly fulfilled and clearly follow from her principles, we may suspect her principles of taking on the character of lawlike generalizations, and thus theory. But it is also possible that we may not be satisfied with the quality of explanation this theory provides, and so seek a better one.

The ground for criticizing a prediction after the fact is its accuracy, while criticism in advance must of necessity be directed at the predicting mechanism, whether theory or something else. Unless we have a Delphic faith in his pronouncements, or credit him with a reasonably Olympic track record, we must demand from the oracle the reason "why." And the best reason "why" is the theory that provides a good explanation along with its prediction.

Two recent studies aim at forecasting the future. One, *Things to Come,* authored by Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, gives the Hud-

**Things to Come: Thinking About the Seventies and Eighties.* By Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 262 pp. $6.95.

World Dynamics. By Jay W. Forrester. Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1971. 142 pp. $9.75.

The Limits to Growth. By Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III. New York: Universe Books, 1972. 205 pp. $2.75 (paper).

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son Institute's views of the world in the years to 1985. The other study, embodied in the Forrester world model of *World Dynamics* and elaborated in Meadows' *The Limits to Growth,* claims to limn the course if not the colors of roughly 200 years, 1900-2100. Kahn's book employs what Forrester and Meadows term a "mental model"; the latter works use what they call a formal or mathematical model, which is more precisely stated and hence open to inspection and criticism and to faultless computer tracing of its consequences.

Mental models may be used because of the difficulty of creating an adequate formal one. Both kinds of models, however, can be built out of theories. The quality of the predictions may suffer as the model loses explicitness, but an explanation judged "satisfactory" by some standard may still be provided.

Because the interrelationships of a world model do not necessarily obtain—other arrangements of the real world system being possible—any given world model is inevitably normatively loaded. In no modern society, for example, are births and deaths rigidly linked or equated by legal means, so that zero population growth occurs. But they *could* be deliberately equated. Thus the relationships in a world model reflect observed societal norms, whether or not these are consciously specified. A model may also assume that there will be a series of changes in societal norms—perhaps a set of alternate future-paths. Alternate models based on relationships implying alternate norms may produce alternate futures. Depending on our set of conscious norms for the way society ought to be, some of these futures may be judged more desirable than others. Thus, in examining models that predict future world states, we may be concerned neither purely with explanation as provided by a theory in the physical sciences, nor purely with prescription as determined by a theory of value or ethics, but with what could be termed "prescriptive explanation" —the study and evaluation of the principles of societal operation that produce differently valued future states. It is clearly important to distinguish between analysis of the principles themselves, which may change with change in the norms of societal operation, and evaluation of the relative desirability of alternate future world states.

II

In partial support of their projections of the years to 1985, Kahn and Bruce-Briggs identify fifteen components of a single "long-term multifold trend" in Western culture. These suggest that the West is becoming increasingly sensate, bourgeois, centralized, industrialized, populated, affluent, urbanized, and so on. What, then, can we say about a resulting prediction of "some acceleration, some continuation but also some selective topping off of *multifold trend* (and perhaps some temporary reversals)"? (p. 42.) Is there one multifold or are there many parallel trends? As we discussed above, one does not generally offer satisfactory explanations by noting trends,

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and one does not predict either if selection from among competing trends is not made.

The authors do include a vast quantity of pseudo-theoretical material to back their projections. Almost every page is packed with unsupported, much less lawlike, generalizations, many of which are far from intuitively obvious; such propositions require empirical testing, or at least an indication that they are merely hypothetical assumptions.

Kahn and Bruce-Briggs appear to be unaware of some of the recent results of both empirical and purely theoretical research in the social sciences, such as modern theories of national development, policy-making, and individual behavior in complex organizations. They are inclined to take simplistic, one-dimensional views of national characteristics and people; they seem to misunderstand the functional nature of some forms of conflict and the sources and possible remedies of other kinds, again ignoring recent research. And whatever research is used is rarely cited.

Although the authors assert that they have devised a special "methodological framework" complete with technical jargon, there is little or no real methodology employed in this book, nor any coherent mental or formal model. Kahn and Bruce-Briggs surmount the problem posed by the mass of competing trends and generalizations by offering a "surprise-free projection" of the world of the 1970's and 1980's, i.e., "a projection which is not surprising to the author." This is against the "naive projection" where "certain aspects of a situation are kept constant and others are permitted to continue to evolve in some prescribed manner—usually according to current trends." The surprise-free projection, rather than relying solely on "current trends," may apply "theories," or "intuitions," possibly contradictory, "that the author happens to believe or finds plausible. Therefore, if the analysis turns out to be true he will not be surprised." The authors note that it is thus "possible to have two or more contradictory surprise-free projections." (p. 40.)

By rationalizing all probabilities, a "surprise-free projection" merely assures the prescience of the prognosticators. It thus defeats the whole aim of trying to identify and weigh the relative importance of trends and their relationships in the world system in order to understand and thereby give credence to one's predictions. Neither explanation nor prediction then obtains. At any rate, we may protest that the interesting aspect of futurology studies is not the surprise-free, but the surprise-ful, nature of what's to come.

The authors' handling of the evaluative, the "desirability," component of prediction is just as haphazard; we might term their technique "prescriptive speculation." They offer, for example, three alternate futures for the United States: the "neutral context," the "modestly optimistic context," and the "modestly pessimistic context," with possible "branch points." Somewhat anachronistic value judgments are strewn through the text. Thus, on the Caribbean: "Be-

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cause their only resources are their climate and beaches, their only possible business is tourism. But, demagogues maintain that this turns them into nations of busboys. In the contemporary world, very few people take pride in personal service." (p. 75.)

Prediction entails a responsibility to explain, not expound. In order to be taken seriously, an ambitious forecaster must in turn take considerable pains to justify his ambition. A book that instead takes the easy road of lofty generalization and infatuation with futuristic gadgetry, exotic subcultures, and the like, may, as this one does, catch our eye—but not convince us.

III

The Forrester-Meadows study is a serious attempt to use what is known about the workings of the world system to construct a model of that system capable of predicting the "modes" or gross behaviors rather than the details of future world states. The Meadows model has scores of interlocking equations which, upon being fed appropriate data, can generate successive world states. Like the much smaller Forrester model, it centers on five major levels or variables of the world state: population, natural resources, industrial capital, food production, and pollution.

A conceptualization important in analyzing the behavior of such a model is the feedback loop. This is a circular path taken through the model system: a change in the level variable from which the path is begun leads through changes in intervening variables back to a change in the original variable. For example, consider a simplified model in which a rise in population occurs. The rise results in less food per capita, other things being equal. Decreased food leads to a rise in the death rate, and a fall in population. Thus, a rise in population in our simplified model leads indirectly to a fall in population, and the loop is complete.

The feedback loop structure of the Forrester-Meadows model is such that "even rather large changes in input data do not generally alter the *mode* of behavior. . . . Numerical changes may well affect the *period* of an oscillation or the *rate* of growth or the *time* of a collapse, but they will not affect the fact that the basic mode is oscillation or growth or collapse." (p. 121.) Thus the model seeks to predict only the mode or gross behavior of the future world system—oscillation, growth, collapse, or steady-state in the five "level" variables that describe the basic world state. Because the feedback loop system is relatively insensitive, inaccuracies in the model's input data may have no significant effect on the output mode predicted.

Forrester emphasizes that formal models constructed in this fashion may produce compelling evidence of the possibility of counterintuitive behavior in the modeled world system. In other words, the value of such a model is that its results may be surprise-ful, not surprise-free. I share the opinions of other critics of the Forrester-Meadows model, however, that really compelling evidence for such behavior is not produced. Furthermore, *The Limits to*

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Growth lacks a detailed description of the world model used;[1] it contains, rather, a general discussion of the relations in the model, and how the authors have manipulated them to generate alternate futures. This makes it difficult to criticize on the basis of its explanatory principles. We will, however, suggest a modification of the model below.

Unfortunately the Meadows work is written more as a polemic, warning ominously of a future in which the model's predictions may be realized, than as the report of the scholarly study it purports to be. The conclusions of the study are: (1) If present trends continue, the limits to world growth will be reached within a hundred years, with a sudden, uncontrollable decline in population and industrial capacity. (2) It is possible to alter these trends and establish a state of global equilibrium such that "the basic material needs of each person on earth are satisfied and each person has an equal opportunity to realize his individual human potential." (p. 24.) (3) "If the world's people decide to strive for this second outcome rather than the first, the sooner they begin working to attain it, the greater will be their chances of success." (p. 24.)

With such conclusions it is easy to see why the authors elected to proselytize. At any rate, criticisms of the Forrester-Meadows model that have been offered in the past[2] include: (1) The garbage in-garbage out axiom of computer science applies. The information the model requires is unavailable; the modelers have made inaccurate and in some cases absurd estimates. Put silly data in, you get silly data out. (2) The model itself is inaccurate and simplistic; its levels of aggregation are impossibly high; the gulf between the developed and developing countries is obscured by the aggregation used. (3) The world collapse modes are hardly surprising. Like Malthus, the authors have observed that exponential growth quickly overwhelms linear growth. Like Malthus, they are wrong about the capacity of technology to meet the demands of exponentially growing population, pollution, and resource usage. (4) Global equilibrium may enforce the status quo of rich and poor nations. But it is unattainable politically; some form of growth is inevitable. (5) Incremental policy and social adjustments combined with technological fixes can stave off crisis and collapse.

Perhaps the most telling criticism above is that the authors have stacked the deck in favor of catastrophe. They do this by assuming that the "bad" factors, such as pollution, grow exponentially, while the "good" factors, such as pollution control, grow only linearly. The prediction process reduces to an exercise in cranking out the foredetermined collapse. Such a

[1]A technical report describing the model in detail was scheduled to be published in 1972. The work by Forrester, *World Dynamics,* contains a detailed description of an early version of the model, which produces similar predictions.

[2]See, for example, the review by P. Passell, M. Roberts and L. Ross in the *New York Times Book Review,* April 2, 1972.

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collapse is then hardly counter-intuitive. What is perhaps counter-intuitive, but only to those unfamiliar with exponential growth, is the suddenness of the collapse.

Within the constraints of their present model, the Meadows team would have performed a service had they eschewed advocacy in favor of trying to generate and categorize as many classes of future world states as possible. Since much of the data they use is estimated, there is no reason why the data and the relationships in the model could not have been manipulated in order to identify which changes in the model, implying alternate forms of advanced technology or social policy, would produce the range of future worlds one would prescribe as "successful" or satisfactory. In short, they should have made a real effort at prescriptive explanation.[3]

I note with other critics that the model itself may not be truly representative of the world system, even at a rather high level of abstraction. Although it replicates world conditions from 1900 to 1970, certain relations not operative in that period—and thus not present in the model—may in the future come to the fore. I will describe below one such relation apparently not considered by the modelers or those of their critics I have read, and how it could be incorporated into the model. If the model is wrong or incomplete, we can at least try to improve it and the quality of explanation it provides. Perhaps it is not possible to make an adequate model of the world system with present knowledge and techniques—but we may not know this unless we try.

Pollution control, for example, does not appear from the outline of the model presented in *The Limits to Growth* (pp. 102-103) to constitute a drain on industrial capital. The reduction in pollution in the final state is accomplished by arbitrarily limiting the rate of pollution generation to one-fourth of the present rate. How this can be done without substantial capital outlays mystifies me, even given capital-saving technological developments in both pollution control and industrial production. Meadows explicitly notes the skyrocketing cost of very high levels of pollution control. (pp. 134-135.)

To correct this, I propose another feedback loop: A rise in industrial (and perhaps agricultural) capital would cause a rise in pollution. But social policy sets the pollution level constant (alternately, social policy sets the percentage of total capital devoted to pollution control). Then, as industrial capital rises, the percentage or amount of it devoted to pollution control also rises. The rise in the total cost of pollution control—the percentage or level of industrial capital devoted to it—depresses industrial capital formation by driving out inefficient industries and reducing the profits of other industries. Less capital is then available for investment. Thus, completing the loop, a rise in indus-

[3]It is possible that in the technical report on *The Limits to Growth* more of this will be attempted, and the limits of the model itself examined more thoroughly.

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trial capital leads eventually to a fall in or constraint on industrial capital. The loop could be introduced in the *Limits to Growth* model by redefining the level of service capital, or through a new level entirely, that of fraction of total capital devoted to pollution control.

This loop would also act as a resource multiplier as resources are employed more efficiently in more efficient industries. The natural resources level may also be affected by the fact that pollution control may be less resource intensive than production. Thus, as a higher fraction of total capital is devoted to pollution control, the resource usage rate would fall, with savings in addition to those from efficiency.

The net effect of such a loop on the world model may be either a delay in collapse as one limit supersedes another, or a genuine "equilibrium" regulator permitting growth limited only by efficiency with respect to resources and pollution generation. Which effect obtains would depend on the way the loop is set up and the values given it. But the runaway industrial production that occurs even under the level of pollution control included in the present Meadows model would be either contained or allowed to proceed "harmlessly," i.e., through technological advances in efficiency.

Perhaps the most important question raised by the Forrester-Meadows studies concerns not growth or equilibrium but what quality of life the world shall support. Forrester uses an index of "quality of life," quantified in a somewhat offhand manner, in *World Dynamics*. It is apparently dropped from the later work, perhaps for that reason. But in order to choose preferred world states we must be sure what we prefer, and what we are choosing. In this light, the Meadows study really points out the flexibility, not the doomsday nature, of a world system that may attain any of a wide range of future states. To use this flexibility, we must develop not only the model itself and its predictive capabilities, but also finer distinctions of what we value and want to prescribe. Prescriptive explanation requires both well-developed explanation *and* well-developed prescription.

In conclusion, the Forrester-Meadows model is essentially a courageous attempt to build an explanatory and predictive model of the gross features of the world system. Its creators may claim much more than they can do—and may hurt their cause in consequence—but they do take an important step in the "putting up" process that advances science and understanding. They make an important contribution to the prescriptive explanation necessary for planning the future we want. In contrast, the scattershot scholarship of Kahn and Bruce-Briggs does, in the end, little more than entertain us. It is a shame that both studies parade their authors' pride in the methodology employed to the exclusion of a more critical appreciation of the limits of what they attempt. The cloak of expertise in science is too often the emperor's clothes.

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Books Received

I. Politics, History, Economics

Columbia Essays in International Affairs. Volume VII: The Dean's Papers, 1971. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 261 pp. $10.00. A collection of student essays reflecting the scope and concerns of the discipline of international relations. Included in this year's volume are articles on ethnic and regional integration, political and social change in the Third World, economic planning and development, and the foreign policymaking process.

Economic Regulation of the World's Airlines. By William E. O'Connor. New York: Praeger, 1971. 191 pp. $15.00. Dr. O'Connor analyzes the attempts at multilateral regulation of air transport, identifying the national aviation interests that impede agreements of this type. He proposes a new system of bilateral agreements based on increased international cooperation, which he believes meets the test of political feasibility even though it is short of the multilateral ideal. He concludes that "even if there can be no agreement among governments at the present time to change the 'bilateral' mechanisms, it would be desirable to have a reorientation in the philosophy of airlines, governments, and peoples such that the world network of airlines would be seen less in terms of national advantage and more as a public trust for the peoples of the world."

How Democracies Vote. A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems. By Enid Lakeman. London: Faber and Faber, 1970. (Distributed by Humanities Press, New York.) 318 pp. $6.75. This is a much revised version of *Voting in Democracies,* by James Lambert and Enid Lakeman (1955). The author describes and criticizes the nature and consequences of a number of types of electoral systems. Several brief case studies of proportional systems are provided, with emphasis on the European experience. The book is a valuable reference for studies in comparative Western democracy.

Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations. By Frederick H. Harbison. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 173 pp. $6.50 ($2.50, paper). Professor Harbison argues that "human resources—not capital, nor income, nor material resources—constitute the ultimate basis for the wealth of nations." He reviews the role of human capital in development, giving particular consideration to human resource utilization, critical issues in the nature of education in less developed countries, and the problem of international brain drains.

The Improbable Triumvirate, Kennedy-Khrushchev-Pope John: An Asterisk to the History of a Hopeful Year, 1962-1963. By Norman Cousins. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972. 171 pp. $5.95. Magazine editor Norman Cousins describes three world leaders of the early 1960's as he narrates his own role in two controversies of that era, those surrounding the nuclear test ban treaty and the internment and subsequent release of two Catholic archbishops by the Kremlin.

International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research. Edited by Charles F. Hermann. New York: The Free Press, 1972. 334 pp. n.p. Essays demonstrating the behavioral approach to crisis decision-making consider events from the ending of the First World War to the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Contributors include Glenn D. Paige, Ole R. Holsti and Charles A. McClelland.

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International Economic Reform: Collected Papers of Emile Despres. Edited by Gerald M. Meier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 293 pp. $7.50. Economist Emile Despres has raised fundamental questions about community arrangements to achieve genuine liberalization of trade, international development, and reform of the international monetary system. His essays, organized by Professor Meier in three parts—international trade, development and monetary reform—range chronologically from the foreign exchange problems of Britain and Germany on the eve of World War II to the current problems of the dollar reserve standard and the future of gold as a medium of exchange.

It's Not Too Late. Edited by Fred Carvell and Max Tadlock. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Glencoe Press, 1971. 312 pp. $3.95. A collection of essays relating to the ecological crisis, this volume examines the environmental issue not only from a biological perspective, but also from the sociological, philosophical and psychological points of view. With this aim, the editors have selected contributors from diverse vantage grounds, among them Saul Pett, an Associated Press newsman; Lord Ritchie-Calder of Balmashannar, a former professor of international relations at Edinburgh University; and Arthur Pearl, an education professor at the University of Oregon.

Law, Institutions, and the Global Environment. Edited by John Lawrence Hargrove. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1972. 396 pp. $20.00. Papers prepared for the September 1971 Conference on Legal and Institutional Responses to Problems of the Global Environment, sponsored jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the American Society of International Law. For the most part they describe general international environmental problems, assess the present state of international environmental law, and discuss various international institutions that might be created to handle these problems.

The Methodology of Comparative Research. Edited by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. New York: The Free Press, 1972. 419 pp. $3.95 (paper). This well known collection, now in paperback, includes articles on research techniques and alternative theoretical approaches by Holt, Turner, John M. Richardson, Jr., Fred W. Riggs, Joseph Lapalombara, David Apter, Frederick Frey, Dell Hymes and Sylvia Thrupp.

The New Language of Politics: A Dictionary of Catchwords, Slogans and Political Usage. (Second edition.) By William Safire. New York: Collier Books, 1972. 782 pp. $4.95 (paper). This entertaining collection of political slang has been updated to embrace phrases from the first Nixon Administration. Safire has added such terms as "effete snobs" and "radic-lib" to older gems ranging from "bafflegab" through "snollygoster" to "what's good for General Motors. . . ." He provides definitions, frequently including a review of relevant connotations and the phrase's origins and etymology. ("Snollygoster" was a term coined in the Civil War era to describe an unprincipled politician; it was revived by Harry S. Truman in a 1952 speech.)

Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability. By Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972. 232 pp. $8.95 ($4.95, paper). Rabushka and Shepsle attempt to apply some of the techniques of modern formal analysis in political science to the study of pluralistic societies. They provide a number of case studies to support their theoretical paradigm, considering "competitive configuration" as in Trinidad and Malaya, majority domination as in Ceylon, minority domination as in South Africa, Rhodesia and Burundi, and fragmentation as in the Congo, Nigeria and Yugoslavia.

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Polls: Their Use and Misuse in Politics. By Charles W. Roll, Jr. and Albert H. Cantril. New York: Basic Books, 1972. 177 pp. $6.95. A critical analysis, by pollsters, of the role of polls in politics, with examples of their use and misuse. The McCarthy and Muskie primary campaigns in New Hampshire provide illustrations for a discussion of the "numbers game" of winning percentages, for instance, and that polls may be useful in assessing the impact of a third candidate is shown by recalling some recent New York State gubernatorial campaigns. The book also contains chapters on poll reliability, polling techniques and interpretation, and the authors' view of polling's place in a free society.

Requiem for Democracy? An Inquiry into the Limits of Behavioral Control. By Lewis M. Andrews and Marvin Karlins. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. $4.00. The authors consider the possible societal impact of new techniques of behavior control. They argue that conditioning is present in both a participatory democracy and a "psytocracy" such as that portrayed in Orwell's *1984,* and that the new psychological techniques may thus be used to improve the former as well as to achieve the latter.

The Rise of Radicalism: The Social Psychology of Messianic Extremism. By Eugene H. Methvin. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1973. 584 pp. $9.95. The author, a senior editor of the *Reader's Digest* and author of *The Riot Makers,* examines the phenomenon of radicalism from the era of the French Revolution to the present, its philosophies, leaders, modes of operation, and appeal. He devotes considerable space to Karl Marx, the Russian Jacobins, Lenin and the Comintern, and Hitler and Mussolini, whom he treats as radicals of the Left. "It is a testimonial both to the power of fantasy of the contemporary leftists, and to the efficacy of their propaganda, that they have made the word 'fascist' mean to the average American something distinct from, and even opposed to, communism or their own brand of revolutionary radicalism. For twentieth-century fascism sprang full-grown from the radical revolutionary movement like Minerva from the head of Zeus. . . ." In the last two chapters he examines revolutionary radicalism around the globe today (which he labels "competitive social demolition") and the "New Left" in America.

The Three Worlds of Economics. By Lloyd G. Reynolds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. 344 pp. $12.50 ($3.45, paper). A comparative study of three broad types of economic systems: capitalist, socialist and less developed. Professor Reynolds discusses "the usefulness of different branches of economic theory in different institutional settings," and explores "fruitful directions for comparative economic analysis."

Totalitarianism. By Leonard Schapiro. New York: Praeger, 1972. 144 pp. $6.00. Professor Schapiro begins with the etymology of the word totalitarianism (first appearance, 1928), looks at the ways in which we use it today, and examines the character of totalitarian regimes as expressed in fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin. He argues that totalitarianism is new, in definite respects, both as a concept and as a system apart from analogies in previous political theory and practice. Yet, imprecise as the word may be, it retains a sufficiently distinct meaning to be of use to the political scientist in his attempt to define and describe certain types of absolutist governments.

The Year Book of World Affairs: 1972. New York: Praeger, for the London Institute of World Affairs, 1972. 380 pp. $19.50. An annual selection of essays representing all aspects of the study of international relations. The 1972 edition includes "The Limitation of Strategic Armaments," by J. I. Coffey; "International Law and the Environment: Evolving Concepts," by H. L. Dickstein; and "The British Confront their European Test," by Stephen C. Holt.

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II. United States and Canada

American Imperialism in the Image of Peer Gynt: Memoirs of a Professor-Bureaucrat. By E. A. Johnson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971. 352 pp. $12.75. In a critical investigation of American foreign policy, Professor Johnson evaluates the cultural factors that have shaped American preconceptions and attitudes toward world affairs. The study is based on his own experiences as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer and in teaching at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS.

The Economics of Defense: A Partisan Review of Military Spending. Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, Military Spending Committee. Introduction by Senator Mark O. Hatfield. New York: Praeger, 1971. 278 pp. $15.00. Challenging basic military assumptions, this book calls for a re-evaluation of the U.S. military stance in light of changing international conditions and domestic concerns. The authors assert that reductions can be made in military spending without a corresponding weakening of national security, and recommend an increase in R&D so that apparent weaknesses—as in the U.S. sea-based deterrent systems—may be remedied.

FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny, 1882-1928, A History. By Kenneth S. Davis. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972. 936 pp. $15.00. This biography of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, from birth to his decision to run for the governorship of New York, is set against the background and happenings of almost half a century to show how the man and his career were shaped by the world in which he lived. Mr. Davis has previously written biographies of Charles A. Lindbergh, Adlai E. Stevenson, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Freedom and the Court. (Second edition.) By Henry J. Abraham. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. 397 pp. $12.50. Dr. Abraham's basic text on civil liberties and the judicial process was first published in 1967. In the Preface to this edition he notes that "Although the scope and approach of the new work are the same as [in] the original, the passage of time—however brief in the annals of constitutional development—has mandated changes on almost every page and the rewriting as well as enlarging of certain chapters. . . ." When the revamping was done, in the fall of 1971, the Burger Court had "embarked upon a period of consolidation and caution, but [this], with the arguable exception of the criminal justice sector, did not reveal any clearly demonstrable tendency to chip away at the legacy of the Warren Court. . . ."

Governing Urban America in the 1970s. Edited by Werner Z. Hirsch and Sidney Sonenblum. New York: Praeger, 1973. 206 pp. $15.00. Critical issues in urban politics are examined in this collection of essays. Topics include general problems of evaluating governance; dissent, protest, and alienation; interest group power; fiscal crises; overlapping governments; giant governments and centralized power; campaign finance; threats to privacy; crisis in the criminal justice system; land use planning; and organizing for political change.

An Introduction to American Government. (Second edition.) By Erwin L. Levine and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 270 pp. $4.25 (paper). This is a traditional, institutional description of the components of American government designed for use as an introductory text. The authors discuss the U.S. Constitution, pressure groups, political parties, the Presidency, Congress, the bureaucracy, policymaking, and the judicial branch.

John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times. By Michael A. Guhin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 404 pp. $12.95. Dr. Guhin illustrates that the image of John Foster Dulles as the prototype "Cold War Warrior" does not survive the test of research into Dulles' background, career, and the political

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milieu of the 1950's. Of particular concern to this biographer are the details of Dulles' views regarding the Soviet Union, China and the development of the Cold War.

The Kennedy Round and the Future of American Trade. By Thomas B. Curtis and John Robert Vastine, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1971. 239 pp. $17.50. This book recounts the U.S. experience in the trade and tariff negotiations initiated in 1962 by the member countries of GATT. Special emphasis is placed on the interaction between political problems and the economic policies pursued by a country. In their prescription for U.S. economic policy in the 1970's, the authors indicate that GATT members' movement away from the stated goals of freer trade and toward cartelization in major commodities is resulting in a neo-mercantilistic approach to world trade. To combat this trend, they say, the United States must "seize the initiative and generate a new momentum toward the solution of the important problems that confront the world economy."

Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson. Volume I, 1897-1948. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972. 301 pp. $12.50. This first of three volumes of memoirs of the former Prime Minister of Canada and Ambassador to the United Nations spans the period from Pearson's childhood in Ontario at the turn of the century, through World Wars I and II, to his decision in 1948 to enter Canadian politics. A major portion of the book is devoted to his career in the Department of External Affairs. Interwoven throughout Pearson's accounts of and reflections on the political events of the times is the story of the joys and trials of preserving family life in the diplomatic service.

The Military and American Society. Edited by Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr. New York: The Free Press, 1972. 322 pp. $10.00. A series of essays tracing the rise of the modern American military establishment from the Second World War to the present and the conditions within society that allowed its growth. The authors include Bruce M. Russett, Morris Janowitz, and Elizabeth B. Drew.

The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control 1945-1970. By Chalmers M. Roberts. New York: Praeger, 1970. 159 pp. $6.95. A former newspaperman surveys the nuclear arms race and arms control efforts from 1945 to 1970, dividing the nuclear years into four eras. In the first era, following World War II, the hope invested in the Baruch Plan was doomed from the start because of the Soviet veto in the United Nations. The second period, distinguished by the "Open Skies" proposal, proved to be a time of wary assessment. The next decade was one of limited agreements, characterized by the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1961 and the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1967. In the fourth era—today—the determinant is U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity, which has made it possible for the superpowers to reach agreement in the SALT.

A Religious History of the American People. By Sydney E. Ahlstrom. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 1158 pp. $19.50. Dr. Ahlstrom, Professor of American History and Modern Church History at Yale University, deals with the role of major Western and Eastern religions, cultic phenomena and secular movements in American history; describes the European antecedents that shaped the religious life of the early American settlers with consequences that are felt even today; places religious history within the context of the social, political and intellectual development of America; and treats of the growth of church organizations, changing modes of belief, and tension between church and state.

Unquestioning Obedience to the President: The ACLU Case Against the Illegal War in Vietnam. By Leon Friedman and Burt Neuborne. New York: W. W.

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Norton, 1972. 284 pp. $8.95. Excerpts from legal briefs in two related New York cases that challenged the legality of the United States' involvement in the Viet Nam war, with short narratives tying the legal documents together and explaining the progress of the proceedings. American Civil Liberties Union lawyers argued that the war was unconstitutional and succeeded in having the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, rule on the merits of the case—though the ruling went against the ACLU position. Appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied. The cases did establish that "congressional involvement in presidentially initiated hostilities was inevitable—in the form of appropriations bills. . . . No longer could critics of a war be dissuaded from debating its merits during the appropriations process by assurances that paying the bills for a war did not constitute its approval."

III. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

Ambitions and Realities. By Robert Rhodes James. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 311 pp. $8.95. Major developments in British politics, such as the performance of Labour as a governing party, the revival of the Conservatives, the impact of Enoch Powell, and the General Election of 1970, provide the framework for an analysis of the personalities and contributions of notable Parliamentarians of the late 1960's, chief among them Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and Enoch Powell.

The Anglo-Soviet Accord. By Richard H. Ullman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 509 pp. $17.50. Professor Ullman's final volume of three concerning Anglo-Soviet relations appraises the impact the Bolshevik success in the Russian Civil War had upon the course of British foreign policy. His review of British policy during this period contains, besides an analytical investigation of bureaucratic politics, a descriptive essay on the political style and statecraft of David Lloyd George. There is also a brief discussion of Soviet diplomacy as seen from telegraphic messages between Moscow and London.

Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert. By Paul W. Schroeder. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. 544 pp. $19.50. Relations between Austria and the Western Powers form the nub of this reappraisal of the diplomacy of the Crimean War. The author argues that the war resulted from a clash between conflicting diplomatic approaches—Austria's traditional balance of power diplomacy and Britain's new tactic of confrontation. As he demonstrates, while Austria resorted to diplomatic maneuvers to avert war with Russia and settle the Eastern Question, Britain led the Western Powers in blocking all efforts at peace, seeking instead a prestigious military victory that would establish her leadership in a new and progressive Europe.

European Security and the Atlantic System. Edited by William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 276 pp. $10.00. Considered in these essays are the forces, such as domestic pressures, the strategic arms race and budget priorities, that have shaped the desire for a new security system for Western Europe and North America. Among the contributions are Klaus Knorr's "Economic Factors in Future Arrangements for European Security"; Andrew J. Pierre's "Britain and European Security: Issues and Choices for the 1970's"; and Annette Baker Fox's "NATO and the American Nuclear Deterrent."

The Paris Commune. By Stewart Edwards. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973. 417 pp. $12.50. Edwards examines the myths surrounding the Paris Commune

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created in the spring of 1871 as the Second Empire collapsed under the defeat suffered in the Franco-Prussian War—not "because they are untrue, but because they are, rather, the apotheosis of the [most extreme] week's events": the burning of the Hôtel de Ville and the Tuileries Palace, the execution of the Archbishop of Paris, and the sacking of Paris by French armies. He concludes by noting that the Commune was essentially a collective experience of the people, one that afterward became part of the patrimony of the whole European socialist revolutionary movement.

The Security of Western Europe. By Sir Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin. London: Charles Knight and Company, 1972. 189 pp. £3.00. An examination of the defense environment in which Western Europe now finds itself, this book catalogues the reasons why European defense requirements are a vital issue and discusses the impact greater unity could have upon European security. Of particular concern to the authors are the attitudes of the United Kingdom, France and West Germany toward the formulation and the nature of a European defense system. They dwell at length on the domestic situation in these countries, the interplay between their individual policies and collective aspirations, the external influences at work, the possible ways in which defense cooperation might be expressed, and the kinds of institutional machinery available to give it expression.

The Shadow War: European Resistance 1939-45. By Henri Michel. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. 416 pp. $8.50. In describing the role of the Resistance during the Second World War, Professor Michel analyzes the movement's component parts, shows how it drew its members from all political and social groups throughout Europe, examines how it was recruited, organized and equipped, and notes the varying tactics used. He makes the point that the Resistance not only transcended national boundaries but cut across traditional social and political barriers.

The Struggle for a Free Europe. By Dean Acheson. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. 216 pp. $2.50. An excerpt from Acheson's larger work, *Present at the Creation*, this book details the high-level diplomacy which resulted in the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Schuman Plan and the building of the hydrogen bomb. It reveals not only the origins of these decisions and policies, but also their effect upon international relations in the two decades that followed.

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

East Europe in Search of Security. By Peter Bender. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972. 281 pp. $7.00 ($3.00, paper). Using a broad range of source materials, including political speeches, press articles, and his own knowledge of the six states linked to the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, the author analyzes East European security concerns and policies. In separate chapters, he considers the special circumstances of each country, the dangers peculiar to each, and the individual security policies consequently implemented by each state.

Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik. By János Radványi. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 197 pp. $5.95. An appraisal of the international ramifications of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 that eventually resulted in the UN acceptance in 1963 of the credentials of the Hungarian communist government. Of particular interest is the author's description of the American, Soviet and Chinese policies and behind-the-scenes negotiations on the Hungarian question. Dr. Radványi, a former Hungarian diplomat with twenty years of service, was a participant in some of the events

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reported in his book. He was Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington from 1962 to 1967, and is now Associate Professor of History at Mississippi State University.

People's Poland: Government and Politics. By Alexander J. Groth. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972. 155 pp. $3.95 (paper). This introduction to the politics of Communist Poland in the 1970's surveys the history and geography of Poland, and examines party and political institutions, communism and Catholicism, the social and economic impact of communist rule, and foreign policy issues since World War II.

Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek Era, 1968-1969. By Galia Golan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 327 pp. $18.50. Dr. Golan, author of *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement,* examines the nature and effects of reform rule in Czechoslovakia from Dubcek's assumption of power in January 1968, through the August invasion by the USSR, until Gustav Husak became First Secretary in April 1969. She traces the reforms in nearly every sector of society (the economy, trade unions, social organizations, national and religious minorities, cultural sphere, Party, government bureaucracy, legal and security systems, and foreign policy), investigates the reaction of Czechoslovakia's East European "allies," who tried to restrain and eventually terminate reform rule, and assesses the reasons behind the severe Soviet intervention to halt the experiment in democratic socialism.

Socialist Economics. Edited by Alec Nove and D. M. Nuti. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. 528 pp. $3.95 (paper). A collection of readings on the principles and practice of economics in socialist countries, with emphasis on the Soviet Union. Included are quotations from the original Marxist theorists, articles on accumulation and growth in socialist economies, and papers on planning, the mathematical techniques used in planning, and the recent reforms in Soviet and East European economies. The volume concludes with an appraisal of the Chinese model for economic planning and growth.

V. Middle East and Africa

The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq. By Lorenzo Kent Kimball. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1973. 246 pp. $7.95. Since 1958, Iraq has been racked by a series of coups d'état. Professor Kimball finds that the pattern of change was fomented by the forces of nationalism and militarism, deeply rooted in Iraq's ancient heritage, and further complicated by foreign intervention. In his estimation, the problem of sustaining legitimate power has not yet been resolved, nor has a local nationalism fully developed.

The Discarded People: An Account of African Resettlement in South Africa. By Cosmas Desmond. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971. 265 pp. $1.95 (paper). A Franciscan priest's denunciation of one aspect of South African apartheid—the resettlement of Africans in Bantu homelands. He asserts that "No real economic development has started in the 'homelands' in spite of two well-publicized five-year plans." Overcrowding, decline in real income, malnutrition and disease are "emasculating a whole people. . . . They are broken, demoralized, apathetic, seeking any kind of release from stress . . . . the migrant labor system is destroying family and community life," and violence is spreading in resettlement camps. Separate development "is no more than a pretence of a solution to South Africa's problems for the outside world and a sop to White consciences inside the country, while . . . . the system of White supremacy is perpetuated."

The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process. By Michael Brecher. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 693 pp. $17.50. Brecher

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provides a view of a foreign policy system in action as he probes for the social, psychological, political, geographic and economic determinants involved in the formulation and execution of Israel's foreign policy. Central to his exploration are the decision-makers' perceptions and their subsequent impact on foreign policy design. Besides demonstrating the viability of his theoretical approach, he presents a detailed examination of the international conflict in the Middle East and of the foreign policy of Israel as a new state in the region.

Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview. By Kenneth W. Grundy. New York: Grossman Publishers, A World Order Book, 1971. 204 pp. $4.95 (paper). After treating briefly the causes of political violence in Africa and African conceptions of violence and its role, the author examines the relevance of the Maoist and other communist theories of guerrilla warfare for Africa, guerrilla training for Africans, and African guerrilla conflict doctrines. He describes guerrilla movements, such as those in Kenya and Algeria, in Portuguese Africa, in Rhodesia and South Africa, and in the Congo and Sudan. In the final two sections, he takes a look at the future of guerrilla warfare in Africa, the nature and extent of external involvement, cooperation among guerrilla movements and among target regimes, and short- and long-term trends.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria. By Alf Andrew Heggoy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. 327 pp. $10.00. A study of the tactics and organization of the Algerian rebels and the French counterinsurgent forces from 1954 to 1958. Utilizing both unpublished documents and personal interviews with French and Algerian soldiers, the author argues that the French were capable of defeating the National Liberation Army on the military front, but could not win the allegiance of the Algerian people. The National Liberation Front was able to gain Algeria's independence by shifting the emphasis from the military to the political aspects of the struggle.

The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role. By Rouhollah K. Ramazani. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1972. 157 pp. $7.50. With the departure of the British from the Persian Gulf, Iran has become the strongest regional power. As Dr. Ramazani points out, it aspires to play a leading role in the Gulf, but its ability to do so is tempered by its deep-seated conflict with the Arab states and the problems of maintaining internal political stability.

VI. East and South Asia

Administration and Development in Malaysia: Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society. By Milton J. Esman. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. 341 pp. $12.50. A case study of an attempt at senior administrative reform in the post-colonial bureaucracy of Malaysia. Professor Esman reviews the plural nature of Malaysian society, draws a profile of the administrative system, and describes the experience of the reform program in which he was involved.

China and Southeast Asia—The Politics of Survival. By Melvin Gurtov. Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1971. 234 pp. $10.00. Dr. Gurtov examines the impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's foreign policy and the relations between Peking and three Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Cambodia and Burma. He stresses the often overlooked fact that "China's policy choices concerning relations with governments and antigovernment movements in the three countries have been heavily influenced by American policy in the Indochina area." "China's support for revolution in Southeast Asia becomes perfunctory whenever local governments are willing to demonstrate their friendship toward Peking by avoiding excessive dependence on American (or Soviet) support."

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Documents of Korean Communism 1918-1948. Edited by Dae-sook Suh. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 570 pp. $15.00. The sixty-six documents collected in this volume constitute primary archival sources for the study of Korean communism in the period from the Russian Revolution to the communist takeover of North Korea in 1948. From the first speech of Pak Chin-sun at the Comintern in 1920 to Kim Ha-il's speech in the session presided over by Comrade Togliatti at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935, the documents shed light on Korea's first Socialist Party and the relations between the Korean communists and the Comintern.

India's Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, 1953-1969. By Asha L. Datar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 278 pp. $18.50. In this history of economic relations between India and the Soviet bloc, the author relies heavily on an impressive statistical and economic survey of aid, trade and balance of payments relationships. She points out that there are "special disadvantages associated with tied credits" of East European countries and the Soviet Union, and that while the substance of this aid was small, the effect it had on other donors—notably the United States—gave it a considerable impact. Miss Datar concludes: "One might say that nowhere has such a small substance cast such a great shadow."

Japan and East Asia: The New International Order. By Donald C. Hellmann. New York: Praeger, 1972. 243 pp. $2.95 (paper). Dr. Hellmann examines Japan's Asian role from two perspectives, her postwar diplomatic history and the domestic political process. He notes that the emerging multipolarity of the international system has put pressures on Japan to become more active in Asia, and that this disturbing prospect has tended to polarize Japanese politics, as illustrated by the nuclear debate within the country. At the same time, however, the Japanese political process precludes bold leadership and makes a passive and reactive role in Asia virtually inevitable. Thus, he concludes, Japan is unlikely to adjust smoothly to her new status as a major power or to be adept at balancing China, the Soviet Union and the United States in the Pacific region, although the factor of Japan in international affairs must be considered a growing constraint upon great-power actions.

Korea: The Third Republic. By Kyung Cho Chung. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 269 pp. $6.95. In reviewing the political developments and constitutional accomplishments of the South Korean Third Republic, Dr. Chung covers the crucial period since the students' uprising of 1960 and the military coup, and assesses the unrest caused by such events as the *Pueblo* affair. He details the economic, political and social problems in the way of Korean unification as well as South Korea's relationship to the superpowers, the United Nations and the developing countries in Asia. One of his conclusions is that Korean unification is necessary because the South is in danger of being economically (not militarily) defeated by the North.

Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics. By David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 320 pp. $12.00. The focus of this study is on the transition from military to civilian rule in South Korea. Primary attention is given to the interaction of economic modernization with the political process. It is the authors' contention that the pressures of economic and political development in South Korea were mutually reinforcing in the 1960's. As the pluralization of the decision-making process improved the economic efficiency of the state, so the modernization of economic structures increased growth and provided goals around which a new national consensus could be drawn.

Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. By Rounaq Jahan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 248 pp. $12.50. Dr. Jahan seeks to explain why the

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institutional innovations of the Ayub Khan regime were the prelude to the destruction of national unity in Pakistan. Concentrating on the difficulty in integrating the geographically and culturally distinct Bengalis into the national experience, she contends that the regime, by failing to realize the significance of the economic and political demands from the Eastern wing of the country, encouraged the revolt which was to end in a Pakistani defeat by the Indians.

Problems of Australian Defense. Edited by H. G. Gelber. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 359 pp. $17.75. This study questions the inherited attitudes with which Australia has for so long been content and provides some new criteria for an assessment of that country's defense position. Along with articles on the technical and economic aspects of defense are those concerned with the nuclear debate, the oil shortage, and the factor of Australia's geography. Contributors include A. L. Burns, David Hamer and Arleigh Burke.

Vietnamese Anticolonialism. By David G. Marr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 322 pp. $12.50. Utilizing numerous primary sources, the author examines the roots of the Vietnamese conflict. His emphasis is on the origins and the communication of anti-colonial symbols, nationalist aspirations, and the Vietnamese sense of identity as a people.

The Vietnam War and International Law: Volume Three, The Widening Context. Edited by Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 951 pp. $25.00 ($9.50, paper). This volume contains a series of articles, reprinted from various professional sources such as *Foreign Affairs,* concerned with the escalation of the Vietnamese war after the May 1970 Cambodian incident. The editor has also included a number of readings addressing the larger questions involved in the conflict in Southeast Asia—for example, the extension of the American President's executive powers and the effectiveness of international organizations in dealing with conflictual situations. Among the contributing authors are W. H. Rehnquist, Quincy Wright and Louis Henkin.

VII. Latin America

The Central American Common Market: Economic Policies, Economic Growth, and Choices for the Future. By Donald H. McClelland, New York: Praeger, 1972. 243 pp. $15.00. This assessment of the first five years of the CACM—whose members are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua—examines the effects of the Common Market on the growth of, and structural changes in, the Central American economy; analyzes CACM forces and instruments in order to determine whether different policies might have produced more favorable results; and distills from the record the lessons and policy implications that appear to be most important for the future. The author is Chief of the Evaluation Staff in the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Program and Policy Coordination.

Cuba, Castro, and Revolution. Edited by Jaime Suchlicki. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1972. 250 pp. $7.95. Seven essays and an introduction by the editor form the contents of this volume on Castro's Cuba. Essay titles are Nationalism in Cuban Politics; Changes in the Social Structure; Structural Economic Problems; Creativity and Revolution: Cultural Dimension of the New Cuba; Cuba and the Soviet Problem in Latin America; Soviet-Cuban Relations: The Growing Integration; and Castro's Challenge to Latin American Communism.

Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution. By Luis E. Aguilar. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. 256 pp. $9.50. A reinterpretation of Cuban history from 1898 to 1933 by an Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Service

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of Georgetown University, who was a critic of Batista and is now an exile from Castro's Cuba. He describes the social, economic and political forces that formed Cuban nationalism; explores the early influence of the Communist Party; sheds new light on the interventionist role of the U.S. government and questions the actions of American diplomats in Havana; and analyzes the 1933 revolution in terms of its accomplishments, frustrations and impact on the nation.

Historical Dictionary of Bolivia. By Dwight B. Heath. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press. 1972. 324 pp. $9.00. This convenient reference manual for the student of the history of Bolivia and its antecedent, Alto Perú, is the fourth in a series of Latin American Historical Dictionaries. Entries are arranged in alphabetical order, with frequent cross-references. A brief bibliographic essay and a substantial bibliography are appended.

Industrialization in a Latin American Common Market. Prepared by Martin Carnoy. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1972. 267 pp. $8.95. This study presents a methodology for determining the optimum (minimum cost) location of production for particular industries in the Latin American Free Trade Association and for measuring the gains and losses of regional production compared with producing nationally or importing from the United States. It also indicates the cost to the region of producing in alternative locations that may be politically more acceptable than the economically optimum one. Six industrial case studies form the heart of the book: nitrogenous fertilizers, methanol and formaldehyde, tractors, lathes, powdered milk and cheese, paper and pulp. Using drafts prepared by eleven Latin American research institutions and the Brookings Institution, Dr. Carnoy, an Associate Professor at Stanford University, developed the methodology for the international comparative analyses, made the calculations, and wrote the text.

Student Alienation: A Venezuelan Study. By Robert F. Arnove. New York: Praeger, 1971. 209 pp. $15.00. This study of students attending the University of Oriente presents findings about their aspirations, expectations and frustrations, and the ways in which the university affects their concepts and images of the future. The problem selected for examination was alienation, "studied as student evaluations of their competency to perform future occupational and political roles, and expectations that their behavior would influence the probability of their success in those areas." Dr. Arnove is educational adviser to the Ford Foundation in Bogota and Assistant Professor of International and Comparative Education, Indiana University.

Tariff Profiles in Latin America: Implications for Pricing Structures and Economic Integration. By Harry H. Bell. New York: Praeger, 1971. 168 pp. $13.50. The author, a retired Foreign Service Officer who served a three-year tour as Director of the Research Division of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, examines the structures of protection in Latin American countries; interprets commercial policy issues in light of attempts at regional economic integration; and develops an analytic framework of tariffs and other protective structures, applying it to such policy-oriented issues as specialization among and within industries, trade creation and diversification, location of industries under integration schemes, and the position of multinational corporations. He calls for reform of the protective and exchange rate systems as a precondition to substantial progress toward economic integration.

The United States in Panamanian Politics: The Intriguing Formative Years. By G. A. Mellander. Danville, Ill.: The Interstate Printers & Publishers, 1971. 215 pp. $7.95. An in-depth study of the birth of Panama, the building of the Canal, and relations between Panama and the United States from 1903 to 1908.

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Monographs and Reports Received

Accessories to Terror: The Responsibility of Arab Governments for the Organization of Terrorist Activities. Jerusalem: Information Division, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Israel, Middle East Information Series, October 1972. 47 pp. n.p.

Asia and the Major Powers: Implications for the International Order. By Robert A. Scalapino. Washington and Stanford: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, AEI-Hoover Policy Study No. 3, November 1972. 117 pp. $3.00.

The Bokaro Steel Plant: A Study of Soviet Economic Assistance. By Padma Desai. New York: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1972. 108 pp. $6.75.

The Contentious Horn of Africa. By Mordechai Abir. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies, No. 24, June 1972. 19 pp. $3.50.

Crucial Issues and Challenges Facing International Business and the World's Economies. Declaration of the Fifty-ninth National Foreign Trade Convention. New York: National Foreign Trade Council, December 1972. 35 pp. n.p.

Dollars, Jobs, Trade & Aid. By William Diebold, Jr. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 213, December 1972. 71 pp. $1.00.

The Interdependence of Nations. By Lester R. Brown. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 212, October 1972. 79 pp. $1.00.

The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT. By Sven Hirdman and others. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1972. 123 pp. n.p.

Le Projet de Force de Frappe Multilaterale. By Didier Truchet. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972. 75 pp. 13F.

Prospects for Arms Control in the Ocean. By Sven Hirdman. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No. 7, October 1972. 25 pp. no charge.

The Question of an Ocean Dumping Convention. Conclusions of the Working Group on an Ocean Dumping Convention and a Background Paper by Lawson A. W. Hunter. Washington: The American Society of International Law, with the Committee on International Marine Science Affairs Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, ASIL Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No. 2, August 1972. 53 pp. $1.50.

Resources Devoted to Military Research and Development. By Mrs. Randall Forsberg. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, August 1972. 112 pp. no charge.

Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Policy. By Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Vladimir Prokofieff. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, Monographs in International Affairs, 1972. 219 pp. $5.95 ($.95, paper).

Seaford House Papers, 1971. Foreword by Alastair Buchan. London: The Royal College of Defence Studies, 1972. 157 pp. n.p.

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Strategic Arms Limitation, Part II. By George Rathjens. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No. 6, September 1972. 28 pp. no charge.

Strategic Arms Technology and Doctrine under Arms Limitation Agreements. By Michael M. May. Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 37, October 1972. 31 pp. $2.50.

Strategic Significance of Singapore: A Study in Balance of Power. By Yuan-li Wu. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Foreign Affairs Study No. 6, December 1972. 28 pp. $2.00.

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SOMMAIRE

(37è année) No. 6 1972

Henri BONNET	René MAYER
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Dieter SENGHAAS	La dynamique de la course aux armements, condition restrictive de la détente
Ljubivoje ACIMOVIC	Les aspects militaires de la Sécurité européenne
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The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Britain Faces Europe, 1957-1967. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 228 pp. $6.00.

Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense. By William R. Kintner. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1969. 413 pp. $6.95.

Contending Theories of International Relations. By James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971. 415 pp. $9.95 ($6.25, paper).

SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972. xxiv + 447 pp. $11.95.

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Index to Volume XVI

Adaptive Polities in an Interdependent World, by James N. Rosenau, 153-173
Aden, *see* Bell
Africa, *see* Thompson
Algeria, *see* Reflections 854-858
Allen, Edward H., Revolution and Economic Growth: The Mexican Case, 820-822
alliance systems, U.S., *see* Gibert, Pierre
American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy. An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community, by William Welch. Reviewed by Robert C. Horn, 816-820
anti-ballistic missile systems, *see* Bailey, Dougherty, Kintner, Reflections 11-16, 323-327
Argentina, *see* Corbett
arms control, *see* Dougherty, Kintner
arms race, *see* Gray
The Arms Trade with the Third World, by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Reviewed by Geoffrey Kemp, 809-816
Assessing the Moscow SALT Agreements, by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 341-360
An Assessment of Castroism, by Jaime Suchlicki, 35-57
Avgust Chetyrnadtsatogo (August 1914), by A. Solzhenitsyn. Reviewed by William J. Spahr, 570-575

Bab el Mandeb, Strategic Troublespot, by J. Bowyer Bell, 975-989
Bailey, Martin J., Deterrence, Assured Destruction, and Defense, 682-695
Bangladesh, *see* Syed
Barber, Willard, Cuba After Thirteen Years of Castroism, 296-298
Bedeski, Robert E., Institutional Legitimacy and External Affairs in Modern China, 237-256
behavioralism, *see* Yalem
Beilenson, Laurence W., *Power Through Subversion.* Reviewed by Eugene H. Methvin, 803-809
Bell, J. Bowyer, Bab el Mandeb, Strategic Troublespot, 975-989
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., and Cornelius J. Gearin, Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age, 1008-1031
Bolivia, *see* Corbett
bomber gap, *see* Gray
Bonsal, Philip W., *Cuba, Castro, and the United States.* Reviewed by Willard Barber, 296-298
Borisov, O. B., and B. T. Koloskov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye Otnosheniya, 1945-1970 (Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970).* Reviewed by Vladimir Petrov, 567-570
Brazil, *see* Conference Report, Brazil's Role; Corbett, Gordon, Rosenbaum
Brazil's Foreign Policy: Developmentalism and Beyond, by H. Jon Rosenbaum, 58-84
Brazil's Future World Role, by Lincoln Gordon, 621-631
Brazil's International Role in the Seventies: A Conference Report, 545-560
Brezhnev Doctrine, *see* Mitchell
Britain, the Common Market, and the Forces of History, by Paul Taylor, 743-759
Bruce-Briggs, B., and Herman Kahn, *Things to Come: Thinking About the Seventies and Eighties.* Reviewed by Barry M. Mitnick, 1073-1079
Burma, *see* Holmes
Busch, Terry J., and Ronald J. Stupak, The U.S. Military: Patterns of Adaptation for the 1970's, 990-1007

Cambodia, *see* Paul, Reflections 848-854
Campbell, John Franklin, *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory.* Reviewed by Robert R. Sullivan, 298-302
Chang, Parris H., The Changing Patterns of Military Participation in Chinese Politics, 780-802
The Changing Patterns of Military Participation in Chinese Politics, by Parris H. Chang, 780-802
Chile, *see* Corbett, Reflections 16-20
China and Africa 1949-1970, by Bruce

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Larkin. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson, 1066-1069
China, Communist, *see* Bedeski, Chang, Holmes, Mitchell, Reisky de Dubnic, Rhee, Syed, Thompson, Reflections 5-11, 323-327, 617-620
China, Republic of, *see* Pierre, Reisky de Dubnic, Rhee, Reflections 5-11
Cohen, Benjamin J., Will Clayton's Philosophy of Trade, 561-567
COMECON, *see* Wasowski
Conference Report: Brazil's International Role in the Seventies, 545-560
Conference Report: U.S.-Japanese Political and Security Relations, 275-288
Corbett, Charles D., Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military, 927-951
CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), *see* Reflections 841-844
Cuba, *see* Barber, Suchlicki
Cuba, Castro, and the United States, by Philip W. Bonsal. Reviewed by Willard Barber, 296-298

Denmark, *see* Ørvik
Deterrence, Assured Destruction, and Defense, by Martin J. Bailey, 682-695
Dill, Marshall, Jr., *Germany: A Modern History.* Reviewed by John Stanley Wozniak, 1070-1073
Dobney, Frederick J., editor, *Selected Papers of Will Clayton.* Reviewed by Benjamin J. Cohen, 561-567
Dougherty, James E., Arms and the World: The View from Sweden, 1057-1066

Eastern Europe, *see* Mendershausen, Reisky de Dubnic, Wasowski, Reflections 323-327
Economic Integration in the COMECON, by Stanislaw Wasowski, 760-779
Egypt, *see* Rafael, Reflections 331-336, 613-617
Ending the Viet Nam Conflict: Expectations in Hanoi and Saigon, by Allan E. Goodman, 632-645
environment, *see* Leider
Eritrea, *see* Bell
Ethiopia, *see* Bell
Europe and the New U.S. Policy Toward China, by Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, 85-104
European Community, *see* Ørvik, Rosenau, Taylor, Reflections 608-613
European defense cooperation, *see* Mendershausen, Ørvik, Pierre, Simpson, Reflections 11-16
The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, by John Franklin Campbell. Reviewed by Robert R. Sullivan, 298-302

Forrester, Jay W., *World Dynamics.* Reviewed by Barry M. Mitnick, 1073-1079
France, *see* Kintner, Pierre, Taylor, Reflections 11-16, 608-613
The Future of America's Commitments and Alliances, by Andrew J. Pierre, 696-719

Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Cornelius J. Gearin, 1008-1031
"Gap" Prediction and America's Defense: Arms Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years, by Colin S. Gray, 257-274
Gearin, Cornelius J., and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age, 1008-1031
The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II, by Robert McGeehan. Reviewed by Walter F. Hahn, 289-293
Germany, *see* Hahn, Mendershausen, Reisky de Dubnic, Taylor, Wozniak, Reflections 11-16
Germany and Europe: Historical Essays, by Hajo Holborn. Reviewed by John Stanley Wozniak, 1070-1073
Germany: A Modern History, by Marshall Dill, Jr. Reviewed by John Stanley Wozniak, 1070-1073
Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Post War Years, by Alfred Grosser. Reviewed by Walter F. Hahn, 289-293
Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries, by Lawrence L. Whetten. Reviewed by Walter F. Hahn, 289-293
Gibert, Stephen P., Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Military Aid Policy, 660-681

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Goodman, Allan E., Ending the Viet Nam Conflict: Expectations in Hanoi and Saigon, 632-645
Gordon, Lincoln, Brazil's Future World Role, 621-631
Gray, Colin S., "Gap" Prediction and America's Defense: Arms Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years, 257-274
Gregory, Frank, and John Simpson, West European Collaboration in Weapons Procurement, 435-461
Griffin, Kenyon N., and Alfred L. Monks, Soviet Strategic Claims, 1964-1970, 520-544
Grosser, Alfred, *Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Post War Years*. Reviewed by Walter F. Hahn, 289-293

Hahn, Walter F., The Nixon Doctrine: Design and Dilemmas, 361-376
Hahn, Walter F., West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr, 859-880
Hahn, Walter F., Whither Germany?, 289-293
Holborn, Hajo, *Germany and Europe: Historical Essays*. Reviewed by John Stanley Wozniak, 1070-1073
Holmes, Robert A., The Sino-Burmese Rift: A Failure for China, 211-236
Horn, Robert C., Perceptions of Soviet Foreign Policy, 816-820

Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Military Aid Policy, by Stephen P. Gibert, 660-681
Implications of the Sino-American Détente, by T. C. Rhee, 500-519
India, *see* Holmes, Syed
Indonesia, *see* van der Kroef
Indonesia, the Netherlands and the "Republic of the South Moluccas," by Justus M. van der Kroef, 174-210
Institutional Legitimacy and External Affairs in Modern China, by Robert E. Bedeski, 237-256
insurgency, *see* Tanham, van der Kroef
intervention, U.S., *see* Lefever, Paul
Ireland, *see* Reflections 336-339
Is There a Paradigm in the House?, by John J. Weltman, 1043-1056
Israel, *see* Rafael, Reflections 331-336, 613-617

Italian Political Instability: A Reconsideration, by Anthony James Joes, 488-499
Italy, *see* Joes

Japan, *see* Conference Report, U.S.-Japanese Relations; Pierre, Rhee, Reflections 5-11, 617-620
Joes, Anthony James, Italian Political Instability: A Reconsideration, 488-499
Jordan, *see* Rafael

Kahn, Herman, and B. Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come: Thinking About the Seventies and Eighties*. Reviewed by Barry M. Mitnick, 1073-1079
Kemp, Geoffrey, Strategy, Arms, and the Third World, 809-816
Kintner, William R., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Assessing the Moscow SALT Agreements, 341-360
Koloskov, B. T., and O. B. Borisov, *Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye Otnosheniya, 1945-1970 (Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970)*. Reviewed by Vladimir Petrov, 567-570
Korea, *see* Paul, Rhee, Reflections 617-620
Kuomintang, *see* Bedeski

Lane, Arthur Bliss, *see* Smith
Laos, *see* Holmes, Paul, Reflections 848-854
Larkin, Bruce, *China and Africa 1949-1970*. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson, 1066-1069
Larrabee, F. Stephen, Yugoslavia at the Crossroads, 377-395
Latin America, *see* Corbett, Rosenbaum
Lefever, Ernest W., Moralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 396-410
Legvold, Robert, *Soviet Policy in West Africa*. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson, 1066-1069
Leider, Robert, Strategies for an Environmental Decade, 881-891
The Limits to Growth, by Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III. Reviewed by Barry M. Mitnick, 1073-1079

Malaysia, *see* Holmes, Tanham
Maoist guerrillas, *see* van der Kroef

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MBFR (mutual and balanced force reductions), *see* Reflections 841-844
McGeehan, Robert, *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II.* Reviewed by Walter F. Hahn, 289-293
Meadows, Donella H., and Dennis L., Jorgen Randers and William W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth.* Reviewed by Barry M. Mitnick, 1073-1079
Mendershausen, Horst, Will West Germany Go Nuclear?, 411-434
methodology in international relations, *see* Weltman, Yalem
Methvin, Eugene H., Subversion as a Tool of Statecraft, 803-809
The Mexican Economy: Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth, by Clark W. Reynolds. Reviewed by Edward H. Allen, 820-822
Mexico, *see* Allen
Middle East, *see* Bell, Paul, Rafael, Reflections 331-336, 613-617
military affairs, South America, *see* Corbett
military affairs, Soviet, *see* Dougherty, Kintner, Monks, Ørvik, Spahr
military affairs, U.S., *see* Bailey, Busch, Dougherty, Gibert, Gray, Kintner, Pierre, Simpson, Wiegele
military aid, *see* Dougherty, Gibert, Kemp
missile gap, *see* Gray
Mitchell, R. Judson, The Revised "Two Camps" Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, 21-34
Mitnick, Barry M., The Limits to Prediction, 1073-1079
Monks, Alfred L., and Kenyon N. Griffin, Soviet Strategic Claims, 1964-1970, 520-544
Moralism and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Ernest W. Lefever, 396-410
Moscow Summit, *see* Kintner, Reflections 323-327, 599-603
multilateral nuclear force, *see* Wiegele
multipolarity, *see* Hahn, Kintner, Pierre, Reisky de Dubnic, Reflections 599-603

national liberation movements, *see* Mitchell
NATO, *see* Hahn, Kintner, Mendershausen, Ørvik, Pierre, Reisky de Dubnic, Simpson, Wiegele, Reflections 11-16, 841-844
Netherlands, *see* van der Kroef
Nixon Doctrine, *see* Gibert, Hahn, Pierre, Reflections 323-327, 599-603
The Nixon Doctrine: Design and Dilemmas, by Walter F. Hahn, 361-376
Norway, *see* Ørvik
Nuclear Consultation Processes in NATO, by Thomas C. Wiegele, 462-487
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, *see* Holmes, Mendershausen
nuclear weapons, *see* Dougherty, Kintner, Mendershausen, Monks, Pierre, Simpson, Wiegele

Ørvik, Nils, Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two-Dimensional Threat, 720-742
Ostpolitik, see Hahn, Mendershausen, Taylor

Pakistan's Security Problem: A Bill of Constraints, by Anwar H. Syed, 952-974
Paul, Roland A., Toward a Theory of Intervention, 105-118
Peru, *see* Corbett
Petrov, Vladimir, Moscow-Peking Relations: An Inside View, 567-570
Petrov, Vladimir, *A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane.* Reviewed by Gaddis Smith, 294-296
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., and William R. Kintner, Assessing the Moscow SALT Agreements, 341-360
The Philippine Maoists, by Justus M. van der Kroef, 892-926
Philippines, *see* Tanham, van der Kroef
Pierre, Andrew J., The Future of America's Commitments and Alliances, 696-719
Poland, *see* Smith, Wasowski
Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military, by Charles D. Corbett, 927-951
Power Through Subversion, by Laurence W. Beilenson. Reviewed by Eugene H. Methvin, 803-809
Prolegomena on the Post-Behavioral Revolution in International Studies, by Ronald J. Yalem, 1032-1042
A Proposal for Peace in the Middle East, by Amnon E. Rafael, 119-152

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INDEX TO VOLUME XVI

Rafael, Amnon E., A Proposal for Peace in the Middle East, 119-152
Red Sea, *see* Bell
Reisky de Dubnic, Vladimir, Europe and the New U.S. Policy Toward China, 85-104
The Revised "Two Camps" Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, by R. Judson Mitchell, 21-34
Reynolds, Clark W., *The Mexican Economy: Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth.* Reviewed by Edward H. Allen, 820-822
Rhee, T. C., Implications of the Sino-American Détente, 500-519
Rosenau, James N., Adaptive Polities in an Interdependent World, 153-173
Rosenbaum, H. Jon, Brazil's Foreign Policy: Developmentalism and Beyond, 58-84

SALT, *see* Bailey, Dougherty, Kintner, Ørvik, Pierre, Reflections 11-16, 323-327
Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two-Dimensional Threat, by Nils Ørvik, 720-742
SEATO, *see* Pierre
Selected Papers of Will Clayton, edited by Frederick J. Dobney. Reviewed by Benjamin J. Cohen, 561-567
Simpson, John, and Frank Gregory, West European Collaboration in Weapons Procurement, 435-461
The Sino-Burmese Rift: A Failure for China, by Robert A. Holmes, 211-236
Sino-Soviet relations, *see* Petrov, Reisky de Dubnic, Rhee
Smith, Gaddis, Arthur Bliss Lane: Career Diplomat, 294-296
Solzhenitsyn, A., *Avgust Chetyrnadtsatogo (August 1914).* Reviewed by William J. Spahr, 570-575
Some Insurgency Lessons from Southeast Asia, by George K. Tanham, 646-659
Sovetsko-Kitaiskiye Otnosheniya, 1945-1970 (Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970), by O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov. Reviewed by Vladimir Petrov, 567-570
Soviet foreign policy, *see* Horn, Kintner, Mitchell, Monks, Suchlicki, Thompson, Reflections 3-11, 331-336, 841-848
Soviet Policy in West Africa, by Robert Legvold. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson, 1066-1069
Soviet Strategic Claims, 1964-1970, by Alfred L. Monks and Kenyon N. Griffin, 520-544
Spahr, William J., 1914 and 1941: The Military Parallels, 570-575
State Department, *see* Sullivan
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade with the Third World.* Reviewed by Geoffrey Kemp, 809-816
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1972.* Reviewed by James E. Dougherty, 1057-1066
Strategies for an Environmental Decade, by Robert Leider, 881-891
A Study in Diplomacy: The Story of Arthur Bliss Lane, by Vladimir Petrov. Reviewed by Gaddis Smith, 294-296
Stupak, Ronald J., and Terry J. Busch, The U.S. Military: Patterns of Adaptation for the 1970's, 990-1007
Suchlicki, Jaime, An Assessment of Castroism, 35-57
Sudan, *see* Bell
Sullivan, Robert R., Should the State Department Make Policy?, 298-302
Sweden, *see* Ørvik
Syed, Anwar H., Pakistan's Security Problem: A Bill of Constraints, 952-974
systems theory, *see* Weltman

Tanham, George K., Some Insurgency Lessons from Southeast Asia, 646-659
Taylor, Paul, Britain, the Common Market, and the Forces of History, 743-759
technology, *see* Bailey, Busch, Dougherty, Kintner, Leider, Mitnick
Thailand, *see* Tanham
theory, international relations, *see* Weltman, Yalem
Things to Come: Thinking About the Seventies and Eighties, by Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs. Reviewed by Barry M. Mitnick, 1073-1079
Thompson, W. Scott, The Communist Powers and Africa, 1066-1069
Toward a Theory of Intervention, by Roland A. Paul, 105-118

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trade, U.S. foreign, *see* Cohen, Reflections 844-848
United Kingdom, *see* Kintner, Pierre, Taylor, Reflections 11-16
United Nations, *see* Holmes, van der Kroef (Indonesia)
U.S.-Japanese Political and Security Relations: A Conference Report, 275-288
The U.S. Military: Patterns of Adaptation for the 1970's, by Terry J. Busch and Ronald J. Stupak, 990-1007

van der Kroef, Justus M., Indonesia, the Netherlands and the "Republic of the South Moluccas," 174-210
van der Kroef, Justus M., The Philippine Maoists, 892-926
Viet Nam, *see* Goodman, Holmes, Paul, Tanham, Reflections 3-5, 327-331, 603-608, 848-854

Wasowski, Stanislaw, Economic Integration in the COMECON, 760-779
Welch, William, *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy. An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community*. Reviewed by Robert C. Horn, 816-820
Weltman, John J., Is There a Paradigm in the House?, 1043-1056
West European Collaboration in Weapons Procurement, by John Simpson and Frank Gregory, 435-461
West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr, by Walter F. Hahn, 859-880
Whetten, Lawrence L., *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries*. Reviewed by Walter F. Hahn, 289-293
Wiegele, Thomas C., Nuclear Consultation Processes in NATO, 462-487
Will West Germany Go Nuclear?, by Horst Mendershausen, 411-434
World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook 1972, by the Staff of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Reviewed by James E. Dougherty, 1057-1066
World Dynamics, by Jay W. Forrester. Reviewed by Barry M. Mitnick, 1073-1079
Wozniak, John Stanley, Modern German History: Two Interpretations, 1070-1073

Yalem, Ronald J., Prolegomena on the Post-Behavioral Revolution in International Studies, 1032-1042
Yemen, *see* Bell
Yugoslavia, *see* Larrabee
Yugoslavia at the Crossroads, by F. Stephen Larrabee, 377-395

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